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RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7833
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RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4618

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT SHARI VILLAROSA AND WHA. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 5-7 VISIT OF S/CT 
DEPUTY COORDINATOR OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS SHARI VILLAROSA 
 
REF: A. A. BRASILIA 01206 
     ¶B. B. BRASILIA 00156 
     ¶C. C. BRASILIA 01095 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Steve Liston, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
------------- 
Introduction 
------------- 
 
¶1. (C) The relationship between the United States and Brazil 
is as productive and broad-based as it has ever been in 
recent decades, the result of the cordial personal connection 
already established between President Obama and President 
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, which is building on Lula,s 
excellent relationship with former President Bush. New 
cooperation mechanisms on biofuels, business issues, and 
economic matters, and our shared goals of fostering 
hemispheric stability, promoting democracy, developing a 
consensus on next steps for climate change, and achieving a 
mutually satisfactory conclusion to the Doha round of WTO 
negotiations have fostered the view in Brazil that relations 
between our two countries are closer than ever. Brazil 
appears to be headed for a rapid recovery from the effects of 
the global financial crisis, and Lula remains as popular as 
ever as the country turns its focus on the race to succeed 
him in January 2011. 
 
¶2. (C) Internationally, U.S.-Brazil cooperation is often 
limited by the GOB,s unwillingness to speak out against 
anti-democratic actions in the hemisphere (Venezuela and 
Cuba), take proactive steps to address key issues such as 
nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism concerns, and 
expand its international leadership in meaningful ways. 
However, military-to-military relations are good and growing, 
and most of the Brazilian military understands the potential 
benefits of partnership with the United States. At the 
operational level, cooperation on law enforcement issues, 
such as counternarcotics, container security, and 
intelligence sharing, is excellent and improving. As the most 
senior official in S/CT to visit Brazil in several years, 
your visit provides an opportunity to highlight the 
importance of a regional approach to counterterrorism efforts 
and to explore new avenues for cooperation in that field. 
 
-------------------- 
Counterterrorism: Operational Partnership, Policy 
Intransigence, Legal Weakness 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) The primary counterterrorism concern for both 
Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the 
presence and activities of individuals with links to 
terrorism-particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and 
some individuals linked to Hizballah-in Sao Paulo and other 
areas of southern Brazil. Despite publicly expressed 
sentiments of high-level officials denying the existence of 
proven terrorist activity on Brazilian soil, Brazil,s 
intelligence and law enforcement services are rightly 
concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory 
to support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether 
domestically or abroad, and have focused their efforts in the 
areas of Sao Paulo, where the vast majority of Brazil,s 
estimated 1.2-1.5 million Muslims live; Brazil,s tri-border 
areas with Argentina and Paraguay and with Peru and Colombia; 
and its borders with Colombia and Venezuela. Brazil,s 
recognition of the potential threat from terrorism prompted a 
reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that 
raised the profile of the issue by upgrading the 
counterterrorism division to the department level and 
establishing the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN)-an 
NCTC-like entity within ABIN to coordinate intelligence 
gathering and sharing across the GOB. 
 
¶4. (C) During an early July 2009 hearing before a 
Congressional committee (ref A), the Brazilian Federal 
Police,s head of intelligence publicly admitted that an 
individual arrested in April for hate speech who the press 
had revealed to be linked to al Qaeda was indeed connected to 
the group, contradicting the government,s previous claims 
that there was no terrorism-nexus in the arrest. The arrested 
 
BRASILIA 00001216  002 OF 004 
 
 
individual, Khaled Hussein Ali, who was released pending 
trial, was the global head of the Jihad Media Battalion, and 
according to the DPF, had performed duties for the terrorist 
group, ranging from propaganda, to logistics, recruitment, 
and other activities. Because Brazil lacks counterterrorism 
legislation, the DPF arrested him on charges of hate crimes, 
which carry a much lighter sentence. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Brazilian government continues to be a 
cooperative partner in countering terrorism and related 
activities that could contribute to the facilitation of 
attacks in the region or elsewhere-to include investigating 
potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and 
other illicit activity. Operationally, elements of the GOB 
responsible for combating terrorism -- the Federal Police, 
Customs, and to a lesser extent ABIN -- effectively work with 
their U.S. counterparts and diligently pursue investigative 
leads provided by U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and 
financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects. The senior 
levels of the Brazilian government, however, publicly deny 
the possibility that terrorist groups or individuals 
connected to such groups operate or transit through Brazilian 
soil and vigorously protest any claims made by U.S. 
authorities to that effect. 
 
¶6. (C) The Brazilian government and non-government elite 
shows particular sensitivity when USG officials raise a key 
issues, including the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet, 
sovereignty over their recent off-shore sub-salt oil 
discoveries and the Amazon, and the status of indigenous 
people and lands. Terrorism and the Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay 
Tri-Border Area (TBA) are also sensitive in government 
circles. 
 
-- Terrorism. Officially, Brazil does not have terrorism 
inside its borders. In reality, several Islamic groups with 
known or suspected ties to extremist organizations have 
branches in Brazil and are suspected of carrying out 
financing activities. Although there is good working-level 
law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil on 
terrorism related activities, the official position of the 
government is to deny that Brazil has any terrorist activity. 
 
-- Tri-Border Area (TBA). Related to the above, Brazilian 
officials rebuff any suggestion by U.S. officials  that there 
is terrorist activity in the TBA. A frequent Brazilian retort 
to comments about the TBA is, "Which one? We have nine 
tri-border areas." As we are generally unable to share 
intelligence regarding terrorism-related activities, the USG 
is regularly accused of making unsupported assertions that 
malign TBA residents and have a negative impact on tourism in 
the region. The GOB insists there is no proven terrorist 
activity in the TBA and, in its defense, points to statements 
to that effect in the repeated joint communiques out of the 
annual 3 Plus 1 meetings. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Brazil,s overall commitment to combating terrorism 
and the illicit activities that could be exploited to 
facilitate terrorism is undermined by the GOB,s failure to 
significantly strengthen its legal counterterrorism 
framework. Two key counterterrorism-related legislative 
initiatives continued to languish in 2009. An anti-terrorism 
bill that would have established the crime of terrorism and 
other associated crimes was drafted but shelved before its 
introduction in Congress and a long-delayed anti-money 
laundering bill has not been approved by Congress. If passed, 
the latter bill would facilitate greater law enforcement 
access to financial and banking records during 
investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow 
administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate 
prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal 
definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous 
offense. 
 
-------------------- 
Counterterrorism: Making the 3 Plus 1 Work 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The 3 Plus 1 Mechanism (ref b) on Security in the TBA 
of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay remains, six years after 
its initial plenary session, the only instrument available to 
discuss CT with regional partners at the policy level. Given 
 
BRASILIA 00001216  003 OF 004 
 
 
the likelihood that the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) will 
reject new policy-level proposals for regional security 
cooperation as the GOB focuses on building up a regional 
security architecture in South America that does not include 
the United States (i.e., Mercosul working groups on security, 
UNASUL, South American Defense Council), re-invigorating the 
3 Plus 1 becomes all the more necessary, both as a means of 
achieving meaningful policy-level commitments from Brazil on 
this important issue and as a way of maintaining a foothold 
in regional security discussions. The United States, turn to 
host the upcoming 3 Plus 1 offers the best opportunity since 
the initial plenary to shift the dynamics of the mechanism in 
a way that ensures its effectiveness and our broader security 
interest in the region. Taking advantage of greater GOB 
openness to the new U.S. Administration, a concerted USG 
strategy to implement this new approach that includes careful 
inter-agency preparation and high-level participation could 
lay the groundwork for the GOB to accept expanding the scope 
of the 3 Plus 1-substantively, geographically, or both-to 
make it a more effective regional security dialogue. 
 
¶9. (C) The history of the 3 Plus 1 suggests that it will 
require careful planning and execution to make it a truly 
effective forum for cooperation. The Brazilians have been 
consistent in limiting discussions on topics that are not 
within the established and narrow confines of the 3 Plus 1 
(only counterterrorism, only TBA), and have made it nearly 
impossible for the USG to propose projects for the four 
partners to undertake jointly. 
 
¶10. (C) During SouthCom Commander General Douglas Fraser,s 
visit to Brazil July 29-31 (ref c) Foreign Ministry Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs I Amb. Vera Machado said 
Brazil,s "great concern" was the control of transnational 
illicit activities, nothing that this area is very sensitive, 
as it is seen by some as having this potential to lead to 
external interference in domestic affairs. Foreign Ministry 
Transnational Crimes Director Minister Virginia Toniatti 
raised the 3 Plus 1 security forum for the TBA, noting that 
WHA DAS Chris McMullen had struck the right tone in their 
January 2008 meeting by not speaking about terrorism in the 
border but rather talking about broader illicit activities. 
(Comment: This is the same person who in the past has often 
insisted that 3 Plus 1 could discuss nothing but 
counterterrorism, and who has effectively derailed productive 
dialogue at the 3 Plus 1 meetings.  End comment.)  Stressing 
how much she disliked the term "tri-border area," as it 
suggested an uncontrolled area when in fact each country 
exercised control up to its own borders, Toniatti nonetheless 
said that Brazil is ready to work with its neighbors and the 
United States in a concrete way to address confirmed illicit 
activities. She rejected unsupported assertions made by USG 
officials of support for terrorist activity in the region, 
which only serve to stigmatize it. She noted that there had 
so far been no evidence of terrorist activity or finance in 
the region and that all of the 3 Plus 1 declarations had 
explicitly states as much. 
 
¶11. (C) Despite these difficulties, the 3 Plus 1 mechanism 
serves several important purposes. Policy-level dialogue: 
Although law enforcement cooperation with Brazil has always 
been excellent and fluid at the operational level, 3 Plus 1 
is the only sub-regional discussion on these issues in which 
we participate at a policy level. Networking: Members of the 
Mission,s Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG) -- which 
includes DEA, DHS (ICE, CBP, and USSS), DOj (FBI, RLA), DOD 
(DAO, MLO), and State -- who have attended the 3 Plus 1 
sessions see value in the networking possibilities created 
through the mechanism. Accountability: The 3 Plus 1 allows us 
the opportunity to question Brazil and other partners as to 
what progress they have made to comply with basic 
international norms, and to remind them of their 
international obligations. Information sharing: Mission 
believes much of this information is valuable for 
understanding what the GOB is doing independently and jointly 
with its neighbors, not all of which is information we 
receive through other contacts or in the vetted and open way 
in which it is reported at 3 Plus 1. Moral suasion: Brazilian 
government officials repeatedly cite their participation in 
the 3 Plus 1 as a measure of their commitment to combat 
terrorist activity in the region. To the extent that GOB puts 
value on the 3 Plus 1, it provides some leverage to encourage 
 
BRASILIA 00001216  004 OF 004 
 
 
Brazil to be a positive partner. 
 
¶12. (C) As a result of these benefits, Mission Brazil 
believes 3 Plus 1 mechanism should be maintained. But we also 
need to look for ways to make it more effective. We see two 
main options for improving the mechanism: a somewhat simpler 
but less satisfactory evolution to a broader TBA agenda, or a 
more difficult and ambitious effort at restructuring the 3 
Plus 1 into a country-wide counter-crime forum. (See ref C 
for more detail on Mission proposals.) 
 
-------------------- 
Moving Forward on CT Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) High-level, long-term USG commitment to engaging 
Brazil on counterterrorism, including  in the 3 Plus 1, will 
be necessary to build a productive CT relationship above the 
operational level. Although we expect limited results until a 
new GOB Administration takes office in 2011, your visit 
provides an excellent opportunity to reiterate the high 
priority that the Obama Administration gives to this issue, 
frame the discussion toward a more productive relationship, 
and explore possibilities for policy-level cooperation.. Your 
visit also serves as an opportunity to push U.S. goals and 
regain momentum in advance of the upcoming 3 Plus 1 meeting. 
KUBISKE