VZCZCXYZ0467
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #2680/01 2790311
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060311Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4957
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0020
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2269
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0006
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0657
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0315
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0607

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002680 
 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY, DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC PREF KFRD IZ
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - BAGHDAD 
 
REF:  A.  STATE 057623 
  ¶B.  TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2009 
 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
 
¶1.  Security remains a concern in Iraq; however, conditions are 
gradually improving.  Traveling both domestically and around the 
region remains difficult for Iraqi nationals.  High numbers of 
Iraqis continue to pursue plans to immigrate to the US for economic 
and security reasons.  Post is preparing to expand nonimmigrant visa 
services to include accepting B1/B2 applications from members of the 
public.  Currently, B1/B2 applications are accepted on referral or 
if an applicant meets specific criteria such as a medical emergency. 
 Post also administers a large special immigrant visa program and 
continues processing traditional immigrant visas.  Post continues to 
identify significant vulnerabilities in various Iraqi civil 
documents such as identity cards and certificates of nationality 
that make it possible for mala fide applicants to obtain genuine 
Iraqi passports under false identities.  Access to the Consular 
Section in Baghdad's International Zone is a continuing logistical 
challenge.  The current overall level of fraud at Post is low, 
though this may be a product of our overall qualified applicant pool 
and may change when post begins processing B1/B2 applications for 
the general public. 
 
NON IMMIGRANT VISA (NIV) FRAUD 
 
¶2.  Post adjudicated 1,710 NIV applications between March 1 and 
August 31.  Of these, thirty-four percent were A and G visas, 28 
percent were J visas and 25 percent were B1/B2 visas.  The remainder 
was primarily F visa applicants.   Post began adjudicating F and J 
visas in August 2008.  NIV fraud was minimal during the reporting 
period.  Consular staff referred two non-immigrant cases to the 
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU).  In one, further investigation 
confirmed false identity.  The applicant appeared for a second 
interview and admitted that her fianc had obtained a second 
passport for her in a false identity, due to a previous visa 
refusal.  Facial recognition software made the match between the two 
cases.  FPU staff investigated the second case, involving suspicious 
documents, and found no fraud. 
 
IMMIGRANT VISA (IV) FRAUD 
 
¶3.  Post began immigrant visa processing on July, 2008. 
 
¶4.  In addition to regular IV and DV cases, Post administers two 
Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) programs for Iraqi nationals who have 
been employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government.   Embassy 
Baghdad's Office of Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Affairs 
(REF) accepts Section 1244 SIV applications for Chief of Mission 
approval.  As designees of the Chief of Mission (COM), the refugee 
coordinators in REF determine whether the applicants statutorily 
qualify to apply for the SIV program.  Fraud prevention measures in 
the COM process seek to detect imposters, detect fraudulent 
documents, and verify employment on behalf of the USG. 
 
¶5.  Independent employment verification at the Chief of Mission 
approval stage is an important fraud prevention measure.  REF 
requires all employment letters to be on company letterhead and 
employment verification communication to be done via an official 
USG, military or corporate email account.  REF is creating new SIV 
statistical reports to monitor trends that could highlight areas for 
potential fraud such as an unrealistic number of recommendations 
Qpotential fraud such as an unrealistic number of recommendations 
coming from one supervisor or company.  Generally, applicants in 
both programs have undergone security screening by their employers 
as part of their hiring process and fraud has been limited to date. 
However, the FPU and REF discovered weaknesses in some contractors' 
overall employment vetting, verification and termination procedures 
that have allowed mala fide SIV applicants to reach the visa 
interview stage in cases where they had been fired for cause after 
the REF vetting process.  The FPU coordinates review of suspected 
cases with the Regional Security Office and on occasion has sought 
additional clarification regarding the applicant's history from the 
employer as a second layer of security.  REF and the FPU are working 
together to institute stronger joint internal measures to guard 
against SIV fraud. 
 
¶6.  Post issued 1,876 immigrant visas in this six month reporting 
period.  Eighty percent were Iraqi SIV program cases.  Consular 
staff referred 10 cases to the FPU.  Closer examination found no 
fraud in eight, and two are pending investigation. 
 
 
DIVERSITY VISA FRAUD 
 
¶7.  Baghdad adjudicated twenty-five Diversity Visas and reported no 
fraud. 
 
AMERICAN CITIZENS SERVICES (ACS) AND US PASSPORT FRAUD 
 
¶8.  The ACS unit reported no significant fraud for the past six 
months.  The unit referred one passport case to the Fraud Prevention 
Unit for investigation, which found no evidence of fraud.  The 
majority of first time passport applicants in Iraq are US military 
personnel with government issued identification and original birth 
certificates. 
 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
 
¶9.  Foreign adoptions are not allowed in Iraq and Post does not 
process adoption cases. 
 
USE OF DNA TESTING 
 
¶10.  Post is in the process of negotiating with a new panel 
physician clinic that has the capability to administer DNA testing 
under the recently published Department guidelines. 
 
REFUGEE, ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
 
¶11.  REF continues to work to identity potential fraud in the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and is increasing information 
sharing between the USRAP and the SIV program as the two programs 
draw from the same pool of Iraqi applicants.  REF ensures that 
derogatory threat information that leads to the denial of an SIV is 
passed to DHS officers who will adjudicate the same applicant's 
refugee case. 
 
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL 
 
¶12.  Post maintains a productive working relationship with Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) officials.  Iraq is a known source country for 
terrorists and the Consular Section has been working through the 
Visas Viper and other reporting mechanisms to ensure the proper 
watch listing of suspected terrorists or individuals of concern. 
Iraq is both a source and destination country for men, women, and 
children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual 
exploitation and involuntary servitude (Ref B).  The more prevalent 
means of becoming a victim is through sale or forced marriage.  The 
ACS section assisted three American citizens who were victims of 
forced marriage in Iraq.  Two were successfully repatriated and one 
case is pending resolution. 
 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
 
¶13.  No new information to report this period. 
 
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
 
¶14.  The new A-series Iraqi passport book is scheduled to be issued 
in October 2009; the current G series Iraqi passport will continue 
to be distributed until book stock is depleted.  There will be no 
wholesale replacement of previous books and all issued G-series 
passports will remain valid. 
 
¶15.  The A-series will contain a mandatory thumbprint in the book 
itself, positioned on the data page.  The print will be captured 
electronically at the time of application and then verified when 
applicants retrieve their passports (heads of households can pick up 
passports for the entire family).  The Directorate of Passports, 
Travel and Nationality plans to electronically transfer, via the 
Internet, A-series applications from provincial offices (one office 
in each Iraqi province plus 14 offices in Baghdad).  The books will 
be printed in Baghdad and couriered to provincial offices.  The 
passport office in Baghdad has servers that allow it to accept 
A-series passport applications and required finger scans from 20 
Iraqi embassies overseas (see below) via the Internet.  These 20 
QIraqi embassies overseas (see below) via the Internet.  These 20 
embassies will also submit the application electronically to the 
main passport office for printing, although this system is not yet 
operational. 
 
¶16.  The A-series passport book interior is identical to those in 
the G-series passport.  The cover is slightly different and the book 
has text printed in Arabic, Kurdish and English, instead of the 
G-series Arabic and English only.  The passport office states it has 
the capability to run all applications against a "black list" of 
criminals and terrorists.  It is unclear if all applications are run 
through this check. 
 
¶17.  Overseas passport application facilities (with finger scan 
collection capability): Washington, D.C., Amman, Damascus, Tehran, 
Dubai, Cairo, London, Berlin, Stockholm, Tunisia, Sanaa, Sydney, 
Kuala Lumpur, Ottawa, Brasilia, Vienna, Istanbul, Paris, Bucharest, 
Athens. 
 
¶18.  Post continues to be concerned with the credibility of Iraqi 
identity documents.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that all types of 
fraudulent identity documents are available.  The 
widely-acknowledged existence of forged G-series passports remains 
an issue, but it is a greater concern that authentic G-series 
passports may be issued by the MOI based on fraudulent identity 
documents.  Inconsistency in official document production standards 
remains a fundamental issue, particularly with ID cards issued in 
the Kurdish region and in Diyala province.  The Kurdish Regional 
Government is producing its own version of the Iraq ID card which 
does not conform to national formatting and security feature norms. 
 
 
¶19.  Notwithstanding these concerns and anecdotal evidence, Post has 
not observed a significant volume of fraudulent documentation being 
submitted to support U.S. visa applications. 
 
¶20.  Post has initiated several new programs to combat fraud.  At 
the end of August, the Consular Section established a Fraud 
Prevention Unit composed of the FSO Fraud Prevention Manager, one 
Locally Engaged Staff (LES) member, and one Eligible Family Member 
(EFM).  Each member of the FPU has consular responsibilities in 
addition to the fraud portfolio.  The unit has created a 
computerized index of all exemplars currently in its files and is 
working to acquire more and better samples.  The FPU is currently 
focusing on a retrospective analysis of fraud trends and issues in 
order to establish a baseline for future operational focus. The FPM 
is also refining Standard Operating Procedures for IV, NIV, and ACS 
officers to refer cases to FPU; and the FPM provides Iraqi document 
verification training to consular staff. 
 
¶21.  The Consular Section has expanded outreach efforts to the MOI 
in order to continue information sharing on document fraud trends 
and detection techniques in Iraq.  We also continue enhancing 
liaison and coordination efforts with the Consular Sections of other 
foreign missions in Iraq focusing on common fraud prevention issues 
and sharing relevant information.  The FPM met recently with his 
Danish counterpart to discuss fraud in refugee cases.  The FPU and 
Consular Section also have an excellent working relationship with 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Attache at Post and 
frequently consult regarding suspect documents.  The DHS Attache's 
office also facilitates introduction to important a contacts within 
the MOI and security services for the Consular Section. 
 
¶21.  The FPM and REF staff also met with the Human Resources 
department at Global Linguist Services (GLS), the largest employer 
of SIV applicants, to discuss employment verification and vetting 
Qof SIV applicants, to discuss employment verification and vetting 
concerns in the SIV process. 
 
¶22.  In conjunction with the Health Attache's office, the Regional 
Medical Officer, and REF, the Consular Section is undertaking an in 
depth review of panel physician qualifications and procedures. 
 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
 
¶23.  The Consul General maintains productive relationships with 
officials at the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  Consular staff also enjoy open communication and useful 
working-level relationships with Ministry employees. 
 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
 
¶24.  In addition to concerns over document fraud, Post anticipates 
increased fraud as non-immigrant visa processing expands. 
 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
 
¶25.  The FPM provides individualized training for all consular staff 
working in IV, NIV, and ACS to ensure that personnel know how and 
when to refer cases to FPU.  FPM continues to update Fraud 
Prevention Program files at Post to include more document exemplars, 
fraud reporting trends, and detailed explanations of prior fraud 
cases.  The Consular Section's LES Fraud Assistant spent a week in 
training with Embassy Amman's FPU in August and is also scheduled to 
attend a Fraud Prevention Workshop for FSNs at the Foreign Service 
Institute in November. 
 
 
HILL