VZCZCXRO3278
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2804/01 2921033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191033Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5139
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL-I 
JUSTICE FOR ODAG 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINS CASC IZ
SUBJECT: Dyncorp CP Incident Highlights Need for Additional PSD 
Oversight 
 
REF: Baghdad 1720 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: On September 28, Iraqi soldiers manning an 
international zone (IZ) checkpoint beat four U.S. citizen members of 
a Dyncorp International (DI) personal security detail (PSD) convoy. 
The DI PSD had violated at least two Embassy checkpoint policies, as 
well as Iraqi instructions.  Nevertheless, Iraqi reaction was a 
grossly disproportionate and punitive use of force.  The Embassy 
remained abreast of the situation, contributed information to the 
DOD-led (successful) effort to free the DI personnel, verified the 
citizenship of the victims, and submitted a diplomatic note of 
protest to the MFA.  INL subsequently instructed DI to remove the 
four PSD members from Iraq, which has occurred, and underscored that 
DI personnel must comply with all Iraqi laws and regulations, 
particularly at checkpoints.  DI meantime has implemented a top-down 
review of Embassy checkpoint policy with all of its PSD members. 
Nevertheless, the incident underscores the utility of having Arabic 
speakers join U.S. PSD convoys.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) According to DI accounts, on September 28 at 1712 hours 
Iraqi soldiers stopped and searched a DI convoy at IZ Entry Control 
Point Number Four (ECP-4).  After reportedly soliciting smoke 
grenades from the occupants of each vehicle, Iraqi guards permitted 
two of the three cars in the motorcade to depart CP-4.  The 
assistant PSD leader who was in the third car tried to obtain the 
name of the senior Iraqi official at the CP. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The violent Iraqi reaction apparently was sparked when 
the assistant PSD leader photographed the senior Iraqi military 
official on scene after the Iraqi declined to provide his name.  Per 
DI's initial report, Iraqi soldiers pulled the four PSD members from 
their vehicle, stripped them of their weapons and equipment, and 
physically assaulted them at gun point.  The beatings reportedly 
continued after the Iraqis transferred the DI PSD members to Brigade 
Headquarters.  One DI employee said that he had been struck in the 
abdomen and lower back repeatedly with a 45-pound barbell while in 
custoday at the Brigade Headquarters.  Another reported that he 
sustained numerous blows to the head by an AK-47 butt stock. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  A U.S. Army officer was able to secure the release of the 
DI PSD members and most of their confiscated equipment (not 
including one Beretta pistol) that evening.  The four DI employees 
received medical treatment that night at Sather AFB's Combat Support 
Hospital.  Three of the four were discharged, but the fourth was 
held overnight with a reported concussion and possible cervical or 
spinal injuries. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Immediately after DI informed the Embassy of the 
incident,  the consular officers verified the PSD team members' U.S. 
citizenship and began preparations to request a consular visit. 
(NOTE: The Iraqis released the PSD team before the consular officer 
engaged the MFA. END NOTE) RSO investigators interviewed the PSD 
members and spoke to other DI personnel.  The Embassy subsequently 
submitted a diplomatic note of protest requesting that Iraqi 
officials investigate the physical mistreatment of the four American 
citizens, take appropriate measures to ensure that other instances 
Qcitizens, take appropriate measures to ensure that other instances 
of mistreatment of Americans or USG employees do not occur in Iraq, 
inform all military and law enforcement agencies of their 
obligations under Iraqi law, and urge the Government of Iraq to 
investigate the matter and bring offenders to justice.  The acting 
DCM reiterated this message in a meeting with FM Zebari. RSO and 
their local military counterparts are drafting a directive 
establishing clear guidelines for PSDs operating in Iraq that will 
be distributed to all parties. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  On September 29, INL Baghdad instructed DI to remove the 
four PSD members from Iraq immediately, and to implement a top-down 
review of Embassy checkpoint policy with the DI PSD members who 
remain in Iraq.  Both INL and RSO stressed that DI personnel must 
obey all local laws and regulations.  The RSO and MNF-I, meanwhile, 
are developing a plan to communicate checkpoint policy to all USG 
contractors.  All four PSD members involved in the incident departed 
from Iraq to Washington, D.C. on October 2.  Per INL's instruction 
to DI, these individuals will not return to service in Iraq. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶7.  (SBU)  The DI PSD violated at least two Mission policies on 
 
BAGHDAD 00002804  002 OF 002 
 
 
checkpoint conduct, and these actions probably provoked or elevated 
the violent response by the Iraqi guards.  Nevertheless, the Iraqi 
guards' reaction was a grossly disproportionate and punitive use of 
force at the checkpoint and subsequently at the Brigade 
Headquarters. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) This incident underscores the utility of having Arabic 
speakers in each PSD.  The recently completed INL in-county PSD 
training program could be used to vet, train and employ Iraqi Arabic 
speaking local nationals within PSD convoys.  DI is exploring this 
option, as the September 28 incident might not have occurred if the 
DI PSD had included an Arabic speaker schooled in the most effective 
ways to communicate directly with Iraqis. 
 
FORD