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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO2027 | 2009-09-02 21:38 | 2011-08-26 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO7381
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2027/01 2452138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5929
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8592
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6255
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0070
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 3646
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6773
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0786
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7448
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7065
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 TOKYO 002027
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/02/09
INDEX:
(1) Editorial: Hatoyama administration must change its U.S. policy
(Nikkei)
(2) Security policy obstacle to DPJ effort to form coalition;
Differences with SDP on refueling mission in Indian Ocean (Tokyo
Shimbun)
(3) Poll: Small number of people support DPJ's campaign platform; 31
PERCENT favor child-care allowance plan, 20 PERCENT approve toll
free highways (Asahi)
(4) Change of government (Part 2): "Transition team" plan fizzles
out; Prime-minister-led decision-making system already stumbles
(Sankei)
(5) Column: "The collapse of 'LDP-style Japan': Time to search for a
new mode of 'stability'" (Nikkei)
(6) North Korea a higher priority than striving for a nuclear-free
Northeast Asia (Asahi)
(7) Change of government and Okinawa: Governor seeks ways to
approach DPJ (Ryukyu Shimpo)
(8) Nago citizens harbor mixed feelings of hope and anxiety on
switch in power to DPJ that calls for relocating Futenma base
outside Okinawa (Ryukyu Shimpo)
(9) Talks between Okinawa governor and DPJ Okinawa chapter:
Behind-the-scenes moves becoming active; Okinawa Prefecture, Nago
City, Defense Ministry begin coordination (Ryukyu Shimpo)
ARTICLES:
(1) Editorial: Hatoyama administration must change its U.S. policy
NIKKEI (Page2) (Full)
September 2, 2009
We have strong concerns about the "Hatoyama administration's"
foreign policy, especially about its relationship with the United
States. If the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) sticks to its
opposition-party stance, our concerns will become a reality. (A
proverb says the wise adapt themselves to changed circumstances).
(Like this proverb), it is inevitable for the Hatoyama
administration to adapt itself to the changed circumstances, and we
expect that.
The maxim is often used to mean changing an attitude with no
principles, but its original meaning is different. According to the
Kojien Japanese dictionary, it comes from the Book of Changes (one
of the oldest of the Chinese classic texts) and means that when
there is a mistake, a wise man swiftly corrects it and preserves his
honor.
Four concerns about Japan-U.S. relations
U.S. President Barack Obama, who advocated change, too, has shifted
from the election mode to the governing mode immediately after
assuming office. Such was natural. During the campaign period for
the Aug. 30 House of Representatives election, we pointed out that
TOKYO 00002027 002 OF 016
the DPJ's policies were too ambiguous. In its manifesto (campaign
pledges), the DPJ vowed to "build a close and equal Japan-U.S.
alliance." But the meaning of a "close" and "equal" relationship was
unclear.
The DPJ did not change its ambiguous policy line. Was it a strategy
that factored in a sudden change after the election? Shifting its
deliberately vague policy course to a pragmatic policy line is not a
betrayal of voters. It is irresponsible to opt for continuing
adhering to its opposition-party policies that are certain to rock
Japan-U.S. relations and bring instability to Northeast Asia.
Of the policies taken by the DPJ when it was an opposition party,
there are at least four problems that will adversely affect
Japan-U.S. relations.
First is its opposition to the Maritime Self-Defense Force's
refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Second is its call for the
U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to be moved out of Okinawa,
Third is its opposition to Japan's host-nation support for the costs
of stationing U.S. forces in Japan, which is commonly referred to as
the "sympathy budget" (in Japan). Fourth is that it is calling for a
revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
The legal basis for the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean will
expire next January. DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama, who is certain to
become the new prime minister, has declared that his administration
will not extend the mission. He is considering a means of
cooperation other than refueling.
What does he have in mind? Workers of such offices as the Foreign
Ministry and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) are
already working arduously in Afghanistan for economic cooperation.
Is Japan going to send Ground Self-Defense Force troops to
Afghanistan? The U.S. and European countries, which have dispatched
ground troops there, have lost many lives. Is it advisable to
terminate the refueling mission, which is safer than sending ground
troops and has reportedly earned high marks from other countries?
Relocating Futenma airfield outside Okinawa will not be easy either.
It might be a different story if there is a right place in such
areas as Hokkaido, Iwate, and Mie prefectures where DPJ heavyweights
come from. If renegotiations are held without it (an alternative
place) 13 years after the 1996 agreement, the danger of Futenma Air
Station surrounded by residential areas will continue to exist
semi-permanently.
Proposing talks on revisions to the SOFA and the "sympathy budget"
seems less harmful than these options to Japan-U.S. relations. But
it requires a solution for talks with no way out. To begin with, the
two countries cannot afford to spend time on them. The reason is
because there are many priority issues that require the strategic
responses of Japan and the United States, such as the North Korean
nuclear issue and China's growing position.
The DPJ still thinks bilateral talks are necessary in order to build
an equal Japan-U.S. alliance. We think a change to the Japanese
government's interpretation of the right to collective self-defense
will ensure a close and equal bilateral relationship.
That is what the United States also wants to see. The stage for
TOKYO 00002027 003 OF 016
substantial talks on a SOFA revision will be set once the DPJ shifts
its policy, the government changes its interpretation of the right
to collective self-defense, and a new Japan-U.S. defense cooperation
framework is established.
What is more serious than the four points is DPJ Secretary General
Katsuya Okada's repeated statement urging the United States to
abandon the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Okada is regarded as
a candidate for the foreign portfolio. At this point, his proposal
is more harmful to Japan's security than to Japan-U.S. relations.
Prohibition of preemptive use of nuclear weapons counterproductive
True, in relations between countries like the United States and
Russia that are equally matched in terms of nuclear warheads and are
aware that they will lose much in a nuclear attack, nuclear
deterrence is maintained by means of second attack capability rather
than by a preemptive strike. If the United States declares that it
will attack Moscow, Russia will launch a second attack in several
minutes and annihilate New York. The two sides will suffer
tremendous losses. That is why they do not launch a nuclear attack.
This is the logic of nuclear deterrence.
The logic does not work with countries like North Korea which is not
certain what it will lose. Should North Korea declare that it will
make a nuclear attack on Tokyo and if the United States is bound by
the rule of not using nuclear weapons preemptively, the United
States will simply warn, "If Tokyo is annihilated, Pyongyang will be
annihilated in several minutes." Even though the conventional forces
of the United States and Japan are greater than those of North
Korea, can Japan feel a sense of security under such circumstances?
If North Korea declares an attack on Tokyo, Japan cannot feel secure
unless the United States is expected to make a preemptive strike. If
the United States declares that it will not use nuclear weapons
preemptively, nuclear proliferation to such countries as North Korea
and terrorists might occur and might enliven those who are calling
for Japan to go nuclear, as well.
China has declared a "no first use policy." But the country has not
allowed verifying whether or not its weapons actually deployed fit
that declaration. Abandonment of the preemptive use of weapons
actually does not mean arms reduction.
(2) Security policy obstacle to DPJ effort to form coalition;
Differences with SDP on refueling mission in Indian Ocean
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Slightly abridged)
September 2, 2009
Yoichi Takeuchi, political reporter
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Social Democratic Party
(SDP), and the People's New Party (PNP) have begun discussions on
forming a coalition government. The biggest problem for the official
consultations by their secretaries general and policy officers
starting this week will be whether they can narrow their gap on
foreign and security policies. The role of the SDP and the PNP in
the system of unified policymaking that the DPJ envisions will also
be a key issue.
Four common policies
TOKYO 00002027 004 OF 016
The three parties had agreed on a number of common policies in
mid-August, before the House of Representatives election, namely:
(1) maintaining the current consumption tax rate; (2) drastic review
of the postal businesses; (3) support for child rearing; and (4)
drastic revision of the temporary worker placement law. The
coalition talks will be based on these common policies.
These common policies consist of the "major policies that (the three
parties) could agree on" (in the words of a senior DPJ official),
but they do not include foreign and security policies on which the
DPJ and the SDP do not see eye to eye. While the common policies
might have worked fine for an alliance of opposition parties,
foreign and security policies cannot possibly be shelved for a
coalition government.
The main sticking point is until when should the refueling mission
of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in the Indian Ocean
continue.
The DPJ had shifted to a policy of condoning the continuation of the
mission for the time being during the election campaign. On the
other hand, SDP Chairperson Mizuho Fukushima insisted even during
her news conference after the election that, "We will not compromise
on issues relating to peace. This will be an important issue for
discussion," maintaining the party's position of demanding the
immediate withdrawal of the MSDF.
There are also subtle differences among the three parties on child
allowances, which the DPJ regards as its top priority policy in the
first year of the administration. The DPJ and the SDP differ on the
appropriate amount of allowances, while the PNP's Kamei advocates
setting requirements based on the parents' income.
The three parties can choose to shelve the details of policies in
order to reach agreement before the new prime minister is elected on
September 16. However, this will mean that coordination within the
coalition will take time each time a policy decision is to be made.
On top of specific policy issues, the DPJ also differs with the SDP
and the PNP on the mechanism for policy coordination.
Fukushima and Kamei agreed on the need to create a permanent body
for policy coordination among the ruling coalition parties at their
meeting on September 1.
Arena for making presence felt
Compared to the DPJ, which has won over 300 seats in the Lower
House, the SDP and the PNP are very junior partners. They will have
only one minister each in the cabinet at most. Therefore, it will be
difficult for them to have their voices heard on all policies. That
is why there is a need for an "arena" for them to influence the
"Hatoyama administration" from the outside and make their party's
presence felt.
What the SDP has in mind is the creation of something similar to the
meeting of ruling party policy officers under the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP)-New Komeito administration. Under the LDP-New Komeito
regime, this meeting made decisions on policy and the government
simply confirmed them. A senior SDP official remarked: "The LDP
policymaking system was quite sophisticated. The system of
TOKYO 00002027 005 OF 016
coordinating between each party's policy research organ under the
coalition government was straightforward."
Lessons learned from dual structure
However, this contradicts the DPJ's pledge in its manifesto to have
the cabinet make all policy decisions. Hatoyama has told Kamei that,
"We would like to avoid dual policymaking by the government and the
party as much as possible." This is a policy based on the experience
of the Hosokawa cabinet, where powerful Diet members controlled
policymaking from outside the cabinet under a "dual power
structure."
Nevertheless, the DPJ will not be able to force the unification of
the government and the ruling parties on its coalition partners. For
this reason, the party is thinking of a mechanism for the DPJ
secretary general to heed the demands of the SDP and the PNP.
If a permanent body is created for this purpose, an organ exerting
strong influence on the cabinet from the outside may come into
existence, depending on how the DPJ secretary general handles this
process. The mechanism for policy coordination may emerge as a
tricky question in the coalition talks since this is also related to
appointments under the Hatoyama administration.
(3) Poll: Small number of people support DPJ's campaign platform; 31
PERCENT favor child-care allowance plan, 20 PERCENT approve toll
free highways
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
September 2, 2009
The Asahi Shimbun has learned through a nationwide public opinion
survey that while people have high hopes for a government led by the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), they are also looking carefully at
the specific campaign pledges of the party.
When pollees were asked if they supported the DPJ's plan to abolish
tax income exemptions for spouses, instead of providing 26,000 yen
per month for each child, 31 PERCENT agreed with the plan but 49
PERCENT disagreed. Of those who voted for the DPJ in the
proportional representation segment of the ballot, 37 PERCENT
disapproved (43 PERCENT approved). Of those who voted for other
political parties, 50 to 60 PERCENT opposed the idea.
Regarding a DPJ campaign pledge to make all highway tolls free and
allot tax money to repay the debts, as many as 65 PERCENT were
critical, while only 20 PERCENT approved. Of those who voted for
the DPJ, 56 PERCENT disapproved. When Asahi conducted a poll on
these two pledges before the start of the official campaign for the
general election, 33 PERCENT approved of the plan to introduce a
child-care allowance, while 55 PERCENT did not approve of it. As
for the plan to remove all highway tolls, 23 PERCENT gave positive
evaluations and 67 PERCENT did not approve of it. Regardless of the
DPJ's publicity on its manifesto during the election campaigning,
the features indicate that the party's campaign pledges were not
well understood by voters. When respondents were asked if they
thought the major reason for the DPJ's victory was because voters
supported its manifesto, 38 PERCENT answered "yes," while 52
PERCENT said "no." It is hard to say that the DPJ's manifesto
received a "seal of approval." How the DPJ will explain the
significance of its policy platform to the public will be a major
TOKYO 00002027 006 OF 016
challenge for the party.
Some respondents have high expectations for the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), which suffered an overwhelming defeat in the general
election. Seventy-six percent said that they wanted the LDP to
regain power. Of those who voted for the DPJ in the proportional
representation section of the ballot, 76 PERCENT answered that they
wanted the LDP to recover.
Meanwhile, about a half of those who voted for the LDP in the
election this time viewed the change of government positively. This
indicates that many LDP supporters think that the present LDP had no
choice but to be defeated in the election. One of the LDP's
challenges is how it will transform itself.
(4) Change of government (Part 2): "Transition team" plan fizzles
out; Prime-minister-led decision-making system already stumbles
SANKEI (Page3) (Abridged)
September 1, 2009
Mashiho Akaji
On the morning of Aug. 31, the day after the House of
Representatives election, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President
Yukio Hatoyama gave a press interview at his home in Tokyo's
Denenchofu area.
Hatoyama said: "It has taken a long time, but we have at last
reached the starting line. We are now in a position to create a new
kind of politics. I am filled with deep emotion."
Hatoyama's words apparently came from his strong emotions regarding
the rocky road from the launch of the DPJ 13 years ago to the eve of
the establishment of a DPJ administration.
Hatoyama, who is certain to become the next prime minister, will
soon be able to put his visions into action. But his words and
actions have been inconsistent.
The night before, Hatoyama discussed steps for the transfer of power
with DPJ executives at the party's vote-counting center in Tokyo's
Roppongi district. "We will change the political system itself and
implement our manifesto (campaign pledges)," Hatoyama said before
Deputy Presidents Naoto Kan and Ichiro Ozawa, Secretary General
Katsuya Okada, and other DPJ executives, adding, "We will have to
conduct politics from the viewpoint of the general public."
Hatoyama also indicated that he will decide the new cabinet lineup
in one stroke after the prime ministerial election, astonishing the
DPJ executives. It was a de facto announcement by Hatoyama to drop a
plan to set up a transition team composed of prospective cabinet
ministers tasked with conducting talks for launching a coalition
government with other parties. Instead, the three top DPJ executives
including Ozawa will make preparations for the new administration.
Hatoyama's idea of creating a prime minister-led decision-making
system has already stumbled.
"On the night of Aug. 30, I advised Mr. Hatoyama to set up a
transition team to give the impression that the DPJ is moving toward
establishing the new administration," a Hatoyama aide said
incredulously. "Mr. Hatoyama should have given some thought to it."
TOKYO 00002027 007 OF 016
"It is necessary to replace old things with new things smoothly,"
Hatoyama said to party executives. Hatoyama did not elaborate on
this comment.
Hatoyama is believed to have given up on setting up a transition
team composed of a handful of prospective cabinet ministers so as
not to cause confusion and discontent in the party. He also seems to
have decided to do away with a transition team in deference to the
Ozawa side which is displeased with the fact that a personnel plan
was trumpeted before the election.
As the leader, it is counterproductive to come across as indecisive
and stalling for the sake of keeping harmony in the party and
maintaining momentum.
Hatoyama held a meeting with Ozawa, Kan, and another Deputy
President, Azuma Koshiishi, at party headquarters at around noon
yesterday. They simply decided to swiftly hold consultative meetings
with various factions to discuss the convocation of the next special
Diet session for the election of the new prime minister.
The obscurity and inconsistency of Hatoyama's visions and policies
have often been pointed out.
On July 15 Hatoyama indicated his intention to hold talks with the
United States to remove the principle of not permitting the
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan from the three
non-nuclear principles after the DPJ takes power. In 2005 Hatoyama
released his own proposal for constitutional amendment that did not
touch on the principle of not permitting the introduction of nuclear
weapons into Japan.
Hatoyama's statement has gone through numerous transformations, as
seen in the fact that drawing a strong objection from the Social
Democratic Party, the DPJ's possible coalition partner, he announced
a plan to legislate the three non-nuclear principles.
In the DPJ leadership race in May, Hatoyama pledged to realize a
"fraternal society," a slogan advocated by his grandfather, the late
Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama. Hatoyama also advocates "fraternal
diplomacy" whereby Japan interacts amicably with societies that hold
widely different values. What "fraternity" specifically means
remains unclear, however.
In June a reporter asked Hatoyama, "Does fraternity mean 'humanity'
or 'brotherly love'?" Hatoyama replied: "It is closer to 'humanity.'
I will make efforts to publicize both."
Following the DPJ's landside victory, Hatoyama held news conferences
on the night of Aug. 30 and before dawn of Aug. 31 in which he
refrained from mentioning "fraternity." "I like using the word
'fraternity,' but it is not just wishful thinking," Hatoyama replied
to a question from a reporter on Aug. 31.
The DPJ has achieved a landslide victory facilitated by the fierce
criticism and hatred of the LDP. Like Hatoyama's inconsistent words,
a tailwind could turn into an adverse wind at any time.
(5) Column: "The collapse of 'LDP-style Japan': Time to search for a
new mode of 'stability'"
TOKYO 00002027 008 OF 016
NIKKEI (Page 25) (Slightly abridged)
September 2, 2009
Takashi Mikuriya, professor at the University of Tokyo
How should we look at the recent election, where the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory, capturing 308 seats in
the House of Representatives? Some people believe that a 2009 regime
has replaced the 1955 political regime, but this author thinks that
it is premature to say that a new system is now in place.
It is also said that the era of a full-fledged two-party system has
come after this election to choose an administration. For sure,
dramatic changes like in the present case are possible under the
single-seat constituency system, and if the DPJ makes policy
mistakes, it will be forced out of power. In that sense, it would
appear that a two-party system has begun. However, this may not be
the case either.
The above is evident through an analysis of the factors behind the
DPJ's overwhelming victory.
The DPJ had indeed improved its ability to become the alternative.
However, not all voters who voted for the DPJ did so because they
think the DPJ is good. This election was an election to purge the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The election outcome should be
regarded as the result of widespread discontent with the LDP, which
has changed its president once every year for the past few years and
which repeatedly delayed the dissolution of the Diet in an
opportunistic manner, as well as the people's desire to do away with
such a situation.
A DPJ administration will not collapse that easily, and the move
from a LDP administration to a DPJ one is, in a sense, inevitable.
From a longer term point of view, this reflects the accumulated long
years of distrust of the LDP's ways since it engineered an immediate
comeback to power by co-opting the then Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
after going into opposition briefly with the forming of the Morihiro
Hosokawa administration in 1993. The people were fed up with the
LDP's unscrupulous maneuvering to cling to power by co-opting the
JSP at first, then the Liberal Party, followed by the New Komeito.
The significance of the LDP's loss of power this time may not be
limited to the political level. This may trigger the collapse of
everything that is LDP-style in Japanese systems. For example, the
business sector. If corporate donations are really going to be
abolished, the existence of the economic organizations in their
present form will lose its meaning because individual companies can
now decide and take their own stance in interacting with the
political authorities.
The same is true with the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic systems that
built a special relationship with the LDP over the years have come
to a dead end. It will be impossible to retain the present form of
relationship under a DPJ administration.
Since the DPJ's victory is a premonition of the collapse of all the
old social systems in Japan, even if the DPJ makes certain mistakes,
there is no guarantee that the LDP will be the alternative after
four years. That is, it is fully possible that the collapse of
everything that is LDP-style may force the LDP to change
dramatically and ultimately split into several political parties
TOKYO 00002027 009 OF 016
with new names which will become the rival force to the DPJ. This is
the main difference from the time of the Hosokawa administration in
ΒΆ1993.
Was this election really an election based on manifestos (campaign
pledges), as the media would claim?
Actually, this is also not true. The problem is not just with the
manifestos per se - that the policies were not backed by funding and
that they were incoherent.
The more important thing is that the existence of the LDP itself is
incompatible with manifestos. Junichiro Koizumi, who knew this
intuitively, hated manifestos. The one and only reason for this is
because through its long years of being the ruling party, the LDP
had sought a blanket mandate from the people. The LDP was no good at
prioritizing specific policies.
The LDP won a "blanket mandate" from the people through an election
and was able to implement with competence even contradictory
policies after the election through the actions of its politicians.
It then sought another blanket mandate from the people in the next
election, and had been operating with such a cycle.
This system worked best in an era of economic growth, when the
politicians and bureaucrats worked in perfect harmony. However, it
became difficult to get a blanket mandate from the people during a
time of economic recession. This is because: (1) the size of the pie
was not increasing; and (2) there was a growing need to prioritize
in the distribution of the pie.
Then along came the DPJ as the alternative. The DPJ, which had been
an opposition party throughout the over 10 years of its existence,
had a great variety of policy ideas and was good at criticizing
current policies. To be sure, the entire lineup of its policies were
pie in the sky, but through long years of criticizing the LDP, it
had acquired the ability to debate certain issues effectively - for
example, pensions, environmental issues, and the so-called revenue
source issue.
In other words, the DPJ, while unable to come up with systematic
policies, succeeded in drawing up a manifesto within the bounds of
policies under a limited mandate.
The DPJ's proposals to pay out child allowances or make high school
education and expressways free are criticized by some as pork
barrels, but for the DPJ, they are consistent with its criticism of
the LDP and the bureaucratic systems. The LDP would only pay out
such subsidies indirectly, and intermediary exploitation and
organizations accepting retired bureaucrats under the practice of
amakudari (golden parachute) are allowed to come into the picture.
The DPJ has chosen to make payments directly, and this is an
indication of its desire not to allow intermediary exploitation and
the intervention of amakudari bodies.
As symbolized by the above, there is a decisive difference in the
DPJ's and the LDP's payouts. This difference will expand even more
in politics from now on. The DPJ's policy direction of breaking away
from bureaucratic control will deal a direct blow to the old systems
and this will produce considerable friction.
TOKYO 00002027 010 OF 016
However, such friction will not immediately mean a return to the
LDP. This is because basically, the nature of bureaucrats is such
that they will normally obey the administration if the
administration is stable. Furthermore, if the DPJ succeeds in
building a new relationship with the bureaucracy that is different
from that of the LDP, a different form of relationship of tension
will be born with the bureaucrats. This will probably enrich the
decision-making process in this country.
Then, how far ahead should the DPJ look when conducting its
politics?
The DPJ will probably be able to serve out its full four-year term.
If it succeeds in compiling the budget for three years, it will
certainly be able to implement many of the party's new policies.
However, the people are impatient. They will not be patient enough
to just sit back and wait for four years. Therefore, it is necessary
to imbue a sense of security that the DPJ administration will surely
do something at an early stage. It is necessary to draft a road map
for the 100 days until the end of December, carry out this plan in
haste, and complete the implementation of a number of showpiece
policies - such as reshuffling the budget or building a new
Japan-U.S. relationship - during this period. With some tangible
results, the people will continue to trust the DPJ administration.
On the other hand, the regeneration of the LDP as an opposition
party will be tough, particularly in this case. Since all four prime
ministers who served in the 21st Century still remain in the party,
they will make reform difficult to achieve. This is because they are
only used to looking at political parties from their experience as a
ruling party. There can be no regeneration of the LDP unless it
comes to comprehend the essence of a true opposition party.
The media will also be impatient. If the DPJ is unable to produce
results and appears to be incompetent, they will begin to criticize
the administration in no time. However, it is natural for a party
that is in power for the first time to fumble. Unless some allowance
is given for this fact, no administration can survive for long. It
is easy to destroy something, but it is extremely hard to build
something from scratch. The first 100 days of an administration
should be its honeymoon with the media, as is the case in the U.S.
For now, the media should be kind to the new administration.
(6) North Korea a higher priority than striving for a nuclear-free
Northeast Asia
ASAHI (Page 5) (Full)
August 31, 2009
Susan Burk, the Special Representative in charge of nuclear
nonproliferation for the State Department under the Obama
administration, visited Japan to attend a UN arms reduction
conference in Niigata, which ended on the August 28. In an interview
with the Asahi Shimbun she discussed the policy of the Obama
administration, which has called for the elimination of nuclear
weapons, and the U.S.-Japan relationship.
(Interviewer: Hiroyuki Maekawa)
Q: The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held in May of
next year. Some have said that the atomic energy agreement the Bush
TOKYO 00002027 011 OF 016
administration concluded in 2008 with India, which is not a party to
the treaty, contradicts the implementation of the treaty framework.
Burk: The Review Conference must strike a balance between the NPT's
three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the
peaceful use of nuclear power. Rather than attempting to separate
these we would like to focus on areas in which they can be combined.
The Obama administration is also promoting the U.S.-India Nuclear
Pact. It would like to realize cooperation in the civilian sphere.
That rebuts the view that there is a contradiction with the treaty
framework. We are prepared to address questions at The Review
Conference.
Q: (What are your thoughts on) the North Korea problem?
Burk: I believe that diplomacy, in the broad sense, offers the best
strategy. We should pursue all bilateral and multilateral avenues
including the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and the Six-Party Talks. We should not give up.
Q: Japan is an ally under the protection of the U.S.'s nuclear
umbrella. How can a balance between nuclear disarmament and
deterrence be achieved?
Burk: In his speech in Prague the President clearly said that as
long as nuclear weapons exist, we should preserve the power of
deterrence while taking concrete steps toward a world without
nuclear arms.
The role, composition, and number of nuclear weapons are now under
examination as part of the "nuclear strategy review" to be submitted
to congress by next February. Expanded deterrence ("the nuclear
umbrella") is the core issue. While maintaining the long-term goal
of eliminating nuclear weapons, we will aim to reduce the role of
nuclear arms.
Q: Japan's DPJ is advocating a "Nuclear Free Zone in Northeast Asia"
including North Korea.
Burk: I believe that resolution of the North Korea problem is the
priority. Countries in the region should first devote their energy
to North Korea."
(7) Change of government and Okinawa: Governor seeks ways to
approach DPJ
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 1 & 2) (Full)
September 1, 2009
When the votes were being counted on the night of the Aug. 30 House
of Representatives election, instant reporting on election returns
was showing the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) advantage and the
successful candidates in Okinawa Prefecture. Yoshiyuki Uehara,
director of the Okinawa Governor's Executive Office, who was
watching the counting of votes on television, heard his cell-phone
ring. It was a call from DPJ Okinawa Prefectural Federation Policy
Research Committee Chairman Yoshiyuki Uesato. He told Uehara: "I
want to meet the governor as early as Aug. 31. I will bring along
the representatives of the (Okinawa) No. 3 and 4 districts." Uesato
sounded out Uehara on a talk with the governor. Uehara, who just
watched television reporting the losses of all candidates on the
TOKYO 00002027 012 OF 016
Liberal Democratic Party's and New Komeito's tickets, whom the
governor supported, responded after a short interval: "How about
Sept. 1?"
All eyes are now focused on how the DPJ, which promises to relocate
the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station out of Okinawa to
somewhere overseas, will deal with the Futenma relocation issue
after it takes the reins of government. The DPJ has begun looking
for a way to coordinate its policies with the Okinawa prefectural
government, while taking a stance of paying close attention to the
response of the prefecture and Nago City, which assent to the
relocation of Futenma to a location elsewhere on the island
prefecture.
On Aug. 31, Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima emphasized before reporters his
intention to listen to the views of a DPJ government, noting: "The
Defense Ministry and the central government are responsible for
(Futenma relocation)." The governor had stated that he would go
along with the relocation of Futenma in Okinawa, saying: "The
relocation of the base somewhere within the prefecture is a
realistic choice." However, Nakaima's statement yesterday seemed to
sound as if he would look into the DPJ's seriousness regarding the
relocation of Futenma out of Okinawa.
Amid strong winds blowing in favor of the inauguration of a DPJ-led
government, opposition candidates won in all single-seat district
races and the LDP, which Nakaima backed, lost its Lower House seats
in Okinawa. The balance of power has completely changed after the
general election, which will have a great impact on a package of
promotional measures for Okinawa, including one to reduce Okinawa's
excessive burden of U.S. military bases, as well as an Okinawa
promotional plan. In preparation for the Okinawa gubernatorial
election next year, the political situation in the prefecture will
begin to move forward. The newspaper examined closely the impact of
a change of government that is spreading across the prefecture.
"The governor is wavering in his judgment," said a senior Okinawa
government official. What the official meant is that Nakaima is
wavering between his conventional policy of relocating Futenma to
somewhere in the prefecture and relocating it out of Okinawa,
although his position of relocating it out of Okinawa is not clear
at present.
The DPJ and the Okinawa government have already started seeking ways
to coordinate views. Fearing that his government lacks its own
channels of communication to the DPJ, Nakaima instructed to a senior
prefectural government official at a meeting to secretly create a
point of contact for dialogue with the DPJ.
The governor told the senior official:
"Although I and the deputy governor are taking the lead (in backing
the LDP and New Komeito candidates), I want the administration side
to build communication channels to the DPJ."
LDP Okinawa Prefectural Federation Chairman Kosuke Gushi, who
supports Nakaima, referring to a review of the relocation of Futenma
to a location elsewhere on the island prefecture, emphasized the
governor's firm position, saying:
"The governor will say to the new administration that there is no
one who will reject the relocation of the base out of the prefecture
TOKYO 00002027 013 OF 016
if it is realized. Please make this request (to the U.S. side) in a
strong manner. The Okinawa government will carefully observe
developments for the time being. He will not return the negotiations
to the drawing board."
When the DPJ Okinawa Prefectural Federation sought an exchange of
views with the governor before the Aug. 30 general election, the LDP
Okinawa chapter reacted negatively to it. After the election, too,
the LDP chapter opposed a meeting between the governor and the DPJ
chapter. Also Tomonori Itosu, representative of the New Komeito
Okinawa chapter, asserted that there would be no change in the
governor's policy.
Some have contended that there is a slight difference in the
positions of DPJ headquarters and the Okinawa chapter over the
Futenma relocation plan. DPJ Okinawa Prefectural Federation
Secretary General Yasuhiro Aragaki said: "I actually don't think it
will be easy to resolve this issue." He also added:
"It remains to be seen what kind of policies Nago City and Okinawa
Prefecture can lay down after the DPJ assumes the political helm. If
Okinawa residents fail to come up with a single policy that goes
beyond political affiliations, it will be difficult for the central
government to conclude negotiations with the U.S."
Aragaki's perception is that it is indispensable for the prefecture
and city to line up in favor of the relocation of the base out of
Okinawa.
On Aug. 30 the prefectural government received a phone call from a
senior Nago City official asking for a meeting early in the morning.
The prefectural side immediately accepted the request. A senior
prefectural government official grumbled: "What we must do first is
to exchange views with Nago City."
(8) Nago citizens harbor mixed feelings of hope and anxiety on
switch in power to DPJ that calls for relocating Futenma base
outside Okinawa
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 25) (Full)
September 2, 2009
A new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which
has said it will aim to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air
Station outside Okinawa Prefecture, will soon be inaugurated. With
this new development, citizens' groups opposed to the plan to
transfer the air base within Okinawa have actively carried out
protest campaigns, holding gatherings calling for dropping the
Futenma transfer plan. Meanwhile, residents in Henoko district of
Nago City - the planned construction site for the alternative
facility - are harboring mixed feelings, as one resident grumbled:
"Actually, it is desirable for the base not to move here, but we
also have to think about our lives." People in the prefecture are
paying close attention to what approach the new administration will
take in resolving the Futenma relocation issue.
(Nago)
All the five lawmakers elected from Okinawa Prefecture in the latest
House of Representatives election have expressed their opposition to
the planned transfer of the Futenma Air Station in Ginowan to Henoko
district in Nago. Focusing on this fact, one resident in Henoko
TOKYO 00002027 014 OF 016
said: "I think the Futenma plan will remain unchanged." Another
resident remarked with irritation: "We have been confused by the
government's repeated policy switches." Meanwhile, concerned Nago
government officials remain cautious, with one official saying: "We
would like to intently watch how the situation will develop from now
on."
Hiroshi Omine, 61, who is unemployed and lives in Henoko, said: "I
think the relocation plan will remain unchanged even under the new
government. I hope the government will swiftly push ahead with the
plan." But he added: "Honestly speaking, if asked, I would say it is
desirable for us to see the base not moved here. But the question of
where the air base should go will be left unresolved. This issue
will also have an impact on our livelihoods."
Konomi (TN: phonetic) Eda, 60, a cook, voiced his content with the
government for its repeated changes in the relocation plan, saying:
"I do not mind whether the base is located here or not as long as I
can maintain my current living standards, but now that preparations
for construction work are moving ahead steadily, it might be too
late for the government to suggest reviewing the plan. I feel we are
being pushed around by the government's repeated policy switches. If
the plan goes back to square one, citizens will be thoroughly
disgusted. The government should come up with a definite decision on
whether to carry it out or not because we will have to accept the
decision."
Takako Shinohara, 46, who joined a sit-down strike, commented: "It
is a good chance for the plan to be withdrawn now, and such a
possibility is now looming large. It is not correct to think that
the voters have played out their roles with the change of
government. It is important for the voters to carefully watch moves
by the government."
Kushi Ward head Kiyotaka Higa is taking a wait-and-see attitude,
saying: "The Kube No.3 district did not try to host the base, and it
would be better not to accept the base. Even so, I am concerned
about what will be of the ongoing sewer project and economic
stimulus measures. We will have no choice but to watch the situation
intently."
Nago Vice Mayor Bunshin Suematsu indicated a cautious view,
remarking: "The government has not proposed moving the base outside
the prefecture, and the new government has yet to be inaugurated.
We cannot give a reply under the current situation." Chairman
Morihide Okido of the Nago Chamber of Commerce and Industry Chairman
said: "The government and the U.S. will discuss the matter from now
on, so I would like to keep an eye on the future development of the
negotiations."
(9) Talks between Okinawa governor and DPJ Okinawa chapter:
Behind-the-scenes moves becoming active; Okinawa Prefecture, Nago
City, Defense Ministry begin coordination
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full)
September 2, 2009
The Okinawa prefectural government suddenly came alive on Sept. 1,
when the impact of the change in government due to the Democratic
Party of Japan's (DPJ) crushing victory in the Lower House election
was still being felt. Officials of the DPJ's Okinawa chapter met
with Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima for the first time after the
TOKYO 00002027 015 OF 016
election. They urged the governor to agree with the DPJ's policy of
transferring the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station outside
Okinawa Prefecture or Japan. Officials from the Okinawa Defense
Bureau, an outpost in Okinawa Prefecture of the Defense Ministry,
and Nago City and former prefectural government officials were also
seen on the same floor around the same time. Amid attention being
focused on the new administration's Futenma relocation policy,
officials have begun sounding out each other's true motives.
Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro and Deputy Mayor Bunshin Suematsu
were in the governor's office right after his meeting with the DPJ's
local leaders. Their meeting focused on the talks between the
governor and the DPJ's local leaders. They discussed the timetable
until the new administration is launched and vowed to continue to
exchange information. The governor said: "Even if we say this and
that, there is nothing we can do about it. All we can do is just
wait and see for a while."
Governor remains noncommittal
The talks between DPJ Okinawa leaders and the governor started, with
a pack of reporters inundating. Local DPJ leader Shokichi Kina said
straightforward: "You are all keeping a close watch on the Futenma
issue, aren't you? It would be most ideal if the base is not built
in Henoko and if the Futenma Air Station is returned. In that
respect, we have the same opinion, don't we?"
The governor responded: "I don't understand what you mean. First of
all, I would like to hear what the DPJ intends to do." Kina tried to
get a commitment from the governor, saying, "The best option for
Okinawa is to relocate Futenma airfield 'outside Okinawa
Prefecture,' isn't it?" The governor avoided giving his word,
saying, "We need to hold more talks."
Okinawa prefectural officials are concerned over whether the DPJ's
local chapter is really in agreement with its headquarters. The
governor repeatedly asked, "What is Tokyo saying?" Secretary General
Yasuhiro Aragaki became impatient and tried to persuade him, saying:
"What is important is not the policy of our party's headquarters in
Tokyo but is that Okinawa should back up the new administration in
its talks with the U.S. The new administration is saying that it
will make the best possible choice for Okinawa. Both Okinawa
Prefecture and Nago City should fasten hopes on that." Their talks
ended in failure. The governor wound up the talks, saying, "I see
what you mean." The governor raised a question to reporters about
the party headquarters' stance interpreted by the local chapter and
said, "I cannot figure out some of their explanations that way."
Secret visitor
Okinawa Defense Bureau Director General Ro Manabe visited Yoshiyuki
Uehara, chief of the governor's office, on the morning of the 1st
prior to the meeting between DPJ local chapter officials and the
governor. They exchanged views for over an hour, including how to
respond to the DPJ administration. After the meeting, Manabe said,
"We exchanged views about our common concerns." Uehara said that
there would be no change in the prefecture's previous stance of
approving the transfer of Futenma airfield's functions within the
prefecture. He also said that the prefectural government will take a
wait-and-see attitude regarding what the DPJ administration will
do."
TOKYO 00002027 016 OF 016
Officials from the Defense Ministry's Okinawa bureau were not the
only visitors to the prefectural government office. Reiji Fumoto, a
former chief of the governor's office and now an advisor to Nago
City's municipal government on base issues, was also one of the
visitors that day. By curious coincidence, Fumoto discussed future
measures on the Futenma issue with Uehara, whom Fumoto has known,
around the same time when the Nago mayor was meeting with the
governor. Though the DPJ has yet to decide on a concrete policy on
the transfer of Futenma airfield, behind-the-scenes moves, involving
the prefectural government, are already becoming active.
ROOS