VZCZCXRO8232
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2846/01 2961229
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231229Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5200
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002846 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
NEA/I FOR WWEEMS, CWELLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TEAM LEADERS CONFERENCE:  MANAGING 
RELATIONSHIPS AND CHANGE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 00386 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Baghdad's Office of Provincial 
Affairs (OPA) held its quarterly Team Leaders Conference of 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) at Forward Operating 
Base (FOB) Adder, home to the Dhi Qar PRT.  Embassy, NEA, and 
military officials briefed Team Leaders on plans for the 
changing PRT footprint in light of U.S. troop withdrawals and 
decreased funding, emphasizing the change in emphasis from 
infrastructure restoration to capacity building. 
Participants discussed forging civilian-military teams and 
the best use of local Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in PRT 
operations. National elections will be a focus of PRT 
activity over the next several months, and the Embassy will 
look to PRTs for reporting and analysis.  In breakout groups 
and question and answer sessions, OPA and Team Leaders 
discussed strategic priorities and transition issues in the 
context of building Iraqi capacity in critical areas such as 
water, agriculture, land reform, and the economy.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
FRAMING THE CHALLENGE: IMPLEMENTING U.S. GOALS IN A NEW 
ENVIRONMENT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) Minister Counselor for Political-Military Affairs, 
Ambassador Cameron Munter, addressed partnering with the U.S. 
military.  The 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) between the 
Department of State and the Department of Defense outlines 
how the Military and the Embassy will set goals and measure 
achievements.  Unlike the previous plan, however, the JCP 
contains timelines: August 2010 when U.S. forces reduce from 
130,000 to 50,000, and December 2011, when all U.S. combat 
forces are scheduled to leave Iraq.  Another implementation 
strategy lists the military's non-security functions, and 
then determines which roles civilians (including the UN and 
NGOs) can play, and which functions can be eliminated. This 
last "handover" will help determine OPA's resource allocation 
post-August 2010 and post-December 2011. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Minister Counselor for Political Affairs, Ambassador 
Gary Grappo, reviewed the U.S. vision for Iraq, including 
Iraq's evolving relations with its neighbors.  He identified 
the following as the five greatest internal challenges facing 
Iraq: sectarianism; political development; economic capacity 
building, services, health, and education; balance of power 
between branches of government; and Arab-Kurd tensions.  On 
elections, Ambassador Grappo explained the importance of the 
passage of an elections law but noted that political deal 
making and coalition building would happen after the 
elections.  He urged PRTs to develop provincial strategy 
papers based on the Mission's election strategy plan, and to 
continue reporting from their unique vantage points. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  NEA's Chris Wells presented the Washington 
perspective on the civilian presence in the provinces. 
Accompanying the military drawdown, ePRTs will close by Aug 
31, 2010.   By May 2011 the Department of State will take 
over operation of the enduring sites and eliminate several 
more PRTs.  Washington's long-term goal is two consulates and 
a few Provincial Diplomatic Teams (final numbers and 
locations to be determined). 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Director for Assistance Coordination at Embassy 
Baghdad, Russ Schiebel, outlined the Mission's transition 
goals.  In the face of a shrinking budget allocation for 
Iraq, he emphasized that the PRTs' should focus on 
governance, rule of law, capacity building, and economics. 
The objective is to develop Iraq's self-reliance. 
 
 
EYES ON THE PRIZE:  NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (SBU) A session on the national elections scheduled for 
Q6. (SBU) A session on the national elections scheduled for 
January 2010 highlighted the Mission's focus on supporting a 
credible and Iraqi-led process.  PRTs must identify media 
outlets, assist in voter education programs, and report. 
Although the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) 
wants international observers at the election, no countries 
have yet committed to providing them.  LTG Charles Jacoby, 
Commander Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) pledged military 
support in election efforts, noting that this support is 
contingent upon a request from IHEC. 
 
¶7. (U) According to USAID's Deputy Director of the Democracy 
and Governance, USAID will provide training, database 
development, information technology programming, supplies and 
equipment, and ballot development for the election as part of 
 
BAGHDAD 00002846  002 OF 003 
 
 
its ongoing electoral assistance program. 
 
 
THE VIEW FROM MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU) LTG Jacoby identified four potential game-changers: 
Unsuccessful Sunni reconciliation, Shi'a opportunism, GoI 
democratic failings, and Arab-Kurd tensions.  PRT efforts, 
meanwhile, in governance, rule of law, and economic 
development can reinforce stability.  Reflecting on the 
transition of U.S. Forces out of Iraq's cities on June 30, 
General Jacoby called this shift "a tactical challenge, but a 
strategic imperative," one that has made the partnership 
between U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces stronger.  This 
relationship is based on Iraqi sovereignty and the legitimate 
desire to partner with U.S. forces.  Looking ahead, General 
Jacoby cited national elections, the reduction of U.S. 
Forces, and the transition from MNF-I to US Forces-Iraq 
(USF-I) as decisive points over the coming months. 
 
 
WORKING WITH IRAQ ON ITS PRIORITIES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU) Acknowledging that U.S. efforts must dovetail with 
Iraqi priorities, Team Leaders urged the Embassy to encourage 
the central government to pass national laws and define 
national strategies for water, agriculture, land reform, and 
economic investment.  Only after the GOI defines macro-level 
policy can real progress occur at the provincial, let alone 
district, level.  As one Team Leader explained, "Training in 
economic activity is useless if there is no national Iraqi 
economic policy to encourage or even allow local 
entrepreneurism...and more advanced activities like foreign 
investment will never come without sound policies." 
 
 
CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (U) Civilian and military participants agreed that a key 
to PRT success is cooperation between the Team Leader and 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Commanding Officer.  The Team 
Leader and Deputy Team Leader of PRT Diwaniyah presented best 
practices from their collaboration, emphasizing that personal 
relationships set the tone.  Many Team Leaders urged that PRT 
members attend brigade meetings to foster cooperation, as 
well as host social functions to build esprit de corps.  The 
third piece of the PRT is the Military Support Element, and 
participants emphasized the need to ensure these members are 
invested in the process. 
 
¶11. (U) The Diwaniyah Deputy Team Leader noted that for the 
military to put into practice the civilian-led effort, the 
Commander's Intent must make clear that the PRT has the reins 
in economics and governance issues.  Military commanders need 
to see that the PRT and BCT can work together.  As one Team 
Leader put it, the question BCT Commanders should be asking 
is not "What can the PRT do to help the military win the 
war?," but rather, "What can the military do to help the PRT 
win the peace?" 
 
¶12. (U) Many conference participants cited the need to 
coordinate PRT and BCT efforts on civil capacity projects. 
Where possible, teams link QRF and CERP projects to achieve a 
goal, such as using CERP for construction and then QRF to 
stock it with computers and train staff.  Some PRTs have a 
regular Project Working Group comprised of individuals 
representing the PRT, Brigade, and local actors such as 
directors general or district level council members.  Several 
participants cited the satellite PRT concept, where a 
civilian embeds with a military battalion in a Qada 
(district) outside of the provincial capital. 
 
 
SUSTAINING EFFORTS THROUGH LOCAL STAFF 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13. (SBU) OPA encouraged PRTs to recruit local Subject 
Q13. (SBU) OPA encouraged PRTs to recruit local Subject 
Matters Experts (SMEs) in order to create a lasting presence 
in the provinces.  Advantages of hiring SMEs include low 
cost, quick personnel actions, and their ability to move 
freely around cities and towns.  In addition, bringing them 
on board will give the teams the much-needed institutional 
memory and continuity of effort that will be essential when 
the PRTs are downsizing. 
 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002846  003 OF 003 
 
 
WHAT WE WANT: OPA'S TO-DO LIST 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶14. (SBU) Team Leaders' primary concern was policy guidance 
from the Embassy.  OPA is creating a lessons-learned 
initiative and working to preserve institutional knowledge 
through a classified Intellipedia site. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Other requests and notable areas of concern: 
     * Lack of coordination among PRTs.  OPA should 
facilitate communications. 
     * Help and guidance on how to encourage local elections. 
 Some recommended a two-pronged strategy with the Embassy 
pressing the idea with the GoI in Baghdad and PRTs talking 
with local leaders. 
     * Embassy does not put out adequate information in 
Arabic.  PRTs want more material translated, such as speeches 
by President Obama and statements by Ambassador Hill. 
     *In some provinces, USAID representatives do not share 
information or cooperate on projects and funding. 
     *In order to present a more "civilian" appearance to 
local interlocutors, where security permits, PRTs would like 
to travel in non-tactical vehicles.  OPA allowed that PRTs 
can make such moves with the concurrence of BCT commanders 
and RSO. 
     *Team Leaders want details on the staffing and base 
location plan through 2011 as the U.S. Military draws down in 
Iraq. 
     *As the number of PRTs shrinks and SMEs play an 
increasing role, the Embassy should budget for more SMEs 
along with computers, cell phones, and other supplies for 
each. 
     *Some form of interoffice mail (perhaps through RSO Air) 
would improve efficiency.  PRTs have to make special trips to 
Baghdad to retrieve team members' passports or deliver/drop 
off program money. 
 
 
OTHER CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶16. (SBU) Other sessions focused on the military's mission 
change from counterinsurgency (COIN) to security force 
assistance (SFA) and civil support operations (CSO), working 
groups of regional blocs, and a tour of a training facility 
developed by PRT Dhi Qar that provides a venue for 
international trainers to train Iraqis in everything from 
health care to cheese-making.  Training facility staff also 
hosted participating Team Leaders for a lunch that featured 
governors and provincial council representatives from the 
provinces of Dhi Qar, Muthanna and Maysan. 
FORD