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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0428/01 2581240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151240Z SEP 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0054
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000428 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR HOLGATE, CONNERY, SAMORE; STATE FOR T; IO/GS FOR DETEMPLE, 
HUSKEY; ISN FOR JENKINS, AMOROSO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC PREL PTER KCRM IAEA ENRG TRGY UN
SUBJECT: NSC's Holgate Steers Vienna toward the Nuclear Security 
Summit 
 
Ref: State 94449 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Laura Holgate, NSC Senior Director for WMD 
Terrorism and Threat Reduction, visited Vienna to explain and build 
support for President Obama's Nuclear Security Summit in April 
(reftel).  Holgate also laid the groundwork for the first "Sherpa 
Meeting" in the lead-up to the Summit, scheduled for September 15 at 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Special Assistant to 
the President and WMD Coordinator Gary Samore will lead the Vienna 
event in his capacity as U.S. Sherpa.  Enthusiasm for the Summit ran 
high among Holgate's interlocutors, but she was nonetheless faced 
with tough questions as to why some countries were intended to be 
invited (and not others), how the Summit was distinct from the May 
NPT Review Conference, what were the envisioned roles of the IAEA, 
NGOs and industry, and how the Summit might spark "more doing and 
less talking."  Despite Holgate's explanations, Egyptian diplomats 
meeting with her established an immediate link between nuclear 
security and disarmament.  The knee-jerk link distracts from 
practical debate but will almost certainly make its way into the 
Nuclear Security Summit dialogue at the highest levels.  Meanwhile, 
the majority of Holgate's interlocutors, whether diplomats, IAEA 
employees, or NGO officials looked eagerly to the Obama 
administration's first IAEA General Conference with an anticipation 
that at times approached intemperance. 
 
Summit Details 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The NSC's Laura Holgate met with a number of officials from 
the IAEA, diplomatic missions, and NGOs to explain and build support 
for President Obama's Nuclear Security Summit, scheduled for 
mid-April in Washington.  She also laid the groundwork for the first 
of three "Sherpa Meetings," to be held in Vienna on September 15 on 
the sidelines of the IAEA's annual General Conference.  (The second 
Sherpa Meeting will take place in Asia, and the third elsewhere.) 
In her meetings, Holgate explained that the USG wanted high-level, 
Nuclear Security specialists to serve as Sherpas rather than Foreign 
Ministry representatives, in order to encourage practical debate 
with measurable outcomes (the assignment of WMD Coordinator Gary 
Samore as the U.S. Sherpa was intended to signal both the level and 
the expertise expected of the other Sherpas). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Holgate reiterated on several occasions that the Summit 
goals were starkly different from the May NPT Review Conference in 
New York.  The primary goal of the Summit was to recommit heads of 
state to international instruments of cooperation and resolve any 
lingering doubts about the seriousness of the threat.  The summit 
was not intended to establish yet another initiative, but rather to 
take advantage of existing ones.  It should be viewed in light of a 
series of administration steps to raise the profile of nuclear 
security that included President Obama's April speech in Prague, the 
July G8 Summit in l'Aquila, and the 2010 G8 Summit in Huntsville, 
Canada.  The Nuclear Security Summit would be high level, but would 
focus on "doing, not talking."  Nor would there be a discussion of 
radiological material at this Summit, but rather fissile material in 
all its forms and uses.  At the forefront of her message, Holgate 
emphasized that a key goal of the Summit was to help world leaders 
understand - "as our President does" - that small groups of 
terrorists plus available nuclear material implies Hiroshima-like 
consequences. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In nearly every meeting, questions arose regarding how the 
37 countries had been picked for invites.  Holgate explained that 
Washington had been looking at all countries that could benefit from 
enhanced nuclear security, whether due to large stockpiles or 
advanced nuclear industries or because they served as transit 
points.  Holgate emphasized the pragmatic goals of the summit 
irrespective of political allegiances. Israel, Egypt and Pakistan 
are all invitees.  The Summit also presented an opportunity to 
engage with previously overlooked states such as Argentina and 
Brazil.  Countries such as Libya, Belarus, and even Iran had been 
momentarily, but not definitively, passed over. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Holgate described the role of NGOs and industry in a 
meeting with representatives from the Vienna-based World Institute 
for Nuclear Security (WINS).  Holgate predicted that interested NGOs 
would likely hold an event in advance of the Summit, but Holgate 
signaled apprehension that such an event could become politicized. 
The potential to move from nuclear security issues to disarmament 
and NPT was high, and even "responsible" NGOs were not always 
accurate in their portrayal of administration goals.  Unlike NGOs, 
industry would be more directly incorporated into the Summit, with a 
breakout session on the margins of the Summit.  Both WINS and the 
London-based World Nuclear Association (WNA) might have substantive 
 
roles to play in the industry event. 
 
"Deliverables" 
-------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Holgate took particular care in explaining that countries 
invited to the Summit would be strongly encouraged to arrive with 
"deliverables" as a sign of their commitment to nuclear security. 
These deliverables could take the form of any concrete effort to 
improve security either domestically or globally.  For example, a 
country might commit to signing the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the only internationally 
legally binding instrument of its kind.  The 2005 Amendment to the 
CPPNM is also basic to nuclear security and, upon its entry into 
force, would support the development of a global standard on nuclear 
security.  Signing the Amendment would therefore be considered an 
even more welcome "deliverable."  (Note: Only 22 countries have 
signed the 2005 amendment.  Even the U.S. has not yet completed the 
process, an omission that discomfits Holgate, given the U.S. was a 
primary champion of this effort.) 
 
Fuel Bank 
--------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In addition to the Nuclear Security Summit, several of 
Holgate's interlocutors raised the ongoing effort to design and 
adopt an IAEA mechanism for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. 
Holgate did not dismiss the possibility that IAEA Member States 
might still manage to establish a mechanism for fuel assurances 
before the expiration of the NTI challenge grant, or in parallel 
that NTI may extend the deadline for Board action a second time if 
prevailed upon by Director General ElBaradei.  Holgate heard from 
Ambassador Bjorn Skala, the Swedish EU Presidency's special envoy 
for multilateral nuclear arrangements, that the European Union 
wanted to bring about a clear procedural path forward for the IAEA 
Secretariat and Board on the issue.  Holgate pointed to the lack of 
congruence between the DG's proposed criteria for eligibility to 
receive LEU from an IAEA bank, on the one hand, and NSG guidelines 
on the other.  She noted there was not yet a conclusive USG position 
on how to reconcile the issue.  Skala replied that the EU had not 
determined a consensus position on transfer eligibility criteria; 
Sweden's own national inclination, in view of the last-resort 
character of the fuel bank, would be to accept facility-specific 
safeguards of the IAEA INF/CIRC 66 type to be sufficient.  (Key 
points in Holgate's subsequent conversation with German Ambassador 
on this issue were reported in UNVIE 419.) 
 
The Secretariat Weighs In 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Holgate's meetings with Secretariat representatives focused 
on the role of the IAEA at the Summit and arrangements for the first 
Sherpa Meeting on Sept. 15.  Office of Nuclear Security (ONS) 
Director Anita Nilsson agreed to a short presentation during the 
Meeting, tentatively titled "The Future of Nuclear Security at the 
Agency."  Nillson would focus on the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan, 
countries of special attention, their futures and ambitions. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In terms of broader issues, Nilsson also noted that 
non-nuclear countries must accept that many NS issues apply to them 
as well in the areas of transport, trafficking, etc.  Key countries 
included Singapore, Georgia and the Nordic states.  Nilsson 
expressed the desire to shape common values and asserted that ONS 
had the tools to do this. She felt that firm, self sustaining 
support structures (regulatory, educational, and technical support) 
would lead to a stronger nuclear security regime. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Other members of the Secretariat warned Holgate of 
potential pitfalls.  Director of the IAEA's Office of External 
Relations and Policy Coordination (EXPO) Vilmos Cserveny observed 
that the Summit was at the head of state level yet some were not 
invited.  He recalled the troubles of the Anapolis Middle East 
Summit of 2007, from which Iran had been excluded.  Cserveny advised 
that if the USG desired to communicate that nuclear security was an 
issue for all, then inclusion was a must.  He also asked that the 
Summit move from the words promised in President Obama's Prague 
speach to deeds.  EXPO's Head of Verification and Security Policy 
Tariq Rauf contributed that countries such as Pakistan needed 
something to work toward that didn't imply that their nuclear 
weapons were insecure.  Such an admission, Rauf concluded, "would be 
entirely unacceptable."  Holgate agreed that inclusivity was 
important but that so was a meaningful communiqu at the close of 
the event; the two goals were sometimes at odds.  She also noted 
that the proposed threat briefing at the Summit would be focused on 
the demand rather than the supply size, thus assuaging the fears of 
 
potential provider states such as Pakistan. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Holgate also learned that Japan would be holding a 
technical meeting on nuclear security in September, and that the 
IAEA and GOJ had offered to shape the meeting into a higher level 
forum in support of the spring Summit.  Holgate expressed 
appreciation for the offer but declined elevating the biennial 
technical meeting into something greater than its intent.  She left 
open the possibility, however, that Gary Samore might speak during 
the technical meeting without direct reference to his role as U.S. 
sherpa. 
 
Egypt Previews Stumbling Blocks 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In a meeting with Egyptian diplomats, Deputy Chief of 
Mission Aly Sirry signaled no disagreement over the issue of nuclear 
terrorism itself.  He asserted, however, that there were different 
views on the extent of the threat.  Predictably, Sirry counseled 
Holgate that if the USG wanted to rid the world of nuclear 
terrorism, then it needed to rid the world of nuclear weapons.  In 
the meantime, comprehensive safeguards should be established for all 
countries.  Sirrah also alluded to Egypt's "regional concerns" 
(regarding Israel) and described Egypt as having been "super 
patient." 
 
¶13. (SBU) Second Secretary Bassem Ghanem followed up with the 
assertion that the NPT was the only framework for a discussion of 
disarmament and that other mechanisms were silent on this issue.  He 
also reminded Holgate (for the second time) that their immediate 
neighbor, Israel, had not joined the NPT.  Holgate reiterated that 
all armed states would be invited to the summit with the intention 
of bringing them closer to the NPT umbrella.  She also noted that 
reopening the START talks were an important disarmament step. 
 
Comment: Riding the Wave of President Obama's Message 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Nearly all of Holgate's interlocutors, from the Egyptian 
diplomats to members of the IAEA Secretariat, took the opportunity 
of meetings with Laura Holgate to ruminate over the first General 
Conference of the Obama administration.  Many expressed their hopes 
that there would be a "change in approach," and that President 
Obama's expressed desire for renewed engagement and multilateral 
effectiveness would be in evidence at this important, annual 
meeting.  At times their enthusiasm approached intemperance, as if 
the U.S. had not only changed presidents but also its geographical 
location and fundamental beliefs.  For her part, Holgate made good 
progress prompting her interlocutors to think pragmatically about 
the Summit and its outcomes.  Clearly the U.S. will have to work 
hard to separate the associated issues of disarmament and terrorism; 
issues that continue to bleed into one another, with the potential 
to both politicize and mitigate USG nuclear security goals in the 
months ahead. 
 
Davies