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Viewing cable 09TOKYO2027, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/02/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO2027 2009-09-02 21:38 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7381
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2027/01 2452138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 022138Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5929
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8592
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6255
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0070
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 3646
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6773
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0786
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7448
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7065
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 TOKYO 002027 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/02/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Editorial: Hatoyama administration must change its U.S. policy 
(Nikkei) 
 
(2) Security policy obstacle to DPJ effort to form coalition; 
Differences with SDP on refueling mission in Indian Ocean (Tokyo 
Shimbun) 
 
(3) Poll: Small number of people support DPJ's campaign platform; 31 
PERCENT  favor child-care allowance plan, 20 PERCENT  approve toll 
free highways (Asahi) 
 
(4) Change of government (Part 2): "Transition team" plan fizzles 
out; Prime-minister-led decision-making system already stumbles 
(Sankei) 
 
(5) Column: "The collapse of 'LDP-style Japan': Time to search for a 
new mode of 'stability'" (Nikkei) 
 
(6) North Korea a higher priority than striving for a nuclear-free 
Northeast Asia (Asahi) 
 
(7) Change of government and Okinawa: Governor seeks ways to 
approach DPJ (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(8) Nago citizens harbor mixed feelings of hope and anxiety on 
switch in power to DPJ that calls for relocating Futenma base 
outside Okinawa (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(9) Talks between Okinawa governor and DPJ Okinawa chapter: 
Behind-the-scenes moves becoming active; Okinawa Prefecture, Nago 
City, Defense Ministry begin coordination (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Editorial: Hatoyama administration must change its U.S. policy 
 
NIKKEI (Page2) (Full) 
September 2, 2009 
 
We have strong concerns about the "Hatoyama administration's" 
foreign policy, especially about its relationship with the United 
States. If the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) sticks to its 
opposition-party stance, our concerns will become a reality. (A 
proverb says the wise adapt themselves to changed circumstances). 
(Like this proverb), it is inevitable for the Hatoyama 
administration to adapt itself to the changed circumstances, and we 
expect that. 
 
The maxim is often used to mean changing an attitude with no 
principles, but its original meaning is different. According to the 
Kojien Japanese dictionary, it comes from the Book of Changes (one 
of the oldest of the Chinese classic texts) and means that when 
there is a mistake, a wise man swiftly corrects it and preserves his 
honor. 
 
Four concerns about Japan-U.S. relations 
 
U.S. President Barack Obama, who advocated change, too, has shifted 
from the election mode to the governing mode immediately after 
assuming office. Such was natural. During the campaign period for 
the Aug. 30 House of Representatives election, we pointed out that 
 
TOKYO 00002027  002 OF 016 
 
 
the DPJ's policies were too ambiguous. In its manifesto (campaign 
pledges), the DPJ vowed to "build a close and equal Japan-U.S. 
alliance." But the meaning of a "close" and "equal" relationship was 
unclear. 
 
The DPJ did not change its ambiguous policy line. Was it a strategy 
that factored in a sudden change after the election? Shifting its 
deliberately vague policy course to a pragmatic policy line is not a 
betrayal of voters. It is irresponsible to opt for continuing 
adhering to its opposition-party policies that are certain to rock 
Japan-U.S. relations and bring instability to Northeast Asia. 
 
Of the policies taken by the DPJ when it was an opposition party, 
there are at least four problems that will adversely affect 
Japan-U.S. relations. 
 
First is its opposition to the Maritime Self-Defense Force's 
refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Second is its call for the 
U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to be moved out of Okinawa, 
Third is its opposition to Japan's host-nation support for the costs 
of stationing U.S. forces in Japan, which is commonly referred to as 
the "sympathy budget" (in Japan). Fourth is that it is calling for a 
revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 
 
The legal basis for the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean will 
expire next January. DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama, who is certain to 
become the new prime minister, has declared that his administration 
will not extend the mission. He is considering a means of 
cooperation other than refueling. 
 
What does he have in mind? Workers of such offices as the Foreign 
Ministry and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) are 
already working arduously in Afghanistan for economic cooperation. 
 
Is Japan going to send Ground Self-Defense Force troops to 
Afghanistan? The U.S. and European countries, which have dispatched 
ground troops there, have lost many lives. Is it advisable to 
terminate the refueling mission, which is safer than sending ground 
troops and has reportedly earned high marks from other countries? 
 
Relocating Futenma airfield outside Okinawa will not be easy either. 
It might be a different story if there is a right place in such 
areas as Hokkaido, Iwate, and Mie prefectures where DPJ heavyweights 
come from. If renegotiations are held without it (an alternative 
place) 13 years after the 1996 agreement, the danger of Futenma Air 
Station surrounded by residential areas will continue to exist 
semi-permanently. 
 
Proposing talks on revisions to the SOFA and the "sympathy budget" 
seems less harmful than these options to Japan-U.S. relations. But 
it requires a solution for talks with no way out. To begin with, the 
two countries cannot afford to spend time on them. The reason is 
because there are many priority issues that require the strategic 
responses of Japan and the United States, such as the North Korean 
nuclear issue and China's growing position. 
 
The DPJ still thinks bilateral talks are necessary in order to build 
an equal Japan-U.S. alliance. We think a change to the Japanese 
government's interpretation of the right to collective self-defense 
will ensure a close and equal bilateral relationship. 
 
That is what the United States also wants to see. The stage for 
 
TOKYO 00002027  003 OF 016 
 
 
substantial talks on a SOFA revision will be set once the DPJ shifts 
its policy, the government changes its interpretation of the right 
to collective self-defense, and a new Japan-U.S. defense cooperation 
framework is established. 
 
What is more serious than the four points is DPJ Secretary General 
Katsuya Okada's repeated statement urging the United States to 
abandon the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Okada is regarded as 
a candidate for the foreign portfolio. At this point, his proposal 
is more harmful to Japan's security than to Japan-U.S. relations. 
 
Prohibition of preemptive use of nuclear weapons counterproductive 
 
True, in relations between countries like the United States and 
Russia that are equally matched in terms of nuclear warheads and are 
aware that they will lose much in a nuclear attack, nuclear 
deterrence is maintained by means of second attack capability rather 
than by a preemptive strike. If the United States declares that it 
will attack Moscow, Russia will launch a second attack in several 
minutes and annihilate New York. The two sides will suffer 
tremendous losses. That is why they do not launch a nuclear attack. 
This is the logic of nuclear deterrence. 
 
The logic does not work with countries like North Korea which is not 
certain what it will lose. Should North Korea declare that it will 
make a nuclear attack on Tokyo and if the United States is bound by 
the rule of not using nuclear weapons preemptively, the United 
States will simply warn, "If Tokyo is annihilated, Pyongyang will be 
annihilated in several minutes." Even though the conventional forces 
of the United States and Japan are greater than those of North 
Korea, can Japan feel a sense of security under such circumstances? 
 
If North Korea declares an attack on Tokyo, Japan cannot feel secure 
unless the United States is expected to make a preemptive strike. If 
the United States declares that it will not use nuclear weapons 
preemptively, nuclear proliferation to such countries as North Korea 
and terrorists might occur and might enliven those who are calling 
for Japan to go nuclear, as well. 
 
China has declared a "no first use policy." But the country has not 
allowed verifying whether or not its weapons actually deployed fit 
that declaration. Abandonment of the preemptive use of weapons 
actually does not mean arms reduction. 
 
(2) Security policy obstacle to DPJ effort to form coalition; 
Differences with SDP on refueling mission in Indian Ocean 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Slightly abridged) 
September 2, 2009 
 
Yoichi Takeuchi, political reporter 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), and the People's New Party (PNP) have begun discussions on 
forming a coalition government. The biggest problem for the official 
consultations by their secretaries general and policy officers 
starting this week will be whether they can narrow their gap on 
foreign and security policies. The role of the SDP and the PNP in 
the system of unified policymaking that the DPJ envisions will also 
be a key issue. 
 
Four common policies 
 
TOKYO 00002027  004 OF 016 
 
 
 
The three parties had agreed on a number of common policies in 
mid-August, before the House of Representatives election, namely: 
(1) maintaining the current consumption tax rate; (2) drastic review 
of the postal businesses; (3) support for child rearing; and (4) 
drastic revision of the temporary worker placement law. The 
coalition talks will be based on these common policies. 
 
These common policies consist of the "major policies that (the three 
parties) could agree on" (in the words of a senior DPJ official), 
but they do not include foreign and security policies on which the 
DPJ and the SDP do not see eye to eye. While the common policies 
might have worked fine for an alliance of opposition parties, 
foreign and security policies cannot possibly be shelved for a 
coalition government. 
 
The main sticking point is until when should the refueling mission 
of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in the Indian Ocean 
continue. 
 
The DPJ had shifted to a policy of condoning the continuation of the 
mission for the time being during the election campaign. On the 
other hand, SDP Chairperson Mizuho Fukushima insisted even during 
her news conference after the election that, "We will not compromise 
on issues relating to peace. This will be an important issue for 
discussion," maintaining the party's position of demanding the 
immediate withdrawal of the MSDF. 
 
There are also subtle differences among the three parties on child 
allowances, which the DPJ regards as its top priority policy in the 
first year of the administration. The DPJ and the SDP differ on the 
appropriate amount of allowances, while the PNP's Kamei advocates 
setting requirements based on the parents' income. 
 
The three parties can choose to shelve the details of policies in 
order to reach agreement before the new prime minister is elected on 
September 16. However, this will mean that coordination within the 
coalition will take time each time a policy decision is to be made. 
 
On top of specific policy issues, the DPJ also differs with the SDP 
and the PNP on the mechanism for policy coordination. 
 
Fukushima and Kamei agreed on the need to create a permanent body 
for policy coordination among the ruling coalition parties at their 
meeting on September 1. 
 
Arena for making presence felt 
 
Compared to the DPJ, which has won over 300 seats in the Lower 
House, the SDP and the PNP are very junior partners. They will have 
only one minister each in the cabinet at most. Therefore, it will be 
difficult for them to have their voices heard on all policies. That 
is why there is a need for an "arena" for them to influence the 
"Hatoyama administration" from the outside and make their party's 
presence felt. 
 
What the SDP has in mind is the creation of something similar to the 
meeting of ruling party policy officers under the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP)-New Komeito administration. Under the LDP-New Komeito 
regime, this meeting made decisions on policy and the government 
simply confirmed them. A senior SDP official remarked: "The LDP 
policymaking system was quite sophisticated. The system of 
 
TOKYO 00002027  005 OF 016 
 
 
coordinating between each party's policy research organ under the 
coalition government was straightforward." 
 
Lessons learned from dual structure 
 
However, this contradicts the DPJ's pledge in its manifesto to have 
the cabinet make all policy decisions. Hatoyama has told Kamei that, 
"We would like to avoid dual policymaking by the government and the 
party as much as possible." This is a policy based on the experience 
of the Hosokawa cabinet, where powerful Diet members controlled 
policymaking from outside the cabinet under a "dual power 
structure." 
 
Nevertheless, the DPJ will not be able to force the unification of 
the government and the ruling parties on its coalition partners. For 
this reason, the party is thinking of a mechanism for the DPJ 
secretary general to heed the demands of the SDP and the PNP. 
 
If a permanent body is created for this purpose, an organ exerting 
strong influence on the cabinet from the outside may come into 
existence, depending on how the DPJ secretary general handles this 
process. The mechanism for policy coordination may emerge as a 
tricky question in the coalition talks since this is also related to 
appointments under the Hatoyama administration. 
 
(3) Poll: Small number of people support DPJ's campaign platform; 31 
PERCENT  favor child-care allowance plan, 20 PERCENT  approve toll 
free highways 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
September 2, 2009 
 
The Asahi Shimbun has learned through a nationwide public opinion 
survey that while people have high hopes for a government led by the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), they are also looking carefully at 
the specific campaign pledges of the party. 
 
When pollees were asked if they supported the DPJ's plan to abolish 
tax income exemptions for spouses, instead of providing 26,000 yen 
per month for each child, 31 PERCENT  agreed with the plan but 49 
PERCENT  disagreed. Of those who voted for the DPJ in the 
proportional representation segment of the ballot, 37 PERCENT 
disapproved (43 PERCENT  approved). Of those who voted for other 
political parties, 50 to 60 PERCENT  opposed the idea. 
 
Regarding a DPJ campaign pledge to make all highway tolls free and 
allot tax money to repay the debts, as many as 65 PERCENT  were 
critical, while only 20 PERCENT  approved. Of those who voted for 
the DPJ, 56 PERCENT  disapproved. When Asahi conducted a poll on 
these two pledges before the start of the official campaign for the 
general election, 33 PERCENT  approved of the plan to introduce a 
child-care allowance, while 55 PERCENT  did not approve of it. As 
for the plan to remove all highway tolls, 23 PERCENT  gave positive 
evaluations and 67 PERCENT  did not approve of it. Regardless of the 
DPJ's publicity on its manifesto during the election campaigning, 
the features indicate that the party's campaign pledges were not 
well understood by voters. When respondents were asked if they 
thought the major reason for the DPJ's victory was because voters 
supported its manifesto, 38 PERCENT  answered "yes," while 52 
PERCENT  said "no." It is hard to say that the DPJ's manifesto 
received a "seal of approval." How the DPJ will explain the 
significance of its policy platform to the public will be a major 
 
TOKYO 00002027  006 OF 016 
 
 
challenge for the party. 
 
Some respondents have high expectations for the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), which suffered an overwhelming defeat in the general 
election. Seventy-six percent said that they wanted the LDP to 
regain power. Of those who voted for the DPJ in the proportional 
representation section of the ballot, 76 PERCENT  answered that they 
wanted the LDP to recover. 
 
Meanwhile, about a half of those who voted for the LDP in the 
election this time viewed the change of government positively. This 
indicates that many LDP supporters think that the present LDP had no 
choice but to be defeated in the election. One of the LDP's 
challenges is how it will transform itself. 
 
(4) Change of government (Part 2): "Transition team" plan fizzles 
out; Prime-minister-led decision-making system already stumbles 
 
SANKEI (Page3) (Abridged) 
September 1, 2009 
 
Mashiho Akaji 
 
On the morning of Aug. 31, the day after the House of 
Representatives election, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President 
Yukio Hatoyama gave a press interview at his home in Tokyo's 
Denenchofu area. 
 
Hatoyama said: "It has taken a long time, but we have at last 
reached the starting line. We are now in a position to create a new 
kind of politics. I am filled with deep emotion." 
 
Hatoyama's words apparently came from his strong emotions regarding 
the rocky road from the launch of the DPJ 13 years ago to the eve of 
the establishment of a DPJ administration. 
 
Hatoyama, who is certain to become the next prime minister, will 
soon be able to put his visions into action. But his words and 
actions have been inconsistent. 
 
The night before, Hatoyama discussed steps for the transfer of power 
with DPJ executives at the party's vote-counting center in Tokyo's 
Roppongi district. "We will change the political system itself and 
implement our manifesto (campaign pledges)," Hatoyama said before 
Deputy Presidents Naoto Kan and Ichiro Ozawa, Secretary General 
Katsuya Okada, and other DPJ executives, adding, "We will have to 
conduct politics from the viewpoint of the general public." 
 
Hatoyama also indicated that he will decide the new cabinet lineup 
in one stroke after the prime ministerial election, astonishing the 
DPJ executives. It was a de facto announcement by Hatoyama to drop a 
plan to set up a transition team composed of prospective cabinet 
ministers tasked with conducting talks for launching a coalition 
government with other parties. Instead, the three top DPJ executives 
including Ozawa will make preparations for the new administration. 
Hatoyama's idea of creating a prime minister-led decision-making 
system has already stumbled. 
 
"On the night of Aug. 30, I advised Mr. Hatoyama to set up a 
transition team to give the impression that the DPJ is moving toward 
establishing the new administration," a Hatoyama aide said 
incredulously. "Mr. Hatoyama should have given some thought to it." 
 
TOKYO 00002027  007 OF 016 
 
 
 
"It is necessary to replace old things with new things smoothly," 
Hatoyama said to party executives. Hatoyama did not elaborate on 
this comment. 
 
Hatoyama is believed to have given up on setting up a transition 
team composed of a handful of prospective cabinet ministers so as 
not to cause confusion and discontent in the party. He also seems to 
have decided to do away with a transition team in deference to the 
Ozawa side which is displeased with the fact that a personnel plan 
was trumpeted before the election. 
 
As the leader, it is counterproductive to come across as indecisive 
and stalling for the sake of keeping harmony in the party and 
maintaining momentum. 
 
Hatoyama held a meeting with Ozawa, Kan, and another Deputy 
President, Azuma Koshiishi, at party headquarters at around noon 
yesterday. They simply decided to swiftly hold consultative meetings 
with various factions to discuss the convocation of the next special 
Diet session for the election of the new prime minister. 
 
The obscurity and inconsistency of Hatoyama's visions and policies 
have often been pointed out. 
 
On July 15 Hatoyama indicated his intention to hold talks with the 
United States to remove the principle of not permitting the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan from the three 
non-nuclear principles after the DPJ takes power. In 2005 Hatoyama 
released his own proposal for constitutional amendment that did not 
touch on the principle of not permitting the introduction of nuclear 
weapons into Japan. 
 
Hatoyama's statement has gone through numerous transformations, as 
seen in the fact that drawing a strong objection from the Social 
Democratic Party, the DPJ's possible coalition partner, he announced 
a plan to legislate the three non-nuclear principles. 
 
In the DPJ leadership race in May, Hatoyama pledged to realize a 
"fraternal society," a slogan advocated by his grandfather, the late 
Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama. Hatoyama also advocates "fraternal 
diplomacy" whereby Japan interacts amicably with societies that hold 
widely different values. What "fraternity" specifically means 
remains unclear, however. 
 
In June a reporter asked Hatoyama, "Does fraternity mean 'humanity' 
or 'brotherly love'?" Hatoyama replied: "It is closer to 'humanity.' 
I will make efforts to publicize both." 
 
Following the DPJ's landside victory, Hatoyama held news conferences 
on the night of Aug. 30 and before dawn of Aug. 31 in which he 
refrained from mentioning "fraternity." "I like using the word 
'fraternity,' but it is not just wishful thinking," Hatoyama replied 
to a question from a reporter on Aug. 31. 
 
The DPJ has achieved a landslide victory facilitated by the fierce 
criticism and hatred of the LDP. Like Hatoyama's inconsistent words, 
a tailwind could turn into an adverse wind at any time. 
 
(5) Column: "The collapse of 'LDP-style Japan': Time to search for a 
new mode of 'stability'" 
 
 
TOKYO 00002027  008 OF 016 
 
 
NIKKEI (Page 25) (Slightly abridged) 
September 2, 2009 
 
Takashi Mikuriya, professor at the University of Tokyo 
 
How should we look at the recent election, where the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory, capturing 308 seats in 
the House of Representatives? Some people believe that a 2009 regime 
has replaced the 1955 political regime, but this author thinks that 
it is premature to say that a new system is now in place. 
 
It is also said that the era of a full-fledged two-party system has 
come after this election to choose an administration. For sure, 
dramatic changes like in the present case are possible under the 
single-seat constituency system, and if the DPJ makes policy 
mistakes, it will be forced out of power. In that sense, it would 
appear that a two-party system has begun. However, this may not be 
the case either. 
 
The above is evident through an analysis of the factors behind the 
DPJ's overwhelming victory. 
 
The DPJ had indeed improved its ability to become the alternative. 
However, not all voters who voted for the DPJ did so because they 
think the DPJ is good. This election was an election to purge the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The election outcome should be 
regarded as the result of widespread discontent with the LDP, which 
has changed its president once every year for the past few years and 
which repeatedly delayed the dissolution of the Diet in an 
opportunistic manner, as well as the people's desire to do away with 
such a situation. 
 
A DPJ administration will not collapse that easily, and the move 
from a LDP administration to a DPJ one is, in a sense, inevitable. 
From a longer term point of view, this reflects the accumulated long 
years of distrust of the LDP's ways since it engineered an immediate 
comeback to power by co-opting the then Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 
after going into opposition briefly with the forming of the Morihiro 
Hosokawa administration in 1993. The people were fed up with the 
LDP's unscrupulous maneuvering to cling to power by co-opting the 
JSP at first, then the Liberal Party, followed by the New Komeito. 
 
The significance of the LDP's loss of power this time may not be 
limited to the political level. This may trigger the collapse of 
everything that is LDP-style in Japanese systems. For example, the 
business sector. If corporate donations are really going to be 
abolished, the existence of the economic organizations in their 
present form will lose its meaning because individual companies can 
now decide and take their own stance in interacting with the 
political authorities. 
 
The same is true with the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic systems that 
built a special relationship with the LDP over the years have come 
to a dead end. It will be impossible to retain the present form of 
relationship under a DPJ administration. 
 
Since the DPJ's victory is a premonition of the collapse of all the 
old social systems in Japan, even if the DPJ makes certain mistakes, 
there is no guarantee that the LDP will be the alternative after 
four years. That is, it is fully possible that the collapse of 
everything that is LDP-style may force the LDP to change 
dramatically and ultimately split into several political parties 
 
TOKYO 00002027  009 OF 016 
 
 
with new names which will become the rival force to the DPJ. This is 
the main difference from the time of the Hosokawa administration in 
ΒΆ1993. 
 
Was this election really an election based on manifestos (campaign 
pledges), as the media would claim? 
 
Actually, this is also not true. The problem is not just with the 
manifestos per se - that the policies were not backed by funding and 
that they were incoherent. 
 
The more important thing is that the existence of the LDP itself is 
incompatible with manifestos. Junichiro Koizumi, who knew this 
intuitively, hated manifestos. The one and only reason for this is 
because through its long years of being the ruling party, the LDP 
had sought a blanket mandate from the people. The LDP was no good at 
prioritizing specific policies. 
 
The LDP won a "blanket mandate" from the people through an election 
and was able to implement with competence even contradictory 
policies after the election through the actions of its politicians. 
It then sought another blanket mandate from the people in the next 
election, and had been operating with such a cycle. 
 
This system worked best in an era of economic growth, when the 
politicians and bureaucrats worked in perfect harmony. However, it 
became difficult to get a blanket mandate from the people during a 
time of economic recession. This is because: (1) the size of the pie 
was not increasing; and (2) there was a growing need to prioritize 
in the distribution of the pie. 
 
Then along came the DPJ as the alternative. The DPJ, which had been 
an opposition party throughout the over 10 years of its existence, 
had a great variety of policy ideas and was good at criticizing 
current policies. To be sure, the entire lineup of its policies were 
pie in the sky, but through long years of criticizing the LDP, it 
had acquired the ability to debate certain issues effectively - for 
example, pensions, environmental issues, and the so-called revenue 
source issue. 
 
In other words, the DPJ, while unable to come up with systematic 
policies, succeeded in drawing up a manifesto within the bounds of 
policies under a limited mandate. 
 
The DPJ's proposals to pay out child allowances or make high school 
education and expressways free are criticized by some as pork 
barrels, but for the DPJ, they are consistent with its criticism of 
the LDP and the bureaucratic systems. The LDP would only pay out 
such subsidies indirectly, and intermediary exploitation and 
organizations accepting retired bureaucrats under the practice of 
amakudari (golden parachute) are allowed to come into the picture. 
 
The DPJ has chosen to make payments directly, and this is an 
indication of its desire not to allow intermediary exploitation and 
the intervention of amakudari bodies. 
 
As symbolized by the above, there is a decisive difference in the 
DPJ's and the LDP's payouts. This difference will expand even more 
in politics from now on. The DPJ's policy direction of breaking away 
from bureaucratic control will deal a direct blow to the old systems 
and this will produce considerable friction. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002027  010 OF 016 
 
 
However, such friction will not immediately mean a return to the 
LDP. This is because basically, the nature of bureaucrats is such 
that they will normally obey the administration if the 
administration is stable. Furthermore, if the DPJ succeeds in 
building a new relationship with the bureaucracy that is different 
from that of the LDP, a different form of relationship of tension 
will be born with the bureaucrats. This will probably enrich the 
decision-making process in this country. 
 
Then, how far ahead should the DPJ look when conducting its 
politics? 
 
The DPJ will probably be able to serve out its full four-year term. 
If it succeeds in compiling the budget for three years, it will 
certainly be able to implement many of the party's new policies. 
However, the people are impatient. They will not be patient enough 
to just sit back and wait for four years. Therefore, it is necessary 
to imbue a sense of security that the DPJ administration will surely 
do something at an early stage. It is necessary to draft a road map 
for the 100 days until the end of December, carry out this plan in 
haste, and complete the implementation of a number of showpiece 
policies - such as reshuffling the budget or building a new 
Japan-U.S. relationship - during this period. With some tangible 
results, the people will continue to trust the DPJ administration. 
 
On the other hand, the regeneration of the LDP as an opposition 
party will be tough, particularly in this case. Since all four prime 
ministers who served in the 21st Century still remain in the party, 
they will make reform difficult to achieve. This is because they are 
only used to looking at political parties from their experience as a 
ruling party. There can be no regeneration of the LDP unless it 
comes to comprehend the essence of a true opposition party. 
 
The media will also be impatient. If the DPJ is unable to produce 
results and appears to be incompetent, they will begin to criticize 
the administration in no time. However, it is natural for a party 
that is in power for the first time to fumble. Unless some allowance 
is given for this fact, no administration can survive for long. It 
is easy to destroy something, but it is extremely hard to build 
something from scratch. The first 100 days of an administration 
should be its honeymoon with the media, as is the case in the U.S. 
For now, the media should be kind to the new administration. 
 
(6) North Korea a higher priority than striving for a nuclear-free 
Northeast Asia 
 
ASAHI (Page 5) (Full) 
August 31, 2009 
 
Susan Burk, the Special Representative in charge of nuclear 
nonproliferation for the State Department under the Obama 
administration, visited Japan to attend a UN arms reduction 
conference in Niigata, which ended on the August 28. In an interview 
with the Asahi Shimbun she discussed the policy of the Obama 
administration, which has called for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons, and the U.S.-Japan relationship. 
 
(Interviewer: Hiroyuki Maekawa) 
 
Q: The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held in May of 
next year. Some have said that the atomic energy agreement the Bush 
 
TOKYO 00002027  011 OF 016 
 
 
administration concluded in 2008 with India, which is not a party to 
the treaty, contradicts the implementation of the treaty framework. 
 
 
Burk: The Review Conference must strike a balance between the NPT's 
three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the 
peaceful use of nuclear power. Rather than attempting to separate 
these we would like to focus on areas in which they can be combined. 
 The Obama administration is also promoting the U.S.-India Nuclear 
Pact. It would like to realize cooperation in the civilian sphere. 
That rebuts the view that there is a contradiction with the treaty 
framework. We are prepared to address questions at The Review 
Conference. 
 
Q: (What are your thoughts on) the North Korea problem? 
 
Burk:  I believe that diplomacy, in the broad sense, offers the best 
strategy.  We should pursue all bilateral and multilateral avenues 
including the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, and the Six-Party Talks. We should not give up. 
 
Q: Japan is an ally under the protection of the U.S.'s nuclear 
umbrella. How can a balance between nuclear disarmament and 
deterrence be achieved? 
 
Burk: In his speech in Prague the President clearly said that as 
long as nuclear weapons exist, we should preserve the power of 
deterrence while taking concrete steps toward a world without 
nuclear arms. 
 
The role, composition, and number of nuclear weapons are now under 
examination as part of the "nuclear strategy review" to be submitted 
to congress by next February. Expanded deterrence ("the nuclear 
umbrella") is the core issue. While maintaining the long-term goal 
of eliminating nuclear weapons, we will aim to reduce the role of 
nuclear arms. 
 
Q: Japan's DPJ is advocating a "Nuclear Free Zone in Northeast Asia" 
including North Korea. 
 
Burk: I believe that resolution of the North Korea problem is the 
priority. Countries in the region should first devote their energy 
to North Korea." 
 
(7) Change of government and Okinawa: Governor seeks ways to 
approach DPJ 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 1 & 2) (Full) 
September 1, 2009 
 
When the votes were being counted on the night of the Aug. 30 House 
of Representatives election, instant reporting on election returns 
was showing the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) advantage and the 
successful candidates in Okinawa Prefecture. Yoshiyuki Uehara, 
director of the Okinawa Governor's Executive Office, who was 
watching the counting of votes on television, heard his cell-phone 
ring. It was a call from DPJ Okinawa Prefectural Federation Policy 
Research Committee Chairman Yoshiyuki Uesato. He told Uehara: "I 
want to meet the governor as early as Aug. 31. I will bring along 
the representatives of the (Okinawa) No. 3 and 4 districts." Uesato 
sounded out Uehara on a talk with the governor. Uehara, who just 
watched television reporting the losses of all candidates on the 
 
TOKYO 00002027  012 OF 016 
 
 
Liberal Democratic Party's and New Komeito's tickets, whom the 
governor supported, responded after a short interval: "How about 
Sept. 1?" 
 
All eyes are now focused on how the DPJ, which promises to relocate 
the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station out of Okinawa to 
somewhere overseas, will deal with the Futenma relocation issue 
after it takes the reins of government. The DPJ has begun looking 
for a way to coordinate its policies with the Okinawa prefectural 
government, while taking a stance of paying close attention to the 
response of the prefecture and Nago City, which assent to the 
relocation of Futenma to a location elsewhere on the island 
prefecture. 
 
On Aug. 31, Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima emphasized before reporters his 
intention to listen to the views of a DPJ government, noting: "The 
Defense Ministry and the central government are responsible for 
(Futenma relocation)." The governor had stated that he would go 
along with the relocation of Futenma in Okinawa, saying: "The 
relocation of the base somewhere within the prefecture is a 
realistic choice." However, Nakaima's statement yesterday seemed to 
sound as if he would look into the DPJ's seriousness regarding the 
relocation of Futenma out of Okinawa. 
 
Amid strong winds blowing in favor of the inauguration of a DPJ-led 
government, opposition candidates won in all single-seat district 
races and the LDP, which Nakaima backed, lost its Lower House seats 
in Okinawa. The balance of power has completely changed after the 
general election, which will have a great impact on a package of 
promotional measures for Okinawa, including one to reduce Okinawa's 
excessive burden of U.S. military bases, as well as an Okinawa 
promotional plan. In preparation for the Okinawa gubernatorial 
election next year, the political situation in the prefecture will 
begin to move forward. The newspaper examined closely the impact of 
a change of government that is spreading across the prefecture. 
 
"The governor is wavering in his judgment," said a senior Okinawa 
government official. What the official meant is that Nakaima is 
wavering between his conventional policy of relocating Futenma to 
somewhere in the prefecture and relocating it out of Okinawa, 
although his position of relocating it out of Okinawa is not clear 
at present. 
 
The DPJ and the Okinawa government have already started seeking ways 
to coordinate views. Fearing that his government lacks its own 
channels of communication to the DPJ, Nakaima instructed to a senior 
prefectural government official at a meeting to secretly create a 
point of contact for dialogue with the DPJ. 
 
The governor told the senior official: 
 
"Although I and the deputy governor are taking the lead (in backing 
the LDP and New Komeito candidates), I want the administration side 
to build communication channels to the DPJ." 
 
LDP Okinawa Prefectural Federation Chairman Kosuke Gushi, who 
supports Nakaima, referring to a review of the relocation of Futenma 
to a location elsewhere on the island prefecture, emphasized the 
governor's firm position, saying: 
 
"The governor will say to the new administration that there is no 
one who will reject the relocation of the base out of the prefecture 
 
TOKYO 00002027  013 OF 016 
 
 
if it is realized. Please make this request (to the U.S. side) in a 
strong manner. The Okinawa government will carefully observe 
developments for the time being. He will not return the negotiations 
to the drawing board." 
 
When the DPJ Okinawa Prefectural Federation sought an exchange of 
views with the governor before the Aug. 30 general election, the LDP 
Okinawa chapter reacted negatively to it. After the election, too, 
the LDP chapter opposed a meeting between the governor and the DPJ 
chapter. Also Tomonori Itosu, representative of the New Komeito 
Okinawa chapter, asserted that there would be no change in the 
governor's policy. 
 
Some have contended that there is a slight difference in the 
positions of DPJ headquarters and the Okinawa chapter over the 
Futenma relocation plan. DPJ Okinawa Prefectural Federation 
Secretary General Yasuhiro Aragaki said: "I actually don't think it 
will be easy to resolve this issue." He also added: 
 
"It remains to be seen what kind of policies Nago City and Okinawa 
Prefecture can lay down after the DPJ assumes the political helm. If 
Okinawa residents fail to come up with a single policy that goes 
beyond political affiliations, it will be difficult for the central 
government to conclude negotiations with the U.S." 
 
Aragaki's perception is that it is indispensable for the prefecture 
and city to line up in favor of the relocation of the base out of 
Okinawa. 
 
On Aug. 30 the prefectural government received a phone call from a 
senior Nago City official asking for a meeting early in the morning. 
The prefectural side immediately accepted the request. A senior 
prefectural government official grumbled: "What we must do first is 
to exchange views with Nago City." 
 
(8) Nago citizens harbor mixed feelings of hope and anxiety on 
switch in power to DPJ that calls for relocating Futenma base 
outside Okinawa 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 25) (Full) 
September 2, 2009 
 
A new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which 
has said it will aim to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air 
Station outside Okinawa Prefecture, will soon be inaugurated. With 
this new development, citizens' groups opposed to the plan to 
transfer the air base within Okinawa have actively carried out 
protest campaigns, holding gatherings calling for dropping the 
Futenma transfer plan. Meanwhile, residents in Henoko district of 
Nago City - the  planned construction site for the alternative 
facility - are harboring mixed feelings, as one resident grumbled: 
"Actually, it is desirable for the base not to move here, but we 
also have to think about our lives." People in the prefecture are 
paying close attention to what approach the new administration will 
take in resolving the Futenma relocation issue. 
 
(Nago) 
 
All the five lawmakers elected from Okinawa Prefecture in the latest 
House of Representatives election have expressed their opposition to 
the planned transfer of the Futenma Air Station in Ginowan to Henoko 
district in Nago. Focusing on this fact, one resident in Henoko 
 
TOKYO 00002027  014 OF 016 
 
 
said: "I think the Futenma plan will remain unchanged." Another 
resident remarked with irritation: "We have been confused by the 
government's repeated policy switches." Meanwhile, concerned Nago 
government officials remain cautious, with one official saying: "We 
would like to intently watch how the situation will develop from now 
on." 
 
Hiroshi Omine, 61, who is unemployed and lives in Henoko, said: "I 
think the relocation plan will remain unchanged even under the new 
government. I hope the government will swiftly push ahead with the 
plan." But he added: "Honestly speaking, if asked, I would say it is 
desirable for us to see the base not moved here. But the question of 
where the air base should go will be left unresolved. This issue 
will also have an impact on our livelihoods." 
 
Konomi (TN: phonetic) Eda, 60, a cook, voiced his content with the 
government for its repeated changes in the relocation plan, saying: 
"I do not mind whether the base is located here or not as long as I 
can maintain my current living standards, but now that preparations 
for construction work are moving ahead steadily, it might be too 
late for the government to suggest reviewing the plan. I feel we are 
being pushed around by the government's repeated policy switches. If 
the plan goes back to square one, citizens will be thoroughly 
disgusted. The government should come up with a definite decision on 
whether to carry it out or not because we will have to accept the 
decision." 
 
Takako Shinohara, 46, who joined a sit-down strike, commented: "It 
is a good chance for the plan to be withdrawn now, and such a 
possibility is now looming large. It is not correct to think that 
the voters have played out their roles with the change of 
government. It is important for the voters to carefully watch moves 
by the government." 
 
Kushi Ward head Kiyotaka Higa is taking a wait-and-see attitude, 
saying: "The Kube No.3 district did not try to host the base, and it 
would be better not to accept the base. Even so, I am concerned 
about what will be of the ongoing sewer project and economic 
stimulus measures. We will have no choice but to watch the situation 
intently." 
 
Nago Vice Mayor Bunshin Suematsu indicated a cautious view, 
remarking: "The government has not proposed moving the base outside 
the prefecture, and the new government has yet to be inaugurated. 
We cannot give a reply under the current situation." Chairman 
Morihide Okido of the Nago Chamber of Commerce and Industry Chairman 
said: "The government and the U.S. will discuss the matter from now 
on, so I would like to keep an eye on the future development of the 
negotiations." 
 
(9) Talks between Okinawa governor and DPJ Okinawa chapter: 
Behind-the-scenes moves becoming active; Okinawa Prefecture, Nago 
City, Defense Ministry begin coordination 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full) 
September 2, 2009 
 
The Okinawa prefectural government suddenly came alive on Sept. 1, 
when the impact of the change in government due to the Democratic 
Party of Japan's (DPJ) crushing victory in the Lower House election 
was still being felt. Officials of the DPJ's Okinawa chapter met 
with Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima for the first time after the 
 
TOKYO 00002027  015 OF 016 
 
 
election. They urged the governor to agree with the DPJ's policy of 
transferring the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station outside 
Okinawa Prefecture or Japan. Officials from the Okinawa Defense 
Bureau, an outpost in Okinawa Prefecture of the Defense Ministry, 
and Nago City and former prefectural government officials were also 
seen on the same floor around the same time. Amid attention being 
focused on the new administration's Futenma relocation policy, 
officials have begun sounding out each other's true motives. 
 
Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro and Deputy Mayor Bunshin Suematsu 
were in the governor's office right after his meeting with the DPJ's 
local leaders. Their meeting focused on the talks between the 
governor and the DPJ's local leaders. They discussed the timetable 
until the new administration is launched and vowed to continue to 
exchange information. The governor said: "Even if we say this and 
that, there is nothing we can do about it. All we can do is just 
wait and see for a while." 
 
Governor remains noncommittal 
 
The talks between DPJ Okinawa leaders and the governor started, with 
a pack of reporters inundating. Local DPJ leader Shokichi Kina said 
straightforward: "You are all keeping a close watch on the Futenma 
issue, aren't you? It would be most ideal if the base is not built 
in Henoko and if the Futenma Air Station is returned. In that 
respect, we have the same opinion, don't we?" 
 
The governor responded: "I don't understand what you mean. First of 
all, I would like to hear what the DPJ intends to do." Kina tried to 
get a commitment from the governor, saying, "The best option for 
Okinawa is to relocate Futenma airfield 'outside Okinawa 
Prefecture,' isn't it?" The governor avoided giving his word, 
saying, "We need to hold more talks." 
 
Okinawa prefectural officials are concerned over whether the DPJ's 
local chapter is really in agreement with its headquarters. The 
governor repeatedly asked, "What is Tokyo saying?" Secretary General 
Yasuhiro Aragaki became impatient and tried to persuade him, saying: 
"What is important is not the policy of our party's headquarters in 
Tokyo but is that Okinawa should back up the new administration in 
its talks with the U.S. The new administration is saying that it 
will make the best possible choice for Okinawa. Both Okinawa 
Prefecture and Nago City should fasten hopes on that." Their talks 
ended in failure. The governor wound up the talks, saying, "I see 
what you mean." The governor raised a question to reporters about 
the party headquarters' stance interpreted by the local chapter and 
said, "I cannot figure out some of their explanations that way." 
 
Secret visitor 
 
Okinawa Defense Bureau Director General Ro Manabe visited Yoshiyuki 
Uehara, chief of the governor's office, on the morning of the 1st 
prior to the meeting between DPJ local chapter officials and the 
governor. They exchanged views for over an hour, including how to 
respond to the DPJ administration. After the meeting, Manabe said, 
"We exchanged views about our common concerns." Uehara said that 
there would be no change in the prefecture's previous stance of 
approving the transfer of Futenma airfield's functions within the 
prefecture. He also said that the prefectural government will take a 
wait-and-see attitude regarding what the DPJ administration will 
do." 
 
 
TOKYO 00002027  016 OF 016 
 
 
Officials from the Defense Ministry's Okinawa bureau were not the 
only visitors to the prefectural government office. Reiji Fumoto, a 
former chief of the governor's office and now an advisor to Nago 
City's municipal government on base issues, was also one of the 
visitors that day. By curious coincidence, Fumoto discussed future 
measures on the Futenma issue with Uehara, whom Fumoto has known, 
around the same time when the Nago mayor was meeting with the 
governor. Though the DPJ has yet to decide on a concrete policy on 
the transfer of Futenma airfield, behind-the-scenes moves, involving 
the prefectural government, are already becoming active. 
 
ROOS