VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3362/01 2961421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231419Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0471
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0112
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0442
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0468
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BOGOTA 003362

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID PHUM PREF PTER MARR SNAR ETRD
ASEC, CO
SUBJECT: TELLING COLOMBIA'S STORY: FROM FAILING STATE TO STABLE ALLY

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (SBU) The Ambassador challenged the Embassy's Country Team to
critique and refine Post's strategic mission during the annual
offsite meeting on October 5.  The Country Team developed several
objectives for the coming year, including:  articulating and
promoting the USG message on human rights issues in Colombia;
making the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) more
operational in support of Colombia's National Consolidation Plan
(PNC); addressing the ubiquitous need for more police as the
country transitions to a post-conflict environment; using
programming and other resources to encourage rule of law and good
governance practices and to confront pervasive corruption; and
improving our reporting and briefing materials to better portray
Colombia's successes and failures.  End Summary.

COUNTRY CONDITIONS: THUMBNAIL OVERVIEW
--------------------------------------

¶2. (SBU) The Country Team assessed that the possible reelection of
President Uribe for a third term in 2010 will dominate all
political issues in the coming year.  While other qualified
candidates have emerged, none is considered to have a realistic
chance should Uribe run again.  Political and human rights scandals
that have plagued the Uribe Administration -- such as the GOC
electronic surveillance of the Supreme Court -- would likely
continue to haunt a third term.

¶3. (SBU) The Colombian public is becoming increasingly concerned
about economic conditions, particularly unemployment.  Colombia's
economic growth in 2009 is expected to slow to between to 0 and
negative 0.5 percent for the year, although the financial sector
remains solid.  Interest rate cuts and greater emphasis on export
diversification, infrastructure investments and competitiveness
will be essential to return Colombia's economy to sustained growth
in the long term.  The strong Colombian peso is negatively
affecting Colombian exports while helping to offset high tariffs on
U.S. products.  President Uribe remains deeply concerned about
passing the FTA before the elections in May of 2010.

¶4. (SBU) Colombia's regional relationships have become strained due
to the fallout over the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA).  Relations with Venezuela are rockier than normal, but there
are encouraging signs of a rapprochement with Ecuador.

¶5. (SBU) The overall security conditions in Colombia continue to
improve, though the military's momentum against the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has slowed over the past year as
the FARC have switched to asymmetrical tactics.  Coca cultivation
is more dispersed and migrating to more permissive environments
such as national parks, indigenous communities and border areas.
Emerging criminal groups (BACRIM) present an increasing threat in
many parts of the country, causing disturbing spikes in violence as
they battle with other illegal groups for control of the lucrative
drug trade.

OUR FIRST PRIORITY: STRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS
------------------------------------------

¶6. (SBU) Despite progress on human rights in Colombia, serious
concerns remain.  Over the coming year, Post plans to continue to
raise the profile of human rights issues in our strategic
communication, reporting, programming, and engagement with senior
GOC officials.

¶7. (SBU) More specifically, the Ambassador instructed the Country
Team to develop a human right agenda with the Government of
Colombia (GOC), identifying the key areas for improvement and our
suggested talking points.  The Country Team noted the need to:  a)
attack impunity by encouraging the GOC to prosecute current and
past human rights abuses; b) push for the implementation of the
Colombian military's well-defined human rights regimen; and c)
counter the GOC's tendency to stigmatize human rights NGOs and
human rights defenders.  (Note:  Septel will expand on these points
and propose follow-up actions. End note)

CSDI:  TRANSITIONING FROM PLAN COLOMBIA
---------------------------------------

¶8. (SBU) We reviewed progress to date under the Colombia Strategic
Development Initiative (CSDI), which was conceived during the
previous year's offsite as the successor to Plan Colombia.  CSDI is
the Embassy's inter-agency plan to support the GOC's National
Consolidation Plan (PNC) to expand state presence to areas
previously controlled by illegal armed groups.  We have formed a
CSDI executive committee comprised of section and Agency heads from
USAID, the Narcotics Affairs Section, the Military Group, and
Political in order to facilitate inter-agency coordination.
Presently, the Embassy is using existing funding to implement
priority projects.

¶9. (SBU) CSDI is initially focused on the following areas:
Meta/Buenaventura (in Central Colombia), Tumaco/Narino (in the
South), and Montes de Maria (in the North).  Two additional areas,
Choco/Uruba and Catatumbo/Bajo Cauca, could be ready for some CSDI
programs over the next 12 months, which would generally give the
CSDI broad coverage of the impoverished Pacific Coast.  The
civilian lead of the PNC has yet to take full charge of
consolidation efforts, leaving the Ministry of Defense
organizationally in front.  Other obstacles include the need for a
comprehensive security strategy to transition from military to
police in consolidated territories; more focus on alternative
development, social programs, and judicial reform to complement the
ongoingcounternarcotics strategy; stronger presence of the justice
sector and human rights promotion in CSDI areas; and increased
funding commitments from GOC civilian ministries.

MEASURING SUCCESS
-----------------

¶10. (SBU) We reviewed lessons learned under Plan Colombia and
discussed the need to develop a more holistic and accurate metric
with which to measure our progress under CSDI.  Rather than
focusing solely on hectares of coca/poppy eradicated and on drug
seizures, metrics should be expanded to include other indicators
such as:  hectares converted to licit production, individuals who
have switched to legal economic alternatives, and population

segments that have benefited from education initiatives and other
social investments.  In other words, the metric must capture the
whole story of our efforts.

RULE OF LAW IS KEY TO SUCCESS
-----------------------------

¶11. (SBU) The Country Team repeatedly emphasized the critical role
played by the Colombian National Police (CNP) in consolidation.  As
the GOC continues to recover national territory from the control of
illegal armed groups, the vacuum is often filled by drug
traffickers, with violent consequences for the general population.
Police presence is crucial for establishing a community presence in
newly consolidated areas.  Any increase in police forces must take
into account security concerns -- especially given the FARC's
recent announcement that it considers all PNC projects to be
legitimate military targets.  However, while the CNP has the
leadership capacity and organization to increase its presence
throughout Colombia, it lacks the infrastructure, personnel and
budget to do so.

¶12. (SBU) Looking broadly, expanded police presence should be
accompanied by the rest of the state entities that incorporate the
rule of law, namely, the Prosecutor General's Office, Human Rights
Ombudsman, and Inspector General.  We agreed to integrate these
rule of law issues into our CSDI planning process and our overall
strategy, resources and budget planning processes.

CORRUPTION:  A PERVASIVE PROBLEM
-----------------------------------

¶13. (SBU) In addition to serious infrastructure deficiencies in
roads and ports, Country Team members repeatedly identified
corruption as a significant problem in Colombia that limits growth
and investment.  An October 1 article in respected weekly "Cambio"
estimated that Colombia loses as much as $2 billion to corruption
each year, and that corruption in public contracts effectively
doubles the annual cost of democratic security.  We plan to tackle
corruption more directly in the coming year by increasing our
engagement with GOC Anti-Corruption Czar Oscar Ortiz; focusing on
good governance and rule of law initiatives, including through
public-private partnerships; encouraging Colombia to make its
procurement processes more transparent (for example by encouraging
them to become a signatory to the WTO chapter on government
procurement); and shining a light on corruption while at the same
time identifying and working with honest GOC officials.

ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS
----------------------

¶14. (SBU) We discussed management challenges and opportunities,
including the mission platform, space constraints, construction
plans, and future staffing needs.  We considered our longer-term
plans for the new Cartagena branch office.  The Country Team also
agreed that we should bolster our mentoring program for entry and
mid-level officers -- and open these opportunities up to other
sections outside of the traditional Foreign Service community.

TELLING COLOMBIA'S STORY
------------------------

¶15. (SBU) We discussed ways to improve our reporting and the
experiences we offer to visitors to Colombia.  Many Congressional
delegations and senior-level administration visitors have been
impressed by Colombia's progress under Plan Colombia.  At least one
member of Congress remarked that our Country Team briefing
materials could do a better -- and more personalized -- job of
relating Colombia's transition from nearly failed state to a
relatively stable U.S. partner.  Still others have commented that
Colombia has valuable lessons to share with respect to challenges
facing the USG elsewhere, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan.
We will incorporate these suggestions into our reporting and
briefing materials, and consider other media for visitors such as a
DVD with personal vignettes of Colombians whose lives have been
improved through USG assistance.
BROWNFIELD