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DE RUEHWR #0950/01 2581427
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O 151427Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8884
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 000950 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE - PLEASE PASS U.S. SUPREME COURT 
FOR JUSTICE SCALIA FROM AMBASSADOR ASHE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KJUS PL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JUSTICE SCALIA'S SEPTEMBER 23-25 
VISIT TO WARSAW 
 
¶1. (SBU) Mr. Justice, Mission Poland warmly welcomes your 
September 23-25 visit to Warsaw.  Your trip comes on the 
heels of ceremonies in Gdansk marking the 70th anniversary of 
the outbreak of World War II -- one of many important 
commemorations this year, including the 20th anniversary of 
1989 elections that helped bring about the collapse of 
communism in Europe and the 90th anniversary of U.S.-Polish 
diplomatic relations.  Despite uncertainty about the future 
of European Missile Defense -- a U.S. decision is expected 
soon -- and worries here that U.S. efforts to improve 
relations with Russia will imperil bilateral strategic 
cooperation, the U.S.-Polish friendship is strong and 
productive.  While Poles still count on the U.S. as the key 
guarantor of security in the region, there is growing public 
concern that the U.S. assigns the bilateral relationship less 
weight than Poland does and that the U.S. does not fully 
appreciate Poland's many contributions to the cause of 
freedom and democracy.  According to the German Marshall 
Fund's recent Transatlantic Trends survey, Poles, who were 
once considerably more pro-American than Western Europeans, 
are now much more skeptical of the U.S. 
 
¶2. (SBU) As in the American Revolution, World War I, and 
World War II, Polish soldiers fought side by side with U.S. 
troops in Iraq for five years and still maintain the seventh 
largest troop contingent in Afghanistan.  Moreover, Poland 
has long supported efforts to extend the zone of security, 
prosperity, and stability to the former Soviet space. 
Despite our shared ideals and close historical ties, as 
Poland's ties to the EU continue to deepen -- and as Poland 
becomes more influential in Brussels -- we will find it 
increasingly difficult to make the U.S.-Polish relationship 
relevant to average Poles, most of whom take great offense at 
Poland's continued exclusion from the U.S. Visa Waiver 
Program (VWP).  Poles feel they should be included in the VWP 
as a sign of American appreciation for Polish contributions 
on numerous issues. 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE AND PATRIOTS 
 
¶3. (SBU) The fate of Missile Defense remains first and 
foremost on the minds of Poland's government and public.  In 
August 2008, Prime Minister Donald Tusk agreed to locate U.S. 
missile interceptors in Poland under the auspices of a 
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA).  He did so 
largely to accommodate a direct request from the United 
States, Poland's longtime ally.  Poles are now waiting 
patiently for our decision on the future of European Missile 
Defense.  Polish media report almost daily that the U.S. will 
likely withdraw from its prior decisions.  Most Poles are not 
wedded to Missile Defense, but they strongly wish to avoid 
any perception that the U.S. is giving up on the program in 
order to reset relations with Russia. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Regardless of the fate of Missile Defense, there is 
an expectation that the U.S. will move forward with a 
rotation of U.S. Patriot missiles.  We have been reassuring 
on this point.  The President has confirmed that the U.S. 
will implement the August 2008 bilateral Declaration on 
Strategic Cooperation that calls for the Patriot rotation. 
The form that rotation will take continues to receive much 
attention.  Earlier this year, headlines heralding the 
arrival of unarmed "Naked Patriots" reflected fears that the 
rotation of a Patriot battery from Germany may not meet 
Polish expectations, at least in the initial rotation; the 
Poles seek a combat-ready, fully operational system capable 
of integration with the Polish air defense system.  The USG 
interagency continues to work these issues, and is expected 
to inform the Poles of our decisions shortly after your 
visit.  The Missile Defense decision in particular is 
extremely sensitive, and current U.S. thinking is closely 
held. 
 
THE RUSSIA FACTOR 
 
¶5. (SBU) For historical reasons, Poles do not want to see key 
decisions made over Poland's head, but they do not object to 
improved U.S.-Russian relations.  Prime Minister Tusk and 
Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski (with whom you will meet) 
have tamped down the rhetoric directed against Russia, 
instead choosing to engage in a pragmatic bilateral dialogue. 
 The Government has also endeavored to keep thorny historical 
issues such as the massacre of Polish soldiers at Katyn from 
impeding progress in areas like bilateral trade.  While 
Polish officials do not expect major breakthroughs in 
relations with Russia in the near future, their pragmatic 
policy has already paid dividends, including a recent 
agreement on navigation in the Vistula Bay, reopening 
 
WARSAW 00000950  002 OF 003 
 
 
commercial shipping between the Polish port of Elblag and the 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad for the first time since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union.  This pragmatic approach is 
balanced by anxiety about Russia's role as a regional power, 
particularly after the August 2008 conflict in Georgia. 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Polish economy has thus far managed to weather 
the global crisis and is generally performing better than 
other European economies.  While Prime Minister Tusk and his 
center-right Civic Platform party continue to enjoy 
relatively high public support (between 45 and 50 percent 
favorability), his Government and cabinet ministers, for a 
variety of reasons, are less popular.  Tusk is widely 
expected to run against President Lech Kaczynski (who founded 
the more conservative Law and Justice party) in next year's 
presidential elections.  Tusk's policies have focused 
primarily on accelerating Poland's political and economic 
integration into the EU and on increasing Poland's influence 
in Brussels.  Despite Tusk's popularity, media and the 
opposition routinely assert that he formulates policy 
primarily on the basis of polls and that his only policy 
objective is to win election to the presidency.  Although 
President Kaczynski continues to poll as one of Poland's 
least popular politicians, recent opinion polls predict he 
would finish second in the first round of presidential 
elections -- setting up a Tusk-Kaczynski run-off.  Given the 
high stakes, media analysts predict the next 12 months 
promise little more than a parliamentary stalemate between 
Poland's two dominant political parties. 
 
POLAND'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM UNDER FIRE 
 
¶7. (SBU) Poland,s judiciary -- the EU's most expensive on a 
per capita basis --- has long been the subject of public and 
media criticism.  Since taking office in January, Justice 
Minister Andrzej Czuma (with whom you will meet) has sought 
to take on the perceived lack of integrity among Polish 
prosecutors and judges.  Though difficult to prove, 
corruption is believed to be commonplace.  Holdover 
communist-era practices slow court proceedings and lengthen 
pre-trial detentions.  Inexperienced entry-level judges join 
a close-knit group that enjoys almost complete immunity, with 
limited oversight.  While no court system has ever been 
criticized for being too timely or too inexpensive, it is 
increasingly clear to most Poles that another round of 
judicial reforms is needed as Poland leaves its communist 
legal legacy behind.  Although some judges claim that 
Minister Czuma's pledged reforms would encourage executive 
branch interference, few Poles inside or outside of 
government would accept measures that undermine the 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
A BIT ABOUT YOUR HOST 
 
¶8. (SBU) Poland,s independent Civil Rights Ombudsman, Dr. 
Janusz Kochanowski, at whose invitation you will deliver a 
lecture at the Warsaw Royal Castle, was appointed in January 
2006 by the previous Law and Justice Government.  He was born 
in 1940 and graduated from Warsaw University with a degree in 
law in 1966.  He worked as a lecturer at Warsaw University 
until 1991, when he was appointed to serve as Poland's Consul 
General in London.  In 1997, he returned to his position as a 
lecturer at Warsaw University.  He was a member of the 
Solidarity movement from 1980 until 1991.  Kochanowski's 
appointment was opposed by both the Civic Platform and the 
post-communist Democratic Left Alliance, largely because his 
conservative views mirror those of the Law and Justice party. 
 He was confirmed by a 239-194 vote. 
¶9. (SBU) Kochanowski appears regularly in press interviews 
and comments frequently in the media on court decisions, as 
well as domestic and international social issues and current 
events.  Over the past year, he has proposed amendments to 
Poland's constitution, along with revisions to legislation on 
public media, the press, the criminal code, and election 
laws.  He has also spoken out on issues concerning the rights 
of children, women, disabled persons, homosexuals, 
immigrants, and detainees.  Kochanowski was strongly 
criticized by counterparts in other EU member states for 
advocating chemical castration for convicted pedophiles.  He 
has approached the Embassy to express concern about 
allegations of poor treatment of Poles at U.S. ports of entry 
and to advocate on behalf of the mother of a U.S. Marine who 
sought a meeting with President Obama to discuss her son's 
murder. 
 
PRIVATE PROPERTY RESTITUTION LEGISLATION STALLED 
 
WARSAW 00000950  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Poland is one of the last countries in Central 
Europe that have not made legislative provisions for an 
expedited, administrative (rather than judicial) mechanism 
for resolving private property restitution claims, an issue 
closely tracked by the American Jewish community.  Private 
property compensation to owners and heirs -- including 
Holocaust survivors -- remains politically unpopular in 
Poland, even though the great majority of those compensated 
would be Poles living in Poland.  The Polish Government 
recently claimed that Polish compensation legislation would 
risk bolstering pending legal claims by German nationals, 
even though the German government has called the claims 
invalid.  Polish officials also argue that the economic 
crisis is complicating a multi-billion dollar payment 
program. 
 
 
ASHE