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RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 0160
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RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 0002

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SOCI BR HO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL STILL LACKS A STRATEGY IN HONDURAS 
FOLLOWING ITS CONGRESSIONAL VISIT 
 
REF: BRASILIA 01210 
 
BRASILIA 00001262  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Steve Liston, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: A six-member Brazilian Congressional 
delegation traveled to Tegucigalpa September 30 to October 2 
to support the Brazilian community in Honduras and met with 
Zelaya and Micheletti government officials. According to two 
members of the delegation, Zelaya appeared to be "fragile" 
and perhaps not completely lucid. Only four members of the 
delegation met with Micheletti, who affirmed that there had 
been no coup against Zelaya and all of the government,s 
repressive measures were taken to protect the population. In 
meetings with PolOffs in Brasilia and Recife this month the 
delegation was unable to define a strategy or provide 
recommendations for Brazil to help diffuse the Honduras 
crisis, which parallels the lack of planning and vision seen 
in the Lula administration and Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 
Relations (MRE) on the issue (Reftel). At the broadest level, 
this reflects the fact that Brazil is in the unaccustomed 
position of being at the center of a crisis outside its 
historical sphere of influence. End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
BRAZIL CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION VISITS HONDURAS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Six Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (equivalent to 
United States House of Representatives) members traveled to 
Honduras September 30 to October 2 to visit the Brazilian 
Embassy and met with Zelaya and Micheletti government 
officials. The delegation included four opposition 
members--Raul Jungmann (PPS-PE), Bruno Araujo (PSDB-PE), Ivan 
Valente (PSOL-SP), and Marcondes Gadelha (PSB-PB)--and two 
members of the ruling party, Janeta Pieta Rocha (PT-SP) and 
Mauricio Rands (PT-PE)--all of whom serve in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee (CREDN) in the Chamber of Deputies. In 
meetings with Recife PolOffs and Brasilia Poloffs Congress 
members emphasized that the main goal of their trip was to 
support the Brazilian community in Honduras and convey to the 
Micheletti government that Honduras must respect the 
Brazilian Embassy and staff. Rocha and Jungmann said there 
are approximate 600 Brazilians living in Honduras. 
 
¶3. (C) The GOB did not fully support the delegation,s 
mission. Jungmann said that the Ministry Foreign Relations 
(MRE) did not like the idea of having members of Congress 
dealing with a diplomatic issue. Jungmann explained that the 
MRE tried to block their trip and even the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, Michel Temer, heavily lobbied the 
delegation not to travel. According to both Jungmann and 
Rocha, they all had to pay their own way from El Salvador to 
Tegucigalpa, otherwise they would not have been able to make 
the trip. 
 
¶4. (C) Rocha described the situation in Honduras as 
worrisome. She was concerned with the level of repression 
exerted by the government because Micheletti was "ruling with 
a firm hand." There was a curfew being enforced and the media 
was being censored, she said, in addition to the harassing 
measures Rocha said the Micheletti government and security 
forces were employing against the Brazilian Embassy. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
MEETINGS WITH ZELAYA AND MICHELETTI 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Both Jungmann and Rocha recounted their meetings in 
Honduras in general terms. Jungmann said the delegation first 
met with the Honduran Supreme Court, which told the 
Brazilians that Zelaya,s removal from power was 
Constitutional. The delegation was successful in visiting the 
Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa and was well received. 
According to Jungmann, the Embassy,s employees were very 
grateful and felt that the GOB had not abandoned them. There 
are currently only three Brazilian employees at the Embassy, 
and only one is a diplomat. Rocha expressed her appreciation 
for the United States Embassy,s assistance to the Brazilian 
Embassy in Honduras, which included their role in 
negotiations with the Micheletti government and food 
deliveries. 
 
¶6. (C) The delegation also met with the Honduran National 
Assembly and opened a dialog between legislatures in Brazil 
and Honduras, according to Rocha, who said "we as 
parliamentarians can demand a certain parliamentary 
diplomacy." Rocha said they made it clear to the Honduran 
 
BRASILIA 00001262  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Congress that Brazil did not expect or plan Zelaya,s return 
to Honduras and refuge in the Brazilian Embassy. But, because 
of Brazil,s negative experience with a military 
dictatorship, in which so many Brazilian lives were saved 
when other countries gave them refugee, Brazil could not have 
turned down Zelaya.  Rocha added that the meeting was 
interesting since many of the Honduran members of Congress 
were involved with the ousting of Zelaya. The Honduran 
members conveyed to the Brazilians their belief that Brazil 
and Venezuela had partnering roles and positions on Zelaya,s 
return, and the Brazilian delegation worked hard to explain 
otherwise, Rocha said. 
 
¶7. (C) Regarding their meeting with Zelaya, Rocha said he was 
"fragile" but holding up well. Jungmann said the meeting was 
interesting but that Zelaya may not be completely lucid. 
Rocha explained that the Micheletti government was employing 
a lot of "psychological interference" against Zelaya, which 
she listed as light and sound interference and the constant 
presence of snipers around the Brazilian Embassy. Rocha said 
Zelaya thanked the Brazilian delegation for their visit and 
thanked Brazilian President Lula for his support. Zelaya told 
the Brazilians all he wants is an electoral process without 
interruptions before the November election and to step down 
from office in January. 
 
¶8. (C) Rocha and Rands did not attend the meeting with 
Micheletti. Rocha said it was not a difficult decision for 
her to miss the meeting because she ideologically could not 
meet with a "golpista" (coup-maker) and the Micheletti 
appointment was the last on their schedule. Jungmann said 
that in the meeting, Micheletti tried to explain that there 
had been no coup, that every process had been respected and 
done in line with the Honduran constitution, with the 
exception of how the military removed Zelaya from office. 
Micheletti told Jungmann it was the Honduran military that 
saw the need to remove Zelaya from the country to prevent a 
civil war. Micheletti also mentioned that martial law was 
implemented to protect the population, and avoid serious 
confrontations. Micheletti told Jungmann that the military is 
not controlling the private sector or government 
institutions, which is a common occurrence following a true 
military coup. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
MUDDLED GOB MESSAGE AND POLICY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Jungmann and Rocha viewed the trip as a success but, 
while the delegation was united in its primary goal--to 
support the Brazilian community and Embassy in Honduras--they 
appeared factionalized in their intention and views for the 
rest of the trip. Jungmann said the delegation did not speak 
as one voice and as the leader of the group there were some 
uncomfortable moments when he had to manage different 
political views. But, Jungmann said, that was to be expected 
since he put together a delegation with members from 
different parties. Jungmann said he is working on a trip 
report to be presented to the Chamber,s Foreign Affairs 
Committee, but did not say when it would be completed. 
 
¶10. (C) Both Jungmann and Rocha reiterated that they believe 
Brazil was correct in allowing Zelaya to enter their Embassy 
and that the GOB did not have any prior knowledge or warning 
of Zelaya,s return to Honduras. Jungmann, however, made it a 
point to say that Brazil should have prevented Zelaya from 
using the Embassy as a pulpit to stir up his supporters and 
cause problems in Honduras. Jungmann recounted that the most 
delicate and embarrassing moment of the trip was when the 
delegation was shown a DVD with images of protestors holding 
banners saying, "Brazil and Venezuela have violated 
Honduras, sovereignty," images that had been broadcast 
throughout the country many times. Jungmann went so far as to 
say that Brazil should apologize to Honduras, an idea he said 
was completely rejected by other members in the delegation, 
the MRE, and other members of the Chamber of Deputies Foreign 
Relations Committee. He said, "I knew my proposal would not 
be accepted, but one has to express what he or she thinks." 
He said, "the Brazilian government acted correctly when it 
decided to host Zelaya, but our diplomacy made a serious 
mistake in allowing him to interact with the population via 
our Embassy." 
 
¶11. (C) Although she did not define a position and plan for 
Brazil in the crisis, Rocha expressed the need for the United 
States to provide greater clarity on its position on the 
situation, asserting that the U.S. Congress is evidently 
divided over the issue. Rocha added that she hopes that the 
 
BRASILIA 00001262  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
international community exerts greater voice in the Honduran 
crisis because Latin America has seen these types of 
standstills erode the progress made to protect civil rights 
in the region. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT:  The congressional delegation,s somewhat 
chaotic and inconclusive visit to Honduras mirrors the GOB,s 
muddled policy toward the crisis in Honduras (Reftel). The 
matter was further complicated by the differing views within 
the delegation and confusion over which players in Honduras 
to engage.  More than anything, the lack of decisive 
Brazilian action on the issue and the heated public debate on 
Brazil,s role (Sao Paulo septel) reflect the fact that 
Brazil finds itself in an unaccustomed and uncomfortable 
position, at the political center and in the public spotlight 
of a crisis outside its historical sphere of influence. End 
Comment. 
 
¶13. (U) This Cable was coordinated with Consulate Recife. 
KUBISKE