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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD2705, NGO'S SEEK ROLE IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD2705 2009-10-07 14:27 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO4413
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2705/01 2801427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071427Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4990
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002705 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR ECON IZ
SUBJECT:  NGO'S SEEK ROLE IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION 
 
REF:  (A) BAGHDAD 2577; (B) BAGHDAD 2385 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Embassy's Anti-Corruption Coordinator's 
Office (ACCO) hosted a half-day seminar on September 28 to advance 
coordination between Iraq's anti-corruption institutions and members 
of Iraqi civil society.  Participants agreed on the need for civil 
society to take a more prominent role in anti-corruption efforts, 
while acknowledging that both the institutions and civil society 
were still nascent entities with only a limited track record for 
cooperative engagement.  NGO's also complained about the overall 
social and political environment which they said was enabling, not 
thwarting, corruption.  Ideas for next steps included new laws for 
the institutions and NGO's, an oversight board for NGO's, an 
enhanced role for the media, and broader dialog between NGO's and 
the main anti-corruption agencies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
UNCAC and the New Strategy 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  ACCO hosted a half-day seminar on September 28 to bring 
together Iraq's anti-corruption institutions and members of civil 
society to discuss national anti-corruption efforts. 
Representatives of Iraq's Commission on Integrity (COI), Inspectors 
General, and approximately 30 NGO's attended, along with 
representatives from MNC-I, POL, ECON, ROL, CLA, and Iraqi media. 
 
3.  (U) In opening remarks, ACCO Coordinator Stafford noted the 
progress Iraq was making on anti-corruption efforts, hailing Iraq's 
ratification of UNCAC (UN Convention against Corruption) last year. 
He noted the progress of the primary anti-corruption agencies (COI, 
IG's, and the Board of Supreme Audit, or BSA) in gaining capacity 
and, in COI's case, bringing greater numbers of cases to court. 
Stafford and Deputy COI Director Judge Izzat Tawfiq Ja'afar -- the 
senior Iraqi anti-corruption official present -- also hailed the 
importance of NGO contributions -- particularly at the recent 
UN-hosted Amman Conference (Ref A) -- to the new anti-corruption 
strategy that Iraq intends to launch as a means to achieve UNCAC 
compliance. 
 
4.  (U) Inspector General for the Ministry of Industry Salim Polis 
noted that Article 5 of the Convention requires signatories to 
create strategies to combat corruption; he said that thus far, Iraq 
had identified 200 challenges that will need further action under 
the forthcoming strategy.  The first part of the strategy will 
outline general needs and address roles of different players, 
including NGO's, although ensuring NGOs' active role also requires 
Parliament to pass the proposed NGO law.  (COMMENT:  The draft NGO 
law is currently in limbo.  It has received a first reading in 
parliament, drawing extensive comment from international and Iraqi 
civil society and criticism on limits proposed for foreign financing 
and support.  We believe it is unlikely the bill will have a second 
of the required three readings before new parliamentary elections in 
January.  A new government may initiate a new draft or resume debate 
on the current draft. END COMMENT.)  Polis reminded the audience 
that UNCAC preserves a strong role for NGO's in explaining 
anti-corruption to the public and monitoring government execution. 
 
 
Jostling to Engage on Corruption Strategy 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Polis also observed that NGO's in Iraq until now have 
focused most broadly on humanitarian work, with little emphasis on 
trying to promote accountable government.  To improve their 
capacity, he suggested an oversight or governing board for the NGO 
community, composed of GOI and NGO representatives, an idea that 
prompted strong criticism from NGO reps in the audience. 
Qprompted strong criticism from NGO reps in the audience. 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Some NGO's objected to the COI's designating only a select 
group of NGO's, all of which are associated with the Alliance for 
Integrity Organizations, as the COI's primary interlocutors on the 
new strategy, which they said unfairly limited input. Others 
criticized the anti-corruption institutions for allegedly limiting 
investigations to "minor players" while contending that much bigger 
crooks had avoided scrutiny.  One participant noted that corruption 
would persist until those at the top felt pressure to improve their 
own behavior.  In response to the criticisms, COI Director of NGO 
relations Sameer Farraj disputed that COI had arbitrarily closed the 
door to further NGO participation and invited others to join the 
UNCAC process.  He insisted that the COI was also going after senior 
officials, not just the lower-level ones.  (COMMENT:  There are 
signs of late of greater willingness by the COI to act against 
upper-echelon officials -- e.g. the arrest of the Deputy Transport 
Minister on bribery charges (ref B.)  Overall, though, the NGO's 
criticism of the GOI's past failure to bring senior officials to 
account for corruption has some merit.  END COMMENT.) 
 
Free to Complain, Much to Complain About 
---------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Jamil Auda a technical advisor to the Minister of State 
 
BAGHDAD 00002705  002 OF 002 
 
 
for Civil Society Affairs, indicated that corruption in Iraq 
involved government, private sector, and external actors.  He 
asserted the GOI's commitment to protecting freedom of expression 
that permitted discussion of corruption by government officials and 
publicizing cases against them.  Both Auda and William Warda of 
Hammurabi Rights Organization highlighted aspects of Muslim and 
Christian doctrine that stigmatized corruption. 
 
8.  (SBU) Azara Sheikhly, who represents the Mihaniyat Organization 
(an NGO), sharply criticized the idea of NGO supervision through 
establishment of an oversight board, claiming that misconduct in 
civil society was much less egregious than in government.  She also 
said that the government was seeking to muffle NGO's with its 
proposed law that would prevent them from taking outside help; she 
also charged the GOI with failing to give adequate weight to NGO's 
in its decision-making.  Another NGO participant said NGO's were 
crippled by low capacity and needed significant training. 
 
9.  (SBU) William Warda said that COI's NGO department needed to 
establish closer contact with NGO's.  He argued against senior 
officials being allowed to maintain dual nationality, as some 
corrupt officials had been able to establish safe-havens for 
themselves and their ill-gotten funds in their "second homeland." 
 
Personnel System Needs Attention 
-------------------------------- 
 
10.  (U) Participants offered several concrete recommendations for 
strengthening anti-corruption efforts by NGO's, namely: 
 
-- NGO's should participate in decisions relating to the allocation 
of reconstruction funds and economic reforms 
as well as monitor expenditures of major projects; 
--  NGO's should have advisory roles in the crafting of new 
legislation; 
-- the COI should have a role in amending the electoral law to boost 
transparency in the selection of senior government officials; 
-- civil society must raise public awareness of the need for truly 
independent IG's in all ministries; 
-- NGO's who want to contribute to anti-corruption strategy should 
have routine meetings with the IG's and COI; 
-- the COI should engage the media more actively on behalf of its 
anti-corruption efforts; 
-- COI must publish names of corrupt individuals; 
-- COI and others should exploit social pressure points to fight 
corruption (i.e., draw in tribal authorities); 
-- COI should obtain greater authority -- similar to anti-corruption 
institutions in Egypt -- to pursue cases; 
-- donors and a/c institutions should educate the government as well 
as private citizens on anti-corruption issues; 
-- government agencies should make greater use of e-government tools 
for transparency. 
 
Press Coverage 
-------------- 
 
11.  (U) Embassy Public Affairs Section arranged press coverage of 
the conference and individual interviews that were carried by Iraq 
of Tomorrow wesbsite, al-Rasheed TV, Iraq Media Network and al-Sabah 
newspaper.  The televised reports included exclusive remarks from 
the ACCO highlighting the important role of civil society in 
combating corruption and the progress Iraq had made to date on the 
issue.  Coverage of the event spurred interest from other outlets 
including Al-Sharqiya TV, which did an exclusive follow-on interview 
with ACCO Coordinator. 
 
Background on NGO's in Iraq 
---------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) (NOTE:  A survey conducted in Baghdad among 180 NGO's in 
mid-2009 by Al-Amal Association provided a useful snapshot of NGO's 
today in Iraq.  The survey showed that a large portion (47.4%) 
operate on a budget of less than $10,000, with an additional 12.1% 
managing budgets of under $25,000.  Only 7.5% have budgets up to 
Qmanaging budgets of under $25,000.  Only 7.5% have budgets up to 
$200,000 a year.  The organizations who were polled reported 
receiving most of their funds from the U.S. (13.9% from IRI-NDI-NED, 
5.2% from ICSP, and 3.5% from ARD), followed by the UN (19.7%), 8.5% 
from religious institutions, 3.5% from parliament, and 2.9% from the 
government. The largest portion (36.4%) had a membership of less 
than 15.  The majority of organizations working in Baghdad are 
engaged in charitable work (45.7%) followed by development (38.7%), 
and most organizations had carried out fewer than ten projects since 
they were founded.  Both constraints on capacity and funding 
constrain NGO activity, as well as the habit of many organizations' 
shifting activities to mirror prevailing foci of external donors. 
Also, lines between government and NGO's are blurred in Iraq, with 
many politicians jumping back and forth between government and 
NGO's, or pursuing both simultaneously.  Three of the NGO 
representatives attending the ACCO seminar September 28 were sitting 
members of parliament.  END NOTE)