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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 000759 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, EUR/SE 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT 
PARIS FOR NOBLES 
LONDON FOR LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU LE SA IZ SY
SUBJECT: TURKISH SUPPORT EMBOLDENS ASAD BUT PROVIDES BEST HOPE FOR COAXING SYRIA FROM IRAN 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 697 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1486 
 
DAMASCUS 00000759  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, Reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: President Bashar al-Asad's September 
16-17 working visit to Istanbul produced agreement on the 
creation of a high-level strategic cooperation commission, 
visa-free travel between Syria and Turkey, and a Syrian offer 
to work to rehabilitate Syrian PKK members.  The deliverables 
represented a modest step in strengthening bilateral ties, 
but they symbolized a deepening of strategic coordination in 
which Ankara figures more prominently in Syria's approach to 
the region.  The October 13 meeting of Turkish and Syrian 
ministers in Aleppo and Gaziantep produced an ambitious 
action plan in energy, water, trade, cultural, and security 
cooperation for PM Erdogan and President Asad to formalize 
when Erdogan visits Syria in December.  Turkey's methodical 
deepening of relations with Damascus offers Syria a strategic 
buffer against international pressure and a ready mediator 
willing to help Syria mend strained relations with neighbors, 
such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and even Lebanon.  At the moment, 
the SARG is seeking to characterize Turkish-Israeli tensions 
as a show of Turkish solidarity with Syria and Palestinians, 
while maintaining Iranian-Syrian-Hizballah military 
cooperation that has grown significantly stronger since 2006. 
 The major challenge ahead is to prevent Syria from using 
closer relations with Turkey as a means of resisting U.S. 
influence and pursuing policies that would make comprehensive 
peace less likely.  In the long run, Asad's increasing trust 
of PM Erdogan offers the best hope of luring Syria out of 
Tehran's orbit.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Deepening Syrian-Turkish Ties 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  According to Syrian and other diplomatic 
contacts, President Asad's September 16-17 trip to Istanbul 
was notable for his close personal ties to Turkish PM Erdogan 
and for the agreement reached by the two sides to establish a 
high-level strategic cooperation commission. As Embassy 
Ankara reported in Ref B, the two sides also agreed to 
announce agreement on visa-free travel across their shared 
border, a measure that had been under discussion since 
President Gul's visit to Damascus in mid-May, according to 
Turkish diplomats here.  Additionally, there were discussions 
on how Syria might help to support Turkey's outreach to 
Kurdish communities and its efforts to "rehabilitate" PKK 
militants.  Asad, according to several media reports, agreed 
to follow Turkey's lead and provide favorable treatment to 
some 1500-2000 Syrian PKK members if they return from Iraq to 
Syria, so long as they renounce violence and turn themselves 
into Syrian authorities.  According to the Turkish Embassy 
here, Asad and PM Erdogan discussed the need for Syria to 
consider measures that would make Syria more attractive for 
Syrian Kurds. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Al-Hayat Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi (strictly 
protect) reported the one-day meeting on October 13 of ten 
ministers from each side began work on a comprehensive set of 
bilateral agreements that the Turkish and Syrian Prime 
Ministers will formalize sometime in December.  These include 
deepening of security and intelligence cooperation on 
counterterrorism and border security; establishing a joint 
oil exploration company; cooperation in electricity 
generation; water management cooperation; expanding rail 
travel between the two countries; cooperation on port 
expansion; expanding natural gas pipelines and 
infrastructure; and increasing Turkish investment in Syria. 
 
DAMASCUS 00000759  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
These projects will open Syria to increased trade from 
Turkish firms, comments Damascus Chamber of Commerce 
Secretary General Bassem Ghrawi (strictly protect), at a time 
when the Syrian government is struggling to move forward with 
economic liberalization.  Whereas the Syrian regime is 
"taking its time" to evaluate its EU Association agreement, 
President Asad remains fully committed to expanding economic 
ties with Turkey, even if the opportunities for Syrian 
businesses in Turkey are "far less" than Turkish 
opportunities in Syria, says Ghrawi. 
 
------------------------------- 
Turkish-Israeli Row Suits Syria 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  Beyond the promise of economic modernization, 
Turkey offers Syria diplomatic support, particularly in 
Syria's frustrated efforts to pressure Israel to negotiate a 
return of the Golan on its terms.  No country emerged more 
pleased by Turkey's decision to postpone plans for the 
"Anatolian Eagle" military exercise than Syria.  Turkish 
attempts to downplay the political significance of this 
action did little to quell Syrian efforts to exploit the 
decision itself and Turkey's criticism of Israeli policies on 
three issues:  the Golan track, the West Bank (al Aqsa and 
settlements), and Gaza.  The Syrian Minister of Defense's 
crowing on October 13 about a future follow-up Turkish-Syrian 
border security exercise grabbed Syrian and regional 
headlines.  Even as Ankara's rhetoric cooled and avoided 
mention of a Syrian-Turkish exercise, Syrian officials, 
including President Asad, relentlessly singled out Israel as 
the "obstacle" to peace discussions and called on the Israeli 
government to "choose between occupation and peace."  The 
Syrians also called on European partners to play a greater 
role in Middle East peace issues and expressed concern about 
the gap between U.S. rhetoric favoring peace and the absence 
of a workable process to achieve it. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  Turkey's willingness to "stand up to Israel" 
emboldened Syrian thinking, argues Hamidi. "Thanks largely to 
Turkey, Syria is now focusing on increasing pressure on 
Israel, without bearing the blame for the impasse," he 
observed.  Turkey's posture, moreover, has led President Asad 
to insist that any future Israeli-Syrian peace talks must 
return to the Turkish-facilitated process that ended in 
December 2008.  Israeli PM Netanyahu's assertion that Israel 
no longer views Turkish mediation as tenable had little 
impact, argues Hamidi.  Before, Syria faced Israel alone with 
military cooperation from Iran.  "Now, Syria has political 
cover from Turkey in addition to military support from Iran," 
he contends.  Some Syrian officials, adds Hamidi, see Turkey 
as providing "strategic balance" to "open-ended" U.S. support 
of Israel. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Our Turkish colleagues in Damascus claim PM 
Erdogan's and FM Davutoglu's critical comments of Israel 
should not be taken out of context.  At the same time, 
Turkish DCM Aydin Acikel notes, Turkey's position is 
"strongly supported by Turkish public opinion."  Acikel 
stresses Ankara wants to repair relations with Israel, but it 
nonetheless wants to build confidence with Damascus.  Syria, 
he offers, has shown every sign it is ready to negotiate 
seriously to achieve peace.  "The key to changing Syrian 
behavior is to make them feel more secure."  "Isolation and 
sanctions," he contends, "won't work."  Acikel bristles at 
the suggestion that Turkish criticism of Israeli policies 
might reduce the prospects of achieving peace because it 
emboldens Syria, provides no incentive for Syria to curtail 
its relations with Hizballah and Iran, and makes it less 
likely Syria will meet Israeli concerns about Syria's future 
 
DAMASCUS 00000759  003 OF 005 
 
 
strategic orientation.  Acikel claims Turkish policy is 
providing Syria "the confidence it needs" to move gradually 
away from Iran, "on its own terms."  He nonetheless 
acknowledges Turkey's critical stand on Israel may diminish 
Israeli perceptions of Ankara's even-handedness. 
¶7.  (S/NF)  Syrian officials are "hearing only part of the 
message," observes Orient Center Director Samir al-Taqi 
(strictly protect), a contact close to FM Muallim whose 2008 
Track-II efforts with the U.S. landed him in hot water with 
the SARG, so that he now converses with Embassy staff only 
during chance encounters.  The SARG cannot disguise its glee 
over Turkey's willingness to criticize Israel, he notes.  In 
fact, Syrian officials are trying to use closer ties to 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia to bring Ankara and Riyadh closer to 
Syrian-Iranian positions to increase pressure on Israel to 
return to peace negotiations on Syria's terms.  Still, al 
Taqi says, "a few" Syrians realize Turkey alone will be 
unable to deliver Israel to the negotiating table.  SARG 
officials recognize the Turkish-Israeli rift may buy Syria 
time and that deepening ties between Damascus and Ankara may 
provide an alternative to Iran's constant pressure to 
confront Israel militarily.  "Nothing but peace itself will 
change the dynamics with Iran and Syria," he contends. 
Achieving peace, however, will depend ultimately on the U.S. 
"That's why we need you to live up to President Obama's 
rhetoric (on comprehensive peace)."  But until there's 
movement on the Golan track, Turkey's stand-off with Israel 
affords Syria more space and reduces pressure for it to make 
gestures, al-Taqi says. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Turkey Buffers Syria Against Iraqi Charges 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (S/NF)  FM Davutoglu's personal engagement to resolve 
Syrian-Iraqi tensions over the August 19 Baghdad bombings 
helped to preserve Turkey's relationship with both countries. 
 Most Syrian observers, however, judge Turkish mediation as 
favoring Syria, contends Syrian businessman and former MP 
Ihsan Sanker (strictly protect).  Egyptian Political 
Counselor Adel Ibrahim (strictly protect) concurs.  FM 
Davutoglu facilitated several meetings with Arab League 
involvement, with a focus on Iraqi information intended to 
document claims that former Baathist regime elements in Syria 
were responsible for the attacks.  Many Syrians, adds 
Ibrahim, believe the Iranian government worked to convince PM 
Maliki that Syria had played a role in the attacks.  When the 
Iraqi side failed to justify these claims, "the Turks told us 
and others" the Iraqi information was "less than persuasive," 
reports Ibrahim. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF)  The Turkish government sought to "ensnare" both 
sides into a process that would lead to a resolution, but in 
the end, Turkey appeared to "implicitly endorse Syria's 
position by not backing Iraqi allegations," judges 
International Crisis Group representative Peter Harling. 
Meanwhile, Turkey signed over 40 memoranda of understanding 
with Iraq in late October as part of its bilateral strategic 
cooperation council meeting, just as it is likely to do with 
Syria when PM Erdogan visits Syria in December.  According to 
Ibrahim Hamidi, the Turkish played the honest broker and 
provided Syria with a way to demonstrate its good faith. 
When Iraq insisted on UN involvement and balked at further 
talks with Syria because it refused to recognize Baghdad's 
information as "credible," Turkey's mediation provided a 
"buffer" against further Iraqi allegations.  No one, observes 
Hamidi, appears to be overly concerned by Syria's refusal to 
receive a UN envoy to discuss the August 19 attacks. 
 
---------------------- 
 
DAMASCUS 00000759  004 OF 005 
 
 
Help With Saudi Arabia 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S/NF)  According to Turkish DCM Acikel, PM Erdogan 
personally lobbied President Asad to travel to Jeddah to 
change his decision not to attend the opening of King 
Abdullah University of Science and Technology. "The KAUST 
visit opened the way to King Abdullah's trip to Damascus, and 
from there, closer Saudi-Syrian cooperation across the 
region," he argues.  Local observers are quick to point out 
that Yemeni FM Qirby's October visit to Damascus was one 
immediate result of King Abdullah's visit to the Syrian 
capital.  The SARG's public support of the Yemeni 
Government's efforts to deal with breakaway tribes in the 
north represented an important gesture to the King, assesses 
Syrian historian and commentator Sami Mubayed.  Turkey, he 
adds, has encouraged the SARG to show solidarity with King 
Abdullah on Yemen because it represents a major concern for 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
------------ 
And Lebanon? 
------------ 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) Turkey has also quietly tried to encourage Syria 
to respond positively to King Abdullah on the formation of a 
government Lebanon, argues Ibrahim Hamidi.  Unfortunately, he 
adds, "Lebanese politics involve more variables than just 
Syria and Saudi Arabia."  Though a number of contacts, 
particularly those from Lebanon, have sensed an improvement 
in the mood among Syrian officials regarding developments in 
Beirut, no one is prepared to say a deal is imminent, 
observes Basil Hamwy, Director of Bank Audi operations in 
Syria.  President Asad  noted the "urgent need" for a 
consensus government and called on the Lebanese parties to 
reach an accord during the October 22-23 visit of Finnish 
President Halonen.  French FM Kouchner, meanwhile, visited 
Beirut on October 23 and credited Syria for not interfering 
in Lebanese politics.  In a move seen here as overtly 
intended to curry favor with Damascus, he publicly put the 
onus on the Lebanese parties themselves.  Against this 
backdrop, Turkish FM Davutoglu has worked behind the scenes, 
delivering messages to Syrian officials from Lebanese 
PM-designate Saad Hariri, confirms Acikel, who argues Ankara 
believes a deal in Lebanon would help Syria.  Still, even the 
Turks appear less than fully confident that Syria's allies 
will be willing to reach a deal.  "Aoun is tough, and it's 
frankly not clear how closely his actions are connected to 
Hizballah or Damascus," comments Acikel. 
 
---------------------------- 
Nudging Syria Away from Iran 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S/NF)  Turkey's patient and cautious decade-long 
approach to building relations with Syria has generated a 
comfort level that few countries enjoy here.  The President's 
willingness to take Turkish advice and openly defer to 
Turkish preferences contrasts with the pro forma 
appearances that Asad seems to endure with Iranian 
counterparts out of a sense of obligation. Asad undoubtedly 
notes, as do we, Turkey's internal stability and its policy 
of promoting regional peace versus Iran's domestic problems 
and its outward focus on fomenting regional conflict.  Asad 
no longer makes any pretense of being in the business of 
mediating between the West and Iran on the nuclear file, and 
his overriding interest is to keep Syria out of harm's way if 
Israel ever decides to attack Iranian nuclear sites. 
 
¶13.  (S/NF) To be clear, we assess Syrian-Iranian security 
 
DAMASCUS 00000759  005 OF 005 
 
 
relations to be stronger 
than ever, but Iran's internal divisions and the end of 
Syria's isolation have offered Damascus new options.  Syria's 
growing confidence is evident in its decision to postpone the 
signing of  an association agreement with the EU, the SARG's 
claims (now backed by French officials) that Damascus bears 
no responsibility for the Lebanese political stalemate, and 
the increased volume and frequency in recent Syrian rhetoric 
against Israel.  At the moment, Damascus seems content to use 
Turkey's support for tactical advantage and as a means of 
avoiding strategic choices that would become necessary if and 
when it ever signed a peace treaty with Israel. Less clear is 
whether the Syrian government would be capable, even it 
wanted to, of changing its strategic orientation after three 
decades of reliance on Iran and Hizballah.  Asad has 
indicated Syria will maintain relations with Iran, but 
Syria's interest in peace might produce a change in the 
nature of those relations, if and when a peace agreement ever 
materialized. 
 
¶14.  (S/NF)  Syria would almost certainly never reach this 
point of decision without strong GOT influence.  While the 
U.S. and Turkey generally share the same overriding 
objectives of regional comprehensive peace and stability, 
Turkish officials here stiffen when we broach the possibility 
of closer U.S.-Turkish cooperation to influence Syria on 
specific issues (e.g., Iran or Lebanon).  Given Ankara's 
jealous approach to Syria, one that applies equally to French 
and EU efforts to engage Damascus, our challenge is to nudge 
the deepening of Syrian-Turkish relations toward strategic 
Syrian choices necessary for achieving shared objectives, 
even if we  differ with Ankara on tactical approaches. 
HUNTER