VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0708/01 2711309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281309Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6809
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH
INFO RUEHC/ALL NEAR EAST COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1972
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0813
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0405
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1679

UNCLAS TUNIS 000708 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
CAIRO FOR CROWAN 
 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC TS
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TUNIS 
 
Ref:    (A) 08 STATE 74840 
 
¶1. Post responses to ref A follow. 
 
a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Tunis is a low-fraud post.  Most detected 
fraud is in the form of readily identifiable falsified employment or 
education documents.  There are no indicators of organized fraud 
rings or document vendors. Rather, these appear to be individual 
efforts.  Tunisian civil documents are generally secure, with good 
host government controls on the production of birth certificates, 
marriage certificates, and passports.  For reasons of geography, 
language and history, most emigration from Tunisia - legal and 
otherwise - is to Europe.  According to official figures, Tunisia 
has 14.2 percent unemployment, but it is generally believed to be 
much higher in some regions. Despite the present low rate of 
population growth, a demographic peak is now hitting higher 
education and the job market.  Tunisia has invested heavily in 
education and the number of students enrolled at university has 
soared from 41,000 in 1986 to over 370,000 in 2009. Providing jobs 
for these highly educated people represents a major challenge for 
the Government of Tunisia.  According to the World Bank, unemployed 
graduates represent 42.5 percent of the total unemployment rate.  As 
of early 2009, Tunisia's average annual income per capita was 
approximately $3,982. 
 
With CONS Tripoli now fully staffed and operational, Embassy Tunis 
no longer provides NIV visa services for persons residing in Libya. 
Embassy Tunis continues to process Libyan IV cases. 
With two Foreign Service Officers and five Locally Engaged Staff, 
Embassy Tunis disburses routine anti-fraud pursuit to the officer 
who handled the case, whether NIV or IV.  Embassy Tunis' Fraud 
Prevention Unit is primarily focused on tracking, coordination and 
prevention. 
 
b. NIV FRAUD: In general, NIV fraud is infrequent.  Post 
occasionally uncovers document fraud, but these appear to be 
individual efforts to mislead the consular officer, not evidence of 
any organized fraud. 
The demographics of Tunisian applicants vary widely, but the 
majority of applications are for B1/B2 visas.  Of particular concern 
are members of group tours, older women seeking to join their 
children who are in the U.S. illegally (older men are rarely seen, 
while many older women seem to seek to travel to the U.S. to provide 
childcare services), recent high school graduates, and Tunisian F 
class applicants.  One recent validation study indicates that 
increased scrutiny of group tours has resulted in a 100 percent 
return rate since April 2008. 
The majority of third country national applicants are linked to the 
African Development Bank (ADB), which is headquartered in Tunis. 
Applicants from the ADB are usually extraordinarily well qualified. 
Many children of ABD employees apply for F class visas, as the ADB 
provides 80 percent scholarships and many of the ADB employees have 
studied in the U.S.  A recent validation study of ADB applicants 
confirms that ADB candidates have virtually a 100 percent return 
rate. 
 
c. IV FRAUD: While fraud is infrequent, Tunis, like most posts, sees 
its share of questionable marriage cases.  In the last six months, 
seven cases have been returned to the Fraud Prevention Unit at the 
National Visa Center for fraud review.  In particular, a trend 
involving young Tunisian men who marry older lower-income American 
women after only a few days in Tunisia seems to be slowly on the 
SPQ:nJD3*!ri`X^Qfoners have 
recently divorced their American spouses after obtaining their 
American citizenship and have married a Tunisian cousin or other 
extended family member; this second marriage is culturally quite 
common and is often one indicator of a valid marriage for Tunisian 
applicants. 
Libyan immigrant visa cases arXQQea~l[}jJ|2Q=XbQod quality machine readable 
 
documents.  Their issuance is tightly controlled by the Tunisian 
Government.  The single-data page is separate from the cover, 
digitally printed, and is laminated.  Digitally printed photos 
appear on two places on the data page.  The text is in both English 
and Arabic, although applicants' Arabic middle names are routinely 
omitted from the English translations.  Embassy Tunis includes a 
translation in the alias field of every application.  Each of the 32 
passport pages is numbered in multiple places, including ultraviolet 
fluorescing page numbers that change places systematically.  Other 
ultraviolet fluorescing features include a picture of the stadium of 
Rades on every page.  The remainder of the passport does not 
fluoresce.  The paper is microprinted with a green and red 
crosshatching.  Pages 3 through the back cover are perforated with 
the passport number at the bottom center of the page.  Tunisian 
passport numbers are six digits prefixed by a letter.  Recent letter 
series include T, V, and Z. 
l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The Tunisian legal 
system regularly prosecutes persons for visa and document fraud. 
Punishment for document vendors often includes prison sentences of 
one to five years.  To date, these cases have involved unnamed 
European nations.  Post is not aware of any document fraud involving 
US documents, and the host government has never alerted post to any 
such cases involving US documents. 
Relations with the host government on the working level, while 
professional, are frequently lacking in substance.  It is very 
difficult to achieve much without the host government insisting upon 
a request being submitted by diplomatic note.  The host government 
often fails to respond to these requests.  In particular, access to 
and cooperation with airlines and airport authorities is restricted, 
preventing the establishment of more robust collaboration regarding 
screening of fraudulent documents and travelers, detection of 
impostors and washed visas. 
 
m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: For IV cases, Libyan document 
quality continues to be the area of most concern for Embassy Tunis. 
The dubious nature of much of the data presented, the method and 
manner in which official corrections and amendments are undertaken, 
and haphazard implementation of standards raise serious questions 
about the integrity of Libyan travel documents. 
 
n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The vice consul serves as FPM in close 
consultation with the Consular Chief.  Embassy Tunis plans to send 
the officer to an FPM course at FSI as soon as possible.  There is 
not a dedicated LES fraud prevention position but a designated LES 
staff member acts as the FPM Assistant.  All consular team members 
are sensitive to fraud issues and understand the importance of both 
internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud 
prevention. 
 
GRAY 
timely retraction and in a non-disqualifying context. 
 
e. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tunis has seen only sporadic and 
unorganized attempts to commit ACS or passport fraud. 
 
f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a 
Tunisian child by foreign nationals.  Only a US citizen who is 
married to a Tunisian national or is a dual-national can adopt in 
this country.  Because of this, our adoption workload is 
nonexistent.  We have not detected any efforts at fraud or 
misrepresentation in this area. 
 
g. USE OF DNA TESTING: DNA testing is rarely used by Embassy Tunis. 
DNA testing exists in Tunisia and is required by Tunisian law for 
cases where paternity is in question. 
h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives one or two 
reports of a lost/stolen I-551 per month.  We process these cases in 
close coordination with DHS colleagues in Casablanca, and to date 
have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this 
area. 
 
i. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: 
To date, Embassy Tunis has not found evidence of illicit 
facilitation networks or fraudulent document production centers. 
The penalties for forgery and fraud in Tunisia are severe. 
 
j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: The Consular section and the 
RSO section maintain a close working relationship, meeting 
regularly.  Cases for criminal fraud are referred on an ad-hoc basis 
as necessary. 
 
k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
Current Tunisian passports are good quality machine readable 
documents.  Their issuance is tightly controlled by the Tunisian 
Government.  The single-data page is separate from the cover, 
digitally printed, and is laminated.  Digitally printed photos 
appear on two places on the data page.  The text is in both English 
and Arabic, although applicants' Arabic middle names are routinely 
omitted from the English translations.  Embassy Tunis includes a 
translation in the alias field of every application.  Each of the 32 
passport pages is numbered in multiple places, including ultraviolet 
fluorescing page numbers that change places systematically.  Other 
ultraviolet fluorescing features include a picture of the stadium of 
Rades on every page.  The remainder of the passport does not 
fluoresce.  The paper is microprinted with a green and red 
crosshatching.  Pages 3 through the back cover are perforated with 
the passport number at the bottom center of the page.  Tunisian 
passport numbers are six digits prefixed by a letter.  Recent letter 
series include T, V, and Z. 
l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The Tunisian legal 
system regularly prosecutes persons for visa and document fraud. 
Punishment for document vendors often includes prison sentences of 
one to five years.  To date, these cases have involved unnamed 
European nations.  Post is not aware of any document fraud involving 
US documents, and the host government has never alerted post to any 
such cases involving US documents. 
Relations with the host government on the working level, while 
professional, are frequently lacking in substance.  It is very 
difficult to achieve much without the host government insisting upon 
a request being submitted by diplomatic note.  The host government 
often fails to respond to these requests.  In particular, access to 
and cooperation with airlines and airport authorities is restricted, 
preventing the establishment of more robust collaboration regarding 
screening of fraudulent documents and travelers, detection of 
impostors and washed visas. 
 
m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: For IV cases, Libyan document 
quality continues to be the area of most concern for Embassy Tunis. 
The dubious nature of much of the data presented, the method and 
manner in which official corrections and amendments are undertaken, 
and haphazard implementation of standards raise serious questions 
about the integrity of Libyan travel documents. 
 
n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The vice consul serves as FPM in close 
consultation with the Consular Chief.  Embassy Tunis plans to send 
the officer to an FPM course at FSI as soon as possible.  There is 
not a dedicated LES fraud prevention position but a designated LES 
staff member acts as the FPM Assistant.  All consular team members 
are sensitive to fraud issues and understand the importance of both 
internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud 
prevention. 
 
GRAY