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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 000384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR MOPS PK UK XG RS
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC CONCEPT: GROUP OF EXPERTS MET WITH 
PERMREPS ON SEPTEMBER 7 
 
USNATO 00000384  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In the September 7 first meeting of the 
Group of 
Experts (GoE) with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the 
NATO new Strategic Concept (SC) review, both the Secretary 
General (SYG) and former Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, the GoE's chairperson, stressed the importance of 
a transparent, inclusive, and consultative process.  In 
interventions given by 24 out of the 28 Allies, some broad 
themes and general consensus emerged:  the new SC should be 
concise and clear policy document, Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty remains the core of NATO, territorial 
defense and out-of-area operations are not contradictory, 
the relationship with Russia needs to be an area of focus, 
Comprehensive Approach and dealing with international 
actors are key to operational success, and relations with 
other 
international actors are an integral part of NATO. 
Luxembourg and Slovenia announced during the NAC that they 
will host the first and second NATO-sponsored SC seminars in 
October and November, 
respectively.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) In the first NAC meeting with the Group of Experts 
(GoE) for the new Strategic Concept (SC), Secretary General 
Rasmussen said he intended to fully respect and fulfill the 
mandate given to him at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit of 
developing the new SC.  He introduced each member of the 
GoE and said their objective was to present to him by May 
1, 2010, their analysis and recommendations for the SC, 
based upon the results of the GoE's external consultations 
and internal reflections.  This will be preceded by an 
interim progress report to be done in time for the December 
2009 foreign ministerial.  He stressed the GoE's 
independence, noting that each member had been appointed in 
their personal capacities.  As such, they should contribute 
freely, unconstrained by national positions.  The SYG said 
the process will play a key role in the quality of the 
final product, it should be guided by principles of 
inclusiveness, transparency, and it should be participatory 
) he intends to keep the Council involved. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Regarding the reflection phase, the SYG said he 
wanted to involve the strategic community in Allied nations 
in the consideration of the challenges NATO faces, adding 
that he expected the NAC to both actively contribute at HQ 
and ensure capital participation.  The experts should also 
participate in consultation by visiting capitals in groups 
or individually, in addition to consultations on the 
margins of the NATO-sponsored seminars.  The GoE will 
inform the Council both in December and April; the group's 
internal and capital consultations are to remain strictly 
confidential. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Former Secretary Madeleine Albright, the GoE's 
chair, assured Allies that the group would look at all the 
various issues confronting NATO and would establish issues 
of focus and working methodologies.  She voiced her 
commitment that the experts' work would be independent, but 
transparent. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Denmark, the first of 24 nations to speak, raised 
seven points, which the UK, Germany, and many others later 
endorsed and referred to: 
 
 
USNATO 00000384  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
- Denmark favored a concise and policy oriented SC rather 
than a comprehensive political document; 
- The SC should focus on the areas where NATO can add 
value; 
- The SC will need  to be clear on what NATO's focus should 
be and should set out priorities, with the prioritization 
of tasks and the carrying-out of operations based on an 
equitable sharing of resources; 
- The Alliance should be preserved as the primary forum for 
trans-Atlantic dialogue and provider of security; 
- Denmark said the activation of a more deployable force 
structure was crucial; at the same time, it saw no 
contradiction between territorial defense and out-of-area 
operations; 
- The Comprehensive Approach needs to be made an integral 
part of NATO; and 
- Focus needed to be given to developing NATO-EU 
relationships. 
 
Denmark further urged that the SYG and the GoE to be bold, 
challenging, and innovative in approach and methodology. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Luxembourg announced it would host the first 
seminar in mid-October.  It stressed that all Allied 
governments should be involved in the SC process given the 
new challenges, new threats, and new areas of deployment 
they share.  It expressed confidence that the Alliance 
would live up to this charge. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Romania threw its full support behind the GoE, 
stressing that the GoE was the Alliance's group, not just 
the SYG's group.  It noted that process plays an important 
role in strengthening Alliance cohesion.  Romania welcomed 
visits by the GoE.  It did not object to a visit to Russia, 
but thought it should be balanced with visits to potential 
aspirant countries. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Norway was pleased to see the GoE's openness since 
Norway,s candidate was not chosen, and Norway expected the 
Council to be actively involved in the next stage.  Norway 
also favored a concise and compact SC that was shorter and 
more precise than the previous ones.  On substance, Norway 
focused on the following points: 
 
- The SC should have clear references to what NATO faces on 
its own territory and at its periphery.  It also needed to 
have language on Article 5, Alliance solidarity, and 
indivisibility of security; 
- The SC should contain carefully calibrated language on 
arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; and 
- The SC needs to find formulations for other international 
actors, noting the important with relations with the UN and 
the EU. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Spain emphasized that the SC should reaffirm the 
values of the Washington Treaty and the principle of the 
indivisibility of security.  Spain also said that the 
seminars should have participation from civil society, 
noting the importance of public opinion.  Spain wanted to 
consolidate the principles of Comprehensive Approach in the 
new SC and joined Norway,s position on disarmament.  It 
also placed importance on partnerships to the east and the 
south, making the connection that--given the operations in 
Afghanistan and Kosovo--NATO has the greatest part of its 
 
USNATO 00000384  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
operations are in Muslim countries.  It added that NATO's 
partnership structures for the Mediterranean and the 
broader Middle East--the Mediterranean Dialogue and 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative--are closely scrutinized by 
the Muslim world.  To the east, Spain said NATO needed to 
find a way to effectively cooperate with Russia, arguing 
that Russia was not the former Soviet Union. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Turkey recognized that the GoE's independent 
analysis would be important, but pointed out ultimately it 
was the Allies, responsibility to make the hard 
decisions.  Turkey said that on form and structure the SC 
needed to reflect a balance between length and utility ) it 
should be relatively short, but detailed enough to provide 
clear guidance.  Turkey said that many would look at the SC 
to examine NATO's new vision.  Further, the SC should 
contain the following elements: 
 
- Underline the role of consultation and consensus 
building, the importance of cohesion, solidarity, and 
indivisibility in the trans-Atlantic link; 
- Consider threats new and old; 
- Counter terrorism; 
- The desire to work with partners ) Russia is an 
indispensible actor NATO needs to work with, and this can 
be done in a mutually respectful manner; 
- Working with international actors, such as the UN and the 
EU; and 
- The clear need to enhance the Strategic Framework with 
the EU. 
 
Turkey also argued that that many elements in the current 
Strategic Concept were still relevant.  It added that while 
new issues do need to be addressed, the Alliance should not 
try to reinvent the wheel. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Poland echoed Turkey's point that many elements 
in the 1999 SC were still valid.  It said that collective 
defense was the core of NATO and must remain valid.  Poland 
stressed that Article 5 was no less relevant today and 
should still be a part of our everyday business.  Poland 
raised as areas of focus:  enlargement, realistic threat 
assessments, and EU-NATO strategic partnership. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Slovenia announced it would host the second 
seminar some time in November.  It deemed both the process 
and the substance important and supported a dialogue with 
partners and international actors.  It underscored that 
both old and new Allies needed to be able to identify with 
the new SC,  The SC needed to balance between NATO's 
founding purpose and out of area operations, preserve the 
trans-Atlantic link, form a strategic partnership with 
Russia, address Comprehensive Approach, defense 
transformation, and strategic communication. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Estonia expressed high hopes for the work ahead 
and echoed Turkey's point that though some elements of the 
1999 SC are outdated, many points remain valid and should 
not be renegotiated unless nations wanted to open up old 
debates.  On the point of territorial defense, Estonia 
warned that we must accept that conventional war in Europe 
was still a possibility.  Referencing the 2007 cyber 
attack, Estonia said, however, that it does not believe in 
diluting Article 5 and that every new threat should be 
 
USNATO 00000384  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
linked to it.  Instead, Article 5 should be kept as a last 
resort.  Germany later reinforced this point. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The UK came in and subscribed to the Danish 
intervention in its entirety, adding an additional three 
points: 
 
- A great deal in the 1999 SC remains valid, but the 
graphic demonstration of 9/11 showed that security in the 
territory cannot be seen in isolation from elsewhere, and 
the out-of-area/expeditionary capability notion needed to 
find its way into the new SC; 
- A constructive and substantive partnership with Russia 
will need to be a part of the new SC; and 
- The notion of a forward looking and ambitious reform 
agenda was needed to underpin the new SC. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Hungary said it was reassured by statements of 
the Secretary General and Albright that all opinions would 
be heard, but underscored that in the end the SC was a 
document that needed to be fully endorsed and signed on by 
all 28 Allies.  It said that this would require compromise, 
flexibility, transparency, and close contact.  Hungary also 
said it wanted a clear and concise new SC that builds on 
the 1999 SC. It should address Article 5, setting out in 
clear and unambiguous terms that NATO is ready, willing, 
and able to defend its members. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Italy said the Declaration on Alliance Security 
agreed in April 2009 stated where the Alliance is at 
present and it expected from the GoE additional thinking to 
look into the future.  Italy said it expected the Alliance 
to look at Afghanistan, while stressing that the 
Strategic Concept must also look beyond Afghanistan. 
Further, Italy expected in the new SC to include: 
 
- A balancing between traditional threat and new 
asymmetrical threats; 
- A balancing of Article 5 and Articles 4 and 10; 
- Transparency in the process both internally and 
externally, as the rest of the world will want to know what 
NATO is doing; 
- Treatment of NATO-EU relations, arms control, and 
Comprehensive approach. 
 
Italy also favored a short and clear document, saying that 
"short is beautiful, clarity is beautiful.  The general 
public must understand it and others can see what NATO is 
up to." 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Czech Republic offered three points for 
consideration: 
 
- The temptation to go into an exhaustive list of threats 
should be avoided.  The Alliance should keep to areas where 
NATO has a say and occupies a leading role; 
- The SC should define what the Alliance does and will do 
outside of the Alliance area; and 
- In order to reach 100 percent consensus, frequent and 
constant interaction between the GoE and capitals will be 
necessary. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Canada noted that the SYG and the GoE have a 
strong remit from the Heads of State and Government and put 
 
USNATO 00000384  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
forward its desire for a jargon-free, concise and short new 
SC that is both forward looking and well informed by 
current operations.  It pointed to the Washington Treaty as 
a good starting point, highlighting the "Canadian" Article 
2 as a place to reaffirm the original NATO values in a very 
different world.  Characterizing it as a "fascinating and a 
complex task," Canada emphasized that at the end of the 
day, this process needs to achieve a substantive outcome 
with clear political guidance. 
 
19.(SBU) The U.S. pointed out that the GoE, which 
represents not 12 countries (Note: a reference to the 
number of experts in the Group, each from a different 
country) but the entire Alliance, enjoys an independence 
that allows it to ask hard questions and expose differences 
which the Allied members in their national capacities are 
less able to do.  The experts can not only expose the 
points of contention and controversy, but also offer a way 
ahead and strategic guidance.  The U.S. endorsed, like many 
others, a short and concise document that was visionary. 
It shared Canada's view that the Washington Treaty offers a 
good starting point.  In an era of globalization, it was 
important that we explain this Alliance in way that makes 
its roles and purposes understandable to the average 
person. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Bulgaria noted several priorities:  preserving 
NATO as a place for consultation; Article 5; the 
Euro-Atlantic link; a commitment to further develop partner 
nations; the articulation and securing of a vision of 
Europe, who le and free; and Russia. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Greece placed its priorities on:  preserving NATO 
as a political-military alliance; collective defense and 
the trans-Atlantic link; keeping up with new challenges, 
risks and threats; updating of Alliance capacities; and 
promoting cooperation and dialogue with partners. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Later interventions, as much of what had been 
said elicited broad agreement, were kept brief.  France 
intervened to note the importance of the process and 
inclusiveness, adding that it should lead to concrete 
measures in order to adapt the Alliance to the new security 
environment.  Germany endorsed in full the Danish remarks, 
aligned itself with Norway's position on arms control, and 
cited Estonia's comment that not every threat should be 
related to Article 5 but that a balance should be struck 
between Article 5 and other issues.  Iceland added climate 
change and economic security to the list of areas to 
examine while adding that collective defense was the 
backbone of the Alliance and the trans-Atlantic link is 
indispensible.  Belgium mentioned many of the priorities 
already cited by others:  Comprehensive approach ) 
relations with the EU and the UN; disarmament and 
arms-control; relations with Russia; and dialogue with the 
neighbors of the Alliance.  The Netherlands, Croatia, and 
Lithuania all expressed general agreement with everything 
said before. 
 
¶23. (SBU) In response, Albright said that she listened 
carefully to each statement and took them to heart.  She 
assured Allies that she will stay in close touch, give 
interim updates, and reach out generally, including to 
non-NATO members.  In doing so, she will take "lessons 
 
USNATO 00000384  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
learned" into account.  She concluded by saying that she 
will not shrink from looking at the difficult questions as 
"you need to break eggs to make an omelet." 
 
¶24. (SBU) While noting that it was too early to comment on 
substance, Rasmussen said that on procedure, process, and 
form, the purpose of the new SC should be to create 
consensus on what NATO's core tasks are in the current and 
future security environment, thereby serving as a guiding 
instrument for political and military bodies.  The new SC 
should be less wordy and should be written in 
understandable language.  It should address a broader group 
and public, including reaching out to the female audience. 
In answering a question from the UK on how to channel the 
vast interest on the part of think tanks in the new SC, the 
SYG encouraged everyone to participate in as many SC 
related events as possible as it is a common responsibility 
to contribute to this process. 
DAALDER