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UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000450 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA 
NRC FOR OIP - DOANE 
DOE FOR S-1, NA-20-D'AGASTINO; 
NA-243-GOOREVICH, OEHLBERT; 
NA-241 O'CONNOR; NA-21- CUMMINS; 
NE-6- MCGINNIS, PERKO, CLAPPER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
SUBJECT:  IAEA/General Conference: Resolutions Wrap-Up 
 
REF: a) UNVIE 438 b) UNVIE 442 c) STATE 094942 
 
Summary and Comment 
-------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Once again, and despite best efforts by USDEL, Middle East 
issues (ref a) overshadowed much of the substantive agenda of the 
September 14-18 IAEA General Conference.  Among the five core 
technical resolutions referred to the Committee of the Whole, or 
COW, -- omnibus safety, nuclear applications, TC, security and 
safeguards resolutions -- those on safety and nuclear power and 
non-power applications fared better than most, largely due to the 
subject matter and early consultations with the G-77 on these 
resolutions well in advance of the GC.  Internal wrangling among the 
G-77, prompted by a Haitian resolution on LDCs, delayed submission 
of the Technical Cooperation (TC) resolution until the last possible 
moment.  Unable to reach consensus on the belated TC draft, the COW 
reverted to an updated version of last year's text with minimal 
changes.  Although USDEL sought to adopt a forward-leaning posture 
on TC, we could not overcome G-77 mismanagement of the resolution 
and accusations of bad faith levied at the like-minded.  Of all the 
technical resolutions, Nuclear Security and Safeguards bore the 
brunt of Egyptian-led Middle East "hostage-taking" and Iranian 
obstructionism.  Malaysia also deserves special mention for its 
unconstructive stance.  Both security and safeguards were easy 
targets in this regard, given NAM/G-77 reservations and substantive 
objections to the resolutions.   Negotiations on Nuclear Security 
were particularly contentious, as the NAM/G-77 subjected the 
resolution to a days-long, paragraph-by-paragraph dissection in the 
COW, and the Arab Group insisted on inclusion of disarmament 
language.  Only an eleventh-hour deal brokered by the U.S., French 
and German Ambassadors with the Arab Group shortly before midnight 
on the final day of the GC and "adult intervention" by the Russian 
Governor and GC President among others to reign in Iran rescued the 
nuclear security resolution.   Relegated early to a COW Working 
Group, the Safeguards resolution was also the subject of protracted 
negotiations fueled by Egyptian and Iranian amendments.  A strong 
Canadian Working Group Chair managed to wrangle a Safeguards 
resolution, which was referred to the Plenary by COW consensus. 
Nevertheless, at half past midnight on the final day of the GC, the 
Arab Group called a petulant "protest" roll call vote on the 
Safeguards resolution, which was adopted 80-0-18, with mainly Arab 
Group abstentions.   All other resolutions referred from the COW 
were adopted by consensus. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The improvements in text or in guidance to the IAEA 
Secretariat achieved in the Nuclear Security, TC, and Safeguards 
resolutions -- largely iterations of last year's resolutions -- 
would seem hardly commensurate with the effort expended, were it not 
for avoiding the negative symbolism of adopting one of these 
resolutions without the others.  This frustrating outcome was 
despite the best efforts of a strong GC President (New Zealand) and 
strong COW Chair (UK).  As we look forward to next year's GC, a 
number of lessons learned could mitigate, if not avoid, the damage. 
First, we will need to consider carefully what we want from these GC 
resolutions and adjust expectations accordingly.  This might involve 
paring down the resolutions to essential components needed to make 
recommendations to the Secretariat and Board of Governors. 
Alternatively, we could take a broader view in using these 
resolutions to promote the Administration's non-proliferation 
agenda.   The second lesson was the positive impact of early 
consultation and G-77 buy-in on the nuclear safety and nuclear power 
applications resolutions.  By contrast, the lack of consultation and 
delay in circulating both the TC and Nuclear Security resolutions 
undermined those negotiations from the beginning.  (Note: The EU 
submitted last year's Safeguards text as part of its negotiating 
posture.  End note.)  Depending on the conduct and outcome of early 
consultations, a COW Working Group may or may not be the best 
prescription for a particular resolution, but spending nearly nine 
of the COW's cumulative 25 meeting hours plus comparable time in 
side meetings on Nuclear Security was clearly not productive.  One 
may also question the tactic adopted by the COW Chair this year of 
not reporting any of the resolutions, even those adopted by 
consensus, until the conclusion of General Conference. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ultimately, however, the fate of the Nuclear Security and 
Safeguards resolutions, in particular, will be tied up with that of 
Middle East issues.  The annual DPRK resolution, one of the 
cornerstones of the IAEA GC, is a case in point.  While the DPRK 
Core Group spent three months working on this resolution in advance 
of the GC to document significant developments, including the 
nuclear test, and though it was sponsored by 43 countries, even the 
DPRK resolution nearly fell victim to Arab Group hostage taking. 
Without prior consultation, the Arab Group tabled an amendment on 
NPT universality to the DPRK resolution, in retribution for Western 
opposition to the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities resolution.  Only 
pressure from Russia and China persuaded the Arab Group to back down 
and narrowly averted the first-ever vote on the DPRK resolution. 
End Summary and Comment. 
- 
Resolutions and Decisions Adopted 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Among the first items of business, the General Conference 
approved the appointment of IAEA Director General-designate Yukiya 
Amano (GC(53)/RES/ 3) and a Tribute resolution (GC(53)/RES/4) to 
outgoing DG ElBaradei, conferring on him the title of "Director 
General Emeritus."  The General Conference also approved 
applications for IAEA membership by Cambodia (GC(53)/RES/ 1) and 
Rwanda (GC(53)/RES/ 2).  On the fourth day, the General Conference 
elected Cameroon by a secret ballot vote (53-46-1), contested by 
Libya (following the withdrawals of Niger, Morocco, and Sudan) for 
one of two Africa seats on the Board of Governors.  Kenya was 
elected by consensus to the other African seat, and all other 
regional slates for the two-year elected term on the Board 2009-11 
were adopted by consensus: Peru and Venezuela (GRULAC), Denmark and 
The Netherlands (Western Europe), Azerbaijan and Ukraine (Eastern 
Europe), Pakistan (MESA), Mongolia and ROK (Far East). 
 
¶5. (U) In addition to the technical resolutions (safety, nuclear 
applications, Technical Cooperation, security and safeguards) 
negotiated in the Committee of the Whole (COW), covered below, the 
General Conference adopted the following routine resolutions and 
decisions by consensus: 
 
-- The Agency's Accounts for 2008 (GC(53)/RES/5) 
-- Regular Budget appropriations for 2010 (GC(53)/RES/6), pursuant 
to budget agreement approved by the Board of Governors in July). 
-- Technical Cooperation Fund Allocation for 2010 (GC(53)/RES/7) -- 
The Working Capital Fund in 2010 (GC(53)/RES/8) 
--Scale of Assessment of Members' contributions towards the Regular 
Budget (GC(53)/RES/9) 
-- Personnel (GC(53)/RES/18) 
-- Examination of delegates credentials (GC(53)/RES/19), following 
the customary exchange of letters between the Arab group and 
Israel) 
-- Article XIV.A of the Statute (GC(53)/DEC/11) 
-- Amendment to Article VI of the Statute (GC(53)/DEC/12) 
 
Full text of all GC resolutions and decisions is on the IAEA public 
website: www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/Resolutions . 
 
 Nuclear Safety 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Of all the technical resolutions referred to the COW, the 
omnibus nuclear safety and nuclear applications (nuclear power and 
non-power applications) were among the least controversial and least 
susceptible to Mideast-related "hostage taking."  In part, this is 
attributable to general support for the subject matter but it also 
reflects the early negotiation of these resolutions with G-77 buy 
in.  Sponsor Australia undertook a major overhaul of the annual 
resolution on "Measures to strengthen international cooperation in 
nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety" (GC(53)/RES/10). 
Doing so required considerable discussion among interested Member 
States, participating in more than 15 hours of negotiations in July 
and August, well prior to the GC.  The most problematic issue raised 
by Malaysia (and seconded by Egypt and the Philippines) was 
insertion of references to military and defense activities in the 
context of nuclear liability coverage and INLEX and emergency 
response (e.g., citing military vessels as a potential cause of 
nuclear accidents.)  While this was successfully repelled, we can 
anticipate efforts to inject such references in the safety 
resolution in the future.  Over the course of negotiations, Egypt, 
Brazil, Malaysia, Philippines, Argentina, Ireland, New Zealand, Peru 
and Chile raised other issues (e.g. liability for accidents, climate 
change), but with a good working relationship established, 
compromise language was found on most of the text.  By the time of 
the General Conference, only a few bracketed paragraphs remained. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Once in the COW, UK Chair Smith quickly dispensed with the 
few remaining issues, rather than referring the resolution to a 
working group, to come to consensus on the text.  This was in 
retrospect a good decision in that a working group (as was the case 
last year) would have only delayed agreement on the text, given the 
extensive negotiations before the GC.  In the final analysis, the 
early discussions over the summer coupled with a strong COW Chair 
who did not default to a working group led to smooth and expeditious 
disposition of the safety resolution in the COW's first two hours of 
work.  The safety resolution then waited on the docket along with 
all the other non-controversial items referred from the COW to the 
Plenary to be gaveled through at the conclusion of the GC. 
 
Nuclear Power and Non-Power Applications 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While occupying more time in the COW than should have been 
necessary (three post-dinner hours), the four nuclear power 
resolutions under the omnibus resolution "Strengthening the Agency's 
activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications 
"(GC(53)/RES 13) also fared relatively well.  The Friends of Nuclear 
Energy (FONE - U.S., France, Canada, China, Russia, Japan, ROK and 
India) had laid a good foundation for the chapeau resolution on 
nuclear power, having begun drafting in July.  Informal meetings 
with like-minded and the G-77 the week before the General Conference 
led to introduction of a resolution that was close to consensus. 
Highlights of the resolution were: the recognition of the success of 
the April Ministerial in Beijing, along with a call for another 
high-level meeting in 2013; an explicit acknowledgment of the role 
of the IAEA in international discussions addressing global climate 
change; and taking note of the Secretariat's continuing work on 
financing nuclear power while encouraging interested Member States 
to work toward addressing financial issues.  (Note: Limiting the 
role of the IAEA in the financing issue was a key sticking point 
with the "like-minded" when the chapeau resolution was first 
introduced in 2006.  End note.)  The most significant addition by 
the G-77 this year was language acknowledging Member States' rights 
with respect to establishing technology requirements, but there was 
no objection to adding the caveat that choices had to be in 
accordance with their relevant international obligations.  The only 
deletion of any significance during the negotiations was the quote 
from the Concluding Statement of the Beijing Ministerial referring 
to the role of nuclear power in the post-Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms -- a relatively small price to make peace among the 
like-minded. 
- 
¶9. (SBU) The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors 
and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) resolution was adopted largely intact and 
differed little from the 2008 resolution.  The Indian-sponsored 
Small and Medium Reactor (SMR) resolution did not fare quite as 
well, with a long debate in the COW over Iran's insistence on 
removal of reference to NGOs from the list of relevant institutions 
that the Secretariat could consult with on development and 
deployment of SMRs, while retaining a reference to international 
organizations.  The question was finally resolved by reference to 
"other relevant organizations," leaving it up to the Secretariat to 
decide who was relevant.  Of greatest concern was the debate over 
the Infrastructure resolution.  Egypt did not want to "commend" the 
Agency on the establishment of the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure 
Review (INIR) service.  More importantly, Egypt refused to recognize 
use of the results of such assessments of infrastructure 
requirements in the optimization of the Technical Cooperation 
program, insisting on deletion of language contained in the 2008 
resolution.  Egypt essentially argued that the IAEA should not tell 
Member States what they needed but simply deliver what was asked. 
Egypt's adamancy on this point, coupled with the now standard 
NAM/G-77 line in Board meetings that the guidance in the IAEA's 
Milestones documents is not compulsory as it was up to each state to 
decide what it needed, prompted USDEL to express regret over the 
increasingly adversarial view on the part of developing countries of 
the assessment process and development of TC projects, in what 
should be a cooperative process between the State and the Agency to 
develop projects that best met a State's needs and optimize the use 
of limited resources.  In the end, 2008 language encouraging Member 
States and the Secretariat to take the results of assessments of 
infrastructure requirements into account was retained.  On a more 
positive note, the COW agreed to two new paragraphs in the 
Infrastructure resolution related to human resource development and 
training. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The non-power portions of the omnibus nuclear applications 
resolution consisted of a chapeaux text based on the 2008 resolution 
with minor updates.  The sub-resolutions, some biennial in 
applicability, focused on producing potable water economically using 
small and medium sized nuclear reactors, the Programme of Action for 
Cancer Therapy (PACT), isotope hydrology for water resources 
management, and support to the African Union's Pan African Tsetse 
and Trypansomosis eradication campaign (AU-PATTEC).  The 
resolutions, tabled at the beginning of the GC, were 
noncontroversial since they relied heavily on previous resolutions. 
With minor changes, the chapeaux and sub-resolutions were agreed to 
in the COW without controversy. 
 
¶11. (U) The omnibus nuclear applications resolution was referred by 
consensus to the Plenary and adopted at the conclusion of the 
General Conference. 
 
Technical Cooperation 
---------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The first version of the Technical Cooperation (TC) 
resolution, penned by Egypt on behalf of the G-77, was shared with 
the like-minded (UK, U.S., Canada and Australia) the Friday before 
the GC.  The G-77 draft contained unacceptable budget language, 
calling for TC to be moved into the Regular Budget and absolving TC 
recipient countries of paying National Program Costs (NPCs). 
References to the 2009 budget negotiations and interpretations of a 
newly published budget document were also problematic.  Egypt, when 
pressed to constitute a working group in the COW, declined to do so, 
leaving the like-minded to wonder when the resolution would be 
officially tabled.  (Comment:  Egypt's pique was also related to the 
late submission by France of the nuclear security resolution.  End 
comment.)  Parallel to the TC resolution, Haiti, on behalf of Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), tabled a resolution calling on the IAEA 
to create a special category of TC assistance for LDCs.  The 
technical substance focused on TC and nuclear power development was 
non-controversial but budget references and calls for studies were 
problematic for like-minded. 
 
¶13. (SBU) During the first three days of the GC, there was no 
mention by any group of either resolution.  The G-77 was reportedly 
side-tracked by internal negotiations over incorporation of the 
Haitian resolution, with countries such as South Africa objecting to 
bifurcation of TC assistance for LDCs vice other recipients.  On 
Thursday, September 17, Egypt finally tabled a TC resolution which 
subsumed the LDC resolution in new preambular and operative 
sections.  Like-minded states immediately raised objections to being 
given a text with less than 24 hours notice before it being taken up 
in the COW.  On Friday afternoon, the last day of the GC, the COW 
began a paragraph-by-paragraph read of the resolution, and after a 
number of hours it became apparent no consensus text could be 
achieved in the time remaining.  Like-minded (U.S., Canada, U.K., 
Belgium, France) raised primarily budget related issues while Iran, 
Pakistan, and Malaysia took issue with every requested change or 
insertion.  Canada and France took the lead in voicing objections 
while the U.S. assumed an intentionally less combative stance on TC. 
 Like-minded tactics were also partially payback (though not on our 
part) for the G-77's paragraph-by-paragraph dissection of the 
nuclear security resolution in the COW.  This discussion ran down 
the clock and at the eleventh hour the COW Chair called upon the 
resolution sponsor to find consensus text.   After a brief exchange 
with a Malaysian delegate from capital, who accused both the U.S. 
and Canada of holding up the TC resolution and threatened to "take 
this with me to the NPT RevCon," Malaysia and Egypt along with other 
G-77 members retreated to a closed door meeting.  In order for other 
states to gain transparency on what was transpiring among the G-77, 
the GC President had to personally intervene.  In the end, the G-77 
and China presented a TC resolution consisting of 90 percent of the 
2008 resolution language with only minor adjustments to incorporate 
the substance of the LDC resolution and a reference to the 2009 
budget. 
 
¶14. (U) The TC resolution "Strengthening of the Agency's technical 
cooperation activities" (GC(53)/RES/ 12) was also referred to 
Plenary and adopted by consensus at the conclusion of the General 
Conference.  Since the resolutions were considered in Plenary in the 
order in which they appear on the agenda, TC was adopted after the 
hard-fought consensus adoption of the nuclear security resolution 
(see next section). 
 
Nuclear Security 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) As has become the case in successive GCs, the Nuclear 
Security and Safeguards resolutions were the primary victims of 
Egypt-led "hostage taking" on GC Middle East issues and Iranian 
obstructionism.  Compounding this dynamic were substantive issues 
raised by NAM/G-77 states, Argentina prominent among them, that have 
cemented their objections to Nuclear Security as a separate field 
from Safety and to the IAEA's increasing investment in the Office of 
Nuclear Security (ONS) in terms of assistance levels and regular 
budget funding.  Most NAM/G-77 are aware that the majority of ONS 
assistance goes to them, yet they quietly allow Egypt to take the 
lead in insisting, including in the negotiation of the GC 
resolution, that 1) Nuclear Security is not a Statutory activity of 
the IAEA, and 2) the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack is 
overrated. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Further raising G-77 ire, the French (as was the case with 
Germany last year) failed to circulate the draft Nuclear Security 
resolution or hold mixed-group meetings in advance of the General 
Conference.  If the resolution sponsor had followed a more proactive 
pattern (along the lines of Australia on the Safety Resolution), COW 
deliberations over this resolution might have been somewhat less 
painful, though nonetheless subject to hostage taking.  During 
initial consideration of the Nuclear Security Resolution in the COW, 
Brazil and Argentina joined Egypt and Iran in raising both 
philosophical and technical questions.  Rather than repairing to a 
Working Group, COW participants engaged in a lengthy, 
paragraph-by-paragraph examination of the resolution that lasted 
several sessions.  WEOG members spent most of the negotiations 
seeking to block attempts by the NAM and Argentina to water down the 
resolution.  NAM/Arab Group defenders of Nuclear Security such as 
Morocco and Ghana remained silent.  Negotiations were also 
complicated by an Arab League proposal to include operative language 
on disarmament and a (U.S.-supported) Russian effort to retain 
references to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GCINT). 
 
¶17. (SBU) Despite the COW Chairman's clearly stated intent at the 
outset to conclude the COW's work by the late afternoon of Thursday 
September 17, failure to reach agreement on Nuclear Security 
resulted in a protracted session of the COW September 18, the last 
night of the GC.  The COW finally disbanded without coming to 
agreement on the Nuclear Security resolution.  Deliberations 
continued in a hastily convened Working Group, chaired by Australia, 
which labored to overcome a revolving door of Iranian obstacles.  In 
the meantime, on the sidelines of the suspended Plenary, the 
Ambassadors of the U.S., Germany and France finally brokered an 
agreement with the Arab Group (led by Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria) on 
preambular language on disarmament.   Then close to midnight, a 
handful of influential Ambassadors -- among them the GC President, 
Russian Governor Berdenikov (who insisted on insertion of GICNT) and 
the Brazilian Ambassador -- made their way to the security 
resolution working group to convince Iran to back down and join 
consensus on the text.  Nuclear Security was the last resolution to 
be agreed, leaving the Plenary to resume its work shortly before 
midnight.   Despite the high drama that held up the resolution for 
days on end in the COW and subsequent negotiations, the Nuclear 
Security resolution was gaveled through the Plenary without 
incident. 
 
¶18. (SBU) One positive outcome of this year's Nuclear Security 
Resolution was its adoption by consensus (whereas the Arab Group 
called a vote last year).  In addition, the U.S. earned general 
goodwill and the personal gratitude of the Lebanese and Egyptian 
delegations for proposing and gaining consensus on disarmament 
language, drawn directly from successive consensus UNGA resolutions. 
  The long hours of deliberation in the COW, however, caused spirits 
to flag, and Iran's late-night recalcitrance on Friday raised the 
ire of many involved (NAM/G-77 and WEOG alike).   For all this 
effort, there were few noteworthy changes from last year in the 
final resolution "Nuclear security, including measures to protect 
against nuclear and radiological terrorism" (GC(53)/RES/11), except 
the addition of disarmament language in the preamble and the 
regrettable loss of explicit references to initiatives of the G-8 
and EU or cooperation with the World Institute for Nuclear Security. 
 
 
Safeguards 
----------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) The Safeguards resolution has been the traditional object 
of Arab Group and Iranian discontent.  A highly competent Working 
Group Chair (Canada) managed to keep this dynamic in check, and the 
resolution "Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the 
efficiency of the safeguards system and application of the Model 
Additional Protocol" (GC(53)/RES/14) was referred by the COW to 
Plenary by consensus.  However, reneging on their promise to the UK 
COW Chair (who muttered repeatedly to his delegation, "I've been 
duped."), the Arab Group staged a petulant "protest vote" (as it did 
last year) at the end of the GC, which resulted in a vote of 80 in 
favor and 18 abstentions (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, India, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.)   With Iraq absent, 
not a single Arab Group member voted in favor of the Safeguards 
resolution.  Iran voted in favor and delivered an EOV in support of 
Safeguards so long as sovereign rights and national security are 
respected.  Iran also expressed reservations as to the exclusion of 
its proposals but expected a more balanced text next year.  As 
Nicaragua was called first in the roll-call vote, its abstention may 
have due to lack of instructions.  India and Pakistan's abstention 
on the Safeguards resolution followed the traditional paragraph vote 
called by India on universality of Safeguards/NPT, which India and 
Pakistan opposed; in the raise-your-placard voting process Israel 
and France abstained, the latter by mistake, thinking the Indians 
had tabled an amendment. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Over the last few years, the safeguards resolution has 
grown in length, and while some text has been added that advocates a 
stronger safeguards system, the overall resolution has been diluted 
by excessive amendments.  This year was no different.  In the COW 
Working Group, Egypt, on behalf of the Arab Group, proposed nine 
amendments to the preambular paragraphs, and one change to an 
operative paragraph.  Iran proposed five changes to the preambular 
paragraphs, and nine changes to the operative paragraphs.  India, 
Israel and Pakistan each had reservations regarding the operative 
paragraph calling for universality of comprehensive safeguards 
agreements, and India and Pakistan argued for an amendment that 
would significantly weaken the text.  Although several states 
insisted that this amendment was unacceptable, India professed that 
it believed that consensus could have been achieved. 
 
¶21. (SBU) During the Working Group negotiations, USDEL worked hard 
to incorporate as much of the text proposed by Egypt as possible, 
and even managed to adopt a proposal made by Iran on the expansion 
of the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL), albeit in a highly 
modified form than that originally proposed.  While the other P-5 
could not accept an Egyptian proposal on nuclear disarmament, which 
the United States could have accepted, USDEL brokered a compromise 
that highlighted the role the Agency had played in safeguarding 
nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons, and, in a gesture 
to South Africa, noted that this effort was important to the entry 
into force this year of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. 
¶22. (SBU) The Canadian working group Chairman James Casterton was 
critical to the successful negotiation of a Safeguards resolutions 
this year.  His strong, impartial leadership kept the group on track 
and did not allow Iran or Egypt to dominate the discussion as much 
as in past years.  By keeping to a tight timetable, the Chair was 
able to pressure States to compromise.  Much progress was also 
achieved by a core group, including Australia, Canada, Brazil, Iran, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, that met outside the 
larger working group. 
 
DPRK 
---- 
 
¶23. (U) The GC adopted by consensus the annual resolution on North 
Korea entitled Implementation of the NPT Safeguards agreement 
between the Agency and the DPRK (GC(53)/Res/15), but for the first 
time this resolution nearly faced a vote.  The Arab group attempted 
to insert last-minute language into the resolution as retribution 
for the votes of certain Member States on the Israeli Nuclear 
Capabilities (INC) resolution.  The Arab Group tabled the following 
amendment in the Plenary: "Stresses that measures requested by this 
resolution constitute steps towards achieving the universal 
application of the NPT and of comprehensive IAEA safeguards."  The 
Arab group had provided no indication to the resolution sponsors, 
including to China and Russia, that it had this proposed text under 
consideration.  China and Russia worked behind the scenes and 
convinced the Arab group to drop the text.  India expressed its 
formal objection to the language.  The Arab group suggested this 
language would be raised again next year.  (Note:  We learned 
subsequently from a like-minded delegation that the Egyptian 
ambassador had advocated that all "regional" safeguards resolutions 
should in the future contain language on NPT universality. End 
note).  Cuba spoke to complain about the hypocrisy of supporting 
this "country-specific" resolution but not the INC resolution. 
 
¶24. (U) The DPRK resolution reflected a three-month effort of 
coordination with the like-minded DPRK "Core Group" in Vienna.  It 
documented the developments on the North Korea issue since the 2008 
GC, which includes the reversal of disablement activities, ceasing 
cooperation with the IAEA, announcements to reprocess spent fuel and 
weaponize the plutonium, announcement of the existence of a uranium 
enrichment program, and a second nuclear test.  Given the stalled 
Six-Party Talks and the escalatory actions by DPRK the resolution 
reflected condemnation and concern about DPRK's actions.  The 
resolution also called on Member States to implement UNSCR 1718 and 
¶1874.  The resolution was co-sponsored by 44 states, the eight Core 
Group members plus:  Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine. 
 
¶25.  (U) Mission would like to thank Washington-based delegates who 
helped steer COW negotiations of the technical resolutions and who 
subsequently contributed to this report -- Rob Cockerham and Steve 
Adams(ISN/MNSA), Al Burkart and Jan Fladeboe (ISN/NESS) and Elena 
Thomas (DOE/NNSA). 
 
 
 
DAVIES