VZCZCXRO1863
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2208/01 2652129
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 222129Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6329
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8897
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6558
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0373
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 3896
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7075
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1060
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7719
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7329

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 19 TOKYO 002208 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/22/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Editorial: Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.: Consider revision 
of campaign pledges to maintain the alliance (Sankei) 
 
(2) Many obstacles to "rebuilding the Japan-U.S. relationship" 
(Mainichi) 
 
(3) PM Hatoyama hopeful, excited about playing leading role in 
achieving "world without nuclear weapons" (Mainichi) 
 
(4) The Hatoyama administration's foreign, security policies: How to 
rebuild the Japan-U.S. relationship (Nikkei) 
 
(5) Interview with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada - I will say what 
must be said (Mainichi) 
 
(6) Editorial: Investigation into Japan-U.S. secret accords; Take 
advantage of change of government (Mainichi) 
 
(7) Work to uncover secret pacts moves into full swing: 
Investigative team to be launched on the 25th (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(8) Editorial: Russia should respond to U.S. scrapping of missile 
defense deployment (Nikkei) 
 
(9) Editorial: Countries should use U.S. decision to suspend 
deploying MD system in Eastern Europe as a springboard for further 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Asahi) 
 
(10) Profiles of new senior vice ministers (Nikkei) 
 
(11) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Yomiuri) 
 
(12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Editorial: Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.: Consider revision 
of campaign pledges to maintain the alliance 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
September 22, 2009 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is visiting the U.S. to attend the UN 
General Assembly and participate in other meetings, thus kicking off 
the new administration's diplomacy. In New York he will be meeting 
U.S. President Barack Obama after meeting Chinese President Hu 
Jintao. 
 
Although the prime minister has stated that his main focus in the 
Japan-U.S. summit meeting is to build a relationship of trust, a 
stronger relationship of trust will not be possible without concrete 
measures. We hope that the two countries will identify common 
interests and continue the basic policy line of maintaining the 
alliance. The prime minister must not forget that partly due to the 
publication of his article interpreted by some to be 
"anti-American," the U.S. administration attaches great importance 
to this summit meeting. 
 
There are three pending issues between the two countries. One of 
them is the refueling support provided by Japan's Maritime 
 
TOKYO 00002208  002 OF 019 
 
 
Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. regards this as an 
"important contribution to the war against terrorism" and strongly 
desires the continuation of the mission after the expiration of its 
authorization in January 2010. The prime minister says Japan "will 
not simply extend (the mission)." If that is the case, he should 
propose other activities on par with the refueling support. Does he 
have any good ideas? 
 
The new administration has also made demands regarding the final 
agreement reached between the two governments three years ago on the 
relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma base. Prime Minister Hatoyama 
is demanding a review of the plan, saying, "the relocation of U.S. 
military bases overseas is most desirable, or at least, they should 
be relocated out of Okinawa." The revision of the Japan-U.S. Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) included in the coalition accord among 
the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the 
People's New Party is probably also a cause of concern for the U.S. 
government. 
 
Both are issues critical for Japan's peace and security. Prime 
Minister Hatoyama needs to modify his party's campaign pledges that 
may harm the Japan-U.S. alliance. We would also like to ask Foreign 
Minister Okada to reconsider from a realistic standpoint his 
long-standing proposal to demand a declaration of no first use of 
nuclear weapons from the U.S. 
 
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hatoyama is advocating the building of an 
"East Asian community" ahead of his meeting with President Hu 
Jintao. While the community would aim at regional cooperation in 
trade and other wide-ranging areas, this concept will also require 
close coordination with the U.S. government. 
 
The main sticking point between Japan and China is the development 
of gas fields in the East China Sea. While the two countries agreed 
in June 2008 on the participation of Japanese companies in the 
development of gas fields that the Chinese side had already started 
drilling, negotiations have stagnated since then. 
 
We must realize that China's strategy to expand its maritime 
interests is backed by the buildup of its military capability 
through an increase in its defense spending for 21 consecutive 
years. There are reports that China is building its first aircraft 
carrier, and the advantage enjoyed by Japan and the U.S.in terms of 
security in seas near Japan is being threatened. 
 
Prime Minister Hatoyama should frankly convey the above concerns to 
China. A "mutually beneficial strategic partnership" cannot be built 
with mere diplomatic rhetoric. 
 
(2) Many obstacles to "rebuilding the Japan-U.S. relationship" 
 
MAINICHI (Pages 1, 3) (Excerpts) 
September 20, 2009 
 
Nakae Ueno, Takashi Sudo; Yoso Furumoto in Washington 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has started his first full-fledged 
diplomatic tour by embarking on a visit to the United States on 
September 21. 
 
In early September, when the position of the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) as the ruling party was guaranteed by its winning 308 
 
TOKYO 00002208  003 OF 019 
 
 
seats in the House of Representatives election, a Diet member close 
to Hatoyama made secret contacts with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. 
This was a move made in light of Hatoyama's wish to achieve a soft 
landing for the difficult issues in diplomacy toward the U.S. and 
build a new era in the bilateral relationship. The main purpose was 
to give an explanation on Hatoyama's article published in a magazine 
reported to be anti-American and to sound out U.S. concerns about 
the discontinuation of the refueling mission. 
 
The U.S. side said that "Japan-U.S. relations will not deteriorate 
as a result of the discontinuation," but stressed that "we would 
like you to think about aid measures for Afghanistan (in place of 
the refueling mission)." This confidant of the prime minister merely 
responded with "we will think of alternative plans, including 
humanitarian aid." 
 
On September 9 U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Geoffrey Morrell 
voiced a strong demand for Japan to continue the refueling mission. 
This reflected the frustration in the U.S. government with the 
difficulties in mopping up terrorism in Afghanistan. However, Prime 
Minister Hatoyama, who has just taken over the reins of government, 
will not be able to abandon the DPJ's campaign pledge that easily. 
 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell came to Japan and 
met with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on September 18. At a 
subsequent news conference, Campbell said: "The year 2010 marks the 
50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. 
We should not only look back on past achievements, but should also 
think about how to cooperate in the future." This echoed Hatoyama's 
advocacy of a new era in the bilateral relationship. On the other 
hand, Campbell also stressed that "Japan should think of how it can 
contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan." It is believed 
that he asked for alternative proposals before President Obama's 
visit in November. 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment issues, 
including Futenma relocation, constitute a thorn in the bilateral 
relationship. Since the DPJ has the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as 
a coalition partner, trouble is inevitable in the review of 
Futenma's relocation site. Okada has designated USFJ realignment as 
"one of the issues that have to be resolved in the first 100 days 
(of the administration)." A "plan for deepening Japan-U.S. 
relations" (tentative name) - consisting of the USFJ issues, support 
for President Obama's "world without nuclear weapons," and 
Japan-U.S. collaboration for the revival of the world economy - is 
being considered as a package of policies toward the U.S. to 
accelerate discussions. 
 
At their meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on 
September 18, Campbell said, "Basically, we stick to the existing 
agreement," while Okada told him that "(the ruling party Diet 
members) elected from the four single-seat districts in Okinawa have 
all expressed clear opposition to relocation to Henoko." Even though 
the two are old acquaintances, tension ran high when the discussion 
moved to the relocation of the USFJ's Futenma Air Station (in 
Ginowan City, Okinawa). 
 
In the Japan-U.S. summit that will take place less than 10 days 
after the inauguration of the new administration, if the prime 
minister goes back on his previous policy, he is sure to be 
criticized at home for "following the U.S. blindly." On the other 
hand, if he declares his intention to work for relocation outside 
 
TOKYO 00002208  004 OF 019 
 
 
Okinawa, this will come across as a clear "anti-American" message, 
since the U.S. has already informed Japan that it will uphold the 
previous agreement. 
 
Mindful of this situation, Campbell reportedly told Okada at their 
meeting that "we are allies, so let's discuss all the issues. There 
is nothing (in USFJ realignment) that we cannot talk about (with 
Japan)." 
 
Some MOFA officials advocate postponing these issues. One senior 
official says that "there is no need for Japan to bring up specific 
issues." However, deferring the issues will only offer very 
temporary relief. USFJ realignment, the refueling mission, and other 
issues are already expected to be discussed at the Japan-U.S. 
foreign ministerial meeting on September 21. A source on Japan-U.S. 
relations says: "President Obama's visit to Japan in mid-November is 
the time limit. It will not do for Japan to say that they are still 
under consideration." 
 
At his first news conference after taking office on September 17, 
Okada said that, "(SOFA revision) is the next step after solutions 
are found for USFJ realignment and Afghanistan," clearly indicating 
that SOFA revision will be deferred. This could be taken as a 
message that this issue will not be taken up at the upcoming 
Japan-U.S. summit, nor during President Obama's visit. Compared with 
Futenma and the refueling mission, the U.S. position on SOFA 
revision is that there is no need for revision and problems can be 
dealt with through improvement of operations. 
 
Japan's demand for SOFA revision touches on the most sensitive 
issues for the U.S., including the issue of the human rights of U.S. 
soldiers stationed abroad. In a sense, this a more profound question 
than the specific issues relating to Futenma and the refueling 
mission. 
 
Hatoyama's article carried on The New York Times online edition 
before the Lower House election became controversial not because of 
its specific criticism of U.S. market fundamentalism or 
globalization but because the article as a whole was interpreted as 
anti-American or breaking away from the U.S. The U.S. tends to be 
very wary of Japan going in a different direction on issues bearing 
on fundamental U.S. values, including the market economy and human 
rights. Hatoyama's concept of an East Asian community may come to 
have a different meaning depending on how he handles relations with 
Asian giant China, which embraces different values. 
 
The main purpose of Hatoyama's U.S. visit is to strengthen the 
relationship of trust between leaders. The U.S. side will be closely 
watching his thinking as reflected in his words and actions. 
 
(3) PM Hatoyama hopeful, excited about playing leading role in 
achieving "world without nuclear weapons" 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Excerpts) 
September 22, 2009 
 
Nakae Ueno, Takayasu Ogura (New York) 
 
"Playing a positive role" 
 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama will talk about the elimination of 
nuclear arms at the UN Security Council (UNSC) high level meeting on 
 
TOKYO 00002208  005 OF 019 
 
 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in New York on September 
24 and at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly following 
that. 
 
On the evening of September 8, before Hatoyama became prime 
minister, he met Chairman Jitsuro Terashima of the Japan Research 
Institute, his foreign policy adviser, at a Chinese restaurant in 
Akasaka, Tokyo. He explained that, "I received advice (from Mr 
Terashima) on my speech at the UN General Assembly and on the 
Japan-U.S. summit." 
 
The U.S. President, the most important diplomatic partner of the 
Japanese prime minister, has sent out a message on a "world without 
nuclear weapons." How should Japan offer its support as an 
atomic-bombed country? 
 
Based on advice from Terashima and Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji 
Yabunaka, Hatoyama is expected to touch on the following three 
points in his speech: 
 
(1) The world is exposed to the threat of nuclear proliferation. The 
risk of nuclear terrorism is approaching a critical stage with the 
nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea and the acquisition of 
nuclear materials by terrorist organizations; 
 
(2) Japan, as the only atomic-bombed nation, will enhance the 
effectiveness of the peaceful use of atomic energy through the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and support President 
Obama's plan for a "world without nuclear weapons"; 
 
(3) Japan will propose a denuclearization treaty for Northeast Asia 
in order to guarantee denuclearization in Asia and play a positive 
role in promoting denuclearization in the world. 
 
The above reflects the prime minister's hopes and excitement about 
Japan and the U.S. leading the efforts toward nuclear disarmament. 
 
First time in history for U.S. president to chair UNSC 
 
In early July, about 45 days before the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) won 308 seats in the House of Representatives election and the 
Liberal Democratic Party administration collapsed, Japan's UN 
mission was notified by the U.S. government that, "We would like to 
put nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on the agenda for the 
UNSC summit meeting in September. President Obama will preside over 
the meeting." 
 
A Japanese diplomatic source observes that: "This would have been 
unthinkable during the previous (Bush) administration. It must have 
been a major decision on the part of the President." 
 
This is the first time in history for a U.S. president to chair the 
UNSC. A UN source notes that, "The U.S. cannot afford to fail." By 
putting the nuclear issue on the agenda, the U.S. has shown that it 
is making this a pragmatic policy issue. Hatoyama is also very 
conscious of the President's great enthusiasm. 
 
The gap between Japanese and U.S. policies on the nuclear issue is 
narrowing. The U.S. has not only decided to participate in the 
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the previous Bush administration 
refused to attend, but has discreetly conveyed its decision to 
 
TOKYO 00002208  006 OF 019 
 
 
support the Japan-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution on the 
elimination of nuclear arms, also opposed by the former 
administration. The conditions are becoming ripe for Japan and the 
U.S. to cooperate in multilateral negotiations on the nuclear 
issue. 
 
On the other hand, there is no denying that subtle differences 
remain in the two countries' positions. The above UN source explains 
that: "While Japan gives the same importance to nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation, the U.S. focus is on non-proliferation. 
Disarmament is a means for non-proliferation." The draft resolution 
drawn up by the U.S. is also called the "draft resolution on nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament," with "non-proliferation" 
preceding "disarmament." 
 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is at risk of 
collapsing with North Korea conducting its nuclear tests following 
the examples of India and Pakistan. And since the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, with nuclear arms and nuclear-related materials falling 
into the hands of terrorists becoming a real possibility, the U.S. 
has judged that the only way to avert the nuclear threat is to 
realize a nuclear-free world. It has set nuclear non-proliferation 
as a pragmatic policy for its own national interest. 
 
On the other hand, Japan, which has promoted nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferation at multilateral diplomatic venues, but has 
constantly affirmed the "nuclear umbrella" in its bilateral 
relations with the U.S., has not actually designated nuclear 
disarmament as a pragmatic policy goal. How will nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament, on which the Obama administration 
has shown great enthusiasm in multilateral diplomacy, affect 
bilateral relations? Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada will need to examine the issues very carefully. 
 
(4) The Hatoyama administration's foreign, security policies: How to 
rebuild the Japan-U.S. relationship 
 
NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
September 19, 2009 
 
Hiroyuki Akita, editorial staff member 
 
On the eve of his election as prime minister in early September, 
Yukio Hatoyama took time out from his extremely hectic schedule to 
prepare for diplomacy. He met Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka 
twice and Deputy Foreign Minister Yoichi and other officials once 
for one hour at a time and listened carefully to their briefings on 
urgent issues. 
 
Repeating the word "trust" 
 
During the first meeting, the focus was on his visit to the U.S. 
from September 21, while the second meeting was about issues in the 
Japan-U.S., Japan-China, and Japan-ROK relationships. The subject of 
the third meeting was how to handle the G-20 financial summit in 
Pittsburgh on September 24-25. 
 
In all these meetings, the rebuilding of the Japan-U.S. relationship 
was a top priority. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) stood for a 
"close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship" during the House of 
Representatives election and called for a review of the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). Hatoyama's 
 
TOKYO 00002208  007 OF 019 
 
 
article (in the New York Times) had also been reported by the U.S. 
media to be anti-American, so there was both anxiety and expectation 
in the U.S. about the new administration. 
 
One Obama administration official noted that the misunderstanding 
arising from the Hatoyama article has been resolved. "We will 
closely observe what Prime Minister Hatoyama's true view of the U.S. 
is." 
 
The Japan-U.S. summit on September 23 will be a litmus test. Perhaps 
in recognition of the U.S.'s anxiety, Hatoyama struck a conciliatory 
tone at his news conference on September 16. "The first step is to 
build a relationship of trust with President Obama," he said. He 
repeated the word "trust" four times during the news conference. 
 
For the immediate future the Hatoyama administration intends to 
emphasize "continuity" rather than change in foreign and security 
policies. Now that he has access to confidential information, unlike 
when he was an opposition politician, Hatoyama's plan is to look 
over such information, make an overall assessment, and come up with 
a new strategy, according to his aides. 
 
However, the U.S. may not necessarily be willing to wait for the 
Hatoyama administration to finish its "test drive." At her first 
meeting with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on September 21, U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will reportedly "draw the line" 
on USFJ realignment, Afghanistan, and other pending issues. 
 
The U.S. may possibly convey the message that it will be difficult 
to review SOFA and USFJ realignment. One U.S. government source says 
that "it is better to let the Hatoyama administration know our 
principles before it starts to review its policy toward the U.S." 
 
The Hatoyama administration's emphasis on Asian diplomacy is another 
variable in the potentially stormy Japan-U.S. relationship. At his 
news conference held in the early hours of September 17, Minister of 
Finance Hirohisa Fujii said that the plan for an Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) is "one of the important issues," indicating a strong desire 
to realize the AMF. 
 
While it is quite natural for Japan to have closer relations with 
the Asian countries, with whom it is increasingly strengthening 
economic ties, if this is interpreted as a move to "quit America and 
join Asia," it may give rise to conflict between Japan and the U.S. 
 
China, Russia hopeful 
 
China and Russia are also hoping to draw Japan closer. The first 
foreign leader to call Hatoyama after he took office was Russian 
President Dmitriy Medvedev. At the height of the Cold War, Prime 
Minister Ichiro Hatoyama signed the Japan-Russia joint communiqu in 
1956 despite U.S. reservations. Since Yukio is his grandson, Russian 
diplomats openly voice expectations for the new administration's 
policy toward Russia. 
 
In late August, when the likelihood of a landslide victory for the 
DPJ became strong, China discreetly sounded out Japan on its 
participation in a trilateral summit with China and the ROK in early 
October. This was a sign of its desire to consolidate Japan-China 
collaboration before Obama's expected visit to Japan in November. 
 
Hatoyama, who is keen on building an "East Asian community," asked 
 
TOKYO 00002208  008 OF 019 
 
 
Italian President Georgio Napolitano at their meeting on September 
18 about the secret of the success of the European Union (EU) and 
was told "patience and hard work are important." 
 
It takes years for diplomacy to bear fruit. The Hatoyama 
administration should not decide on a new strategy hastily. It 
should remain patient and start with efforts to strengthen the unity 
between Japan and the U.S. 
 
(5) Interview with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada - I will say what 
must be said 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) 
September 20, 2009 
 
-- What is the order of priority among the refueling mission in the 
Indian Ocean, a revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces 
Agreement, and the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air 
Station (Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture)? 
 
Okada: A shift in foreign policy resulting from a change of 
government requires us to look at matters from a higher perspective. 
We should conduct in-depth discussions with our partner. 
 
-- You said that the government will not simply extend the refueling 
mission in the Indian Ocean. Does that mean you might not withdraw 
the Maritime Self-Defense troops? Are you going to seek alternative 
legislation on the grounds that the refueling mission is a violation 
of the Constitution? 
 
Okada: Not making a simple extension means not to extend the mission 
simply. I have no intention of elaborating on it any further. 
Earlier when Ichiro Ozawa was president, he described the refueling 
mission as a violation of the Constitution, but the party has not 
said it is a violation of the Constitution. 
 
-- President Yukio Hatoyama vowed to move Futenma Air Station at 
least out of Okinawa. 
 
Okada: We want to relocate it outside the prefecture. Nevertheless, 
talks will not proceed smoothly if the range of options is narrowed 
down from the beginning. 
 
-- You have now taken power. How will that shift Japan's foreign 
policy? 
 
Okada: During the Bush administration, (then Prime Minister 
Junichiro) Koizumi said Japan should simply follow the United 
States. Since Barack Obama became the President, the Japanese 
administration has admired the idea of a world without nuclear 
weapons. The Japanese administration has always tried to fall in 
step with (the U.S. government) without taking a firm stance. Those 
days are over. We will seek the best solution by saying what must be 
said and by making compromises when necessary. 
 
-- A declaration to abandon the preemptive use of nuclear weapons 
will weaken the United States' nuclear umbrella over Japan. 
 
Okada: If the preemptive use of nuclear weapons is allowed, such an 
argument can be engaged in. However, (the U.S. government) has said 
that it will aim at the elimination of nuclear weapons. The two 
perspectives do not mesh. 
 
TOKYO 00002208  009 OF 019 
 
 
 
-- In the upcoming Japan-U.S. talks, are you going to tell (your 
counterpart) that (the United States) should declare the abandonment 
of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons? 
 
Okada: I want to avoid the mistake of urging the United States to 
make a declaration unilaterally. Even so, I cannot understand the 
view supporting the preemptive use of inhumane (nuclear) weapons in 
this day and age when the use of other weapons of mass destruction 
is said to be illegal. 
 
-- Is the nuclear umbrella necessary? 
 
Okada: I am not opposed to retaliation in response to a nuclear 
attack. 
 
-- Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is eager to settle the Northern 
Territories issue. 
 
Okada: It is a matter of great interest to the Prime Minister, so I 
want to listen to his view. 
 
-- How are you going to deal with the North Korean issue? 
 
Okada: In principle, the matter must be discussed in the framework 
of the Six-Party Talks. Holding separate (talks) might work 
favorably for North Korea. In other words, U.S.-DPRK talks should be 
held as necessary to break the gridlock. 
 
-- You ordered investigations into the secret pacts on your first 
day in office. What is your aim? 
 
Okada: The change of government provides a good opportunity. Past 
prime ministers and foreign ministers have denied the existence of 
secret agreements, so bureaucrats could not say that such agreements 
existed in reality. Government officials should consider this to be 
a good opportunity. 
 
-- If such pacts exist, who should be blamed? 
 
Okada: Basically the (past) prime ministers and foreign ministers 
are to blame. 
 
-- What if it becomes clear that the documents on the secret pacts 
have been destroyed? 
 
Okada: Too much thinking might spoil the efforts to investigate the 
facts. We should first concentrate on investigating the agreements 
thoroughly and disclosing them to the public. 
 
(Interview by Takenori Noguchi) 
 
(6) Editorial: Investigation into Japan-U.S. secret accords; Take 
advantage of change of government 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
September 18, 2009 
 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada instructed ministry officials to 
examine documents on secret pacts on security cooperation between 
Japan and the U.S. and to issue a report on the results of the 
investigation by the end of November. The secret pact issue has 
 
TOKYO 00002208  010 OF 019 
 
 
heightened public distrust in diplomacy. The Foreign Ministry should 
carry out a thorough investigation to dispel such distrust, taking 
advantage of the change of government. 
 
Okada listed four secret accords for investigation: (1) a pact made 
when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was revised in 1960 allowing 
stopovers in Japanese territory by U.S. military aircraft and 
vessels carrying nuclear weapons; (2) a pact on combat operations in 
emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula; (3) a pact made at the 
time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972 allowing the U.S. 
military to bring nuclear weapons into Japan in emergency 
situations; and (4) a pact concerning Japan's payment of fees for 
restoring sites vacated by the U.S. military to their original 
state. 
 
The revised treaty stipulates the need for Washington to hold prior 
consultations with Tokyo before bringing nuclear weapons into Japan. 
On the other hand, Japan and the U.S. reached a secret agreement 
under which Tokyo would tacitly allow U.S. warships carrying nuclear 
weapons to call on Japanese ports and pass through Japanese 
territorial waters without requiring prior consultation. The two 
countries also signed an agreement in which Japan would allow U.S. 
forces based in Japan to conduct sorties without consultations in 
emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
The existence of these secret accords has been revealed by official 
documents that have been kept by the U.S. government. On the alleged 
secret pact on warships carrying nuclear weapons, former 
administrative vice minister Ryohei Murata said that he took charge 
of the document (from his predecessor) when he assumed the vice 
ministerial post and then later passed it on to his successor. 
 
On the accord to allow the U.S. forces to bring nuclear arms into 
Okinawa in emergency situations, the then Japanese prime minister 
reached an agreement with his U.S. counterpart, according to 
information disclosed in a book by former Kyoto Sangyo University 
professor Kei Wakaizumi. Wakaizumi was engaged in negotiations with 
the U.S. government as an emissary of then Prime Minister Eisaku 
Sato. Former Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau Director 
General Bunroku Yoshino acknowledged the existence of the secret 
accord concerning Japan's payment of fees for restoring sites 
vacated by the U.S. military to their original state. 
 
Foreign Minister Okada said that there are about 2,700 volumes of 
materials related to the Japan-US. Security Treaty and about 570 
volumes of data related to the return of Okinawa to Japan. Given 
this, Okada is considering the possibility of temporarily calling 
staff members of diplomatic missions abroad back to Japan to have 
them examine these related documents. The ministry also plans to set 
up a third-party committee after the investigation has made a 
certain extent of progress and listen to the views of ex-ministry 
officials. Okada also plans to also carry out an investigation in 
the U.S. 
 
When these secret accords were entered into, the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union were hostile toward each other, but with the collapse of the 
Cold-War structure, the international situation has changed 
significantly. There is no rational reason for the Foreign Ministry 
to continue to deny the existence of the secret accords. Okada has 
also said that "the secret accord issue is increasing public 
distrust (in the nation's diplomacy)." The Foreign Ministry should 
realize that making diplomatic affairs more transparent will allow 
 
TOKYO 00002208  011 OF 019 
 
 
the ministry to develop diplomacy backed by the people for the first 
time, and the ministry should actively cooperate in the 
investigation. 
 
Once the government admits the existence of the secret pacts based 
on the results of the investigation, the issue of compatibility will 
emerge between the secret accords and Japan's advocacy of the three 
nonnuclear principles while depending on U.S. deterrence to secure 
its national security, centering on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The 
government also should prepare an explanation to respond to this 
question. 
 
(7) Work to uncover secret pacts moves into full swing: 
Investigative team to be launched on the 25th 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Excerpts) 
September 22, 2009 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) will launch a full 
investigation into the so-called secret pacts between Japan and the 
U.S. on permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the 
country and the reversion of Okinawa. A set of such pacts have 
already been disclosed through the U.S. archives. However, the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration and the LDP itself 
denied the existence of such agreements. The capability of the new 
Hatoyama administration will now be tested in terms of whether it 
can do away with the secretive nature of the bureaucracy and promote 
new diplomatic and security policies. 
 
Shortly after the launch of the new administration, Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada ordered Vice Minister Mitoji Yabunaka to launch an 
investigation into the secret agreements and report on the survey 
results by around the end of November. MOFA will also launch a team 
of about 15 officials on Sept. 25. MOFA will also set up a committee 
of experts from the private sector in late October and conduct an 
interview survey of senior MOFA officials. 
 
(8) Editorial: Russia should respond to U.S. scrapping of missile 
defense deployment 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
September 20, 2009 
 
The Obama administration of the United States has announced the 
scrapping of a plan to deploy a missile defense (MD) system in 
Eastern Europe. This was probably a concession to Russia, which is 
opposed to the deployment, in order to give priority to confidence 
building between the two countries. It is now Russia's turn to 
cooperate with the U.S. on nuclear disarmament and Iran's nuclear 
issue and fulfill its responsibility as a major nuclear power. 
 
The plan to deploy an MD system was a project of the former Bush 
administration. It consists of setting up a missile interception 
base in Poland and building a radar facility in the Czech Republic, 
aiming at synchronized operations by 2012. 
 
The United States' purpose was to protect Europe from the threat of 
nuclear and missile attacks by Iran, but Russia has opposed this on 
the grounds it would weaken Russia's nuclear deterrence. This issue, 
along with the eastern expansion of NATO, has been a major factor in 
the chilling of U.S.-Russia relations. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002208  012 OF 019 
 
 
Naturally, an attempt to reduce defense spending is one reason why 
the Obama administration reconsidered deploying an MD system in 
Eastern Europe, but more importantly, the cancellation of the 
deployment is meant to promote cooperation with Russia in nuclear 
disarmament. 
 
The U.S. and Russia are in the process of negotiating a new nuclear 
disarmament treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I 
(START I) before the end of 2009. If these two countries, which 
possess over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, are able to 
agree on a substantial reduction in nuclear arms, this will be a 
major step toward realizing President Obama's goal of a "world 
without nuclear weapons." 
 
U.S.-Russia cooperation is also important in solving the issue of 
Iran's nuclear program. Talks among the six parties, the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) plus Germany, 
are scheduled to resume on October 1, but Iran stands firm on 
continuing its enrichment of uranium. The cooperation of Russia, 
which has close relations with Iran, is indispensable for preventing 
the development of nuclear arms. 
 
Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev has welcomed the discontinuation 
of the MD deployment plan in Eastern Europe as a "responsible 
approach." However, Russia should not stop at mere welcome; it has 
the responsibility to make sincere efforts for nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation in the world. 
 
We hope that the U.S.-Russia nuclear-disarmament talks will aim for 
the conclusion of a strict treaty containing measures for mutual 
verification, as well as indicate the future course for nuclear 
weapon reduction. A U.S.-Russia summit will be held on September 23 
and the UNSC's high-level meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament will be held on September 24. The U.S. and Russia need 
to set an example, if only to prod China and the other nuclear 
powers toward nuclear disarmament and realize thorough nuclear 
non-proliferation. 
 
Russia also needs to play an active role in preventing the 
development of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea. If 
negotiations produce no results, Russia should also cooperate in 
taking strict measures, including imposing stronger sanctions. 
Russia is suspected of supplying Iran with ground-to-air missiles in 
secret. It goes without saying that it should stop exporting weapons 
related to the development of nuclear arms to Iran. 
 
(9) Editorial: Countries should use U.S. decision to suspend 
deploying MD system in Eastern Europe as a springboard for further 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
September 19, 2009 
 
U.S. President Barack Obama has made a significant diplomatic 
decision in an effort to turn his call for a world free of nuclear 
weapons into action. The decision is to suspend the planned 
deployment of the missile defense (MD) system in Czechoslovakia and 
Poland in Eastern Europe. The Obama administration has decided to 
review the MD plan for Europe promoted by the previous Bush 
administration. 
 
Russia has strongly reacted to the planned deployment of the MD 
 
TOKYO 00002208  013 OF 019 
 
 
system in Eastern Europe, claiming that the system would neutralize 
its nuclear arms. By dispelling such Russian apprehension, Obama has 
urged that nation, in a sense, to make a concession on drawing up a 
treaty to be adopted after the expiration of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START 1). The U.S. is aiming to reach a conclusion 
in the negotiations by the end of this year. 
 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a statement welcoming the 
U.S. decision as "a responsible approach" and calling on the U.S. to 
jointly cope with the threat of missile expansion. Britain and 
France have also welcomed the decision. 
 
President Obama put an end to former president George Bush's 
strategy of preventing nuclear proliferation by resorting to both 
the MD system and preemptive strikes. We hope that the U.S. will 
present a vision of further efforts for nuclear arms reduction after 
the introduction of the new treaty succeeding START 1. 
 
The new U.S. decision will be discussed first at the U.S.-Russia 
summit meeting slated for Sept. 23 in New York and the upcoming 
summit of the UN Security Council, which Obama will chair. 
 
The purpose of the MD system in Eastern Europe was to defend the 
region from possible nuclear and missile attacks from Iran. But the 
previous Bush administration attempted to use the deployment plan as 
a lever to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to 
the East. Czechoslovakia and Poland also seem to have aimed to apply 
pressure on Russia by agreeing to deploy the MD system despite the 
opposition of their peoples. 
 
In countering the U.S. move to deploy the MD system in Eastern 
Europe, Russia also brandished a public threat, as then president 
Vladimir Putin said: "Countries that agree to deploy the MD system 
will be exposed to the threat of nuclear attack." 
 
Russia is also showing signs of selling its anti-air missiles to 
Iran. Moscow should, of course, cancel such a plan now that 
Washington has shown it consideration. 
 
The Obama administration intends to deploy in stages a system 
centering on the Standard Missile 3 (MS3) carried on Aegis ships to 
replace the current MD deployment plan. The administration, while 
emphasizing the flexibility of its new plan, intends to carefully 
observe Iran's response. 
 
On Oct. 1, six countries -- the five UN Security Council members and 
Germany - and the Iranian government will discuss the nuclear issue. 
The meeting will be crucial for the Obama administration, which has 
asked Iran for dialogue. 
 
If Russia favorably responds to the new U.S. approach and if the 
U.S. and Russia adopt a cooperative policy, there will be major 
effects in terms of nuclear arms reduction and nuclear and missile 
nonproliferation. In order to deter nuclear and missile development 
by North Korea, we expect more visible results to be produced (from 
the U.S. decision to cancel the deployment of the MD system in 
Eastern Europe). 
 
(10) Profiles of new senior vice ministers 
 
NIKKEI (Page 4) (Full) 
September 19, 2009 
 
TOKYO 00002208  014 OF 019 
 
 
 
Cabinet Office 
 
Atsushi Oshima 
Graduated from Waseda University; former Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) Diet affairs committee vice chairman, former House of 
Representatives economy, trade and industry committee member; Lower 
House Saitama No. 6 district; fourth term; 52 (Yukio Hatoyama group 
in the DPJ) 
 
Motohisa Furukawa 
University of Tokyo; former DPJ tax research committee vice 
chairman, former DPJ pension research committee chairman; Lower 
House Aichi No. 2 district; fifth term; 43 (Seiji Maehara group) 
 
Kohei Otsuka 
Waseda University Graduate School; former DPJ executive office 
deputy chief, former DPJ policy research committee vice chairman; 
Upper House Aichi constituency; second term; 49 
 
Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry 
 
Shu Watanabe 
Waseda University; former DPJ deputy secretary general, former DPJ 
tax research committee vice chairman; Lower House Shizuoka No. 6 
district; fifth term; 47 (Maehara group) 
 
Masamitsu Naito 
University of Tokyo Graduate School; former DPJ election campaign 
committee deputy chairman, former Upper House internal affairs and 
communications committee chairman; Upper House proportional 
representation segment; second term; 45 (Noto Kan group) 
 
Justice Ministry 
 
Koichi Kato 
Sophia University; former DPJ Diet affairs committee deputy 
chairman, former DPJ deputy secretary general; Lower House Tokyo No. 
20 district; fourth term; 45 (Kan group) 
 
Foreign Ministry 
 
Koichi Takemasa 
Keio University; former DPJ election campaign committee deputy 
chairman, former Lower House foreign affairs committee member; Lower 
House Saitama No. 1 district; fourth term; 48 (Yoshihiko Noda 
group) 
 
Tetsuro Fukuyama 
Kyoto University Graduate School; former DPJ policy research 
committee deputy chief; Upper House Kyoto constituency; second term; 
52 (Maehara group) 
 
Finance Ministry 
 
Yoshihiko Noda 
Waseda University; former DPJ deputy secretary general, former DPJ 
Diet affairs committee chairman; Lower House Chiba No. 4 district; 
fifth term; 52 (Noda group) 
 
Naoki Minezaki 
Hitotsubashi University Graduate School; former Upper House 
 
TOKYO 00002208  015 OF 019 
 
 
financial affairs committee chairman, former DPJ tax research 
committee chairman; Upper House Hokkaido constituency; third term; 
64 (Maehara group) 
 
Education, Culture, Sports, and Science and Technology Ministry 
 
Harumasa Nakagawa 
Georgetown University; former Lower House financial affairs 
committee member, former budget committee member; Lower House Mie 
No. 2 district; 59 
 
Kan Suzuki 
University of Tokyo; former Upper House political ethics, election 
system special committee chairman and former judicial affairs 
committee member; Upper House Tokyo constituency; second term; 45 
(Hatoyama group) 
 
Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry 
 
Ritsuo Hosokawa 
Meiji University; former Lower House environment committee chairman, 
former judicial affairs committee member; Lower House Saitama No. 3 
district; seventh term; 66 (Social Democratic Party) 
 
Hiroyuki Nagahama 
Waseda University; former Upper House land, infrastructure, and 
transport committee member; Upper House Chiba constituency; first 
term (four terms in Lower House); 50 (Noda group) 
 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry 
 
Masahiko Yamada 
Waseda University; former Lower House judicial affairs committee 
member, former health, labor and welfare committee member; Lower 
House Nagasaki No. 3 district; fifth term; 67 (Ozawa group) 
 
Akira Gunji 
Left Meiji Gakuin University in mid-course; former Upper House 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries committee chairman, former Upper 
House Diet affairs committee chairman; Upper House Ibaraki 
constituency; second term; 59 
 
Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry 
 
Tadahiro Matsushita 
Kyoto University; former cabinet office senior vice minister, former 
Lower House cabinet committee chairman; Kagoshima No. 3 district; 
fifth term; 70 (People's New Party) 
 
Teruhiko Mashiko 
Waseda University; former Upper House economy, trade and industry 
committee member, former security special committee member; Upper 
House Fukushima constituency; first term (three terms in Lower 
House); 61 (Hatoyama group) 
 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry 
 
Kiyomi Tsujimoto 
Waseda University; former Social Democratic Party policy chief, 
former Diet affairs committee head; Lower House Osaka No. 10 
district; fourth term; 49 (Social Democratic Party) 
 
 
TOKYO 00002208  016 OF 019 
 
 
Sumio Mabuchi 
Yokohama National University; former DPJ policy research committee 
deputy chairman, former Diet affairs committee deputy chairman; 
Lower House Nara No. 1 district; third term; 49 
 
Environment Ministry 
 
Issei Tajima 
Doshisha University Graduate School; former DPJ policy research 
committee deputy chairman, former Lower House environment committee 
member; Lower House Shiga No. 2 district; third term; 47 (DPJ group 
affiliated with former Japan Socialist Party) 
 
Defense Ministry 
 
Kazuya Shinba 
Otterbein College (U.S.A.); former Upper House foreign affairs and 
defense committee chairman; Upper House Shizuoka constituency; 
second term; 42 (DPJ group affiliated with former Japan Socialist 
Party) 
 
(11) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties 
 
YOMIURI (Page 24) (Abridged) 
September 18, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage) 
 
Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? 
 
Yes 75 
No 17 
Other answers (O/A) 2 
No answer (N/A) 6 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the foregoing question) 
Pick only one from among the following reasons for your approval of 
the Hatoyama cabinet. 
 
Something can be expected of its policy measures 29 
The prime minister is aiming to make policy decisions at the 
initiative of politicians 24 
The prime minister has leadership ability 5 
There's something stable about the prime minister 3 
His cabinet's lineup is good 8 
Because it's a non-Liberal Democratic Party government 25 
O/A 0 
N/A 5 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) Pick 
only one from among the following reasons for your disapproval of 
the Hatoyama cabinet. 
 
Nothing can be expected of its policy measures 40 
Nothing can be expected of its policy decisions made at the 
initiative of politicians 10 
The prime minister lacks leadership ability 9 
There's nothing stable about the prime minister 9 
His cabinet's lineup is not good 12 
Because it's a non-Liberal Democratic Party government 14 
O/A 1 
 
TOKYO 00002208  017 OF 019 
 
 
N/A 5 
 
Q: Which political party do you support now? Pick only one. 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 51 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 19 
New Komeito (NK) 2 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2 
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 1 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 
Other political parties 0 
None 20 
N/A 2 
 
Q: The Hatoyama cabinet is a tripartite coalition government of the 
DPJ, SDP, and PNP. Do you approve of this combination of political 
parties in office? 
 
Yes 49 
No 39 
N/A 13 
 
Q: Mr. Naoto Kan has been appointed to the post of minister for the 
"National Strategy Bureau," which outlines the state budget and 
makes other decisions. Do you approve of this appointment? 
 
Yes 68 
No 18 
N/A 14 
 
 
Q: Mr. Shizuka Kamei has been appointed to the post of minister for 
financial services and postal issues. Do you approve of this 
appointment? 
 
Yes 41 
No 43 
N/A 16 
 
Q: The Hatoyama cabinet is going to make policy decisions at the 
political initiative of about 100 lawmakers in government posts. Do 
you approve of this decision-making process? 
 
Yes 71 
No 16 
N/A 13 
 
Q: The Hatoyama cabinet plans to end the Maritime Self-Defense 
Force's refueling activities in the Indian Ocean by January next 
year when the antiterror special measures law expires. Do you 
support this policy decision? 
 
Yes 44 
No 39 
N/A 17 
 
Q: The Hatoyama cabinet has decided to cut Japan's greenhouse gas 
emissions by 25 PERCENT  from 1990 levels by 2020 in order to 
prevent global warming. Do you support this policy decision? 
 
 
TOKYO 00002208  018 OF 019 
 
 
Yes 74 
No 15 
N/A 10 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted from the evening of 
Sept. 16 through Sept. 17 across the nation on a computer-aided 
random digit dialing (RDD) basis. Households with one or more 
eligible voters totaled 1,820. Valid answers were obtained from 
1,087 persons (60 PERCENT ). 
 
(Note) In some cases, the total percentage does not add up to 100 
PERCENT  due to rounding. 
 
(12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Abridged) 
September 18, 2009 
 
Questions & Answers 
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) 
 
Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 77 (20) 84 74 
No 13 (60) 9 15 
Not interested 9 (18) 6 10 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 3 
3 4 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 
4  4 4 
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
measures 15  15 15 
Because the nature of politics is likely to change 77  77 77 
 
 
Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? 
 
 T P M F 
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 8 
15 6 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 9 
 5 11 
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy 
measures 58  68 55 
Because the nature of politics is unlikely to change 23  8 27 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
 T P M F 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 45 (39) 51 42 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 12 (20) 15 11 
New Komeito (NK) 4 (5) 2 5 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (4) 5 2 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2 (1) 2 3 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (0) 0 0 
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 3 (2) 2 3 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) -- 1 
 
TOKYO 00002208  019 OF 019 
 
 
Other political parties 1 (1) 1 1 
None 27 (26) 21 30 
 
Q: Do you think public life will improve or worsen with the DPJ 
running the government? 
 
 T P M F 
Improve 47  57 43 
Worsen 6  5 7 
Remain unchanged 44  36 48 
 
Q: When you look at the cabinet lineup, do you have expectations for 
the Hatoyama cabinet? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 68  76 64 
No 28  20 32 
 
Q: The DPJ has set forth a policy of reducing Japan's greenhouse gas 
emissions by 25 PERCENT  from 1990 levels by 2020. The Aso cabinet's 
goal was to reduce emissions by 8 PERCENT . Do you support the 25 
PERCENT  reduction? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 69  72 68 
No 25  24 26 
 
Q: The DPJ falls short of a majority in the House of Councillors, so 
the DPJ has formed a coalition government with the SDP and the PNP. 
Would you like to see the DPJ form a single-party government after 
next summer's election for the House of Councillors? 
 
 T P M F 
A single-party DPJ government 33  42 28 
A DPJ coalition with the SDP and the PNP 34  33 35 
A DPJ coalition with other political parties 25  20 27 
 
Q: The LDP has become an opposition party as a result of this 
summer's election for the House of Representatives. Would you like 
the LDP to reconstruct itself? 
 
 T P M F 
Yes 56  58 55 
No 41  40 41 
 
 (Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that 
the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "--" denotes that no respondents 
answered. "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the 
results of the last survey conducted Aug. 26-27. The cabinet support 
rate in parentheses is for the Aso cabinet from the last survey. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Sept. 16-17 over the 
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit 
sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,650 households with one or more 
eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,014 
persons (61 PERCENT ). 
 
ROOS