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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI772, FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI772 2009-09-30 15:33 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO8156
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0772/01 2731533
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301533Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5307
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0447
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0613
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5853
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO/KCC, AND NEA/MAG 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LY
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009 
 
REF: 08 STATE 74840 
 
TRIPOLI 00000772  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. 
 
a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the 
full range of American Citizen Services and has been issuing the 
full range of non-immigrant visas since March 25, 2009.  Because 
of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few "pull" factors from 
the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the United States 
is very small. As Libya is a relatively wealthy country, "push" 
instigators for Libyan citizens are also fairly minimal. 
Official Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated and 
usually handwritten, featuring few, if any, security features. 
We also have heard reports that genuine documents with false 
information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a 
fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the 
Libyan government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm 
information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability 
to conduct fraud investigations.  Further to this, the GOL 
requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed 
through only one designated host government security service 
point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our 
inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits 
ability to conduct anti-fraud work.  Libyan applicants in 
general are unfamiliar with U.S. laws and processes and have 
proven susceptible to a number of fraudulent schemes in an 
effort to obtain visas or American citizen services. 
 
b. NIV FRAUD: Post only began processing visas other than A and 
G in the past 6 months, and to date we have seen only a few 
cases of conventional fraud involving presentation of false 
documents.  In one such case, an H1B applicant presented 
documents that were clearly fake and stated that he paid a large 
sum for them on-line.  He believed this to be the process to 
obtain a work visa in the United States.  DHS has reported two 
Libyan applicants turned back at point of entry and admitting to 
lying during their interviews. In one case, the applicant 
mentioned that a known visa-fixing agency in Tripoli had coached 
him on successful interview techniques and recommended borrowing 
money to enhance his bank account statement. In addition, we 
have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their 
personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get 
a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews.  We 
have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all 
of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have 
usually issued the visas in accordance with the request. We 
continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the 
applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new 
instances of overstays. We will continue to monitor such cases 
closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan 
visa applicants sometimes procure false employment letters from 
friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has 
implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member 
companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of 
all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa 
applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have 
involved petitions from international oil companies; we have 
detected no evidence of any fraud thus far. 
 
c. IV FRAUD: Over the past year, Tripoli began to accept 
petitions for immigrant visas from resident American citizens, 
but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not yet 
seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships.  We 
do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" 
rather than separate birth and marriage certificates.  While 
this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage 
certificate, both of which are available. All three documents 
are handwritten, and contain no security features. We have no 
exposure to employment-based IV cases. 
 
d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has 
received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other 
Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants and other 
Libyans who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail 
from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV 
forms, and have placed a general warning about the use of 
service providers for any visa services on our website. 
 
e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full 
passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from 
first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth 
in the United States while a parent was attending university. 
These cases require more time to review than  most, in large 
part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the 
identity of applicants.  However, the vast majority of 
applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the 
time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming 
 
TRIPOLI 00000772  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast 
amounts of supporting documentation.  We routinely ask for two 
forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants 
because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability 
of the Libyan passport as an identity document.  Libya issues a 
national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most 
Libyans also hold a drivers' license.  Both of these documents 
include a photo, but are only in Arabic. 
 
f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of 
a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident U.S. 
citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a 
dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Embassy 
Tripoli has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption 
in Libya, and has not seen a case. A pending case involves an 
American family in France seeking to adopt an illegal TCN 
immigrant child in Libya; the outcome remains uncertain. 
 
g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for 
DNA testing to date. 
 
h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent 
reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these 
cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and 
Rome.  We have not detected any efforts at fraud or 
misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 
92/93 cases. 
 
i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST 
TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both 
for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially 
from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the 
production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers 
operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to 
Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya 
does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely 
difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2 million 
irregular (illegal) migrants are present in-country but live 
outside mainstream Libyan society. Post knows that European 
Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a 
Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has 
received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or 
other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another 
Western country. In the 6 months we have been processing NIVs, 
we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be involved 
in smuggling or trafficking. Most TCN applicants are 
executive-level employees of international oil or construction 
companies. 
 
j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's RSO served as ARSO/I 
and FPM in his last assignment while the ARSO's previous 
assignment was as an RSO-I.  Post has an SOP for referring fraud 
cases to RSO.  However, to date, we have not had any cases to 
refer to DS with the exception of the H1B fraudster. 
 
k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL 
REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly 
handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any 
security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable 
features. While both marriage and birth certificates are 
available, the document in everyday use to demonstrate 
relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue 
or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A 
man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his 
wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family 
book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who 
can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity 
cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a 
photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite 
how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have 
not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified. 
 
The Libyan passport is the only official government document 
that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last 
pages. The GOL has indicated that in the future, it plans to 
assign a single national ID number which will identify a person 
from the registration of their birth through their entire life. 
Under this plan, passport numbers would remain the same for a 
person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register 
lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports 
would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its 
passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates 
for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last 
year. The new passport and identity documents are currently 
slated for release in the next few months. The GOL has not 
shared an exemplar of the new passport. 
 
TRIPOLI 00000772  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
The Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries 
in Libya, has identified several genuine Libyan passports issued 
with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the 
passport is a replacement for an older passport.  This notation, 
according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior 
passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's 
travel history. This calls into question the integrity of the 
Libyan passport as an identity document.  Post is not aware of 
any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency 
and civil registry has reportedly begun a process of 
"correcting" the last names of Libyan citizens, many of whom, as 
is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as 
their last name.  One visa applicant told us that this practice 
was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the 
use of "family" or clan last names instead.  There are routinely 
four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, 
the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family 
name.  The handwritten English translation of the passport 
rarely contains a full translation of these four names - more 
frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an 
initial only.  When changes are made, no mention of any previous 
passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. 
We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications 
to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by 
mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the 
passport number on Libya passports.  In September 2008, Tunis 
detected numerous duplicates in their database.  Contact with 
the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the 
six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used.  The 
Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" 
serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not 
appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to 
find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications 
without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where 
inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the 
passport data page. 
 
l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our 
relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. 
Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and 
even then, are often ignored.  The Consular section is not 
permitted by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law 
enforcement, as all such contact is required to be between RSO 
and a designated GOL liaison.  Even with close cooperation with 
RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated 
requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has 
repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' 
personal data with foreign governments, which will further 
complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud. 
 
m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: We are working with other 
Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop 
our 
understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 
214(b). Early indicators are that few unqualified applicants are 
presenting themselves for interviews. 
 
n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The deputy section chief serves as 
FPM.  He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in 
the past 
five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. 
All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the 
importance of both internal controls and our external image in 
relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa 
or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular 
Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has 
influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are 
required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their 
orientation. 
 
 
POLASCHIK 
CRETZ