VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKB #0811/01 2821001
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091001Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1876
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//DCO-I//
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0082
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0686

UNCLAS BAKU 000811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC - JFRIEDMAN, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN 
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE - KBILGE 
CBP/INA FOR CSTALLWORTH, RWATT, KCHAISSON, CDONOFRIO 
USDOE/NNSA FOR TPERRY, RTALLEY 
DOC FOR PETERSEN-BEARD 
COAST GUARD FOR SHABTEMICHAEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP AJ
SUBJECT: EXBS: AZERBAIJAN ADVISOR MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE - 
September 2009 
 
¶I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS: 
 
¶A. An International Border Interdiction Course scheduled for the 
week of 21 September was cancelled due to the lack of MFA response 
to a diplomatic note requesting approval and names of students. 
 
¶B. Commander Ross Stroebel from the U.S. Coast Guard is in 
Azerbaijan for an intensive two week cooperative study of the 
Azerbaijani Coast Guard's (AJCG) maintenance, sustainability, and 
logistics capabilities.  A final report will be made available to 
the AJCG, DTRO, and EXBS. 
 
¶C.  Given that the State Border Service (SBS) is not currently 
participating in EXBS funded training no equipment purchases will be 
made for the SBS until which time they resume participation in EXBS 
training courses. 
 
¶D. The AJCG Commander expressed support for sending two junior AJCG 
officers to long term resident training in the U.S.  The EXBS 
Advisor is in the process of notifying the Government of Azerbaijan 
(GOAJ) through official channels with the goal of a training start 
date in mid 2010. 
 
¶E. GOAJ authorities reported the seizure of radioactive material at 
a port of entry on the Russian border.  The material seized was 
radium 226 in luminescent paint on Soviet-era aircraft dials. 
Further details in Paragraph E. 
 
 
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD 
 
¶A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS DURING REPORTING PERIOD: 
 
The Advisor continues to work with Mr. Fuad Maharramov of the Baku 
Center for Foreign Trade Security regarding the proposal for EXBS to 
fund a government to industry outreach website containing 
information regarding export control in Azerbaijan. 
 
2 September - The EXBS Advisor met with Deputy Commander of the 
State Border Service Major-General Farhad Taghizada at his request 
to discuss the future of EXBS/SBS cooperation.  The EXBS Advisor 
informed the General that if the SBS does not participate in EXBS 
funded training, no further equipment provisions will be made.  The 
General expressed dismay that cooperation between SBS and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection would be adversely affected and 
further stressed that SBS cooperation with the U.S. government 
should not be adversely effected by political issues between the USG 
and the GOAJ.  The EXBS Advisor agreed to pass his concerns to the 
Bureau but that as the situation currently stands, EXBS funded 
equipment provisions for the SBS are on hold. 
 
15 September - The EXBS Advisor met with members of the WMD-PPI team 
to discuss cooperative EXBS/DTRO efforts with the AJCG.  The WMD-PPI 
team members were Project Manager Kevin Sullivan and Project Officer 
Steven Frake.  The team discussed the details for the upcoming visit 
by a U.S. Coast Guard officer for a maintenance and sustainability 
assessment of the AJCG and to discuss the status of a pending EXBS 
funded equipment purchase for the AJCG. 
 
18 September - The EXBS Advisor submitted final comments on a draft 
report on strategic trade controls in Azerbaijan by the University 
of Georgia Center for International Trade and Secuity.  This draft 
report is an update to a previous similar report from 2005.  The new 
report illustrates that although Azerbaijan has made some very minor 
improvements in export controls since 2005 much improvement is still 
needed. 
 
24 September - The EXBS Advisor briefed a State Department 
Anti-Terrorist Assessment Team that was TDY to Baku.  The briefing 
covered all relevant information on border security issues in 
Azerbaijan. 
 
29 September - The EXBS Advisor met with Mr. Fuad Maharramov of the 
Baku Center for Foreign Trade Security to discuss options for 
payment of a contract to establish and maintain a website dedicated 
to government to industry outreach in the area of licensing and 
 
export control. 
 
¶B. TRAINING CONDUCTED DURING REPORTING PERIOD: 
 
NONE 
 
¶C. ITEMS DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD: 
 
Description              US $ Value 
 
¶D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE: 
 
TRAINING: 
 
NONE 
 
EQUIPMENT - Procurement in process: 
 
Description                   US $ Value 
Hand-held Trace Detectors/Analyzers           Out for bid 
Baggage X-ray System 
Radioisotope Identifiers 
X-ray Florescence Metal Analyzers 
Portal Type Metal Detectors 
Density Meter Kits 
Fiberscope Kits 
 
 
¶E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY: 
 
The 16 September seizure of innocent radioactive material at the 
Russian border crossing of Xanoba illustrated that the State Border 
Service (SBS) is at least at times utilizing the radiation portal 
monitors provided through the Department of Energy's Second Line of 
Defense Program.  However, the response procedure that took place 
during the incident illustrated a weak link in that the GOAJ agency 
responsible for responding to such seizures, the Institute for 
Radiation Problems (IRP), called the U.S. Embassy for financial 
support to mobilize a response to the incident.  Additionally, SBS 
officers have been trained extensively to identify and determine the 
difference between innocent or otherwise naturally occurring 
radioactive material (NORM) and isotopes of concern yet SBS 
leadership notified the IRP that they had seized "very dangerous 
radioactive material." The material turned out to be a minute amount 
of radium paint on Soviet era aircraft instrument panel dials. The 
IRP identified the material as radium 226 which is a commonly 
occurring commercial source of radiation.  As this is not an isotope 
of concern the IRP team left the seized items with the SBS officers 
at Xanoba.  Had the SBS officers properly used the SLD provided 
handheld equipment for a secondary inspection they could have 
identified the suspect material themselves thereby avoiding the need 
for IRP to respond.  The SBS has since not been forthcoming with any 
details regarding further action on the incident but the IRP has 
stated that they are no longer involved.  The overall response to 
the incident illustrates an immediate need for the GOAJ to evaluate 
and improve legislation related to radioactive material and further 
develop national response capabilities, plans, and procedures. 
 
 
POC for this report is David Hall, EXBS Advisor. 
 
LU