VZCZCXYZ0877
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCH #0769/01 2790942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060942Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8443
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0016
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1965
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS CHISINAU 000769 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DS/ICI/CR 
DEPT FOR CA/VO/KCC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KTIP MD
SUBJECT:  Fraud Summary - Chisinau: March 2009 - 
September 2009 
 
REF: (A) CHISINAU 723, (B) CHISINAU 721 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: 
 
Before its forced annexation into the Soviet Union 
in 1940, Moldova was part of Romania for 21 years, 
and hence enjoyed close ties to the rest of 
Europe.  Those historical ties, and the ability of 
many Moldovans to quickly learn Romance languages 
similar to their native Romanian, have made it 
possible for hundreds of thousands of Moldovans-- 
between 25% and 40% of the working-age population, 
according to some estimates--to live and work in 
Western Europe, particularly in Italy, Spain and 
Portugal.  Most Moldovans also speak Russian and 
many more work in Russia.  Although Moldova's per 
capita GDP has more than doubled in the last five 
years, the current international financial crisis 
has caused a sharp contraction in the Moldovan 
economy as remittances from those working abroad 
declined significantly.  Business and investment 
suffer because of corruption, excessive 
bureaucracy and official interference.  Many 
public services, particularly health care, are 
being overwhelmed by the combined impact of 
budgetary constraints and an aging population. 
 
Moldovan passports are considered secure, although 
most other documents provided by visa applicants 
are unreliable.  School or university diplomas, 
drivers' licenses, and employment booklets can be 
purchased on the local market.  False documents 
are available from some Moldovan officials.  Local 
firms advertise visa assistance services in 
newspapers and help applicants secure letters of 
invitation and prepare documents. 
 
Moldova's law enforcement and judicial systems are 
under-funded, poorly trained, and often corrupt, 
and they lack public support and credibility.  EU 
and U.S. training assistance efforts have helped 
the host government revise legislation, improve 
effectiveness, and increase transparency and 
accountability.  However, criminal prosecution of 
document and passport fraud is very limited in 
Moldova. 
 
A separatist regime controls a narrow strip of 
land in the Transnistria region of eastern 
Moldova.  Many Transnistrian companies are not 
legally registered with Moldovan authorities and 
operate in contravention of Moldovan law. 
Verification of work and travel documents from 
this area is extremely difficult.  Residents of 
Transnistria frequently hold Russian or Ukrainian 
passports in lieu of Moldovan passports. 
 
Chisinau is a medium fraud post. 
 
¶B. NONIMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD: 
 
B-1/B-2:  Moldova's weak economic condition and 
lack of criminal prosecution are the main factors 
contributing to NIV fraud.  Most Moldovan citizens 
who commit NIV fraud do so to travel to the United 
States to work illegally.  Their destinations are 
usually the larger Moldovan refugee communities, 
most commonly in and around Sacramento, CA; 
Portland OR; Tacoma, Spokane, and Vancouver, WA; 
and Asheville, NC.  Others attempt to go to 
Russian-speaking communities in Brooklyn, NY, or 
Los Angeles, CA.  Given the large disparity 
between wages in Moldova and the United States (in 
Moldova, professionals normally earn monthly 
salaries between USD 200-500, and construction 
workers usually earn up to around USD 500 
monthly), many applicants are willing to pay 
hundreds and even thousands of dollars for forged 
documents to support their case for an NIV. 
 
Post has observed that most applicants using 
fraudulent documents to obtain visas are between 
18 and 35 years of age, but many older Moldovan 
citizens also try to work illegally in the U.S. 
Post regularly sees forged invitation letters and 
 
has provided spot reporting of this phenomenon 
(REF A).  Applicants in the above categories 
normally are dispatched through INA 214(b) 
refusals. 
 
Post also recently conducted a study of travel 
patterns for people over 60 (REF B).  The study 
showed that only 5.2% of travelers over 60 
overstayed or adjusted status. 
 
Many NIV applicants are sponsored by churches and 
religious organizations in the United States, 
usually to visit communities with large Moldovan 
refugee communities.  Post has detected some fraud 
or abuse of visas by applicants in that category. 
 
In the past year post has seen several applicants 
planning to attend intensive English language 
training programs, most often in New York City. 
The applicants claim to have located the U.S. 
schools and applied for SEVIS without the aid of 
middlemen.  However, searches of SEVIS by school 
and nationality show that groups of applicants 
attending the same school enter SEVIS at the same 
time, frequently on the same day.  The 
improbability that they are acting independently, 
usually combined with unrealistic expenses and 
weak social and work ties, result in INA 214(b) 
refusals. With the assistance of CA/VO/FP, post is 
currently investigating the travel patterns of ESL 
students for one of the schools involved in this 
phenomenon. 
 
J-1 Trainees and Interns:  Post continues to see 
ostensible J-1 training and intern programs for 
hotel housekeeping, food and beverage, fast food 
restaurant workers, farm, viniculture, and other 
unskilled labor positions.  Many of these 
applicants are former Summer Work and Travel (SWT) 
program participants who have recently graduated 
from university and face poor employment prospects 
in Moldova. 
 
Adjustment of Status in the United States:  Post 
has identified several institutions that have many 
Moldovans on their student rolls, all or most of 
who have applied for their I-20s or DS-2019s while 
already in the United States on a B-1/B-2 or J-1 
visa.  Whenever post receives an F-1 application 
at post from an unfamiliar institution, we search 
SEVIS using the school name and the Moldovan 
country code.  We now routinely run results of 
ADIS searches that indicate an individual has 
applied for a change of status to F-1or J-1 
through SEVIS to spot schools hosting othr visa 
holders who have failed to return to Moldoa. 
 
¶C.  IV FRAUD: 
 
Immigrant Visas for Moldovas are processed in 
Bucharest.  Post takes occasinal I-130 petitions 
and processes I-604 (Requestfor and Report on 
Overseas Orphan Investigation)for international 
adoption cases originating fromMoldova.  We have 
not seen suspect I-130 petitios during the 
reporting period. 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD: 
 
Embassy Bucharest processes all DV applications 
for Moldovan citizens.  On occasion Bucharest 
rquests assistance with checking the legitimacy 
ofMoldovan documents, usually diplomas, with 
localauthorities.  Post has confirmed several 
fake dilomas submitted by Moldovan applicants to 
Embass Bucharest.  Post has been contacted by a 
few Modovans who have had their winning DV 
entries intecepted and held by the companies that 
submitted heir entries.  The applicants then have 
to pay te companies USD 1,200-1,400 to receive 
their wining applications. 
 
¶E. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAU: 
 
Chisinau has not encountered incidents of U.S. 
 
passport and citizenship fraud during the 
reporting period. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD: 
 
As noted above, Chisinau does not process IV 
cases, but it does process I-604 overseas orphan 
investigation requests.  Local authorities have 
ceased any activity on international adoptions, 
and post has not encountered a suspect or 
fraudulent adoption. 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING: 
 
Post has not employed DNA testing. 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: 
 
Chisinau has not seen direct evidence of asylum 
cases or DHS benefits fraud.  We see fewer than 
five lost I-551s per year.  However, post notes 
that a large number of NIV applicants traveling to 
visit "refugee" relatives indicate that their 
relative emigrated for reasons other than credible 
fear of persecution.  When asked why they thought 
their relatives applied for refugee status, visa 
applicants commonly refer to abuses that occurred 
in the Soviet period.  Many of these refugees 
return regularly to Moldova for family visits. 
Communities with large refugee populations are 
also primary sources of suspect invitations for 
NIV applicants. 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, 
AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: 
 
While we are aware of reported trafficking of 
Moldovans to Turkey, Western Europe, and other 
former Soviet states, post has seen little 
evidence of transit to the United States.  We are 
not aware of the production in Moldova of false 
U.S. travel documents. 
 
The RSO has cultivated an excellent relationship 
with local law enforcement officials.  Based on 
their information, we have entered the identities 
of nearly two hundred known and suspected Moldovan 
organized crime figures into CLASS.  Post has no 
indication of terrorist travel from Moldova. 
 
¶J.  DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: 
 
The Consular Section referred one case (REF A) to 
RSO for investigation and will report on any 
developments. 
 
¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND 
CIVIL REGISTRY: 
 
Host country identification documents are of high 
quality and considered secure.  Post has not 
detected a false Moldovan passport, but is aware 
of a recent case in which Government of Moldova 
authorities detected a genuine passport issued 
with fake supporting documentation.  Moldova began 
issuing biometric passports in March, 2008. 
Regular-issue Moldovan passports are machine- 
readable and those manufactured after June 2005 
contain a digitalized photo. 
 
The host government authorizes the simultaneous 
possession of two valid tourist passports. 
Moldova issues machine-readable official and 
diplomatic passports with digitalized photos. 
Older versions still in service are not machine- 
readable and contain laminated photos.  Regular 
Moldovan passports cost USD 12 and can be obtained 
in one month; however, for a USD 100 expediting 
fee, a Moldovan passport can be ordered and 
received in one day.  Applicants for passports 
must present birth certificates, proof of 
identification, and in the case of university 
graduates, diplomas. 
 
¶L.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: 
 
 
The Consular Section has an active relationship 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration.  As noted above, the RSO maintains 
excellent relations with host government law 
enforcement, including its Center for Combating 
Economic Crime and Corruption and the Center for 
Combating Trafficking in Persons.  The Ministry of 
Education and the General Department of Civil 
Records are reliable sources when we seek to 
verify educational, marriage, and birth records. 
 
¶M.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: 
 
With several thousand Moldovan students recently 
participating in Summer Work and Travel program 
jobs in the United States, Chisinau is concerned 
about the use of "facilitators" for immigration 
attorneys.  These facilitators advertise 
attorneys' services to assist Moldovans in the 
United States to adjust status to F-1 or H2B with 
USCIS in order to prolong their stays.  In the 
past two years, according to ADIS data, more that 
1,000 Moldovan SWT participants (10% of the total) 
sought to adjust status in the United States. 
This rate of adjustments of status strikes us as 
higher than expected. 
 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING: 
 
Chisinau has two full-time consular officers. 
Consul and FPM Richard W. Roesing attended fraud 
prevention training at FSI in 2007.  The LES Fraud 
Prevention Assistant attended fraud prevention 
training at FSI in 2009. 
 
MICHELI