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UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000442 
 
STATE FOR T; IO/GS FOR DETEMPLE, HUSKEY; ISN FOR JENKINS, AMOROSO 
NSC FOR HOLGATE, CONNERY, SAMORE 
DOE FOR NA-1, NA-24, NA-25 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.OL 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC PREL PTER KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY UN
SUBJECT: THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT SHERPA MEETING IN VIENNA 
 
REF: STATE 94449, UNVIE 425 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Special Assistant to the President and U.S. 
Sherpa Gary Samore outlined the preliminary agenda of the Summit and 
solicited initial reactions from participants in a September 15 
first Sherpa meeting.  Samore explained to representatives of nearly 
all 37 Summit-invitee countries the ways in which the goals of the 
Nuclear Security Summit were distinct from other big events, such as 
the upcoming NPT Review Conference in May.  Argentina and Egypt, two 
G-77 heavy-hitters openly skeptical of the threat of nuclear 
terrorism, questioned the basis of the Summit.  South Africa, Russia 
and Pakistan asked detailed and occasionally pointed questions about 
the ground that would be covered and the intended outcomes. 
Switzerland, disgruntled at not appearing on the Summit invitee 
list, attended the Meeting as an observer.  The remaining thirty-odd 
representatives were enthusiastic about confronting the threat of 
nuclear terrorism and participating in a Summit to draw attention to 
the issue.  Even skeptical participants applauded the goals and 
timing of the Summit.  Morocco proved a serious G-77 advocate, while 
Canada, Germany and Japan played the role of dependable and 
supportive allies.  Above all, the Sherpa Meeting and related side 
meetings served to clarify basic questions about the upcoming Summit 
and encourage the appointment of high-level Sherpas.  The next 
Sherpa Meeting is tentatively scheduled for December 3 in Japan. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) White House WMD Coordinator Gary Samore presided over the 
first of three Sherpa Meetings September 15 in Vienna, intended to 
guide preparations for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in 
Washington, April 12 - 13, 2010.  (Thirty-seven countries had been 
recently invited to the Summit, with additional invitations to be 
provided to UN Secretary General Ban, IAEA Director 
General-designate Amano, and an appropriate EU representative.) 
More than thirty invitee states were represented at the short-notice 
Vienna Sherpa Meeting in some capacity.  Samore opened by explaining 
the concept of the Summit as an outcome of President Obama's April 5 
speech in Prague, where the President described nuclear terrorism as 
"the most immediate and extreme threat to global security."  The 
President hopes to use the Summit to develop a common understanding 
of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism at the highest political 
level, Samore said.  Other tangible outcomes included improving 
measures to secure nuclear material and prevent nuclear smuggling 
and terrorism.  Samore emphasized the need to focus the Summit on 
Nuclear Security issues and leave broader issues of disarmament, 
nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy issues for 
other venues, such as the NPT Review Conference. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Samore urged invitees to use the Summit as a venue for 
announcing specific steps they are taking nationally to secure and 
consolidate nuclear materials in the civilian sector.  Rather than 
inventing a new initiative, Samore hoped the Summit would reinforce 
existing mechanisms that support the concept of Nuclear Security, 
such as the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security (ONS), UN Security 
Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, and the G8 Global Partnership.  Samore proposed the 
release of a communique at the close of the Summit that would 
outline, on a consensus basis, the commitments made by leaders 
during the Summit (to be worked out in advance of the event). 
Samore also speculated about the likelihood of industry 
participation during one of the final segments of the Summit. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Anticipating questions regarding the invitee list, Samore 
explained NSC efforts to invite a regional and representative 
balance of countries that have the most direct, national 
responsibility for securing nuclear materials due to extensive 
holdings of nuclear materials and facilities or because they were 
likely to acquire or develop such holdings in the future as peaceful 
uses of nuclear power grows.  Some countries were potential 
transport points for smugglers, another motivation behind the 
invitations.  NSC Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat 
Reduction Laura Holgate, Dr. Samore's sous-Sherpa, led a discussion 
on the proposed Summit agenda, noting the overall theme of the 
Summit: Every nation has the sovereign responsibility to secure all 
weapons-usable materials to the highest standards, to ask for 
assistance or support should that be needed, and to provide help if 
asked.  IAEA Director of the Office of Nuclear Security Anita 
Nilsson followed up with comments on the IAEA's role in Nuclear 
Security and steps that countries could take to prevent terrorists 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  Non-state actors are key elements 
in Nuclear Security, Nilsson asserted, distinguishing the field from 
state-to-state proliferation concerns as dealt with in the NPT. 
Nilsson emphasized that the greatest risk of an improvised nuclear 
device came from civilian-source material. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Most participants in the Sherpa Meeting were broadly 
supportive of its goals and timing, and of the narrow focus on 
Nuclear Security.  Canada was particularly effusive, while others, 
like Belgium, simply stated their support and interest.  Many were 
attracted by the Head-of-State / Sherpa duality that could 
successfully marry high-level political commitment with 
follow-through at the expert level.  Indonesia and Spain asked 
specifically about the relationship of the Summit to the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Building on this 
reluctance to confuse their leaders, Singapore wondered how 
effectively the many related initiatives could be handled at the 
highest levels.  Japan questioned whether leaders would be able to 
engage in meaningful exchange on what is fundamentally a technical 
topic.  There was also some difficulty in understanding the 
divisions between Nuclear Safety (preventing human or equipment 
error) and Nuclear Security (preventing malicious acts from the 
outside).  Brazil pointed out that in Spanish, both Safety and 
Security are translated into the same word ("seguridad"). 
 
¶6. (SBU) South Africa posed a number of very specific questions 
regarding the agenda, such as how to distinguish "illicit networks" 
from smuggling.  South Africa also criticized the use of the words 
"law enforcement" in the draft Summit agenda as insufficiently 
cooperative in tone.  South Africa also requested more elaboration 
on nuclear forensics, asking whether the topic included material 
accounting.   Other participants also shared pointed questions about 
the proposed communique, China and Russia in particular.  China 
warned that it would not agree to mentioning (in the communique) 
initiatives to which it was not a part. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Argentina, represented by its local Ambassador, questioned 
Samore about the underlying assumptions of the Summit and the 
non-binding nature of Nuclear Security arrangements.  He emphasized 
that in recent years the scope of security had grown, in his mind 
inexplicably: "I do not mean mission creep, I mean it has exploded." 
 He also questioned a proposed Summit agenda item that combined 
smuggling and terrorism, describing them as separate issues 
(smuggling is well defined, terrorism is "vague").  Finally, 
Argentina questioned the communique and promised (or perhaps warned) 
that his government would have to "consider the proposal closely." 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Argentina was the most pessimistic participant, even more 
so than the predictably combative Egyptian representative, who 
opened with an observation that there were different "perceptions" 
of the level of the terrorist threat.  Egypt also asked a 
deceptively innocent question about the links between 
nonproliferation and Nuclear Security.  (Egyptian representatives 
routinely argue that disarmament and the NPT are indelibly linked to 
the issue of Nuclear Security, while the U.S. and other like-minded 
countries prefer to address the two task sets separately.)  Egypt 
signaled "full support" for the Summit but complained about the lack 
of attention to "nuclear facilities."  Egypt also felt compelled to 
note each country's "domestic responsibilities" for Nuclear 
Security, another digression that serves to distract from the ways 
international cooperation can be strengthened. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In sharp contrast to these comments, Morocco spoke 
earnestly about the threat of terrorism and of nuclear terrorism in 
particular, noting that terrorists seek safe havens - countries with 
weak program or deserted areas.  Morocco called for resources to 
support countries' infrastructure, border monitoring, etc., but also 
support for norms and standards.  Morocco hoped the Summit would 
address such topics. 
 
Bilateral Exchanges Delve Deeper 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Samore and Holgate also held a number of bilateral 
meetings during the period September 14-16.  During these exchanges, 
Samore's interlocutors were at times even more candid about the 
goals and potential pitfalls of the Summit.  Russia and Brazil 
pleaded for simplicity in the communique as a way to bring countries 
quickly and efficiently to consensus.  Pakistan was proud of its 
participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT), but, like others, wondered how the Summit intersected with 
GICNT. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The invitee list remained an ongoing issue - additional 
proposals for invitees included Afghanistan (proposed by Japan), 
Malaysia (proposed by Australia and Germany), Thailand (proposed by 
Germany), Armenia and Belarus (proposed by Russia and accompanied by 
the prediction that Belarusian President Lukashenko would "behave 
himself").  An interlocutor representing the European Commission 
(EC) suggested that Samore watch closely the outcome of the Irish 
vote on the Lisbon Treaty this fall as an indicator of the 
appropriate EU representative. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Germany remained stalwart in its support, signaling 
Chancellor Merkel's "personal commitment" to the goals of the Summit 
and her readiness to help with deliverables.  Germany also noted its 
recently announced intent to contribute 10 million Euros to the 
IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund.  Japan was also enthusiastic and 
agreed with Samore and Holgate to hold the next Sherpa meeting on 
December 3 in Tokyo.  Looking to the future, the EC representative 
strongly supported a biannual Summit.  Russia also raised the topic, 
offering to host a follow-on summit in 2012. 
 
¶13. (SBU) As during the Sherpa Meeting, Argentina and Egypt proved 
themselves tricky to deal with in the bilateral context.  They both 
cast doubt on Nuclear Security as a concept that lacked definition, 
unanimity, and specificity (as in, does Nuclear Security apply to 
both materials and facilities?).  Argentina reiterated the need to 
address divisions between Nuclear Security and Safety, as well as 
divisions between legally binding standards and voluntary 
guidelines.  Egypt stressed the importance of distinguishing between 
non-state actors and proliferators.  Ever vigilant of NPT issues, 
Egypt also asserted that it would not join international cooperation 
to secure stockpiles in non-NPT states, an activity that would only 
serve to legitimize unsafeguarded stockpiles. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Pakistan also shared its reservations about the Summit, 
warning that the proposed threat briefing during the Summit "should 
not single out any particular country."  Pakistan also counseled 
careful treatment of nuclear forensics (a sensitive topic). 
Pakistan went on to complain that its status as an NPT non-signatory 
had unfairly prejudiced its standing on Nuclear Security.  For 
example, Japan had decided against finalizing a radiation detection 
equipment deal due to Pakistan's NPT status, and the U.S. had failed 
to recognize Pakistan's contributions to the Container Security 
Initiative and Megaports Initiative. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Australia had given a fair amount of thought to the 
Summit's objectives, and suggested that it could help advance issues 
such as strengthening best practices in Nuclear Security, expanding 
the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service 
(IPPAS) missions, improving implementation through the IAEA Nuclear 
Security Program, and improving connections among 
security/safeguards/safety.  Australia also suggested using the 
Summit to strengthen the Additional Protocol as a condition for 
sensitive transfers or to suggest reporting of export denials as 
well as approvals, but recognized these may be outside the realm of 
the Summit.  Despite Samore's statement that the Summit is not 
intended as a pledging conference, Australia indicated it would be 
willing to pledge new funds toward a concrete and constructive work 
plan, especially of activities in the Pacific. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Russia echoed a previous suggestion from China that the 
large size of the guest list would be unwieldy in the development 
and negotiation of text, and that an informal "core group" of about 
10 nations should be developed to work on issues leading up to 
larger meetings.  Suggested core group members include Brazil, 
China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, 
United Kingdom, and the U.S. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Invitations to the Sherpa Meeting came too late to attract 
uniformly high-level participation in this initial meeting, but this 
may have been a blessing in disguise, allowing invitees to pose 
basic questions and get a feel for U.S. goals.  The outcome of the 
meeting will be passed back to capitals, informing national 
officials and influencing the identification of "real" (and 
hopefully high-level) Sherpas for the next meeting.  The 
well-attended and generally positive event bodes well for building 
both momentum and interest in the goals of the Summit.  It can only 
be hoped that increasing attention to the issue at the highest 
levels will serve to bring skeptics like Argentina and Egypt into 
accepting - and actively addressing - the threat of nuclear 
terrorism.  End Comment. 
 
 
DAVIES