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Viewing cable 09STOCKHOLM577, FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS AFPAK, IRAN, MEPP AT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STOCKHOLM577 2009-09-10 15:09 2011-08-29 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Stockholm
VZCZCXRO2633
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHSM #0577/01 2531509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101509Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4704
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 000577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019 
TAGS: AF AL CE EUN IR IS IZ PGOV PK PREL SY SW
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS AFPAK, IRAN, MEPP AT 
SEPTEMBER GYMNICH 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  At the September 4-5 informal foreign 
ministers' meeting (Gymnich) in Stockholm, the Swedes 
deliberately limited the meeting agenda to provide adequate 
time for more thorough discussions, and the Swedes insisted 
on strict anonymity in reporting, a format that was broadly 
praised by participants.  Ministers were also, with few 
exceptions, on-message in their statements to the press, 
reflecting unusual cohesion as compared to more recent 
Gymnichs.  While the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and 
Afghanistan were the focus of ministers' discussions, Syria, 
Iran, future EU foreign policy, and EU Enlargement were also 
addressed.  Regarding U.S.-led peace efforts in the Middle 
East, there was reportedly consensus that U.S. efforts must 
be supported and were on the right track.  Since this was an 
informal gathering, no formal conclusions or decisions 
followed. Instead ministers used this forum as an opportunity 
to prepare for the upcoming General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) and United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) sessions when many of these topics will be revisited. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) In a subsequent meeting with Jonas Wendel, Deputy 
Director of the EU Correspondent's Office of the Swedish MFA, 
on September 7, Stockholm poloffs were able to obtain a more 
thorough readout of the discussions.  The highlights include: 
 
--MEPP: Ministers welcome and support U.S. efforts to start 
peace talks.  EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (HR) Solana wants to keep everyone focused on 
the end goal, a two-state solution respecting 1967 borders. 
He proposed creating a steering group of Quartet and Arab 
states to monitor negotiations.  There was support for a 
peace conference in Moscow and for continued EU contributions 
to Palestinian statebuilding. 
 
--Syria: The Dutch appear to be moderating their human rights 
objections to signing an Association Agreement with Syria.  A 
solution is likely to be found that would allow for a 
possible signing in October. 
 
--Iran: The tone of ministers, brief Iran discussion 
suggested that enhanced EU sanctions were a question of when, 
not if. Swedish FM Bildt ordered a report on EU-Iran trade to 
provide a factual basis for continued discussions during the 
September GAERC.  The EU wants to use the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) week to try once again for new UN Security Council 
(UNSC) backed sanctions.  If these fail, there is still EU 
division over whether the EU should impose new 
nuclear-related sanctions or to broaden them to other items. 
 
--Afghanistan: Ministers acknowledged that Afghanistan's 
political outlook is grim, but are resolved to continue 
engagement.  The outline of the new EU AfPak strategy was 
well received. Bildt requested that a catalogue of existing 
bilateral and EU programs there be compiled in order to avoid 
duplication and prod members to do more. Ministers publicly 
stressed the need to let the Afghani election monitors do 
their job, but discussions did not include a plan in the case 
that the election result was disputed. 
 
--EU as Global Actor and Candidates: Ministers were asked to 
urge finance ministers to increase funding for Common and 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  At the lunch for 
candidate country FMs, Turkey,s Davutoglu gave a strategic 
overview of foreign policy developments in their region. 
 
MEPP 
---- 
3. (C) The Solana Plan: HR Solana presented his thoughts on 
the way forward following his recent trip to the region, 
Wendel reported.  First and foremost he wants to keep the end 
goal*a two-state solution that respects the borders of 
1967*in sight.  If work remains focused on that objective, 
which he also reiterated in his public remarks, the details 
of the solution will follow.  An Israeli freeze on 
settlements would be a nice confidence building gesture, but 
Solana argues that most likely settlements will have to be 
negotiated and will be part of the peace process.  Assuming 
the U.S. takes the lead in negotiations, Solana thinks there 
should also be a steering group, consisting of the Quartet 
and Arab states, to monitor negotiations and ensure that all 
parties, issues are taken into account in the process.  When 
a settlement is closer to completion, the Arab states would 
be brought into the agreement as parties to the process. The 
EU should engage in active mediation to support Washington,s 
efforts, possibly setting benchmarks for monitoring progress. 
 Solana said that a timetable is urgent, and many ministers 
agreed that the window to a solution could close in a couple 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000577  002 OF 004 
 
 
of months.  UNGA is the first important date, hopefully 
marking the beginning of talks, and the late September 
meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Group would be another. 
 
4. (C) Ministers discussed the region for over three hours, 
according to Wendel.  There was support for convening a 
conference in Moscow, as this would also engage Russia in the 
process.  A French proposal to use the Union for the 
Mediterranean as a forum for peace discussions was less 
popular, given the untested nature of the Union. There was a 
general feeling that the EU's strength lies in state 
building, although given the informal nature of the meeting 
there were no concrete decisions on eg increasing aid to the 
Palestinian Authority.  Administrative obstacles put in place 
by Israel were identified as a main cause of the problems of 
running Gaza.  The Fayad Plan was praised as a complex, 
mature, confident document that inspired confidence among 
ministers that the PA was serious about reconciliation. 
 
5. (C) Way forward: There will be no conclusions issued on 
this topic at the September 14-15 GAERC, Wendel said, but 
Swedish FM Bildt acknowledges that some official statement 
will be necessary from the EU before UNGA.  Bildt spoke with 
Special Envoy Mitchell on September 6, providing a Gymnich 
readout, and agreeing that Bildt and Mitchell will coordinate 
on the proper timing of an EU statement. This will probably 
come during Mitchell's trip to the region later this week. 
 
6. (SBU) Ministers' public statements on settlements were 
much less sanguine than Solana,s private observations. 
Italian FM Frattini, Finland's Stubb, Sweden,s Bildt, and 
even Solana's spokeswoman Gallach called for a stop of 
Israeli settlement activity, with Bildt later echoing 
Solana,s argument that eventually settlements would be just 
one more issue to negotiation as part of a settlement.  All 
FMs who gave public statements on the MEPP were extremely 
pleased with the new U.S. work to stimulate peace talks and 
expressed solidarity and willingness to support this work. 
 
Syria 
----- 
 
7. (C) All ministers but the Dutch seemed ready to offer 
Syria an Association Agreement.  Wendel opined that even FM 
Verhagen seemed "more flexible" on the issue than before, 
although Verhagen had not backed down on the need to 
highlight ongoing human rights shortcomings.  The Hague also 
harbors some misgivings on the Agreement's nonproliferation 
clause and the terms under which the Agreement could be 
suspended, although it acknowledges that Association 
Agreements are fairly standardized and allow few 
customizations. Wendel noted that a statement on human rights 
could be issued at the time the agreement was signed; 
however, Wendel doubted that a final agreement would be ready 
for the September GAERC, so it may be pushed to October. 
Publicly, External Relations Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner said she was sure an agreement would be 
reached "in the near future," creating a contractual 
relationship between the EU and Syria via which the EU could 
monitor rights and other developments in Syria. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
8.  (C) Iran got only 45 minutes of discussion (only 12 
ministers spoke) and will be continued at the GAERC, Wendel 
reported.  Bildt has ordered a factual report on the nature 
of EU-Iran trade and on the likely impact of sanctions to 
form the basis for the GAERC discussions. No formal 
conclusions are expected.  However, Wendel noted to his 
personal satisfaction, unlike in countless earlier meetings, 
discussion this time focused more on when, not if, the EU 
must act to impose autonomous sanctions on Iran, and involved 
less emotion and more concrete discussion of facts and policy 
choices. As Iran's largest export market, the EU has the 
means to do more, and there appears to be support for more 
sanctions targeted at nuclear-related activity.  However, the 
majority of member states will not yet accept the notion of 
broadening sanctions to include more generic trade or 
financial transactions, Wendel estimated.  The ministers want 
to use UNGA to try the UN process one more time.  Were Russia 
and China to flatly refuse further targeted sanctions at 
UNGA, the EU would be ready to move toward its own sanctions, 
or possibly, toward concerted action with a "coalition of the 
willing" including perhaps Arab states and/or India. More 
likely, Wendel posited, Russia and China would provide an 
unclear response at UNGA, and some EU member states will be 
tempted to latch on to a new UNSCR that only squeezed Tehran 
a tiny bit harder. 
 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000577  003 OF 004 
 
 
9.  (C) Background: Ministers find Iran,s internal situation 
hard to assess from outside, but they sense that the popular 
protests after the election have eroded the authority of the 
president and the religious authorities, according to Wendel. 
 As a result, ministers expect a purge of moderates over the 
next 1-3 years--exactly the time period over which Iran may 
complete its work on a nuclear weapon, if it so chooses. 
Therefore it will be very hard for the EU to find moderates 
with whom to deal on the nuclear issue. Some ministers wanted 
to find ways to support protest groups and moderates, but 
others opposed this because it would strengthen Tehran,s 
accusations that the protesters were simply the product of 
foreign intervention, and would brand EU countries as 
subversive. Several ministers found the recent IAEA 
assessment to be the most clearcut and worrying to date. 
 
10. (C) Meanwhile the consular crisis concerning EU nationals 
detained in Iran shows no sign of conclusion, said Wendel. 
The French national Reiss was interrogated by the police late 
last week, and the police were under orders to return her to 
jail rather than to the French Embassy.  Only after the 
accompanying French Ambassador negotiated for several hours 
was Reiss allowed to return to the Embassy. Wendel said that 
if the court returns the "wrong" verdict on EU citizens, the 
EU may refuse to grant visas for diplomatic passport holders. 
 Although such a ban is hard to implement in practice and may 
cause few practical problems for Iranian diplomats that 
regularly rotate in and out of European embassies, it would 
send a political signal. 
 
11. (U) Publicly, ministers urged Iran to respond to the 
American offer of dialogue, and hoped for a positive response 
to the EU3 plus 3 offer on the table.  Bildt was perhaps most 
forward leaning, saying that "we want cooperation with Iran 
( if they want confrontation, we are ready."  Stubb 
underscored the need for the EU and United States to present 
a united front, and if there is no Iranian response then the 
EU will intensify sanctions. French FM Kouchner, on the other 
hand, said that UNSC agreement was needed in order to impose 
more sanctions, and Austrian FM Spindelegger was likewise 
more cautious. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
12. (C) Discussion of Afghanistan,s political situation 
painted a somber picture, Wendel said.  Several ministers 
alluded to a nightmare scenario where President Karzai 
claimed to have won over half of the votes in the first 
round, but after fraudulent ballots were taken into account, 
Karzai was shown to have won less than half, and his 
government loses credibility.  There was no discussion of a 
possible EU reaction to such a scenario.  There was great 
concern among ministers that the Afghan people no longer have 
confidence that the Europeans can help build a functioning 
state, and talk of how the EU could be more effective.  FM 
Bildt had requested that the European Commission provide him 
with a list of member state contributions to Afghanistan in 
advance of the Gymnich so that he could &name and shame.8 
He was furious when he was told that the numbers provided 
were not firm enough for this, and he ordered all ministers 
to provide firm numbers to the Commission within 48 hours. 
Bildt was, however, able to use information on contributions 
to EUPOL to encourage members to contribute more.  A 
conference to discuss the transition of security 
responsibilities from ISAF to the Afghans*announced publicly 
by France, the UK, and Germany on September 6*was also 
introduced at the meeting. Both EUPOL and other EU 
involvement will be discussed further at the GAERC, when more 
is known about the Afghan elections. Pakistan was only 
mentioned by one minister, who put a possible free trade 
agreement on the table. 
 
13. (U) Ministers addressing the press uniformly stressed the 
need to stay involved in Afghanistan, as the problems there, 
especially narcotics and terrorism, affect Europe directly. 
Many journalists asked about the recent air strike called in 
by German ISAF soldiers on stolen fuel tankers near Kunduz 
and the apparently high casualty count.  Most ministers 
referred the incident as a tragedy, with Bildt explaining 
that even deaths of Taliban "however you define them" are 
tragedies.  Members of the German media challenged this 
characterization at nearly every opportunity, asking FM 
Bildt, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and others how they could 
consider enemy Taliban fighters killed in the attack as 
victims.  Calling the air strike a "big mistake," Kouchner 
echoed others when he underscored the need to "not just bomb 
them" but to engage in state capacity building. Implicitly 
defending Commission policy to date, Ferrero-Waldner 
explained that the new AfPak strategy would help the EU to 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000577  004 OF 004 
 
 
further improve on existing policy. Programs would be better 
coordinated within the EU and with international partners. 
Funding was not discussed explicitly, Ferraro-Waldner 
explained, but some FMs noted that increased contributions 
may be necessary as a result. 
 
EU as Global Actor 
------------------ 
 
14. (C) These talks centered on funding for CFSP.  Ministers 
were encouraged to raise CFSP during EU budget talks, and to 
have their own Finance Ministries appropriate more money for 
CFSP projects.  After a short discussion of the powers that 
the new High Representative under the Lisbon Treaty might 
have, ministers were asked to put their thoughts in writing 
for discussion at the October GAERC. In the concluding press 
conference, Bildt explained that "there is a demand for the 
EU in the world" and he hoped Lisbon would give the EU the 
institutional tools to better fulfill its mission. 
 
Candidates, Lunch 
----------------- 
 
15. (C) Wendel said the lunch with candidate countries FYROM, 
Croatia, and Turkey was more strategic than usual and less 
focused on candidates' individual accession processes. 
Croatian FM Jandrokovic made a positive impression, noting 
Zagreb's Euro-Atlantic orientation and arguing that this 
perspective should be encouraged throughout southeastern 
Europe. He worried that the new Serbian foreign policy 
strategy was not solely focused on the west but also 
encouraged strong ties to Russia, China and the non-aligned 
movement.  This, Jandrokovic argued, set the stage for more 
"foreign policy games" from Belgrade. He was personally 
encouraged that Croatia,s bilateral border dispute would 
soon be solved.  (Note: Wendel corrected press reports that 
claimed Bildt had mediated a Slovenia-Croatia meeting. He had 
not, and Wendel did not know if any bilateral talks occurred 
on the Gymnich margins. End note)  The FYROM FM Milososki was 
also optimistic about the resolution of the Macedonia name 
dispute. 
 
16. (C) Turkish FM Davutoglu spoke at length.  He highlighted 
recent steps to improve Turkish-Armenian relations, Turkish 
mediation between Iraq and Jordan and between Israel and 
Syria.  He saw a good likelihood that the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict could be resolved, perhaps inspiring resolution of 
other frozen conflict.  Davutolgu outlined the Kurdish 
Initiative, meant to satisfy EU demands for better treatment 
of Turkey's minorities, help defuse support for the PKK and 
ease relations with northern Iraq.  Davutoglu stressed, 
however, that Turkey needs European countries to also address 
PKK elements in their countries.  French FM Kouchner was not 
present for the lunch and there was little discussion.  Asked 
what the EU could do to help in the southern Caucasus, 
Davutoglu suggested Brussels build a road from the Caspian to 
the Black Sea. Special Representative Peter Semneby will look 
into it. 
 
Atmospherics 
------------ 
 
17. (U) The Swedish Presidency deliberately limited the 
meeting agenda to provide adequate time for more thorough 
discussions.  Focusing their attention primarily on MEPP the 
first day and Afghanistan the second, participants reported 
having had adequate time to analyze and discuss these 
challenges without being rushed.  In addition, the Swedes 
insisted on strict anonymity in reporting, a format that was 
also broadly praised by participants.  In an "Avignon-like" 
approach, the presidency reportedly allowed only a single 
presidency note taker to be present during ministers, 
discussions, briefing fellow EU MFA correspondents thoroughly 
upon the conclusion of each session.  Unlike Avignon where 
there was much criticism of this approach because EU 
correspondents felt that they had been deliberately cut out 
of the process and poorly briefed, the Swedes made it clear 
from the onset their reasoning - FM Bildt's desire to return 
to the informal atmosphere of Gymnichs past - and ensured 
that EU correspondents were briefed in a timely and thorough 
manner.  Ministers were also, with few exceptions, on-message 
in their statements to the press, reflecting unusual cohesion 
as compared to more recent Gymnichs. 
 
 
 
BARZUN