VZCZCXYZ1816
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #2694/01 2791530
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061530Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4973
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0080

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/I 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID SNAR MOPS SOCI IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD: INL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  INL faces significant challenges in its effort to 
ensure contractor performance in Iraq.  Some of the challenges are 
due to current constraints on the number of program officers and 
in-country contracting officer representatives (ICOR) in Baghdad, 
while others appear to be inherent in the design of the current base 
contract (BC).  While Post is fully aware that the contracting 
function rests in Washington, INL Baghdad would like to provide 
input based on its experience in the field.  To this end, Baghdad 
would welcome the inclusion by INL procurement officials of 
performance metrics that equate to real-time financial rewards, or 
costs, to contractors in the next base contract, and its component 
task orders (TO).  End summary. 
 
Managing Growth and "Normalization" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Looking ahead to the handover to INL of the 350 member 
police development mission, and roughly the current level of 
engagement in the justice sector, INL Embassy Baghdad requires a 
minimum NEC staff of 21 personnel in CY 2010, growing to 27 by CY 
¶2011.  Opportunities to strengthen INL Baghdad staffing levels have 
arisen due both to the handover and to the ongoing mission-wide 
effort to "normalize" and right-size Embassy Baghdad.  INL/I is 
coordinating NSDD-38 requests that will seek to increase INL 
staffing in Iraq in the near-term (septel). 
¶3.  (U) INL Baghdad positions include the current INL director, 
deputy director, reporting and coordination officer, management 
officer, OMS, senior executive police advisor, three Rule of Law 
project managers, one corrections advisor, one Rule of Law 
consultant, and one bilingual-bicultural advisor.  Also required as 
soon as possible are four senior police advisors and a new financial 
management specialist. 
 
¶4.  (U) INL Baghdad would benefit from six NEC-based ICORs dedicated 
to contractor performance and project quality assurance throughout 
Iraq.  Five additional ICORS would be based at Camp Butler in the 
Victory Base Complex, and in the regions.  This proposed staffing 
level would permit Baghdad ICORs to implement the robust Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Program (QASP) required to oversee the large, 
complex and growing INL program in Iraq. 
 
¶5.  The balance of the positions in place by January 2011 should 
include five police mission supervisory staff.  There would be 
another 52 State employees (3161 or PSC) assigned to supervise the 
350 person police training project. 
 
Changing Incentives 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Another opportunity to improve our performance, and those of 
our contractors, rests in the March through July 2010 base contract 
re-compete for the next five-year period.  INL Baghdad recommends 
that INL procurement officials take advantage of this opportunity by 
adjusting the incentive structure of the next BC to ensure greater 
contractor responsiveness to growing customer requirements in Iraq. 
 
 
¶7.  (U) To illustrate, in the current BC the task order for 
construction does not contain a liquidated damages clause in which 
the parties designate in advance of an award the timing and amount 
of damages an injured party may collect as compensation should 
specific breaches under the control of the contractor occur.  A 
liquidated damages clause would provide INL a means to better 
incentivize timely project completion, and "front-load" financial 
repercussions faced by contractors who fail to meet agreed 
performance standards. 
 
¶8.  (U) Contractors under the current arrangement generally are paid 
"as they go" whether or not they meet agreed construction timelines. 
Q"as they go" whether or not they meet agreed construction timelines. 
 "Equitable adjustment" exists for such cases, but it is a crude 
measure used to garner damages at contract closeout rather than a 
mission-focused management tool meant to assure the quality and 
timeliness of contractor service throughout the life of a project. 
 
 
¶9.  (U) Another device that Washington may wish to include in the 
next base contract is the contractor performance rating system 
Embassy Baghdad uses to encourage, measure and reward acceptable 
performance by its life support provider.  The system is configured 
to ensure that the contractoQhieves three primary objectives: (1) 
perform mission-ordered priorities; (2) keep projects on schedule; 
and (3) remain responsive to the customer's changing needs.  It 
gauges contractor performance via monthly rating exercises, with the 
monthly ratings tabulated at the end of each twelve-month period 
into a final annual rating upon which the bonuses of contractor 
managers and employees are based.  This model refocuses contractor 
emphasis from initiating (but not necessarily completing) cost-plus 
goods and services contracts to having a vested interest in 
delivering results that satisfy the customer. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (U) Whether or not the specific proposals above appear in the 
final base contract, or its TOs, Baghdad proposes that the next INL 
BC contain performance metrics that equate to real-time financial 
incentives to contractors.  Further, INL procurement officials may 
wish to pilot these measures during the extension of ICAS Task 
Orders 4760 (CPI) and 4761 (DynCorp International).  Doing so would 
help to ensure that the next base contract period comes into force 
with a fully-functioning set of performance measures.  End comment. 
 
HILL