VZCZCXRO4726
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGB #2902/01 3031353
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301353Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5276
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002902 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/I, OES/STAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ENRG PBTS PREL SENV TPHY TRGY TSPL EAGR EAID
IR 
 
SUBJECT:  Reduced Turkish and Iranian Water Flows to Iraq's Tigris 
and Shatt Al Arab Rivers 
 
REF: Baghdad 2469 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Daily water flows into three major Iraqi dams 
(the Mosul, Dokan, and Derbendikahn) indicate significant reductions 
in waters crossing into Iraq from both Turkey and Iran.  Iranian 
river blockages and diversions contribute to low Tigris River and 
Shatt Al Arab water flows in Iraq.  Low flow conditions in the 
Tigris and Shatt Al Arab have led to significant backflow of highly 
saline water from the Arabian Gulf.  This backflow has rendered some 
water treatment plants ineffective, shut down a petrochemical 
facility and lowered production rates at a refinery, and reduced the 
quantity and quality of water available for irrigation.  Blockage of 
the Karkh River by Iran appears to have devastated the Iraqi side of 
the Al Huwaza Marsh, whose waters normally flow into the Tigris. END 
SUMMARY 
Tigris River Contributors and Recent Reductions in Flow 
¶2. (SBU) Total river water flow into Iraq has been estimated by 
various sources at between 65 billion cubic meters (BCM) in dry 
years to over 85 BCM in wet years.  The Tigris River and its 
tributaries contribute about 60 percent of this total flow (about 50 
BCM).  Approximately 50 percent of the Tigris River waters enter 
Iraq from Turkey.  Iranian rivers have historically contributed 
approximately 30 percent of the Tigris river flow.  (The remaining 
waters arise out of the mountains in Kurdistan within Iraq.)  While 
over 40 tributaries originate in the western mountains of Iran 
before crossing the border to join with the Tigris and the Shatt Al 
Arab Rivers, there are only four major Iranian tributaries:  the 
Lower Zab River (6.7 BCM) and the Diyala River (5.1 BCM) located in 
the northeastern corner of Iraq, and the Karkh River (6.4 BCM) and 
the Karun River (14.4 BCM) located near Basra.  The rainfall 
catchment basins for these four tributaries stretch across both 
Iraqi and Iranian territory, but the bulk of the river water results 
from the melting snowcaps of the Zagros mountain range in 
northwestern Iran.  A fifth large tributary to the Tigris River, the 
Upper Zab River (13.3 BCM), arises out of the mountains of Kurdistan 
and eastern Turkey. 
¶3. (SBU) In the last two years, flows from the major Iranian 
tributaries to the Tigris and Shatt Al Arab have dramatically 
decreased.  Evidence of the flow decrease in the Lower Zab and 
Diyala Rivers is shown in daily water data for the Dokan Dam on the 
Lower Zab River and the Derbendikahn Dam on the Diyala River near 
the Iranian border.  The average inflow rates from Iran into these 
dams during July-September 2009 have decreased 62 percent and 66 
percent, respectively, compared to July-September 2005, and 52 
percent and 64 percent, respectively, compared to July-September 
¶2007.  (Insufficient data exists to calculate average flow rates in 
2006 and 2008).  The limited available data indicates that the 
decreasing inflow rate may have begun in 2008. 
¶4. (SBU) Iran appears to have reduced the Karkh and Karun River 
flows into Iraq by constructing a sand berm (Karkh River) and canals 
(Karun River) that divert large amounts of water away from the Iraqi 
border.  Recent visual observation and unclassified photographs of a 
sand berm along the Iran-Iraq border indicate that the Karkh River 
(6.3 BCM) has been blocked, resulting in water pooling on the 
Iranian side of the border and dry land on the Iraqi side of the 
border.  Unclassified aerial photographs show Iranian diversion 
Qborder.  Unclassified aerial photographs show Iranian diversion 
canals that are drawing water from the Karun River inside Iran. 
This water then appears to be directed to a canal that flows just to 
the east of the Iraq-Iran border and south into the Arabian Gulf. 
¶5. (SBU) As measured at Iraq's Mosul Dam, Tigris River average 
inflows from Turkey have decreased significantly since 2005.  In 
2005 and 2007, the average water inflow rates of the Tigris into 
Iraq during July-September were 219 cm/s and 204 cm/s, respectively. 
 In 2009, the average water inflow rate of the Tigris during 
July-September had decreased to 153 cm/s. (Insufficient data exists 
to calculate average flow rates in 2006 and 2008.)  The limited 
available data indicates that the decreasing inflow from Turkey may 
have begun in 2008. 
Water Blockages and Diversions Have Significant Downstream Impact 
¶6. (SBU) The decreasing water inflows from Iran and Turkey and a 
regional drought have caused severe impacts from Kirkuk in the north 
to Basra in the south.   In recent years, the Derbendikahn Dam, fed 
by the Diyala River, has seen dramatic drops in water level. 
Another dam (Dokan Dam) is fed by the Lower Zab River, which is a 
major source of water for the city of Kirkuk.  The Dokan Dam's water 
level over the last two years is lower than it has been in the 
previous four years.  According to the Foreign Agricultural Service 
(FAS), careful management of the remaining water in the dam as well 
as in other parts of Iraq is necessary to ensure adequate soil 
moisture and surface water availability going into the sowing season 
for wheat and barley.' 
¶7. (SBU) In Basra province, low river water flows from Karkh River 
blockages and Karun River diversions have allowed the Arabian Gulf 
to intrude up to 60 kilometers north of the mouth of the Shatt Al 
Arab.  This highly saline water pollutes water treatment plant 
intakes and irrigation canals and has interfered with at least one 
 
BAGHDAD 00002902  002 OF 002 
 
 
petrochemical plant.  Karkh River blockage has also had a 
devastating effect on the Iraqi side of the Al Huwaza Marsh.  Flow 
that used to exit the Al Huwaza Marsh from the south side and join 
the Tigris River is nonexistent, and only patches of small stagnant 
pools of water can be seen from the air.  An area of the Al Huwaza 
that was described as "Nice Marsh" by USG personnel during aerial 
reconnaissance last year is today dry land with no water and no 
vegetation. 
¶8. (SBU) According to the Minister of Water Resources, salinity 
concentrations in the town of Sibah, located 40 km south of Basra 
near the mouth of the Karun River, have reached 9 parts per 
thousand. That contrasts to the World Health Organization standard 
of no more than 1 part per thousand.  For agricultural uses, the 
standard is no more than 2 parts per thousand.  Amer Salman, head of 
Basra Agriculture Directorate stated in September that "The salinity 
level has made it impossible to use the water for drinking and 
irrigation, animals and agriculture.  This is a real and serious 
catastrophe and it will probably affect the down-town area of Basra 
soon."  A Ministry of Water Resources October 2 statement said, "The 
province of Basra suffers from scarcity of fresh water after the 
majority of desalination plants stopped due to the high percentage 
of salt in the water."  Recent news reports from Basra indicate that 
the Petrochemical Plants Compound shut down for several weeks due to 
high salinity in the Shatt Al Arab.  In addition, according to oil 
refinery officials in Baghdad, the Basra refinery is experiencing 
reduced production rates due to salt water in its intakes. 
Efforts to Mitigate Negative Impact 
¶9. (SBU) Humanitarian efforts are ongoing in Basra Province to 
counteract the effects of diminished and ineffective water treatment 
capabilities due to the high salinity concentrations. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are contributing water storage 
tanks in Al Fao and Sibah, and UNICEF and the U.S. military are 
providing 150,000 and 600,000 liters per day of potable water to the 
region, respectively.  (Comment:  The U.S. military contract for the 
provision of water is scheduled to end on January 1.  End Comment) 
The U.S. military is also refurbishing water treatment plants and 
supply lines in the area to facilitate increased flow from water 
sources other than the highly saline Shatt Al Arab. 
¶10. (SBU) The Government of Iraq (GOI) has announced medium- and 
long-term steps to improve water treatment and supply in Basra 
province.  The GOI has approved funding of a $20 million pipeline to 
transport lower salinity waters from the north of Basra to the 
southern towns perched along the banks of the Shatt Al Arab.  The 
government has purchased eight desalination units to be installed in 
Al Fao and Sibah and has preliminarily approved funding for the 
construction of a dam system on the Shatt al Arab that would 
eventually impede the backflow of salt waters from the Arabian Gulf. 
 In addition, according to the Deputy Minister of Municipalities and 
Public Works, the GOI has published a tender to obtain 325 low 
capacity (1-5 cm/hr) solar powered desalination units to be 
distributed to smaller villages in the most affected areas. 
¶11. (SBU) Long-term water planning is also being addressed by the 
GOI.  Three firms, British, Italian, and Russian, responded to a 
tender to develop a 30-year strategic water plan for the country. 
This plan will provide a realistic estimate of present and future 
QThis plan will provide a realistic estimate of present and future 
agricultural, industrial, and potable water requirements and 
expected water availability for the country.  As discussed reftel, 
available water resources must be managed properly in order to 
maximize beneficial usage of this resource. 
Comment:  Water Realities 
¶12. (SBU) Iraq is in a tenuous position with regards to water.  Iraq 
is surrounded by traditionally dry countries that appear ready to 
fully utilize the water that travels through their territory.  Since 
Iraq is a downstream riparian state, it must develop an overall 
water strategy that includes a strong water rights negotiating 
position, an achievable water management plan, and water treatment 
facilities that have the ability to desalinate brackish and sea 
waters.