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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 001206 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT SHARI VILLAROSA AND WHA. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: POLICE PUBLICLY ADMIT AL QAEDA'S PRESENCE; 
GOB DENIES TERRORISM A THREAT 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i. Lisa Kubiske, reason: 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d) 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: The head of the Brazilian Federal Police,s 
(DPF) intelligence division admitted publicly during a 
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, hearing on terrorism July 7 
that an individual arrested in April on hate crimes-related 
charges was in fact linked to al Qaeda (AQ), the first time a 
Brazilian government official has gone on record admitting 
this link.  The admission followed earlier denials by non-DPF 
Brazilian government officials responding to press reports 
that the individual was linked to the terrorist group. 
During the hearing, Minister Jorge Felix, head of the Office 
of the Presidency,s Institutional Security Cabinet (a 
combination DNI, ONDCP, with some NSC-like attributes), stuck 
to the usual script, despite the admission, and denied there 
was any evidence that terrorists had or would be interested 
in establishing a presence in Brazil, even as he asserted 
that Brazil remained vigilant to the threat. As part of this 
vigilance, Felix reported during the hearing that GSI had 
created a new counter-terrorism (CT)-focused entity within 
its structure as well as an interagency working group to 
draft a new national security law, which could end up 
addressing Brazil,s single biggest inadequacy when it comes 
to its CT efforts: lack of CT legislation. While Felix, the 
DPF, and members of Congress agreed on the need for CT 
legislation, there is a lack of will in the GOB to expend the 
political capital to do push it, as a result of ideological 
and historical concerns that such legislation might be used 
against legitimate opposition and social movements. Concerned 
to maintain Brazil,s position as a racially, ethnically, and 
religiously harmonious society, the GOB is hesitant to engage 
in what it thinks might be perceived as provocative foreign 
and domestic policy. Nonetheless, post believes that the good 
operational cooperation on CT between our law enforcement 
agencies enjoy and Brazil,s general commitment to 
international counterterrorism norms provide a basis to 
engage the GOB and spur gradual change in Brazil,s mindset. 
 In light of Brazil,s growing global clout, this could pay 
dividends well beyond Brazil. End summary. 
 
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We have and have had Al Qaeda in Brazil 
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¶2. (SBU) During a 7 July hearing of the Chamber of Deputies 
Organized Crime and Public Security Committee, Daniel Lorenz 
de Azevedo, head of the DPF,s intelligence division publicly 
admitted for the first time that the DPF believed the 
individual arrested on April 26 for hate crimes in Sao Paulo, 
Khaled Hussein Ali was, in fact, believed by the DPF to be 
closely linked to al Qaeda.  As global head of the Jihad 
Media Battalion, Lorenz noted during the hearing that Ali had 
performed duties for the terrorist group, from propaganda to 
logistics, recruitment, and other activities.  (Note: In late 
May, the press started reporting on the 26 April arrest of 
the then unidentified Ali,s links to AQ, which were followed 
by quick statements by the prosecutor denying that the 
individual had any ties to terrorism.  That same week, during 
a meeting with CODEL Thompson, General Felix categorically 
denied the terrorism and AQ connection, even as he noted that 
it was a DPF matter.  End note.) 
 
¶3. (U) Lorenz further stated that Ali was not the first or 
only AQ-linked individual to have lived in or transited 
through Brazil.  He mentioned Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,s trip 
to Foz de Iguacu in 1995 (subject of a cover story in Veja 
magazine several years ago).  He further noted that the DPF 
has monitored several other "extremists" that have transited 
through Brazil or had taken up residence in the country. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
General Felix: We will never admit anything 
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¶4. (U) During the hearing, Felix testified that it was the 
government,s belief that terrorists could potentially use 
Brazilian territory for transit, to exploit its resources, or 
for safehaven.  He further added that, even as Brazil has 
maintained an aggressive posture to prevent such activity 
 
BRASILIA 00001206  002 OF 005 
 
 
from taking place, "we haven,t seen any confirmation that 
such activity has ever taken place, even if the media claims 
otherwise." 
 
¶5. (U) Faced with questions from Members of Congress who were 
keying off of Lorenz testimony, Felix added that Brazil,s 
public stance regarding the presence of terrorism is part of 
a deliberate strategy on the part of GSI and an assessment of 
what is in Brazil,s best long-term interest.  Felix noted 
that over the years he has had the opportunity to meet with 
officials from various countries at all levels, including 
those who affirm that there may be terrorists in Foz de 
Iguacu and Sao Paulo, and to date none of these countries 
that make these statements, going back to the AMIA bombing, 
have ever provided Brazil with evidence that this is the 
case.  He further added, with emphasis, that "even if a 
problem were to appear, we won,t admit that the problem 
exists."  According to Felix, this "denialism" is a posture 
that he believes will "protect" Brazil.  He observed that 
modifying this language could provoke actions by unwelcome 
elements and could set back a policy that, while it 
repudiates terrorism, seeks to avoid inviting or importing 
threats. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Yet, Threats Abound 
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¶6. (U) Felix characterized the theoretical risks Brazil faces 
as pretty low.  He added that, "because of our external 
policy, our domestic characteristics, our international 
projection, our image of a positive peaceful country with 
various ethnicities and religions interacting peacefully in 
harmony" there is little risk of attacks against Brazil.  At 
the same time, Felix recognized that the risks are not the 
same when discussing foreign structures within Brazil.  The 
situation in those cases is different, particularly when it 
comes to ideological or religious terrorism, which does not 
respect frontiers.  He cited Argentina,s experience, which 
suffered two attacks in the 1990,s against its Jewish 
community.  It shows, according to Felix, that even in a 
country that faces reduced risks against its own interests, 
it can suffer attacks against foreign interests in that 
country.  Felix also added that, because of Brazil,s vast 
territory and porous borders, it can be difficult to monitor 
the movement or activities of terrorists within Brazilian 
territory. 
 
¶7. (U) Lorenz disagreed with Felix,s characterization of the 
level of risk Brazil faces.  He noted that the DPF has 
followed terrorism since 1995, a year after the AMIA bombing. 
 In that time, DPF has seen several phases in the evolution 
of the terrorist threat in Brazil.  First, DPF began with the 
notion that terrorists could be transiting or hiding in 
Brazil, but that there was no threat of attacks in Brazil. 
Lorenz used KSM,s travel through Foz de Iguacu in December 
of 1995 to illustrate this phase.   Then the DPF started 
noticing that some of those who were transiting or hiding 
were beginning to establish residency in Brazil by marrying 
Brazilian women and adopting Brazilian children.  In a third 
stage, DPF began seeing that some Brazilians began to be 
captivated by extremist ideology and the idea of martyrdom. 
Some Brazilians have left Brazil for what the DPF believes is 
extremist religious instruction in Iran and other places in 
the Middle East.  Finally, the DPF has begun to see some of 
those foreigners that achieved permanent residency start 
preparations for acts outside the country and helping 
terrorist groups with recruitment, training, logistics 
support, and reconnaissance for terrorist actions not in 
Brazil.  This last stage, added Lorenz, was what the DPF saw 
in Ali,s case.  He added that the DPF,s perception is that 
things are evolving and that in this continuing evolution of 
activity, which still remains outwardly focused, could 
perhaps evolve in a different direction eventually. 
 
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Consensus on one thing: TBA not a problem 
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BRASILIA 00001206  003 OF 005 
 
 
¶8. (U) While offering differing views in some areas, both 
Lorenz and Felix agreed that the Triborder Area (TBA) is not 
a problem anymore.  According to Lorenz, the question of 
financing for groups for Islamic groups out of the TBA is a 
non-issue, adding that "we have found that Zakat is a normal 
thing."   He criticized attacks on Brazil from foreign 
countries, including the United States, that accuse Brazil of 
ignoring this fundraising, especially after the DPF has found 
that most of the money that goes from the TBA passes through 
the United States on its way to Lebanon.  "We have told the 
Americans,  I can guarantee that this money that goes to 
Lebanon passes through the United States, I can prove it"if 
you think this money is for terrorism, why won,t you stop it 
yourselves," adding,  we can give you the names and bank 
accounts.," Lorenz continued, "people who know TBA in the 
1990s, like I did, know that it is not now what it once was. 
It is now the Chinese criminal networks who are the most 
active there, not the Arabs." 
 
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Lack of Legislation a Problem 
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¶9. (U) Federal Deputy Raul Jungmann (PPS, Socialist People's 
Party, opposition; of Pernambuco) questioned Felix on 
Brazil,s failure to pass terrorism legislation.  He told the 
story of talking to an advisor to Minister of Justice Tarso 
Genro who told Jungmann that passing anti-terrorism 
legislation could actually invite terrorism into Brazil.  He 
finally asked Felix if Brazil could condemn terrorism in its 
constitution and various other laws, sign all 13 
international conventions against terrorism, have 
anti-terrorism divisions in the DPF and ABIN, why couldn,t 
it have it legislation dealing with terrorism?  Without 
directly answering Jungmann, both Felix and Lorenz 
acknowledged that the lack of terrorism legislation is a 
limitation for Brazil. The DPF acts, noted Lorenz, via 
connected crimes.  Lorenz stated that the DPF looks to see if 
terrorists are committing crimes related to terrorism, such 
as preparatory acts.  For example, he noted, a terrorist 
could enter the country to commit a terrorist act and the DPF 
would look at whether he used fraudulent documents or had 
immigration violations; if he were to use a car bomb, they 
would see if he stole a car.  In some cases, he added, the 
DPF has already used this approach to neutralize people with 
Islamic extremist leanings. 
 
¶10. (U) In the case of Ali, he used the LAN house (or 
cybercafe) he ran to lead and coordinate the activities of 
Jihad Media Battalion.  At the beginning, noted Lorenz, he 
used it for to perform propaganda on behalf of AQ,s cause. 
Later it turned ito a space for recruitment, support, 
training, communications, operational security, and battle 
orers for actions outside Brazil.  The DPF started te 
investigation after the FBI passed them an IP ddress used by 
a person in Brazil.  But, Lorenz dded, we arrested him not 
because of these activities, and not because of the battle 
orders to case places for actions outside Brazil, but through 
technical surveillance to decipher and break encryption his 
messages, which allowed us to find instances of hate crime, 
such as anti-Semitism and preaching hate against West.  Ali 
was not just engaging in hate crimes, Lorenz hastened to add, 
but that was enough to charge him for a crime, even if it was 
a lesser crime with low penalties. 
 
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Building new structures 
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¶11. (U) Responding to Congressional questions of what 
measures Brazil has taken to prevent terrorist activities in 
Brazil, Felix responded that in addition to signing all 13 UN 
and OAS conventions on the topic, which require actions by 
GOB, Brazil has cooperative relations with police and 
intelligence units with many countries.  In addition, he 
added, Brazil has been active in monitoring entry points and 
has progressively improved capabilities in this area.  Brazil 
has also focused on of military, federal police, and state 
police forces focused on combating terrorism.  Brazil, 
 
BRASILIA 00001206  004 OF 005 
 
 
according to Felix, has closely studied the Spanish model, 
particularly in the area of responding to attacks.  Felix 
noted that the Spanish response to the Madrid train bombings 
was very effective, as the trains were running shortly after 
the attacks. 
 
¶12. (U) Brazil is also, according to Felix, currently 
elaborating a bill for the "defense of sovereignty", which 
will update the old national security law.  The GSI-chaired 
Council on Foreign Relations and National Defense is working 
with MoJ on this proposal. (Note: the Council on Foreign 
Relations and National Defense, or CREDN, is a National 
Security Council-like body not to be confused with the 
Foreign Relations and National Defense Committees in Congress 
which also use CREDN for their initials.  End Note.). 
According to Felix, the CREDN working group is going to try 
to come up with a list of crimes that constitute terrorism, 
and noted that "eventual punishments are less important; more 
tricky is which crimes should be included."  He added that 
there were still some weeks to go before the working group 
finishes up its work, but that they would soon submit the 
proposal to the ministries and after that to the President 
for approval before being introduced before Congress. 
 
¶13. (U) Felix also discussed the newly created Nucleus of the 
Center for the Coordination of Activities for the Prevention 
and Combat of Terrorism, to be housed within GSI.  According 
to Felix, this nucleus emerged from discussions the GOB had 
in 2004-05 as part of a project to create a national 
counterterrorism authority, which would have created a 
national agency to prevent and combat terrorism.  In the end, 
noted Felix, they concluded that the attributes of an 
anti-terrorism "agency" would render it unworkable within the 
Brazilian system, so GSI decided on creating a "center." 
However, because of bureaucratic difficulties in creating 
such a center, GSI went ahead and proposed the creation of 
this nucleus. 
 
¶14. (U) The problem for GSI in creating a "center" is that it 
does not have its own personnel.  GSI officials are all 
seconded from other agencies.  According to Felix, GSI will 
be sending proposal to Congress to allow GSI to have its own 
personnel.  It will be staffed on a part-time basis by the 
officers that are detailed to GSI.   The nucleus will follow 
actions related to terrorism; promote threat assessment 
studies; and provide coordination among the various 
ministries.   (Comment: The "center" Felix referred to does 
not exist.  GSI needs statutory authority to be able to 
create a center that will have its own staff.  The newly 
created "nucleus" is in essence a proto-center, similar to 
the U.S. Terrorist Threat Integration Center, that could, 
after gaining statutory authority, eventually morph into a 
"center", or something somewhat equivalent to the U.S.,s 
National Counterterrorism Center.  End comment.) 
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Comment: Long-Term Engagement Needed 
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¶15. (C) Lorenz,s admission represented a rare instance in 
which a Brazilian public official admits that AQ-linked 
individuals are either in, or have transited through, Brazil. 
 That it was admitted publicly by one of Brazil,s top 
authorities on the subject of terrorism should give the 
United States some cover when engaging in 
counterterrorism-related dialogues with Brazil, including at 
the 3 Plus 1.  It will also be helpful as we engage Brazilian 
audiences on the issue of passing CT legislation.  In a 
surprising public admission, Felix, Lorenz, and members of 
Congress present at the hearing all agreed on the need to 
pass anti-terrorism legislation, with Lorenz stating point 
blank that the reason the Jihad Media Battalion,s Ali could 
not be charged with a more serious crime was inadequacy of 
current laws. 
 
¶16. (C) Unfortunately, the admission appears unlikely to 
change Brazil,s public posture.  While there appears to be 
an agreement in the GOB on the need to pass CT legislation, 
there is a lack of will to expend the political capital to do 
so. General Felix stuck to the script even as he was being 
 
BRASILIA 00001206  005 OF 005 
 
 
contradicted, a script we have also heard from interlocutors 
at Brazil,s foreign ministry.  Revealingly, Felix admitted 
that no matter what evidence is presented Brazil,s posture 
is deliberate and will not change.  The argument boils down 
to this:  Brazil is a racially, ethnically, and religiously 
harmonious society that engages in a correct and 
un-provocative foreign policy.  As a result, Brazil is not a 
target of terrorists.  In order to maintain this position, 
Brazil must do nothing that will make it a target, such as 
taking a higher-profile or more confrontational approach to 
counterterrorism efforts or actively looking to pass 
anti-terrorism legislation. 
 
¶17. (C) To further complicate matters, many senior officials 
in both the government and the opposition were labeled 
terrorists and suffered exile, prison, or in some cases 
torture, under the military regime that ended in 1985.  This 
is the case, for example, of the two most prominent 
presidential candidates to replace Lula in 2011, Lula,s 
minister of the Civil Household Dilma Rousseff and Sao 
Paulo,s opposition governor Jose Serra.  In addition, many 
in the current government fear that members of what they 
consider to be legitimate social movements fighting for a 
more just society might be branded terrorists.  Finally, 
Brazilians express concern that anti-terrorism legislation 
would be viewed as directed at Arab-Brazilians or Foz do 
Iguacu, and thus would become a divisive issues.  As a 
result, many Brazilian officials are uncomfortable with 
giving the state greater authority to fight terrorism. 
 
¶18. (C) This mindset presents serious challenges to our 
efforts to enhance counterterrorism cooperation or promote 
passage of anti-terrorism legislation. At the same time, with 
good operational cooperation on the issue between our law 
enforcement agencies, Brazil,s stated commitment to 
international anti-terrorism regimes, and work underway to 
draft a new national security law, there is every reason to 
enhance our engagement with the Brazilian government on this 
issue.  Although there is little chance of an immediate 
change in posture or that a new national security law will be 
seriously considered in Congress before the 2010 presidential 
elections, we should begin engaging the GOB now on this 
issue.  Securing passage of anti-terrorism legislation, 
changing the mindset of senior officials with regard to the 
threat that terrorism poses, and finding acceptable ways to 
cooperate on terrorism will be a long-term effort requiring 
commitment and creativity on our part.  In light of Brazil,s 
role as a regional leader and its growing role as a global 
power, the investment will likely pay dividends well beyond 
Brazil. 
KUBISKE