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Viewing cable 09BEIJING2999, CHINA/FOOD SECURITY: STILL WARY OF ACTIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING2999 2009-10-30 08:58 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO4430
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2999/01 3030858
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300858Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6642
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0091
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 002999 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR 
USTR FOR STRATFORD/MAIN 
NSC FOR JIM LOI 
STATE FOR EEB/TPP/MTAA/ABT ARYAN 
STATE FOR C MPLOWDEN 
STATE FOR IO RHAGEN AND JTUMINARO 
USDA/OSEC FOR MMICHENER 
USDA/FAS FOR OGA/HOUSE 
FAS FOR OCRA/RADLER/SHEPPARD 
FAS FOR OFSO/WAINIO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EFIN EAGR EAID PREL CH
SUBJECT: CHINA/FOOD SECURITY: STILL WARY OF ACTIVE 
AFSI SUPPORT IN LEAD-UP TO ROME FAO SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 107298; B. Beijing 1727; C. Beijing 
2744 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: China continues to be 
unenthusiastic about actively supporting the 
L'Aquilla Food Security Initiative (AFSI), which it 
sees as a developed country initiative requiring 
developed country resources.  China would like to 
know more about how the U.S. plans to present AFSI 
principles in negotiations over declaration language 
for the November 16-18 Food Security Summit in Rome, 
and is also looking for concrete indications at the 
Summit that the AFSI donor pledge will materialize. 
Currently, Chinese interlocutors indicate that the 
initiative fails to address China's own food 
security concerns or acknowledge its bilateral food 
assistance.   This cable provides information in 
response to Ref A. End Summary. 
 
Message Delivered: We Want You On Board 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Ambassador on October 20 delivered to 
Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei the Secretary's 
letter (ref A) urging support for endorsing 
L'Aquilla Food Security Initiative (AFSI) principles 
at the November 16-18 World Food Security Summit 
hosted by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) in Rome ("the Rome Summit").  VFM He told the 
Ambassador that he understands the importance the 
Secretary places on the issue.  Post also provided a 
copy of the letter to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
China, The Doubting L'Aquilla Signatory 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) In a follow-up meeting on October 29, Lu 
Mei, Deputy Director in Division 2 of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department of International 
Organizations and Conferences, told Econoff that 
China is still studying the proposal and will 
respond formally in due time, which may be just 
before or at the November 16-18 World Food Security 
Summit hosted by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) in Rome. 
 
4. (SBU) Noting that MFA had just received a revised 
draft of the Rome Summit declaration from the FAO 
secretariat, Lu asked when and how the U.S. plans to 
introduce AFSI principles in negotiations over 
declaration language.  She commented that if the 
principles are not included in the Summit 
declaration, support will not be formalized.  Lu 
also asked about U.S. representation at the Summit, 
and said China's representation will be "quite high" 
-- above the Ministerial level. 
 
Goals for Rome: China Looking Out For "The South" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (SBU) Explicitly aligning China with other 
developing countries, Lu said this block of 
countries has problems with some of the principles 
in the L'Aquilla Food Security Initiative (AFSI) and 
the proposal accompanying the Secretary's letter. 
(Note: China endorsed the AFSI at the G8 Summit and 
sent their UN Ambassador to the Secretary's 
September Partnering for Food Security event in New 
York. End Note.)  Lu cited as an example the 
proposal to mention the Accra Agenda for Action 
(AAA), noting that the AAA is part of the Paris 
Declaration, about which many developing countries 
have concerns.  Lu said China is also not sure how 
the AAA will apply to the agriculture field, and is 
 
BEIJING 00002999  002 OF 003 
 
 
studying this issue.  China is also studying whether 
it can accept language in the newest draft of the 
Summit declaration on eliminating constraints on 
exports of food for humanitarian assistance, since 
food exports are a sensitive issue for China, 
according to Lu. 
 
6. (SBU) Lu also said developing countries are very 
keen to see developed countries delivering on the 
AFSI USD20 billion pledge.  Lu said it will be hard 
for countries to support the other AFSI principles 
if there is doubt about follow-through on this 
promise, and it would be helpful and important for 
developed countries to show concrete indications at 
the Rome Summit that they will deliver.  Lu 
emphasized that the USD20 billion goal is a 
developed country (as opposed to developing country) 
obligation. 
 
7. (SBU) Lu said that of the two main themes laid 
out in the FAO secretariat's letter to participants, 
China is focusing on the theme of governance of 
global food and agriculture trade and institutions. 
Lu opined that the other Summit theme, financing for 
agriculture development, "for now at least seems to 
always be there," apparently indicating that China 
itself will not focus on pressing donors to meet 
pledge commitments.  After the global financial 
crisis, fair trade and representation in decision- 
making for developing countries were key, according 
to Lu.  She explained further that China hopes the 
Summit will look at governance issues in a 
comprehensive way that includes broader issues such 
as trade and the Doha Round, commodity markets, the 
impacts of climate change, and climate change 
financing. (Comment: This comment reflects efforts 
by China and other developing countries to raise a 
range of issues at the Rome Summit that they think 
are not being addressed satisfactorily elsewhere. 
End Comment.) 
 
Comment: Gradually Bringing China into the Fold 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8. (SBU) China continues to show little interest in 
actively participating in many aspects of AFSI (Ref 
B) and is wary of stepping up as a high profile 
donor.  Beijing policy makers are aware that China's 
sheer size means it plays an important role in 
global food security, but at this point they are 
preoccupied with their own domestic food security 
concerns.  These concerns include skepticism about 
whether global markets can provide food security for 
a rapidly-growing China that is in turn influencing 
those markets, as well as the impact of commodity 
speculation on food prices (Ref B).  However, China 
sees the Rome Summit, not AFSI, as a forum where 
these issues can be addressed. 
 
9. (SBU) We may be able to overcome China's 
reticence regarding AFSI by showing that core 
Chinese concerns that the global economic system 
threatens China's food security can be addressed 
under AFSI.  We can also emphasize that China's 
preferred method of using bilateral assistance can 
occur under a donor coordination framework that is 
both controlled by developing countries and 
recognized under AFSI (e.g., the Comprehensive 
African Agriculture Development Initiative (CAADP). 
See Ref C).  Messaging can also acknowledge China's 
efforts to ensure its domestic food security as an 
important element impacting global food security, 
and note that these efforts make China uniquely 
qualified to play a key international role. 
 
BEIJING 00002999  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
HUNTSMAN