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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1254, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1254 2009-10-22 09:13 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1254/01 2950913
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220913Z OCT 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2526
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9444
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0858
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001254 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage October 22 on the developments in cross-Strait relations, 
on local political issues, and on the complaints over some "odd" 
training approaches adopted at a local cram school.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the conservative, 
pro-unification, English-language "China Post" discussed what the 
paper believes to be Taiwan's "poorly equipped" and "poorly 
disciplined" air force.  The article said that, given the lack of 
discipline in Taiwan's air force, the Ministry of National Defense 
had better "cancel any purchase of advanced fighter-interceptors 
from the United States to alleviate the drain on the national 
coffers."  An op-ed in the KMT-leaning, China-focused "Want Daily" 
discussed the possibility of a peace agreement across the Taiwan 
Strait.  The article said, judging from what the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration has been saying lately, Ma is not really interested 
in negotiating a peace agreement with Beijing.  End summary. 
 
A) "Poorly Equipped Air Force Is Equally Poorly Disciplined" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (10/22): 
 
"... As a matter of fact, any poorly disciplined air force, or any 
fighting force for that matter, can't fight.  Taiwan's air force is 
already no match for its opposite number in the People's Liberation 
Army.  We used to have air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.  We 
have long since lost it, for we are not adequately armed and 
equipped.  Time was when our fighters shot down all MiG fighters of 
the PLA air force before, during and after the Quemoy Crisis of 
August 23, 1958.  And we never lost a plane!  Well, that's the 
reason why Taiwan has been trying to buy F16-D fighters from the 
United States.  The Pentagon has hesitated to sell the highly 
sophisticated warplanes to us, however. 
 
"Perhaps for good reason.  The U.S. top brass must have known our 
poorly equipped air force is equally poorly disciplined.  In that 
case, whatever advanced type of fighters we have would simply end up 
a mass of scrap iron when hostilities break out between the two 
sides of the Strait.  Of course, no war is likely between Taiwan and 
China.  One thing the Ministry of National Defense should do is to 
cancel any purchase of advanced fighter-interceptors from the United 
States to alleviate the drain on the national coffers.  Taiwan is in 
a dire financial strait.  We cannot afford expensive warplanes which 
are most likely to stay on the ground in time of war." 
 
B) "Ma Ying-jeou Says No to a [Cross-Strait] Peace Pact?" 
 
Professor Chang Ya-chung from National Taiwan University's 
Department of Political Science opined in the KMT-leaning, 
China-focused "Want Daily" [circulation: 10,000] (10/22): 
 
"Establishing mutual trust are the words that [Chinese President] Hu 
Jintao has constantly talked about over the past year, and they are 
listed at the top of his 16-character guideline on cross-Strait 
relations.  All these showed the significance of these words to 
Beijing.  Politically speaking, 'establishing mutual trust' includes 
two main issues:  namely, a peace accord and a military 
confidence-building mechanism.  One day prior to [President] Ma 
Ying-jeou's doubling as the KMT chairman, Chao Chun-shan, Chairman 
of the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies, a peripheral 
organization of the National Security Council, clearly indicated 
that Taiwan must complete 'three preparations' before it engages in 
political dialogue with mainland China.  Such remarks can be viewed 
as a clear statement from the [Taiwan] government, telling Beijing 
that currently there is no chance for political dialogue [across the 
Taiwan Strait]. ... 
 
"The 'three preparations' remark indicates that Ma has again stated 
his position [on cross-Strait relations], except that two more 
preconditions have been added -- namely, 'reaching an internal 
consensus [in Taiwan] (including 'not ruling out [the possibility 
of] launching a referendum [on cross-Strait political talks]), and 
winning acceptance [of the political talks] by the international 
community.  Such a message was akin to clearly telling Beijing that 
now is the time to put on hold for the time being the calls for 
peace negotiations!  Given this, the public should be able to more 
accurately interpret Ma's current mainland policy, namely, 
'economics only, and no politics.' 
 
"The move to hand over the prerequisites for a cross-Strait peace 
agreement and a military confidence-building mechanism to the 
[Taiwan] people and the United States is clearly another way of 
saying 'No' [to Beijing]. ... If the Republic of China is a nation, 
a [true] entity, how can it possibly put the interests of the United 
States and Japan as a prerequisite [for cross-Strait relations]? 
[Actually,] in Ma's mind, the principal [priority] is 'arms 
procurement, the United States, and [winning the] elections;' the 
so-called cross-Strait peace pact is nothing but lip service.  Here 
we have to ask, with only trade and economic exchanges and no peace 
 
accord, will it be possible to resolve the core problems between the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait?  Will it really meet Taiwan's 
interests if [we] simply dodge sensitive issues?  We are concerned 
that time is not necessarily on Taiwan's side.  How many bargaining 
chips will we be able to have while waiting to be forced into talks 
for a peace agreement?" 
 
STANTON