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DE RUEHUNV #0427/01 2581205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151205Z SEP 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0050
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0930
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1006
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0404
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0796
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1760

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000427 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN FOR RANA AND MAHAFFEY, IO FOR DETEMPLE, EAP FOR ROQUE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: BOARD REMAINS CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR 
ISSUE, SUPPORTIVE OF SIX-PARTY TALKS 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU) The IAEA September Board of Governors registered 
grave concern over the DPRK's escalatory actions, 
particularly the September 4 letter to the President of the 
UN Security Council announcing the DPRK was in the "final 
stage" of enriching uranium and undertaking weaponization of 
newly extracted plutonium from the reprocessing of spent fuel 
rods from Yongbyon.  The Director General's introductory 
remarks on North Korea were brief; he reminded Board members 
that the IAEA had been unable to carry out any monitoring and 
verification activities in the DPRK since it had ceased all 
cooperation with the IAEA in April.  Twelve statements were 
delivered under the Agenda item on the Application of 
Safeguards in the DPRK: Six-Party partners, the EU, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, Switzerland, Cuba, 
Philippines, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea under 
Rule 50.  All interventions urged North Korea to resume a 
dialogue with the international community and return to the 
NPT and IAEA Safeguards. 
End Summary. 
 
---------- 
DG Remarks 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Director General has reported on the status of 
the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, as requested by 
the Board of Governors, since inspectors were expelled from 
Yongbyon in December 2002 (GOV/2003/14).  Inspectors returned 
to North Korea in July 2007 at the request of the Six Parties 
under the February 13, 2007, Initial Actions Agreement.  The 
IAEA was once again asked to leave North Korea on April 16, 
2009 when the DPRK ceased all cooperation with the IAEA. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In his introductory remarks, the Director General 
reminded the Board that the IAEA had been unable to carry out 
any monitoring or verification activities in the DPRK since 
April.  The Director General called on all parties to work 
for a comprehensive solution through diplomatic means that 
would bring the DPRK back to the NPT and address its security 
concerns, humanitarian needs, and other political and 
economic requirements. 
 
------------------------------ 
Six Parties Express Concern, 
Call for Diplomatic Resolution 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Six-Party members represented on the Board (China, 
Russia, Japan, and the U.S.) and South Korea (under Rule 50) 
called on DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks.  China spoke 
first and made a brief statement expressing its concern with 
the situation in North Korea and its firm commitment to 
achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  China 
noted the issue can only be resolved peacefully through 
diplomatic efforts and called on the Six Parties to maintain 
and use its effective platform.  Japan expressed serious 
concern over the DPRK's September 4 letter to the President 
of the UN Security Council and stated the DPRK's activities 
constitute a grave threat to the peace and security of 
Northeast Asia and the international community. Japan noted 
it is "totally unacceptable" that the DPRK launched a 
ballistic missile on July 4 in "flagrant disregard" of UNSCR 
1874 and described as equally unacceptable the DPRK's 
announcement of its intent to weaponize the whole amount of 
newly extracted plutonium and commence uranium enrichment. 
South Korea expressed grave concern about the DPRK's decision 
to cease cooperation with the IAEA and called on the 
international community to fully implement UNSCR 1874. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Russia made a strong statement that described the 
DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile tests as a "serious 
blow" to international efforts to strengthen the 
nonproliferation regime and a threat to security and 
stability in the region. Russia stated it supports resumption 
of IAEA activities in North Korea and pointed out that the 
IAEA is the only organization with the proper expertise to 
monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities and therefore must play 
a central role in the future.  Russia noted its support for a 
 
diplomatic resolution to the DPRK nuclear issue and called on 
North Korea to return to the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon 
State and return to the Six-Party Talks. 
 
----------------------- 
Support for UNSCR 1874 
and the Six Party Talks 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) There was broad support among Board members for the 
Six-Party Talks and resuming a dialogue towards a peaceful 
resolution.  Canada, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, South Africa, and the Philippines all called for 
the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks, and several of 
these Board members emphasized that North Korea must return 
to the negotiating table without preconditions.  Canada 
called on the DPRK to fulfill all of its commitments made as 
part of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of September 2005 
as well as the October 2007 agreement on Second Phase 
Actions.  Egypt noted its support of the diplomatic efforts 
to address the DPRK nuclear issue and called for similar 
diplomatic efforts to be undertaken to address nuclear 
concerns in other parts of the world. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Board members reiterated their support for UNSCR 
1874 and called on the DPRK to comply with its obligations 
under the resolution to abandon all nuclear weapons and 
existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible manner.  Australia noted that UNSCR 1874 sends a 
"clear and united signal from the international community 
that the DPRK must end its nuclear weapons program." 
Australia, along with the EU, Japan, and South Korea 
additionally called upon the international community to fully 
implement UNSCR 1874. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Other Board members echoed the Six parties' 
expressions of concern with North Korea's September 4 letter 
to the President of the UN Security Council announcing it is 
in the "final stage" of enriching uranium and undertaking 
weaponization of newly extracted plutonium from the 
reprocessing spent fuel rods from Yongbyon.  Canada noted the 
DPRK's actions pose a "grave threat" to regional and 
international security and a "serious challenge" to the 
nonproliferation regime.  The Philippines remarked that North 
Korea's provocations "negate forward momentum" and are a 
setback for the nonproliferation regime. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Cuba took the opportunity to raise disarmament, 
noting that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons 
will guarantee the peace and stability for the entire world. 
Cuba lamented the slow progress on disarmament and appealed 
to nuclear weapons states to immediately comply with Article 
VI of the NPT. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Comment:  Beyond broad expressions of concern, 
there really is not much for the IAEA Board or Director 
General to say at this point on the DPRK's indigenous 
program.  So long as the DPRK continues to reject IAEA access 
pursuant to Six-Party initiatives, the IAEA focus on DPRK 
will shift to continuing to confirm the nature of the 
DPRK-supplied facility in Syria, and the IAEA will also 
eventually need to consider whether safeguards at the DPRK's 
IRT research reactor should be reinstated under 
"INFCIRC/66"-type safeguards if it is finally determined that 
the DPRK is no longer an NPT party and therefore no longer 
subject to NPT-type safeguards. 
 
---------------------- 
U.S. Statement on DPRK 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Madam Chairwoman, 
 
The international nonproliferation regime faces a critical 
challenge from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. 
North Korea's April 5 and July 4 ballistic missile tests and 
the May 25 nuclear test, in clear violation of its 
obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions, have 
seriously threatened international peace and security.  North 
Korea's actions, as well as its recent provocative 
statements, imperil the nonproliferation objectives shared by 
the community of responsible nations.  This includes its 
 
decision to cease cooperation with the IAEA, expel Agency 
monitors and U.S. observers, and its announced intentions to 
restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and reprocess the 
spent fuel - all in contravention of its Six-Party 
commitments. 
 
The international community has condemned these actions with 
a unified voice through the unanimous adoption of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1874.  This resolution, like Resolution 
1718, demands that North Korea not conduct any additional 
nuclear tests or launches using ballistic missile technology. 
 It also requires North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons 
and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible manner and immediately cease all related 
activities.  Furthermore, the resolution demands that the 
DPRK return, at an early date, to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and calls 
on North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without 
preconditions. 
 
The unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1874 represents a global 
consensus on the imperative to eliminate the DPRK's ability 
to pursue nuclear, ballistic missile, and other WMD-related 
activities and to prevent proliferation to and from North 
Korea.  The new measures under this resolution include a 
total ban on arms exports from North Korea and a major 
expansion of the ban on arms imports, new financial measures, 
and enhanced inspection provisions for suspected transfers of 
proscribed cargo.  Pursuant to UNSCR 1874, the DPRK Sanctions 
Committee has also designated a number of individuals, 
entities, and goods related to North Korea's nuclear and 
ballistic missile programs.  It is our belief that effective 
implementation of this resolution is imperative to convince 
North Korea that its only viable option is a return to 
diplomacy and denuclearization. 
 
The United States has been coordinating closely with key 
international partners to implement resolution 1874.  At the 
direction of President Obama and Secretary Clinton, we are 
working hard to promote full implementation of these 
resolutions and continued vigilance against North Korea's 
proliferation and other illicit activities.  The United 
States urges all states to implement fully Resolutions 1718 
and 1874, and commends the efforts of those that have acted 
proactively and effectively to enforce the relevant 
provisions.  We call on all states to be vigilant and 
transparent in their dealings with North Korea.  These 
resolutions, combined with the designations authorized by the 
United Nations Sanctions Committee, and the establishment of 
a Panel of Experts to monitor implementation, provide a 
powerful mechanism to curb North Korea's unacceptable 
activities and compel it to commit to denuclearization and 
nonproliferation. 
 
The United States calls on North Korea to return without 
conditions to the Six Party Talks and honor its commitments 
to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.  Our policy remains the 
same.  We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon 
state, and we remain committed to the goals of the September 
2005 Joint Statement.  North Korea must signal that it is 
willing to commit to an irreversible process of complete and 
verifiable denuclearization.  We are open to engaging North 
Korea, including bilaterally within the multilateral 
framework of the Six-Party Talks.  We continue to believe 
that the IAEA has an important role to play in this process, 
the ultimate objective of which is to return a North Korea 
free of nuclear weapons and related programs to the NPT and 
IAEA Safeguards - a process through which North Korea can end 
its isolation and take its place as a responsible member of 
the community of nations.  As my President has said, "North 
Korea has a pathway to acceptance in the international 
community, but it will not find that acceptance unless it 
abandons its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and 
abides by its international obligations and commitments." 
 
Our firm response to North Korea's actions and our collective 
resolve to bring North Korea into compliance with its 
obligations and commitments are vital not only to global 
peace and security but to the credibility and viability of 
the international nonproliferation regime itself. 
 
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 
 
DAVIES