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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002269 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA PINR
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH DPJ 
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NAOTO KAN 
 
TOKYO 00002269  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt, Reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  SUMMARY:  Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for National Strategy Bureau, Economic 
and Science and Technology Policy Naoto Kan in Tokyo on 
September 18.  The officials spoke about the historic nature 
of the DPJ's recent victory and ascension to power, the 
definition of an ""equal relationship"" between the U.S. and 
Japan, security issues related to Okinawa, and upcoming 
high-level USG visits to Japan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Historic Changes, Convincing the Public 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C)  Assistant Secretary of State (A/S) for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for National Strategy Bureau, Economic 
and Science and Technology Policy Naoto Kan over breakfast at 
a Tokyo hotel on September 18.  Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (PDAS) Derek Mitchell also participated 
in the hour-long meeting.  Minister Kan started by pointing 
out that there were two historic changes taking place now in 
Japanese politics.  The first being the change of ruling 
party from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the second being the 
change from bureaucrat-led governance to that by politicians. 
 Kan said that one big challenge for politicians now was 
explaining to the Japanese people why they were taking 
certain actions and creating certain policies.  Especially 
challenging would be actions and policies related to national 
security, in which the public traditionally has little 
interest.  In particular, because Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama already spoke publicly about relocating Futenma 
outside of Okinawa, this was something that would pose a 
challenge for DPJ politicians who needed to build popular 
support. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Kan said that a challenge for his National Strategy 
Bureau (NSB) would be to explain not only its policies, but 
also Japan's national security strategies in the global 
context, to the Japanese people.  The Minister continued that 
this would be a real challenge because the Japanese public 
was fundamentally uninterested in developments overseas. 
NOTE:  Kan mentioned that his college professor of 
international relations, Yosuke Nagai, in a book called ""the 
Price of Peace,"" wrote about President John F. Kennedy's 
ability to skillfully explain to the American people why 
missiles in Cuba were a threat to Americans.  Because of 
this, Kan said, Kennedy was able to mobilize public support 
for his response to the Cuban missile crisis.  Kan said that 
Professor Nagai taught him that there is always a price for 
peace and security.  END NOTE. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
An Equal Relationship, Okinawa 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (S)  A/S Campbell advised that while the DPJ worked to 
bring about such historic changes, it keep in mind some 
lessons from the recent past.  One such lesson was to not 
only take bold actions, but also take responsibility for 
those actions.  Trying to justify unpopular actions by 
blaming foreign pressure was not helpful in building a strong 
and equal relationship between the U.S. and Japan, Campbell 
said.  Such a tactic may be politically expedient, but 
ultimately leaves a bad impression with the Japanese public, 
the A/S continued.  Another lesson the DPJ could learn from 
the recent history of bilateral relations was that Japan's 
tendency to let the U.S. take the initiative on security 
matters then simply responding was not indicative of an equal 
relationship.  Campbell stated that the U.S. also desires an 
equal relationship, but that a change in Japanese behavior 
was necessary.  He said the DPJ victory represented a 
historic opportunity to bring about change in the 
relationship, and called on the two governments to work 
together to strengthen the alliance. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Campbell said that the Futenma issue was extremely 
important, and pointed out that the maintenance of a strong 
U.S. military presence in Asia during these difficult times 
was critical.  The A/S pointed out that U.S. troops in Japan 
were important for the Japanese as well, and implored Kan to 
move carefully on the Futenma issue.  PDAS Mitchell mentioned 
that he had spoken about the Futenma issue, which was very 
sensitive, with the DPJ's Parliamentary Vice Foreign Minister 
Akihisa Nagashima (whom Kan had earlier commented would be a 
pragmatic and influential player in the new Ministry of 
Defense).  Mitchell stated that he was willing to discuss 
with the DPJ side the USG's rationale for the realignment 
plan, but asked the DPJ to be open-minded and work together 
with the U.S. government as partners. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Kan said that he completely agreed that blaming 
foreign pressure was not good for Japan-U.S. relations in the 
long-term, and admitted that Japan bears some responsibility 
in this issue.  For example, the LDP would give the Okinawan 
people hope on issues of concern to them, then blame the U.S. 
after making decisions together with the USG.  Kan professed 
that he did not have any specific good ideas on how to 
resolve the Futenma dilemma, and instead pointed out a 
contradiction-that although the U.S. military presence in 
Japan is important, Okinawa was a special place (a place 
where a ground war took place, as well as a place that 
experienced a long period of U.S. occupation after the war) 
with special relations with the Japanese central government. 
Because of the strong possibilities of fissures in the 
relationship between Okinawa and Tokyo, Kan said he needed to 
think more about how to reconcile this contradiction.  Kan 
revealed that at the time of former U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld's decision to move troops from the front 
lines to the rear in places like Korea, he had thought the 
U.S. could do something similar in Japan to reduce the burden 
on Okinawa by transferring troops to Guam.  However, Kan 
continued, the overall situation has changed. 
 
¶7.  (C)  According to Kan, his National Strategy Bureau will 
not be a decisive policy maker on security issues.  Instead, 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, who Kan said was a very 
powerful, competent, and eager politician, would take the 
lead on the U.S.-Japan security alliance.  Kan explained that 
he himself might get involved if directed to by the Prime 
Minister. 
 
¶8.  (S)  Campbell said that because President Obama's 
November visit to Japan was a historic opportunity, both 
sides needed to decide quickly how to translate these 
security-related discussions into the bilateral process.  The 
A/S pointed out that presently, there were several DPJ 
officials making contrasting statements on security issues 
that were not well coordinated.  The U.S. will not respond to 
such statements, Campbell stated, but hopes there will be a 
more disciplined policy process to deal effectively and 
constructively with different issues, including refueling, 
nuclear issues (such as the ""secret agreement""), and Okinawa 
issues.  He then asked Kan to help impose discipline on 
bilateral interaction.  PDAS Mitchell added that Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates would be coming to Japan in mid-October 
and will be interested in discussing these alliance issues as 
well as Afghanistan-Pakistan. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Kan said that the Japanese government also would 
like President Obama's visit to be a success, and that Prime 
Minister Hatoyama must now explain Japan's security 
environment to the Japanese people and convince them of the 
challenging problems facing the nation.  Kan assured Campbell 
that he would to his utmost to assist Hatoyama in this task, 
but pointed out the limited amount of time before President 
Obama's arrival. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Participants: 
Naoto Kan 
A/S Campbell 
PDAS Mitchell 
DCM James Zumwalt 
Yumiko Miyazaki (interpreter) 
 
¶11.  (U)  Assistant Secretary of State Campbell and Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mitchell have cleared 
this cable. 
ROOS