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DE RUEHBS #1414/01 2950820
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R 220820Z OCT 09
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001414 
 
PASS TO FSI 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EUN AMGT
SUBJECT:  LISBON TREATY: THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE -- 
TOWARD AN EU FOREIGN SERVICE 
 
BRUSSELS 00001414  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Treaty of Lisbon, if and when ratified, will 
establish a new European diplomatic corps, known as the European 
External Action Service (EEAS).  The EEAS would support the future 
High Representative of the EU for External Affairs and Security 
Policy.  The EEAS would knit together officials from the Commission 
and the Council's General Secretariat, as well as diplomats seconded 
from the EU Member States.  Over time, the new service could help 
the EU define and implement more unified positions when dealing with 
external relations.  The relationship between the EEAS and the 
diplomatic services of the Member States will require considerable 
adjustments during the start-up phase.  The EU Commission's own 
delegation offices, in capitals throughout the world, have garnered 
a mixed reception.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) The new High Representative ("High Rep") of the EU for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be appointed under the 
Treaty of Lisbon (still subject to full ratification and entry into 
force).  He or she will combine the current responsibilities of the 
European Commission's External Relations (RELEX) Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner with those of the High Rep for the EU's Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana.  Under "Lisbon," 
the new High Rep, who will also serve as a Commission 
Vice-President, will conduct the EU's CFSP, contribute to the 
development of such policy, and then implement policy.  He or she 
will have similar responsibility for the EU's European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP).  As a member of the Commission, the High Rep 
will also have at his or her disposal the budget currently held by 
the RELEX Commissioner, thus improving the EU's ability to put its 
money where its mouth is on foreign policy.  A key innovation is 
that the High Rep will chair the meetings of the "Foreign Affairs" 
Council.  The current "External Relations" and "General Affairs" 
components of the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations 
Council) will be split into separate Council formations, with the 
High Rep chairing sessions on external relations and the (rotating) 
EU Presidency Foreign Minister chairing the separate General Affairs 
Council. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to the Lisbon Treaty (Article 27[3],) the new 
High Rep is to propose the organization and functioning of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist him or her, in 
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States.  It 
is to be made up of officials from relevant departments of the 
Secretariat General of the Council and of the Commission, as well as 
staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member 
States.  The EEAS will be formally established by a decision of the 
Council, after consulting the European Parliament and after 
obtaining the consent of the Commission. 
 
MAKING UP THE EEAS 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The precise composition, size and internal set-up of the 
EEAS are not spelled out in the Treaty of Lisbon.  As early as 2005, 
EU officials began work on plans for the EEAS.  Many questions 
remain, in part because Member State governments were unable to work 
on solid legal ground, pending ratification of Lisbon.  Contacts 
have told us the EEAS was not talked about much this past year to 
avoid its possible role becoming an issue in the October 2009 Irish 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.  It is likely some staff in the 
Council Secretariat will move to the new, permanent Presidency of 
torate-General acreasinglyQ decide.  With the process of 
shaping his new team somewhat delayed pending clarification of the 
fate of the Lisbon Treaty, President Barroso has not provided 
indications on how policy implementation would be integrated with 
the EEAS.  Trade policy, now run by the Commission's Directorate 
General for Trade, will likely remain separate from the External 
Relations Directorate General and the EEAS.  Development and 
humanitarian aid policy could be closely associated with, if not 
fully incorporated into, the EAAS to ease the formulation of a 
comprehensive and coherent foreign policy toward Africa.  Other 
questions still need to be answered.  Among these:  will there be a 
chain of command -- e.g., on budgetary and administrative matters -- 
that will give the new High Rep an effective coordinating and 
 
BRUSSELS 00001414  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
supervisory role inside the new College of Commissioners? 
Commission internal rules could be adjusted to ensure that certain 
decisions by individual Commissioners could be taken only in 
agreement with the High Rep who will also, as described, serve as 
one of several Vice Presidents of the Commission. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) A 2005 progress report and recent discussions among the EU 
PermReps suggest that the EEAS could be "sui generis;" i.e, not fall 
within existing EU institutions, but would be linked to them.  Like 
the European Defense Agency (EDA), the EEAS might have no tenured 
staff of its own, at least in its start-up phase.  If proven 
effective, it could subsequently evolve into a more stable 
structure.  The need for the EEAS to bring together staff from two 
EU bodies (Commission and Council Secretariat) and 27 Member States 
will naturally provoke bureaucratic turf wars that could impair its 
effectiveness. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) A possible interim solution could preserve the "sui 
generis" character of the EEAS without creating a new status for its 
staff; in this scenario the EEAS would have staff entirely seconded 
from the Commission, the Council General Secretariat and the Member 
States.  The administrative costs of the EEAS could be covered 
primarily by the EU budget, thus involving the European Parliament 
(EP), which is keen to expand its influence on the conduct of EU 
foreign policy through its supervisory responsibilities over the 
Commission.  (NOTE:  The EP's role in "second pillar" issues has 
traditionally been limited to budgetary provisions with no say in 
CFSP decision-making, which remains a prerogative of the Member 
States. #END NOTE.)  The arrangement could be applied initially 
through 2013 (when the current EU Financial Guidelines will expire) 
or 2014 (the end of the next Commission's term) and be reviewed in 
light of experience. 
 
DEALING WITH THE EEAS 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Inside the EU system, the EEAS will have to liaise with 
the President of the European Council who will serve a two and a 
half year term, the every-six-months rotating Presidency of the 
Council, and relevant EU and Member State officials. Its liaison 
role will include preparing for the monthly General Affairs Councils 
(the other component of the current GAERC) to ensure the necessary 
policy coherence with foreign policy issues.  In dealing with the 
foreign diplomatic corps accredited to the EU (including USEU), the 
EEAS will likely become the regular channel for day-to-day contacts 
and dialogue, answering queries and sharing information with people 
who currently deal with the many faces and voices operating in EU 
institutions.  And in all of this, the EEAS will report formally to 
the new High Rep for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  As 
confusing as this role may seem, it is perhaps little different from 
how any nation's embassies abroad deal with their own respective 
national interagency process. 
 
¶9.   (SBU) The Commission currently has over 150 delegations 
overseas, dealing primarily with EU assistance and issues (such as 
trade) where Member States have handed authority over to the EU. 
Some heads of delegation may be eager to use Lisbon implementation 
to gain visibility and importance as the local branch of the EEAS. 
In fact, under Lisbon, these delegations will fall under the 
authority of the new High Rep.  To date we have observed 
considerable unevenness in the performance of Commission delegations 
in third countries.  Even EU Member State diplomats have been 
dismissive of the Commission delegations' appropriation of 
diplomatic titles such as "Ambassador" and "First Secretary."  We 
have observed Commission delegation officials making public 
statements at odds with common foreign policy positions of the EU-27 
Member States.  Another question is whether Member State diplomats, 
especially the more able, will want to take a detour from their home 
country foreign services for a stint in the EEAS.  The pay may be 
better, but will they want to put at risk their careers in their 
member state diplomatic services by taking a multi-year absence to 
participate in the EEAS? 
 
¶10.  (SBU) We put this last question, on member state diplomats' 
potential interest in serving in the EEAS, to two Senior Commission 
officials responsible for training at the EEAS.  Both replied that 
respected member state diplomats may want to serve as Chief of 
Mission at the EEAS' largest posts, and perhaps also in ranking 
positions such as Political Counselor at high profile posts. 
Otherwise, they agreed, the EEAS will not have much appeal for 
member state diplomats from the EU's larger countries.  Diplomats 
from smaller member states, however, may prove to be more interested 
in a stint in the EEAS. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Our two Senior Commission training officials (one of whom 
had served at the EU Commission delegation in Washington) said they 
will not be setting up anytime soon a U.S. Foreign Service 
Institute-type training facility.  Such an institution, they said, 
would be far too threatening to the member states.  What our 
 
BRUSSELS 00001414  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Commission contacts are already doing, however, is setting up 
training seminars for Commission and Member State diplomats on 
foreign policy themes.  They are also approaching local think tanks 
and academic institutions to explore the most useful options for 
training modules in the future.  From their descriptions, those 
modules correspond quite closely to FSI School of Professional 
Studies training courses.  We even perceive the think tanks and 
academic institutions in Brussels trolling for their own contractual 
opportunities in these forthcoming programs. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Serge Abou, the head of the European Commission 
delegation in Beijing, recently described the future EEAS as "a very 
important engine to make more and more harmonious the analysis, the 
views and the actions of our Member States."  He sees his future 
EEAS colleagues becoming first among equals in areas of EU 
competence, compared to Member State diplomats.  He thought that in 
capitals such as Washington, where Member States are well 
represented, EU embassies would "help defend and express the common 
positions" developed in Brussels.  With a large network of 
Commission offices in developing countries, implementation of Lisbon 
reforms would also enable EU citizens and tourists to have greater 
access to diplomatic facilities overseas.  We are told that some 
Member States may take advantage of the EEAS and growing EU 
delegations abroad to close some bilateral embassies. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Should Lisbon be implemented, the U.S. will need to 
adjust constantly to the Treaty's implementation, including the 
EEAS.  With the new High Rep eventually giving us, perhaps, the 
famous "one phone number" to call -- combining these separate 
bureaucracies together will be complex and lengthy.  Some sources 
tell us it could take two years to implement Lisbon reforms, and 
many provisions will require, in effect, an extension of the 
negotiations among Member States. 
 
MURRAY