Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT1264, TURKMENISTAN: IRAN'S RECENT CASPIAN-ENERGY RHETORIC

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ASHGABAT1264.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASHGABAT1264 2009-10-02 13:09 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO0149
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLH RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #1264 2751309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021309Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3572
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5751
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3463
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3327
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3994
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1186
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3971
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS ASHGABAT 001264 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN; EEB; NEA/IR 
ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/BURPOE/COHEN 
COMMERCE FOR EHOUSE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET PGOV EINV IR TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: IRAN'S RECENT CASPIAN-ENERGY RHETORIC 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) A number of international media outlets recently cited 
Reza Kasaeizadeh, Managing Director of the National Iranian Gas 
Export Company, as stating Iran would prevent Turkmenistan from 
participating in any projects aimed at transporting Turkmen gas via 
the Caspian Sea.  Although Kasaeizadeh's words cannot be considered 
an official government statement, they still reflect Iran's position 
on the issue of energy export routes from Central Asia.  The only 
westbound energy export routes from Central Asia that Iran does not 
oppose are routes that would run through its own territory.  Iran is 
extremely interested in becoming a transit country for gas exports, 
given Iran's current economic and political isolation.  Kasaeizadeh 
did not mention, however, how Iran would block trans-Caspian 
projects. 
 
3.  (SBU) Theoretically, Iran could use the unsettled boundary 
status of the Caspian Sea as an excuse to impede a trans-Caspian 
pipeline project by insisting that no international projects should 
be implemented without the agreement of all littoral states.  Iran's 
position on the Caspian issue is that the Caspian seabed should be 
divided equally among the littoral states so that each country gets 
a 20% share.  This position is unacceptable to the rest of the 
littoral states and makes it difficult to foresee settlement of the 
Caspian delimitation issue in the near future.  Iran could also put 
economic pressure on Turkmenistan by stopping imports of Turkmen 
gas, cutting oil swap operations, and prohibiting transportation of 
Turkmenistan-bound goods across its territory.  Experts assert that 
potential economic losses that Turkmenistan would suffer from such 
measures would be significantly lower than the economic benefits 
that Turkmenistan would reap from a trans-Caspian pipeline. 
 
4.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Recent Iranian statements regarding its ability 
to prevent Turkmenistan from pursuing Caspian projects seem to be 
just that...empty statements.  In January 2008, Turkmenistan cut gas 
supplies to Iran, citing technical difficulties.  Iran reportedly 
tried to strong-arm Turkmenistan into resuming supplies but ended up 
paying the Turkmen more for gas.  As a result, experts believe that 
Iran's influence over Turkmenistan, especially when it comes to 
energy issues, is still very limited.  END COMMENT. 
 
CURRAN