VZCZCXRO1468
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1145/01 2890439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160439Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0816
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0265
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0092
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1693

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001145 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON EAID EINV TI
SUBJECT: ON THE WINGS OF A GOAT: REMOTE PAMIR MOUNTAINS NOT REALIZING 
POTENTIAL 
 
REF: 08 DUSHANBE 1343 
 
DUSHANBE 00001145  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Region 
is separated from the rest of Tajikistan by hundreds of 
kilometers of bad roads and thousands of years of divergent 
history.  Its predominantly Ismaili Shi'a inhabitants have long 
thought of themselves as distinct from the rest of the country. 
During the Soviet era the region benefited from massive 
subsidies from Moscow, but has fallen into neglect since 
independence.  Business leaders complain that Dushanbe hinders 
Badakhshan's development by preventing the issuance of mining 
licenses and makes it difficult for tourists to reach the 
region's spectacular mountains and scenic valleys.  Trade with 
China, a lifeline for both Badakhshan and the country as a 
whole, is similarly hampered by central government policies. 
Despite such problems, some areas are showing improvements, 
including Murghab, high on the eastern Pamir plateau.  Much of 
the development work in Badakhshan has been carried out by the 
Aga Khan, through a network of charitable and for-profit 
entities, but some residents expressed frustration with an 
organization viewed as paternalistic and monopolistic.  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
A Region Apart 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) In many ways, the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous 
Region -- known to most here by its Russian acronym, GBAO -- is 
separate from the rest of Tajikistan.  Its roughly 218,000 
inhabitants are two-thirds Ismaili Shi'a, while the rest of 
Tajikistan is Sunni.  Even GBAO's small Sunni population differs 
from the rest of the country in that it is predominantly ethnic 
Kyrgyz.  Badakhshan's Pamir ethnic groups speak a number of 
Eastern Iranian dialects, each endemic to a particular valley, 
that are for the most part unintelligible to Tajiks elsewhere in 
the country.  During the Soviet period GBAO benefited from 
Moscow's policy of providing heavy subsidies and other support 
to regions and ethnic populations deemed to be less advanced. 
Accordingly, Badakhshan continues to be characterized by 
relatively high levels of literacy, education, and 
Russian-language ability. 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) Since Tajikistan's independence, however, the region has 
drifted into neglect.  The most palpable aspect of this is its 
physical isolation.  The drive from Dushanbe to the regional 
capital, Khorog, takes 14 hours under ideal conditions; more 
often than not, however, conditions are anything but ideal. 
Although on maps the road appears as Tajikistan's major (and in 
some places, only) east-west artery, for most of its length it 
is in fact nothing more than a one-lane dirt track clinging 
perilously to vertical escarpments.  The twisted and rusting 
vehicles occasionally glimpsed in the valleys below -- many of 
them military transports dating from the civil war -- testify to 
the hazardousness of the route.  Beyond Khorog the road improves 
somewhat as it climbs onto the 4,000-meter plateaus of eastern 
GBAO, and many stretches leading up to the Chinese and Kyrgyz 
borders are fairly well-paved.  The improvement is not due to 
better maintenance, but rather the fact that the region's 
flatter terrain and lower precipitation have resulted in less 
erosion. 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) The region is frequently no easier to access by air than 
it is by land.  Though there is ostensibly a daily flight from 
Dushanbe to Khorog, it is canceled at the least appearance of 
bad weather because the Antonov-28 flying the route must 
actually pass through, rather than over, the high peaks leading 
to Khorog.  In places the plane's wings are reportedly within 50 
meters of the mountains on either side.  During the Soviet era 
this was reportedly the only route for which pilots received 
danger pay.  The ticketing system for the flight is rudimentary: 
 prospective travelers queue up each morning to see if the 
flight will take off.  If it does not, they return the next 
morning, and so on.  Those who make it onto the flight sometimes 
have to pay a small consideration to move to the front of the 
line. 
 
 
 
GBAO Suffering From Not-So-Benign Neglect 
 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00001145  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶5. (U) A constant theme in discussions with business and 
political leaders in GBAO was the extent to which Dushanbe's 
policies have hampered the region's economic development. 
Though some said Dushanbe's policies might reflect a simple lack 
of interest in a distant and thinly-populated region, most 
believe the national leadership had deliberately sought to stunt 
the economic and political autonomy of a historically fractious 
region.  During the 1992-97 civil war GBAO's population was 
generally aligned with the opposition, and to this day the 
government sees it as a potential challenge to central authority. 
 
 
 
¶6. (U) According to Buribek Buribekov, head of the Qalam 
Information Center, an NGO promoting economic and civil society 
development, Dushanbe officially classifies GBAO as an 
agricultural region, despite the fact that only 0.2% of the land 
is arable.  In official government statistics, GBAO appears to 
be relatively self-sufficient, growing 100% of its own potatoes 
and 70% of its own grain.  In fact, however, a great deal of the 
region's produce is imported from Dushanbe or China.  According 
to Boimahmad Alibakhshov, chairman of the GBAO Small Business 
Association, precipitation has been declining steadily since the 
1960s, so even the 13,000 hectares of arable land are producing 
progressively smaller yields.  (This year's harvests have been 
an exception due to above-average spring rains.  In lower 
elevations apples and other fruit trees appeared abundant, and 
wheat was being cultivated in terraced fields as high as 3,300 
meters.)  Only in meat production is GBAO truly self-sufficient, 
and meat prices are considerably less than in Dushanbe. 
Alibakhshov said livestock levels were declining as well, 
however.  During the Soviet period the Pamirs had 30,000 yaks, 
but the number has since been halved. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Rather than developing GBAO as an agricultural region 
-- or, more accurately, failing to develop it at all -- 
Buribekov and Alibakhshov said the government should be 
concentrating on two potentially much more lucrative sources of 
revenue, mining and tourism.  Badakhshan's soil contains sizable 
quantities of gold, silver, tungsten, uranium, nickel, and 
precious stones such as rubies.  Indeed, in the mountains east 
of Khorog there are mines dating from the first millennium. 
Instead of developing these resources, however, the government 
continues to drag its feet on issuing licenses for mineral 
exploration, especially to international companies, under the 
premise that Tajikistan's geology is a state secret. 
Unfortunately, few if any domestic companies have the capital 
and expertise to mount a profitable mining operation.  Although 
the sector is underdeveloped throughout the country, 
Badakhshanis believe the government is particularly reluctant to 
see a profitable mining enterprise in their region.  Several 
interlocutors independently told the story of a Canadian mining 
company that had spent several years in GBAO building access 
roads, drilling test mines, and bringing in equipment, only to 
have its license suddenly revoked by the Tajik government. 
Although details differed -- some said the company was mining 
tungsten while others said gold; some placed the mine north of 
Khorog, others to the east -- the fact that the story was so 
ubiquitous indicates the extent to which Badakhshanis see 
Dushanbe as hindering GBAO's development.  (Note:  In an 
unprecedented move, the government recently declassified a 
number of Soviet-era geological studies of the Fon Yaghnob 
coalfield to the north of Dushanbe, for which the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency is funding a feasibility study.  The 
declassification, which had been rejected on numerous occasions 
over the past year, required the signature of the President 
himself.) 
 
 
 
¶8. (U) Many in Badakhshan complain that the government in 
Dushanbe is not concentrating any resources on developing other 
industries in the region.  They note that during and immediately 
after the Soviet period Khorog hosted a textile mill, a bread 
factory, a milk processing factory, and a hydropower station. 
Only the latter remains.  Alibakhshov said 90% of the wool 
produced in GBAO is wasted because there are no facilities for 
cleaning and processing it.  The same is true of hides.  While 
there is Chinese interest in importing wool, phytosanitary 
restrictions require that it be cleaned before being exported. 
Much of GBAO's milk is also wasted because there are no means of 
exporting it.  Regional officials say they do not have the 
funding to promote economic development on their own.  As a 
result of government policies concentrating budget authority at 
 
DUSHANBE 00001145  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
the center, 79% of GBAO's revenue comes as subventions from 
Dushanbe.  Private investors see GBAO's numbers as too small to 
be attractive, Alibakhshov said.  For the moment he is working 
to develop links and markets in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
Trade and Tourism Trickles, Not Torrents 
 
 
 
¶9. (U) Though the economics of industrial development in a 
region as remote and sparsely populated as GBAO may be 
questionable, several business and government contacts noted 
that the central government is failing to make even simple 
changes that would bring money into the region.  Chief among 
these would be to open the Kulma border crossing with China to 
more traffic.  While Kulma ranks as one of the world's more 
inaccessible crossings -- at 4,362 meters above sea level, 
hundreds of kilometers across unimproved roads from Khorog -- it 
nevertheless represents an economic lifeline for the region and 
the country.  Millions of dollars in Chinese goods, from rice to 
minivans, pass through each year on their way to bazaars in 
Khorog, Dushanbe, and other cities.  Last summer, however, Kulma 
was closed to Tajik citizens entering China.  Traders from GBAO 
who once easily bought goods in Kashgar, China, must now make 
their way by plane or vehicle to Dushanbe, take one of the 
twice-weekly flights to Xinjiang's capital Urumqi, then travel 
overland to Kashgar before returning to Tajikistan.  Chinese 
citizens may continue to pass through Kulma in both directions. 
Interlocutors in GBAO were not sure why the border rules had 
changed.  Some said it was part of a deliberate effort to hamper 
the region's economic growth, while others thought Beijing may 
have made the change during the Olympic games.  Either way, most 
agree it has made trading in a harsh region even more difficult. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) Much of Dushanbe's neglect of GBAO has a "cutting off 
its nose to spite its face" element to it.  As a result of 
Soviet era transportation links, the vast majority of 
Tajikistan's trade comes through Uzbekistan, with which it has 
very poor relations.  Shipments are frequently held up due to 
border closures, changing customs rules, and other difficulties. 
 Officials in GBAO point out that the government should be 
actively promoting trade links with China rather than hindering 
them.  Not only does this fill markets throughout Tajikistan, 
but it fills government coffers with customs fees.  (Note: The 
fact that all of Kulma's customs fees go to the central budget 
also rankles some Badakhshanis.  End note.)  Alibakhshov said 
that tourism suffers as well.  Kashgar receives some 2.5 million 
tourists a year, many of them western Europeans interested in 
Central Asia.  Even if only a very small percentage of them were 
interested in extending their trip into Tajikistan, opening 
Kulma would increase by several orders of magnitude the number 
of tourists, and the amount of tourist revenue spent, in the 
Pamirs.  As of mid-September, the Murgab Ecotourism Association 
had assisted only 72 tourists to the region, according to the 
center's director Ubaidulla Mamadiev.  Tourists are hindered as 
well by the continuing requirement, a legacy of the USSR, to 
receive separate permission from the government to enter GBAO. 
 
 
 
Problems and Progress on the Plateau 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) With 6,000 inhabitants, Murghab is the administrative 
center of eastern GBAO and the gateway to China and Kyrgyzstan. 
At upwards of 3,700 meters in altitude, the surrounding land is 
a vast high desert whose economy depends almost entirely on 
herding yaks, goats, and sheep.  Despite the remoteness and 
harshness of the climate, there has been evidence of change. 
The town's market has doubled in size since the previous year, 
and many of the sellers' stalls are made out of more permanent 
structures (see reftel).  Apples, tomatoes, peppers, and other 
produce from Kyrgyzstan and China were readily available, at 
prices only a little higher than in Dushanbe. 
 
 
 
¶12. (U) According to Mayor Mairambek Tuichiev, the region still 
faces immense challenges.  Chief among these was the lack of 
power; the Mayor said the same thing last year (reftel). 
Murghab's electricity comes from a small hydroelectric station 
built in 1960.  In Tuichiev's words, the plant "does not even 
 
DUSHANBE 00001145  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
merit the term hydropower station.  It was more like a student 
project, slapped together over a few weeks one summer."  Even if 
it operated at its rated capacity of 400 kWh, it would be wholly 
inadequate for Murghab's population, which has more than doubled 
since 1980.  At its best, the plant only operates at 200 to 250 
kWh during the spring thaw.  In winter it produces less than 
half that.  The lack of power was visible everywhere in Murghab; 
the town's incandescent bulbs shone so weakly they barely 
functioned as nightlights.  All important functions were 
performed by private generators, whether diesel or 
solar-powered.  Tuichiev pointed to a small computer monitor on 
his desk, noting that it was powered by a Chinese-made solar 
panel on his roof.  He said many of Murghab's citizens use such 
panels to power light appliances.  While he would like to see a 
new hydropower station constructed and Murghab connected to the 
national grid, he acknowledged that smaller local solutions were 
more feasible. 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) As in much of GBAO, the general theme in Murghab was 
one of neglect and suspicion by the center.  Mayor Tuichiev said 
his predecessor had been sacked after suggesting that GBAO 
receive some of the thousands of dollars in fees professional 
hunters pay to bag endangered Marco Polo sheep.  He said he has 
sought to make quiet changes, such as the expansion of the 
market, without stirring up trouble.  Dushanbe remains wary of 
eastern GBAO's predominantly Kyrgyz population, and Tuichiev 
said some worry the border with Kyrgyzstan could be closed if 
difficulties emerge.  Tuichiev said he was in fact selected as 
mayor because he speaks good Tajiki (he is a former translator 
of poetry, although he was employed more recently as a 
roadworker) and was viewed as trustworthy.  As a result, the 
ethnic tensions that characterized the tenure of his predecessor 
have calmed down. 
 
 
 
The Ethnic Question 
 
 
 
¶14. (U) The ethnic question is a complicated one in GBAO.  In 
discussions in Khorog and in several towns along the Wakhan 
corridor bordering Afghanistan, Pamiris expressed a 
contradictory set of understandings of their own ethnic identity 
and sense of belonging in Tajikistan.  A group of thirty 
university students in Khorog, when asked to state their 
ethnicity, unanimously said they were Tajik.  In subsequent 
discussions, however, many of them elaborated how they were 
different from Tajiks elsewhere in Tajikistan, frequently 
referring to those outside of Badakhshan as "Tajiks", evidently 
distinct from "Pamiris."  When this distinction was pointed out, 
some offered the explanation that Pamiris are the "original" 
Tajiks, speaking ancient and uncorrupted (by Uzbek, Farsi, and 
Russian) versions of the Tajik language.  Regardless of the 
historical and linguistic merits of this argument, it is evident 
that there exists a substantial sense of ethnic independence 
among Pamiris -- a sense that under some circumstances is at 
odds with an official narrative of ethnic unity promoted in 
Dushanbe.  (Note:  Linguists classify Tajik as a western Iranian 
dialect, along with Farsi and Dari, while the Pamiri languages 
belong to the eastern Iranian branch of the family, indicating 
separate but parallel development of the two language families. 
End note.) 
 
 
 
Some Surprising Resentment at Aga Khan 
 
 
 
¶15. (SBU) In addition to language, one of the chief aspects 
separating Pamiris from others in Tajikistan is their Ismaili 
Shi'a faith and adherence to the Aga Khan.  Many Pamiri homes 
prominently feature portraits of the Aga Khan.  The many 
branches of the Aga Khan Development Network are very active in 
GBAO, involved in everything from hotel management to power 
production to relief work to the construction of a huge new 
university campus in Khorog.  Some interlocutors in GBAO, 
however, expressed some cautiously worded but insistent 
criticism of the Aga Khan's activities.  Buribekov complained 
that the AKDN has a monopoly on relief and development work in 
the region, essentially discouraging would be competitors from 
getting involved.  After lavishly praising AKDN's work, 
Boimahmad Alibakhshov slammed the table with his fist while 
making the same point, saying that a recent EU program contained 
 
DUSHANBE 00001145  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
no money for the Pamirs because it was believed the region was 
being well cared-for by AKDN.  Both men hastened to say the work 
of the Aga Khan was principled and useful, but they complained 
that the overall approach was paternalistic and top-down and did 
not address needs that Pamiris themselves felt were important. 
 
 
 
Comment:  A Short-Sighted Approach 
 
 
 
¶16. (SBU) GBAO ranks as one of the more remote regions on earth, 
and economic development is challenging.  Pamiris are unlikely 
to benefit again from massive subsidies as they did during the 
Soviet era.  Then again, it is also clear that the central 
government is doing little if anything to develop what potential 
exists.  The Kulma policy is particularly short-sighted, robbing 
not only the region but the country as a whole of a much-needed 
source of tourist revenue, customs duties, and Chinese goods. 
The Pamir transit route offers an important counterweight to the 
current reliance on Uzbekistan for the majority of Tajikistan's 
imports, although the completion of the transport corridor from 
Dushanbe through the city of Gharm to Kyrgyzstan and on to China 
will be an important step in this direction.  The central 
government is clearly wary about developing a region that 
recently sought territorial autonomy within Tajikistan.  The 
question is whether a policy of neglect -- or outright 
obstruction -- will be more successful than one of support in 
ensuring harmony and economic development not only in GBAO, but 
the country as a whole.  End comment. 
GROSS