VZCZCXRO6453
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2141/01 2582124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 152124Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6192
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8792
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6453
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0268
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 3815
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6970
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0968
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7627
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7242

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 002141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/15/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Aso to Hatoyama: I hope you will not lead Japan in wrong 
direction (Yomiuri) 
 
(2) Aso cabinet to come to end tomorrow after 358 days in office 
(Nikkei) 
 
(3) Administrative vice ministerial meetings put to an end; New 
government intends to abolish 120-year-old practice (Asahi) 
 
(4) Repercussions of 25 percent cut in CO2 emissions (Nikkei) 
 
(5) Defense Ministry requests additional PAC-3 missiles; 
Bureaucrat-led decision-making still evident (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(6) DPJ, Foreign Ministry moving closer to each other over 
relationship with U.S. and secret pact (Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Aso to Hatoyama: I hope you will not lead Japan in wrong 
direction 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
September 15, 2009 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama met 
yesterday in the Diet with Prime Minister Taro Aso to ensure a 
smooth handover of power. 
 
Hatoyama expressed his gratitude for the present cabinet's provision 
of information. He then told Aso: "If there are matters I should in 
particular continue, I wish you would tell me. I would like you to 
give me guidance and advice as a former prime minister even after 
the new administration is launched." 
 
Citing the international situation, international finance, and 
security, Aso responded, "I hope you will think carefully about how 
Japan should be and will not lead the country in the wrong 
direction." Hatoyama requested the meeting. Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Takeo Kawamura and Hirofumi Hirano, director of the DPJ executive 
office, attended the session. 
 
(2) Aso cabinet to come to end tomorrow after 358 days in office 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
September 15, 2009 
 
The cabinet led by Prime Minister Taro Aso will resign en masse 
tomorrow morning after 358 days in office. A year has passed since 
major U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed 
on Sept. 15 of last year. The Aso administration, which excessively 
focused its attention on efforts to buoy up the faltering economy, 
set aside an aggressive posture in managing Diet affairs and 
eventually missed many good chances to dissolve the House of 
Representatives. Although signs of economic recovery are finally 
appearing, the Liberal Democratic Party will go into opposition for 
the first time since 1993 and 1994 as a result of its crushing 
defeat in the latest Lower House election. The party has not even 
prepared a strategy to return to power, either. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002141  002 OF 009 
 
 
Prime Minister Aso tried to dissolve the Lower House immediately 
after coming into office, when the support rate for his cabinet 
remained high. But he decided to put it off in the belief that if he 
came up with large-scale economic stimulus measures, his cabinet 
might garner more public support. This decision was his most serious 
mistake. While delaying the timing for Diet dissolution, Aso 
repeatedly made slips of the tongue, losing empathy from voters. 
 
Aso gave "priority to policy implementation over political 
point-scoring." As a result, he failed to come up with tactics to 
raise his dismal public support. At a time when Ichiro Ozawa 
resigned as Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) president over alleged 
illegal political donations to his fund-managing organization from 
Nishimatsu Construction Co., Aso was pouring his energy into efforts 
to perk up the economy. Just before dissolving the Lower House, the 
Aso administration had considered the possibility of replacing party 
executives, but he also dropped this idea. 
 
Some members in the LDP, which had enjoyed high public support since 
the Koizumi administration, were upset at the nosedive in public 
support for the Aso cabinet. They began maneuvering to replace Aso, 
but their moves resulted in revealing a lack of party unity and in 
prompting voters to leave the LDP. 
 
The Aso administration came up with economic stimulus measures that 
required large-scale government spending. Ironically, such measures 
have finally begun to produce positive results. The nation's gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the April-June period grew for the first 
time in five quarters. His aides often heard Aso grumble during 
campaigning for the Lower House election: "It is regrettable that we 
have to hand over the reins of government at a time when the economy 
is about to turn around." 
 
When Ocean Policy Research Foundation Chairman Masahiro Akiyama 
visited the Prime Minister's Official Residence on Sept. 9, Aso told 
him, "If we had dissolved the Lower House last fall, we would not 
have experienced this serious defeat in the Lower House, but in such 
a case, we would not have been able to come up with the economic 
stimulus measures we have worked out." He thus indicated his pride 
that his economic measures will be highly evaluated in the future, 
instead of expressing his regret over the LDP's defeat in the 
election. 
 
Even so, the LDP paid too much for that. When the party became an 
opposition party in 1993, the party was able to regain political 
power only in 10 months. But such a situation is unlikely to occur 
this time. In 1993, the LDP was the dominant party in the Lower 
House, but it is now the second largest. Within the party, there is 
no politician who can hammer out a strategy for the party to regain 
political power. 
 
Short-lived cabinets under the current Constitution 
 
1 Tsutomu Hata 64 days 
2 Tanzan Ishibashi 65 
3 Sosuke Uno 69 
4 Hitoshi Ashida 220 
5 Morihiro Hosokawa 263 
6 Tetsu Katayama 292 
7 Taro Aso 358 
8 Yasuo Fukuda 365 
9 Shinzo Abe 366 
 
TOKYO 00002141  003 OF 009 
 
 
10 Yoshiro Mori 387 
 
(3) Administrative vice ministerial meetings put to an end; New 
government intends to abolish 120-year-old practice 
 
ASAHI (Page 1) (Full) 
September 15, 2009 
 
Administrative vice ministers held their last regular meeting 
yesterday at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei). The 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which has advocated "elimination of 
bureaucratic influence," plans to abolish the practice that was 
introduced more than 120 years ago. 
 
The top bureaucrat at each ministry and agency met regularly twice a 
week the day before a cabinet meeting for prior coordination on such 
issues as bills, government ordinances, and appointments that were 
submitted at cabinet meetings. It is believed that the vice 
ministerial meetings have been held since around 1886 although the 
practice is not stipulated in any law. Considering the practice to 
be a factor that prevents politically-led decision-making, the DPJ 
intends to abolish it and have the planned cabinet ministerial 
committee carry out policy coordination. 
 
At yesterday's meeting, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Iwao Uruma 
said, "I think (the next government) will fumble along and repeat 
one trial and error after another. I want them to give considerable 
thought to creating a system under which cabinet meetings work 
smoothly." 
 
Uruma said at a press conference: "There must be a method in which 
politicians carry out policy coordination. I think it is also 
important that policies are decided based on such policy 
coordination." Vice Finance Minister Yasutake Tango at a press 
meeting stated, "Even if the vice ministerial conferences are 
abolished, policy coordination among ministries will be necessary." 
Vice Environment Minister Hikaru Kobayashi told reporters, "I felt 
deeply moved as I took part in the final meeting." 
 
Following the abolition of the vice ministerial conferences, press 
briefings by vice ministers will likely be discontinued in 
principle. Vice Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Harufumi 
Mochizuki said: "Press conferences are important to increase 
transparency of the government. (If they are abolished) the level of 
transparency will be lowered." 
 
(4) Repercussions of 25 percent cut in CO2 emissions 
 
NIKKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
September 15, 2009 
 
Yoichi Kaya, deputy executive director of Research Institute of 
Innovative Technology for the Earth 
 
The incoming administration led by the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) has come up with a goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 
25 percent by 2020 from the 1990 level, a target that is stricter 
than the previous target. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun asked experts 
about what impact the new goal will have on burdens shouldered by 
household budgets, companies and international negotiations. 
 
-- What is your view on the reduction target set by the new 
 
TOKYO 00002141  004 OF 009 
 
 
administration? 
 
"It would be very difficult to meet such a target. In my view, the 
maximum cut that could be achieved by purely domestic efforts would 
be 15 percent in comparison with the 2005 level, which the present 
administration advocates. The DPJ appears to be taking into account 
carbon dioxide (CO2) absorption of forests and purchases of CO2 
emissions credits from abroad. However, emissions cuts achieved by 
such efforts would be about 10 percent at the most. 
 
"The present administration adopted the goal of cutting emissions by 
15 percent compared with the 2005 level, based on the prime 
minister's decision reached after the mid-term goal review committee 
pursued discussions. It is unreasonable for the new administration 
to totally disregard the goal adopted by the previous 
administration. If the next administration wants to change the goal 
set by the present one, it should do so, after making a proper 
review of it once the new administration is inaugurated." 
 
-- The DPJ is taking a positive stance on introducing a domestic 
emissions trading system and a tax designed to curb global warming 
(environment tax). 
 
"I think it is impossible to expect emissions trading to reduce 
domestic emissions. Since industry circles are already grappling 
with emissions cuts, based on voluntary action programs, there will 
be few companies that have room to sell emissions quotas. In the 
end, emissions credits will have to be purchased from abroad. 
 
"If emissions are to be reduced with the introduction of an 
environment tax, the rate will have to be set rather high. If a rate 
exceeding the present gas tax is set, it would be impossible to 
obtain support from the people. The remaining portion would have to 
be achieved through the establishment of regulations, including 
mandating consumers to purchase cars with a certain level of fuel 
efficiency when they purchase cars." 
 
-- What sort of impact will this have on companies and household 
budgets? 
 
"According to an estimate based on a 25-percent-cut goal, steel and 
cement manufacturers will be forced to curb production by about 20 
percent. Consumers will not accept such a burden for the sake of 
curbing global warming. Another way would be for companies to 
transfer their production bases abroad or purchase emissions credits 
from abroad. However, neither way is desirable. 
 
"Obviously, household budgets will also be affected greatly. 
Provided that energy consumption is to be curbed with the 
introduction of the environment tax in order to cut emissions by 25 
percent, utility expenses will increase roughly 60 percent (in terms 
of tax burden). Consumers will not accept such a burden for the sake 
of curbing global warming." 
 
-- There is a view that expanded reductions will prompt economic 
revitalization and technological innovation. 
 
"Basically, it is impossible to make economic revitalization and CO2 
emissions compatible. If the economy turns around, CO2 emissions 
will increase. Based on past cases, emissions decrease only when the 
economy experiences negative growth. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002141  005 OF 009 
 
 
"Concerning technological innovation, technologies that could lead 
to substantial emissions cut, such as reducing iron ore, using 
hydrogen in the iron-making process, cannot be put to practical use 
in ten year's time. What can be done in the next 10 years will be no 
more than the dissemination of hybrid cars and the promotion of 
energy-conserving home electronic appliances, and such measures are 
limited in what they can achieve." 
 
-- Some have pointed out that European countries will highly praise 
the 25 percent cut proposed by Japan as contributing to the 
prevention of global warming. 
 
"Setting a high goal without giving a thought to its feasibility is 
a pie in the sky. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), which will 
become the DPJ's coalition partner, is negative toward nuclear power 
generation. There is a possibility that it will oppose the 
construction of additional nuclear power plants. It is not pragmatic 
to try to realize such a lofty goal without promoting nuclear power 
plants." 
 
(5) Defense Ministry requests additional PAC-3 missiles; 
Bureaucrat-led decision-making still evident 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 27) (Abridged slightly) 
September 15, 2009 
 
The Defense Ministry has presented a budget request for fiscal 2010 
that is 3 percent greater than its budget for the previous year. It 
has become clear that ministry has decided under the leadership of 
its internal bureaus, or civilian officials, to deploy additional 
PAC-3 ground-to-air missiles for a ballistic missile defense (MD) 
system, saying that even the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will 
support the step. Bureaucrats played a central role in deciding to 
introduce the MD system in the first place. (The additional PAC-3 
deployment plan) has exposed the die-hard nature of the Defense 
Ministry. 
 
The Defense Ministry's budget is compiled by the Ground, Maritime, 
and Air Staff Offices that are referred to as officers in uniform. 
The budget is then approved by the internal bureaus, such as the 
Minister's Secretariat and the Defense Policy Bureau. Overriding the 
reluctance of the Air Staff Office, the internal bureaus 
successfully earmarked 94.4 billion yen for the additional 
deployment of PAC-3s. 
 
According to a source connected with the internal bureaus, some DPJ 
lawmakers called for the deployment of PAC-3s to local areas in the 
wake of North Korea's launch of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile in 
April this year. 
 
A sheet attached to the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 
for fiscal 2005 and beyond, adopted by the cabinet in December 2004, 
stipulates that PAC-3 missiles are to be deployed at three key 
air-defense missile groups. 
 
There are six air-defense missile groups in Japan for intercepting 
aircrafts intruding into Japan's airspace. Currently PAC-3 batteries 
to deal with (incoming) ballistic missiles are deployed at three 
air-defense missile groups -- one each in Saitama, Gifu, and Fukuoka 
prefectures. The additional PAC-3 missiles will be deployed at 
air-defense missile groups in Hokkaido, Aomori, and Okinawa. This 
will force the government to revise the NDPG. The DPJ, however, 
 
TOKYO 00002141  006 OF 009 
 
 
intends to postpone the revision of the NDPG, planned for December 
this year. 
 
A person concerned thinks the DPJ will accept a partial revision, 
while a senior officer in uniform thinks the ministry should 
correctly sense the mood (of the DPJ). The DPJ has declared that it 
will shift power away from bureaucrats. Things might not go as the 
Defense Ministry hopes. 
 
To begin with, the introduction of the MD system was decided under 
the leadership of bureaucrats. Then Vice-Defense Minister Takemasa 
Moriya (who has appealed against the ruling that found him guilty of 
taking bribes) convinced the Liberal Democratic Party, maintaining, 
"The United States has invested 10 trillion yen in the development 
of the system. It is natural for Japan to support it as its ally." 
In December 2003, the cabinet decided to introduce the system. 
 
Japan has the two-stage MD system, under which a ballistic missile 
fired against Japan is first targeted by the Aegis destroyer-based 
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) and if that first-stage defense fails, a 
ground-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile will be 
launched to shoot down the incoming missile. The Defense Ministry 
has spent some 850 million yen for the acquisition of the system 
from the United States. 
 
(6) DPJ, Foreign Ministry moving closer to each other over 
relationship with U.S. and secret pact 
 
MAINICHI (Pages 1 and 3) (Abridged slightly) 
September 13, 2009 
 
In tripartite talks to launch a coalition government, the Democratic 
Party of Japan especially struggled to fashion language to address 
the Social Democratic Party's (SDP) demands without tying its own 
hands regarding its relationship with the United States. 
 
The DPJ used to share the SDP's calls for moving the U.S. Marine 
Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture) out of 
the prefecture, revising the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA), and the termination of the refueling mission in the Indian 
Ocean. However, in its manifesto (campaign pledges) for the Aug. 30 
Lower House election, the DPJ used softer language, saying the DPJ 
"will propose the revision of the SOFA and move in the direction of 
reexamining the role of U.S. military bases in Japan." The coalition 
agreement reached on Sept. 9 also adhered to that policy course. 
 
Regarding the relocation site for Futenma Air Station, DPJ President 
Yukio Hatoyama made the following comment in Okinawa City on July 
19, before the Lower House election: "We must take action for at 
least moving (Futenma Air Station) out of Okinawa." But after the 
election, Hatoyama's comments became ambiguous, as seen in his 
statement on Sept. 3: "It is difficult to reach a quick conclusion 
on this issue. There is a need to review the matter comprehensively 
while building a relationship of trust with President Obama." 
 
A meeting on Aug. 12 seemed to be a turning point. 
 
That evening at an Italian restaurant in Tokyo's Aoyama district DPJ 
President Hatoyama, Deputy President Naoto Kan, Lower House lawmaker 
Takashi Shinohara (a former agricultural ministry official), and 
Lower House lawmaker Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi (a former foreign ministry 
official) met with such top Foreign Ministry officials as 
 
TOKYO 00002141  007 OF 009 
 
 
Administrative Vice-Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kenichiro Sasae, Deputy Vice-Foreign Minister Chikao Kawai, 
Foreign Policy Bureau Director-General Koro Bessho, and 
International Legal Affairs Bureau Director-General Koji Tsuruoka. 
 
With a change of government in sight, the meeting was arranged by 
Shinohara at Kan's behest. Their discussion mostly centered on 
Japan-U.S. relations. There were reportedly heated debates on such 
issues as the realignment of U.S. forces, the (Maritime) 
Self-Defense Force's refueling mission, and the purported secret 
nuclear pact. After the meeting, most of the members remained 
tight-lipped, with one saying, "We discussed a variety of topics, 
but I cannot reveal what they are at this point." Another indicated, 
however, "Mr. Kan said (the DPJ) will address the issue of the 
secret pact after the election." 
 
Days before, on Aug. 9, Secretary General Okada's secretary and the 
DPJ's Policy Research Committee department chief secretly left for 
the United States and spent about a week in Washington, D.C. During 
their stay in Washington, the two held talks with such senior U.S. 
officials as Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, State 
Department Office of Japanese Affairs Director Kevin Maher, and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Schiffer. The two 
reportedly conveyed on behalf of DPJ President Hatoyama the message 
that the DPJ administration will continue attaching importance to 
the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
The Foreign Ministry, too, began shifting (its position) after the 
assumption of power by the DPJ became a certainty. Vice-Minister 
Yabunaka, who had denied the existence of the secret nuclear 
agreement, altered his view in a press conference on Aug. 24. "I 
understand that there were all sorts of stories told in the past," 
he said. On Aug. 31, the day after the general election, Yabunaka 
paved the way for the future disclosure of the pact. "We will take 
necessary measures in accordance with instructions from the new 
administration." 
 
With the change of government near at hand, the DPJ and the Foreign 
Ministry, which now share (an understanding) of the diplomatic 
secret, have drawn closer. The planned relocation of Futenma Air 
Station will be the first test for DPJ diplomacy. 
 
Futenma plan to face turning point on Oct. 13 
 
The Futenma relocation plan faces a turning point on Oct. 13. Japan 
and the United States are in accord on building a Futenma 
replacement facility on the coastal area of Camp Schwab in the 
Henoko district of Nago, Okinawa Prefecture. By that day the Okinawa 
governor is scheduled to present his views on preparatory documents 
for an environmental impact assessment conducted by the Defense 
Ministry. 
 
Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, who won office with the support of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the New Komeito, was expected to 
endorse the Henoko plan on the condition that the proposed 
relocation site is moved anywhere from dozens of meters to several 
hundred meters out to sea. 
 
Meanwhile, the DPJ is opposed to relocating the base within 
Okinawa. 
 
On Sept. 1, two days after the election, at the prefectural 
 
TOKYO 00002141  008 OF 009 
 
 
government office DPJ Okinawa chapter representative Shokichi Kina 
pressed Governor Nakaima for a change of policy. "The Henoko plan is 
a result of the compromise Okinawa made to get back Futenma Air 
Station," he said. "There is no need for Okinawa to bear such a 
cross. This is a good chance to eliminate the compromise." 
 
"It would be best to move the base out of Okinawa," the governor 
said in response. "I want to hear the views of the inner circle of 
the party." If the governor endorses (the Henoko plan), that might 
cause tension with the (new) government. 
 
In April 1996 the U.S. and Japanese governments for the first time 
reached an agreement on the complete reversion of Futenma Air 
Station on the condition of building a replacement facility in the 
prefecture. Although then Governor Keiichi Inamine approved a plan 
to relocate the base off Henoko in Nago, the plan stalled on account 
of the anti-base movement and other factors. In October 2005 Tokyo 
and Washington again reached an agreement to build a replacement 
facility in the coastal area of Camp Schwab as part of the 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The U.S. force realignment plan 
specifies steps to reduce the burden on Okinawa, such as the 
relocation of 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the return 
of six bases south of Kadena Air Base. These are all predicated on 
the relocation of Futenma Air Station, however. 
 
The DPJ has yet to forge an intraparty consensus on the issue. In 
July 2008, the DPJ formulated what is called the DPJ Okinawa Vision 
stipulating a plan to move Futenma Air Station out of Okinawa. Many 
party members criticized it as impractical, and the party left it 
out of its manifesto for the previous Lower House election. 
 
Meanwhile, Shu Watanabe, Akihisa Nagashima, and other DPJ lawmakers 
launched a Futenma issue study group in March. On July 16, the group 
presented Secretary General Okada with a report calling for (1) the 
relocation of U.S. Marines from Futenma Air Station to Kadena Air 
Base; and (2) U.S. Marines to conduct their flight training at the 
civilian-pilot training airport on Shimojishima island (in Miyako 
City) 300 kilometers southwest of Okinawa's main island. The report 
differs from the prefectural chapter's call for moving Futenma to a 
place outside Okinawa. It is also designed to forgo the Camp Schwab 
relocation plan. "There is a huge gap between the DPJ's vision and 
the United States' assertion," Watanabe said. "A proposal to discuss 
the option of moving the base out of Okinawa will not help resume 
the talks with the United States. We think that pragmatic and 
concrete proposals are necessary to induce the United States to sit 
down at the negotiating table." 
 
State Department spokesman Ian Kelly remarked concerning the DPJ 
administration's unclear foreign policy, "The United States will not 
renegotiate with the Japanese government on the Futenma relocation 
plan." A Foreign Ministry official who is aware of the mood at the 
U.S. government commented apprehensively, "If the DPJ revives the 
option of relocating Futenma within the prefecture, the Guam 
relocation plan, too, might hit a snag, and that might eventually 
return the roadmap on U.S. force realignment to square one." 
 
Japan's contribution to Afghanistan raises questions 
 
Yudai Nakazawa, Keiichi Shirato, Yasushi Sengoku, and Teruhisa 
Mitsumori; Yoso Furumoto, Washington 
 
The MSDF's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean is also likely to 
 
TOKYO 00002141  009 OF 009 
 
 
test the DPJ's "pragmatic policy." President Hatoyama has announced 
that he will allow the MSDF to continue its refueling mission until 
the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law authorizing it expires (on 
January 2010) but will not extend it beyond that date. Whether or 
not the DPJ will devise a fresh contribution measure to replace the 
MSDF refueling mission is drawing much attention at home and 
abroad. 
 
The Obama administration has called for the refueling mission to 
continue. In a press conference on Sept. 9, U.S. Department of 
Defense spokesman Geoff Morrell urged the DPJ to reconsider its 
plan, saying, "We would very much encourage them to continue those 
efforts. Japan is a great power and has an international 
responsibility." 
 
The DPJ in the past presented a bill to carry out humanitarian 
assistance in Afghanistan, but it was criticized even within the 
party as impractical. The United States is highly alarmed about the 
prospect of Japan's walking away from the international coalition 
against terrorism. In reaction to Morrell's statement, Japanese 
Ambassador to the United States Ichiro Fujisaki expressed a sense of 
displeasure in a press conference on Sept. 10, saying: "(Assistance 
to Afghanistan) is something that the Japanese government should 
consider when a new administration is launched. It is up to Japan to 
decide." Japan, however, does not have any specific plans. 
 
Some in the Foreign Ministry have begun indicating a willingness to 
accept gaps between what the DPJ advocated when it was an opposition 
party and what it will advocate after taking power. 
 
On Sept. 2, a symposium was held at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS). The event to discuss the Japanese 
elections drew an audience of several hundred, showing the United 
States' high level of interest in Japan's Democratic Party of 
Japan. 
 
The event was hosted by CBS anchorman Bob Schieffer. Assistant 
Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, one 
of the panelists, said: "The truth is that U.S.-Japan relations have 
faced challenges over decades, we've surmounted them, we have worked 
closely together, and I think we have a lot of confidence that we'll 
be able to do that over the course of the next several months. The 
watch words are patience, commitment and solidarity." The word 
"patience" means to be ready for confusion at the early stage of the 
DPJ administration. 
 
A symposium was also held the day before at Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies. In the session, Professor Rust 
Deming, a former U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission to Japan, said, 
"Although the DPJ advocates an equal U.S.-Japan relationship, what 
it specifically means remains unclear. If it carries a negative 
connotation of U.S. control, we must be on alert." The high level of 
interest in the DPJ administration underscores that the DPJ is 
little known. 
 
Correction 
The Sept. 14, 2009, issue indicated the article "DPJ to adopt policy 
of protecting agriculture" appeared in the same day's Sankei. The 
article appeared on Sept. 12. 
 
ROOS