VZCZCXRO6266
RR RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHCN #0223/01 2820455
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090455Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL CHENGDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3448
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1926
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0836
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0799
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0822
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 4142

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHENGDU 000223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CH
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - CHENGDU (APRIL TO SEPTEMBER 2009) 
 
REF: 08 STATE 74840 
 
CHENGDU 00000223  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
LOCAL CONDITIONS 
 
 
 
¶1.  The Chengdu consular district covers Sichuan, Yunnan and 
Guizhou Provinces, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and the 
Chongqing Municipality. The majority of the Consulate's NIV 
applicants hail from Chengdu, Chongqing and Kunming, followed by 
Guiyang and smaller cities and towns throughout the region. Post 
sees relatively few applicants from the TAR. 
 
 
 
¶2.  The social and economic conditions in the Chengdu consular 
district mirror those found in the Mission's other four consular 
districts.  Chengdu City tends to present the most qualified 
applicants, while Yunnan, Chongqing, Guizhou, and the rural 
areas in Sichuan Province outside of the capital tend to have a 
higher percentage of fraudulent cases.  A large portion of the 
cases from the TAR are refused for a lack of strong ties rather 
than suspected or confirmed fraud. 
 
 
 
NIV FRAUD 
 
 
 
¶3.  Post's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) conducted 252 
investigations during the reporting period and confirmed fraud 
in 28 NIV cases.  Even when fraud was not confirmed, however, 
many of the FPU's investigations remained inconclusive, 
indicating the possibility of fraud.  In over 40 NIV cases, 
either the applicant's employment or purpose of travel could not 
be confirmed. 
 
 
 
¶4.  The majority of the confirmed fraudulent cases involved 
supposed business travelers applying to travel to the U.S. on a 
B1/B2 visa and who presented fraudulent work credentials or fake 
invitation letters from U.S. inviters.  Out-of-district 
applicants did not contribute greatly to the FPU workload, 
primarily because these applicants already tend to have a 
relatively high refusal rate. 
 
 
 
Fujianese Fake Passport Cases 
 
 
 
¶5.  Post continues to encounter applicants who claim to be from 
Chengdu's consular district, but in fact, have falsified their 
place of issue and place of birth on their PRC-issued passport 
in order to conceal their Fujianese identity.  The majority of 
these altered passports also contain fake Australian and 
Schengen/EU visas used to claim prior international travel. 
Since early 2009, an additional eleven cases fitting this fraud 
pattern have been discovered in Chengdu, bringing the total 
number of fake Fujianese passport cases to 43. 
 
 
 
¶6.  Previously, these applicants tended to apply in groups of 
three and claimed to be participants in a trade fair, usually as 
managers of a furniture manufacturer.  More recently, however, 
they have been applying as individuals, usually as purported 
business travelers going for technical training.  As before, the 
applicants presented a package of well-prepared fraudulent 
documents, some of which included employment letters from real 
companies in China.  In one case, an applicant claimed to be an 
artist and brought with him an elaborate art portfolio, 
including a high-quality hardbound picture book of his work. 
 
 
 
¶7.  In the most recent cases detected in Chengdu, vigilant line 
officers identified suspect passports during fingerprinting or 
interviews, after which the FPU immediately alerted the local 
Public Security Bureau (PSB).  Once the PSB confirmed the 
passports were indeed fraudulent, the FPM notified the RSO, who 
then coordinated with the PSB to have the applicant detained 
 
CHENGDU 00000223  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
outside of the consulate.  Chengdu's FPM and RSO continue to 
work with police investigators from the Sichuan and Fuzhou 
(Fujian) Public Security Bureaus to share information about 
these cases. 
 
 
 
Employment-based Fraud 
 
 
 
¶8.  H1B and L1 fraud continues to be a serious concern in 
Chengdu's consular district.  The FPU has confirmed some type of 
fraud in at least twelve H1B and L1-A cases that it has 
investigated during the reporting period.  Blanket L applicants 
do not present the same level of concern and generally tend to 
be legitimate intra-company transferees. 
 
 
 
¶9.  During the course of their interviews, many L1-A applicants 
fail to adequately describe their business plans or are unable 
to demonstrate that they have the requisite experience in a 
managerial or executive capacity to qualify for their visas. 
Because fraud in this category is a growing concern, Chengdu's 
FPU now routinely conducts fraud investigations for these cases, 
and when possible, site visits to the beneficiaries' companies. 
 
 
 
IV FRAUD 
 
 
 
¶10. Chengdu does not process immigrant visa applications. 
 
 
 
DIVERSITY VISA FRAUD 
 
 
 
¶11.  Chengdu does not process diversity visa applications. 
 
 
 
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
 
 
 
¶12.  Post has had one significant case of suspected ACS fraud 
during the reporting period involving an Amcit child whose 
Chinese-citizen mother submitted a passport renewal application 
on her behalf.  The mother also presented a death certificate 
for the girl's father, along with pictures of their purported 
trip to Europe.  The interviewing officer noticed the travel 
stamps in girl's U.S. passport did not match the photos, at 
which point the mother admitted that she had presented doctored 
photos. 
 
 
 
¶13.  The case was referred to the FPU, which discovered that the 
name on the father's death certificate did not match the name on 
the original at the issuing hospital.  Likewise, the photo on 
the mother's national ID card did not match the photo on the 
original ID registry maintained by the local government.  When 
the adjudicating officer requested another interview, the mother 
came alone, claiming her daughter was too sick to attend.  The 
case remains open and a letter has been sent to the mother 
requesting that she come in for another interview.  She must 
also bring her daughter and all of the documents she used to 
apply for her daughter's U.S. passport.  Based on FAM guidance, 
she has 90 days in which to respond before post must deny the 
passport renewal application. 
 
 
 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
 
 
 
¶14.  Post is not aware of any fraud or special concerns in this 
area. 
 
CHENGDU 00000223  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF DNA TESTING 
 
 
 
¶15.  Post is not aware of any fraud or special concerns in this 
area.  All DNA tests are conducted in accordance with FAM 
guidance. 
 
 
 
ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS 
 
 
 
¶16.  Post receives occasional requests from DHS for materials 
relating to asylum claims filed by individuals issued visas in 
Chengdu.  Travel letter applications are also closely 
scrutinized for possible fraud. 
 
 
 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
 
 
 
¶17.  Post currently has no pending investigations. 
 
 
 
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL 
 
 
 
¶18.  High-quality fraudulent documents produced by document 
vendors and visa brokers continue to be a problem.  These 
include fraudulent EU, Canadian, and Australian visas; 
employment, bank, and housing documents; and U.S. invitation 
letters.  The fake passport cases from Fujianese applicants 
masquerading as locals continue to raise concerns about 
smuggling rings in the Chengdu consular district. 
 
 
 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
 
 
 
¶19.  Post continues to have good relations with the local Public 
Security and Entry and Exit Bureaus.  Cooperation and 
information sharing has helped facilitate the detention and 
arrest of visa applicants using fraudulent or altered PRC 
passports.  Post has been allocated a new A-RSO/I position which 
will further help the FPU work closely with local Public 
Security and Entry and Exit Bureaus throughout Chengdu's 
consular district. 
 
 
 
COOPERATION WITH THIRD-COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS 
 
 
 
¶20.  The FPU does regular outreach to other foreign consulates 
in Chengdu's consular district, whereby information about fraud 
patterns and FPU and other consular best practices is shared. 
During the reporting period, the FPU met with counterparts at 
the British, Canadian, German and Japanese consulates. 
 
 
 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
 
 
 
¶21.  Chengdu's Fraud Prevention Unit consists of one part-time 
Fraud Prevention Manager and one full time FSN Investigator. 
The Unit's Manager is Walter Andonov and the Fraud Prevention 
Investigator (FPI) is Song Qi.  Consular Assistant Yu Jun serves 
as the back-up FPI.  The incoming FPM Aaron Rupert will assume 
his FPU duties in mid-December 2009. 
 
 
CHENGDU 00000223  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
¶22.  Chengdu's FPM also serves as the section's Deputy Consular 
Chief.  Chengdu's FPI spends approximately 20 percent of her 
time assisting other FSNs in the section with routine visa and 
ACS work.  Post has been allocated a new A-RSO/I position that 
is expected to be staffed in calendar year 2010.  The A-RSO/I 
will play an important role in liaising with local law 
enforcement and border control agencies, and with other foreign 
consulates in Chengdu's consular district. 
 
 
 
¶23.  Chengdu's FPM trains all new line officers in post-specific 
fraud prevention techniques.  The FPM developed an updated Unit 
SOP and sends out fraud notices and updates on an ad hoc basis. 
The FPU has also developed a fraud library, made up of sample 
fraudulent and authentic local and U.S. documents.  This library 
will be used as part of regular training sessions, during which 
officers will be able to more formally discuss the fraud 
patterns they see on the interviewing line. 
 
 
 
¶24.  The FPM, in coordination with Chengdu's Post Language 
Officer, designed an 8-lesson, consular-specific Sichuan dialect 
course which began in September and is being funded by the Post 
Language Program.  The course is taught by native speakers and 
is focused on consular officers' specific needs for use on the 
visa interviewing line.  The FPM believes that being able to 
recognize and understand the local dialect will serve Chengdu's 
consular officers as an effective fraud detection tool. 
 
 
 
BROWN