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RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2785/01 2881542
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151542Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5108
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002785 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR ECON IZ
SUBJECT:  ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS ON HOLD 
 
REF:  (A) BAGHDAD 2576, (B) BAGHDAD 2766; (C) BAGHDAD 2695 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT.  As Iraq anticipates the release of a 
new anti-corruption strategy (Ref A), three statutes that would 
strengthen institutional frameworks remain pending in parliament, 
while a separate, general anti-corruption statute is still being 
reviewed by the Council of Ministers.  These four draft laws were 
introduced in 2008 and, if passed as a package, could help anchor 
the strategy, if not fully define it.  Their strong emphasis on 
enforcement fits well with UNCAC's approach, but complementary 
statutes (on governance, economics, education and media) are 
necessary to truly entrench the strategy.  We do not anticipate 
movement on these statutes in the near term, as parliament focuses 
on amending and approving the national elections law and questioning 
ministers (refs B and C).  Should they pass, the anti-corruption 
laws would represent some major advances -- such as the introduction 
of plea bargaining and improved liaison with international partners 
and expanded abilities to pursue cases.  They may also portend 
possible administrative weakening and a reconfiguration of the 
Commission of Integrity that could make it more like a U.S. 
prosecutor's office and less like an Iraqi FBI (i.e., a passive 
recipient, rather than an initiator, of cases).  END SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Iraq's ratification of the UN Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) in March 2008 highlighted the need to strengthen 
the institutional foundations for anti-corruption efforts.  Leaders 
of Iraq's anti-corruption institutions -- the Commission of 
Integrity (COI), the Inspectors General (IG's), and the Board of 
Supreme Audit (BSA) -- negotiated four draft laws to provide a basic 
framework of oversight and enforcement.  Three of these laws were 
packaged together and submitted to the Council of Ministers in June 
¶2008.  They seek to replace CPA Orders 55, 57, and 77, which 
governed operations of the COI, IG's, and BSA respectively.  The 
fourth statute -- presented in November 2008 -- seeks to broaden the 
definition of corrupt acts and add teeth to enforcement. 
 
COI Draft Law is a Mixed Bag on Enforcement 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) From 2003-06, the COI enjoyed substantial legal powers and 
strong leadership but lacked manpower and training.  Nonetheless, in 
that period it attempted to press several cases against powerful 
politicians.  This activism and poor security in Iraq brought 
threats that forced the emigration of then-COI Commissioner Judge 
Radhi.  In response to Judge Radhi's activism, unwelcome in some GOI 
quarters, the June 2008 draft sought to weaken the Commission's 
investigative powers by requiring that COI first loop in ministry 
IG's to supervise all investigations.  At present, the COI is not 
required to loop in IG's but may conduct investigations on its own 
and then submit the findings to an investigative judge for further 
disposition.  The proposed draft also would permit the COI to 
dismiss a corruption case if it determines the case lacks merit. 
 
¶4.  (U)  While the June 2008 draft weakens COI's prosecutorial 
powers, it would potentially strengthen enforcement by permitting 
COI to investigate sudden enrichment of a broader range of family 
members of government officials than current law permits.  The June 
draft also introduced a new administrative structure, adding a 
second deputy commissioner for COI.  A second COI draft was 
introduced in March 2009, revising the administrative structure of 
COI to include a board of directors that would further flatten 
governance of the institution. 
Qgovernance of the institution. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) COMMENT:  On enforcement, both the 2008 and 2009 drafts 
would moderately circumscribe the COI's powers.  On the 
administrative side, the 2009 draft appears to mirror power-sharing 
structures that have arisen elsewhere to establish a quota or 
"muhassasa" arrangement for Iraq's three main ethnic/sectarian 
groups.  The second draft would dilute power structures even 
further.  Efforts to flatten governance show continued mistrust of 
the COI by some GOI elements as officials try to insert additional 
nodes of influence.  On balance, while the COI would emerge under 
either draft law with some expanded powers of investigation, it 
would also confront additional decision-making and enforcement 
turnstiles that could reduce its independence.  Of the three 
institutional statutes being considered, the COI drafts would have 
the greatest impact, effectively making COI more like an American 
prosecutor's office than the FBI in that it would then receive cases 
from others rather than launch the inquiries on its own.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
Inspectors General or General Inspectors? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Prior to the fall of Saddam, several ministries had a 
"General Inspector" who acted as an "administrative enforcer" for 
the Ba'ath party.  CPA Order 57 therefore created a new system of 
"Inspectors General" to provide internal oversight as practiced in 
the West.  The 35 Inspectors General today possess widely divergent 
skill levels and resources, ranging from the Ministry of the 
 
BAGHDAD 00002785  002 OF 003 
 
 
Interior's IG office (with 80 well-trained investigators per 
approximately 400,000 employees) to that at the Ministry of 
Education (2 investigators for an agency of 500,000).  The June 2008 
draft IG law would designate IG's as the principal agents for 
uncovering and conducting initial investigations in federal 
ministries, taking over those authorities from COI.  The IG's would 
also gain power by being accorded higher rank (equivalent to deputy 
ministers) and protection from ministerial dismissal by requiring 
the Prime Minister's consent for such action.  (NOTE:  At present, 
the power to dismiss IG's rests with their respective ministers. 
END NOTE.) 
 
A Super-Inspector General? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In July 2008, Dr. Adel Moshin (then PM Advisor on 
anti-corruption and also IG for Health) introduced a competing IG 
bill that provided for a new stand-alone body for a "Super-Inspector 
General."  This Super IG would supervise the IGs, establish a common 
IG policy, and report to the Prime Minister.  He would also oversee 
the IG reports and assure that IG recommendations would be 
implemented.  This draft supplanted the earlier draft during 
parliamentary review. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  On balance, the first draft IG law would 
enhance the anti-corruption regime by strengthening the IG's; in the 
context of highly fractured government, it also gives the Prime 
Minister new leverage over ministers by giving him both appointment 
and dismissal power over IG's.  The second draft appears to overdo 
those controls by subsuming IG independence into the orbit of an 
official appointed by the Prime Minister.  END COMMENT. 
 
Auditors with Badges 
-------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) For most of its history, the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) 
had the power to investigate and submit findings to an investigative 
judge.  Saddam removed the investigative powers in the early 1990s 
to diminish oversight of his government.  CPA Order 77 did not 
restore BSA's investigative power, but instead transferred it to the 
COI.  (NOTE:  CPA officials saw BSA as Iraq's GAO and COI as Iraq's 
FBI.)  The current draft BSA law restores some investigative powers 
to the BSA. 
 
¶10. (SBU) COMMENT:  Allowing BSA to have some investigative powers 
-- along with COI and the IG's -- potentially boosts anti-corruption 
efforts by allowing more than one agency to have real teeth.  If, 
however, the three investigative agencies are coopted by different 
parties or sects to target one another, anti-corruption efforts are 
distorted.  In any event, the equilibrium achieved by submitting 
parallel COI, BSA, and IG statutes was disrupted by Adel Mohsin's 
super IG initiative, as noted.  Lawmakers have also been quite 
divided on the issue of new administrative structures for COI.  The 
BSA law -- seemingly the least controversial -- has not received any 
Council of Representatives (COR) readings, pending resolution of the 
COI/IG controversy.  END COMMENT. 
 
Omnibus Law Broadens Penalties, 
Incentives, Structures and Authorities 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) A fourth draft law would serve as an omnibus 
anti-corruption law, consistent with  UNCAC requirements.  It would 
strengthen existing anti-bribery laws making it illegal to offer a 
bribe to private sector officials, and for public officials to 
accept gifts or misuse their office.  (COMMENT:  Some of these 
provisions would be considered under U.S. system as overly broad or 
too vague.  END COMMENT.)  The statute would also empower the COI to 
offer rewards for turning in corrupt actors.  In a major departure 
from Iraqi jurisprudence, the draft would also permit plea 
Qfrom Iraqi jurisprudence, the draft would also permit plea 
bargaining.  The draft strengthens the conflict-of-interest 
provisions and allows the anti-corruption institutions to engage 
international partners without direct MFA involvement.  The draft 
contains provisions for a specialized court to hear corruption 
cases.  The draft also gives statutory authority for the Joint 
Anti-Corruption Council (a coordinating body chaired by the Council 
of Ministers Secretary General, that includes the three main 
anti-corruption bodies and the head of the Iraqi Higher Tribunal) to 
coordinate a national anti-corruption strategy and a new corruption 
monitoring center. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The omnibus provision to appoint the JACC to 
oversee the UNCAC may be a mixed blessing; on the one hand, it would 
cement the anti-corruption concept in the Iraqi body politic, on the 
other, it could provide an opening for leverage by the Prime 
Minister.  And while provisions to introduce plea bargaining and 
direct links to international enforcement are solid gains for 
anti-corruption efforts, the omnibus bill has virtually no strong 
advocates and remains stalled in the Council of Ministers.  Indeed, 
none of the four bills are likely to become law before January 
elections. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002785  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Overall, the changes proposed in 
these laws indicate Iraq intends to treat corruption principally as 
a law enforcement matter, reflecting UNCAC's main focus and the 
mandates of those bodies that shaped Iraq's strategy.  They offer 
only minor reinforcement of current efforts to promote transparency, 
accountability, and public awareness, other elements of most 
anti-corruption regimes.  For those, Iraq will need other 
legislative and regulatory measures to complement its core 
anti-corruption statutes.  END COMMENT.