VZCZCXRO1918
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0728 2891239
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161239Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2946
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS ANTANANARIVO 000728 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: BIG FOUR SUMMIT POSTPONED 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  UN Envoy Tiebile Drame convoked the diplomatic 
corps October 16 to seek their opinion on the next steps in finding 
a way out of Madagascar's political crisis.  He explained that 
ousted President Ravalomanana had rejected the Geneva venue for the 
planned Oct 17-19 summit of Madagascar's four vying political 
leaders.  The dip corps agreed that the meeting to put the 
power-sharing transition government in place was urgent, but should 
not be held without Ravalomanana, that Addis Ababa should be an 
acceptable venue for all four chiefs, and that steps would be taken 
to arrange a meeting in Addis as soon as possible.   END SUMMARY. 
¶2. (SBU) UN Envoy Tiebile Drame convoked the diplomatic corps 
October 16 to seek their opinion on the next steps in finding a way 
out of Madagascar's political crisis.  He explained that, although 
the preparations for an Oct 17-19 summit of the four vying faction 
leaders in Geneva had been almost completed, including getting visas 
and plane tickets for the ten plus members of each of the four 
delegations, ousted President Ravalomanana had rejected the venue. 
Furthermore, former President Ratsiraka said that he was prepared to 
attend the meeting, but did not think it should be held without 
Ravalomanana.  Although members of the dip corps and Drame expressed 
frustration with Ravalomanana, most agreed that the meeting could 
not go forward without him.  Everyone agreed that Addis Ababa should 
be an acceptable venue for all four political movements. 
¶3. (SBU) Drame explained that President Chissano would not be 
available again until October 30.  As all agreed that the meeting 
was urgent, several options were proposed: Drame would ask Chissano 
if he could change his schedule to accommodate a meeting in Addis 
ASAP; the French would ask President Sarkozy to contact the German 
president to request that the meeting be approved for Berlin 
(according to the French DCM, Ravalomanana had agreed to Berlin in 
writing, but the Germans had refused due to the state of disarray of 
the government; additionally, Ravalomanana had made clear to 
ambassadors Carter and Marquardt Thursday in Johannesburg that the 
meeting must be held "in Africa"); and if those options failed, the 
mediators would arrange to hold the meeting in Addis October 30. 
¶4. (SBU) Drame noted that the mediators had listened to the concerns 
of Ravalomanana's delegation raised at the Oct 6 International 
Contact Group (ICG) meeting.  As delegation leader Fetison had said 
Oct 6 that the Ravalomanana movement would accept Rajoelina as 
transition president if he agreed not to run in the next election, 
the mediators had proposed the idea to Rajoelina.  Rajoelina 
responded that he was not prohibited by the Maputo accords from 
running and that he had not yet decided if he would run anyway. 
¶5. (SBU) The Senegalese, French, and Russian representatives raised 
concerns about the situation on the ground deteriorating if the 
meeting was not held soon due to divisions within the HAT, and the 
French DCM pushed for establishing a deadline for agreement, arguing 
that "one movement shouldn't have veto power."  The IMF rep noted 
that the state council had put on hold the decree appointing 
consensus Prime Minister Mangalaza until a ruling was made on the 
complaint filed by HAT PM Monja Roindefo regarding his removal - 
thus the government still has a lame duck prime minister.  While 
others agreed that the meeting was urgent, it was decided that the 
venue change should be made to accommodate Ravalomanana, whose 
attendance was essential for any chance of a true resolution.  The 
Charge noted that the international community would lose credibility 
if we decided to move forward without the participation of the 
democratically-elected president.   The Germans strongly agreed, and 
stated their concerns that the international community be careful of 
its role to avoid being accused of interfering and imposing 
political solutions on the Malagasy. 
¶6. (SBU) Comment:  The reason for the failure of this Summit attempt 
may not really lie in the choice of venue, but in Ravalomanana's 
pique with the mediation team after the October 6 ICG, which 
confirmed TGV as president of the transition.  Furthermore, he may 
hope time in on his side, and against Rajoelina, perhaps also seeing 
a further deterioration on the ground likely as more time passes, 
particularly now that Rajoelina is weakened by divisions within his 
own movement.  It remains to be seen if Ravalomanana will create 
another pretext for avoiding a meeting in Addis (or elsewhere).  If 
he does, the patience of the international community vis-`-vis the 
former president will likely have been exhausted, as well as that of 
his own movement, many of whom seemed ready to go to the Summit in 
Geneva without him -- and would probably do so if he balks again. 
Of course, the larger question is, even if the four are brought 
together, will they be able to agree on the final division of 
transition seats?  End comment. 
 
MARQUARDT