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DE RUEHC #8667 2661424
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P R 231405Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 098667 
 
SIPDIS 
PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE 
BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): SYRIA,S 
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM 
 
Classified By: Classified by ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
Reasons:  1.4 (B), (D), (H). 
 
¶1. (U)  This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 2. 
 
¶2. (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Department requests Embassy Paris 
provide the interagency cleared paper "Syria,s Ballistic 
Missile Program" in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for 
distribution to all Partners.  Info addressees also may 
provide to host government officials as appropriate.  In 
delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is 
sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the 
Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the 
MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009.  NOTE:  Additional 
IE papers will be provided via septels.  END NOTE. 
 
¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: 
 
(SECRET REL MTCR) 
 
Syria's Ballistic Missile Program 
 
Introduction 
 
      Despite having produced liquid propellant, short-range 
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) derived from Scud technology for 
nearly ten years, Syria continues to rely on foreign sources 
for critical components and technical expertise to support its 
ballistic missile development efforts.  North Korea remains 
Syria's key Scud ballistic missile technology supplier, 
although Syria's missile program has tried to procure missile- 
related technology from suppliers outside North Korea, 
including entities in MTCR Partner countries.  North Korea has 
also aided Syria in procuring parts for a medium-range 
ballistic missile (MRBM) system based on No-Dong technology. 
Additionally, Iran has supplied Syria with solid propellant 
Fateh-110 SRBMs. 
 
Foreign Support 
 
      Syria's lack of a self-sufficient ballistic missile 
infrastructure has resulted in Syria turning to foreign 
suppliers for items critical to its liquid and solid- 
propellant ballistic missile programs.  For example, Syria has 
attempted - at times directly through its missile-related 
entities - to procure hardware significant for the maintenance 
and production of Scud airframes, as well as various 
electronic components used in Scud SRBM guidance and control 
systems.  Additionally, Syria has procured dual-use items from 
Iran to support its Fateh-110 production and continues to rely 
on North Korea to acquire materials and equipment for its 
missile efforts. 
 
North Korea 
 
      North Korean support has been critical to the success 
and 
advancement of Syria,s liquid-propellant missile program. 
Syria probably will continue to focus its procurement efforts 
on finding key raw materials, specialty metals, alloys, and 
chemicals.   For example, between 2005 and 2006, North Korean 
entities sought, on Syria's behalf, raw materials, including 
graphite necessary to construct the jet-vanes for Scud SRBMs 
and nozzle throats for long-range battlefield rockets.  In one 
case, Syria solicited North Korean assistance to procure 
graphite from third countries, including China.  In another 
case, in 2005, a North Korean entity sought missile-related 
alloys, such as titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel 
(Ti-DSS), for a Syrian ballistic missile entity.  Ti-DSS is an 
MTCR-controlled steel developed exclusively for Scud missile 
production, and remains ideally suited for Scud-type short- 
range ballistic missiles due to its strength and corrosion- 
resistance.  In yet another example, a North Korean company 
shipped several tons of Chinese-origin missile-related 
specialty steel to Syria's Scientific Studies and Research 
Center (SSRC). 
 
      North Korea,s procurement of missile-related goods for 
Damascus continued in 2007 and 2008.  From January-April 2008, 
a North Korean entity worked to procure probable missile- 
related steel and other materials from a China-based entity 
for Syria, and in August 2008 a North Korean entity contracted 
with a China-based entity for Scud electronics.  This 
dependence on North Korean sources both directly and via North 
Korean brokers for a range of missile-related materials, 
advanced chemicals, and technology is likely to continue, 
given the difficulties Syria has encountered purchasing such 
items directly from other suppliers. 
 
      As in many other aspects of its missile program, 
Damascus 
relies upon Pyongyang for the acquisition of machine tools and 
testing equipment.  North Korea on several occasions has 
brokered sales of controlled machine tools from entities in 
Europe and Asia on behalf of Syria.  Syria's acquisition of 
these types of advanced machine tools could allow it to expand 
and improve its ballistic missile production capabilities. 
Syria also has independently sought similar equipment from 
Western firms using front companies affiliated with Syria's 
SSRC. 
 
      North Korea has assisted Syria in acquiring necessary 
parts for a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) based on No- 
Dong technology. In March and October 2005, a North Korean 
entity based in Syria sought ball bearings with specific 
applications for the No-Dong class rocket engine from several 
sources, probably on behalf of SSRC.  Successful development 
of an MRBM by Syria would allow it to strike targets at 
greater ranges and/or with heavier payloads. 
 
Iran 
 
      Iran also has been assisting Syria in the ballistic 
missile field since the early 1990s.  In addition to the joint 
construction with SSRC of both solid- and liquid-propellant 
production facilities in Syria, Syria and Iran have entered 
into an agreement for the transfer of Fateh-110 production 
technology from Iran to Syria.  By at least 2007, Syria began 
receiving missile parts and technical assistance from Iran 
related to this project and successfully flight-tested two 
Fateh-110 missiles in December of 2007 and one in December 
¶2008.  Syria and possibly Iran have made available the 270-km- 
range Fateh-110 SRBM to Lebanese Hizballah, as part of Iran,s 
agreement to share Fateh-110 production technology with Syria. 
Hizballah personnel probably participated in Fateh-110 
meetings and test launches in both Syria and Iran over the 
past three years.  This is consistent with Iran and Syria,s 
past practice of supplying Hizballah with long-range rockets, 
which Hizballah used in the 2006 war against Israel. 
 
Outlook 
 
      Syria is likely to continue seeking material and 
technological support for its ballistic missile program from 
foreign suppliers.  Damascus will continue to rely on 
Pyongyang for assistance because of the North's extensive 
procurement networks and historical association with Syria's 
ballistic missile program.  However, we assess Syria's 
acquisition of the Iranian Fateh-110 solid-propellant missile 
system has allowed Iran to emerge as a key foreign partner in 
Syria's ballistic missile program.  Over time, Iran,s 
provision of solid-propellant technologies, expertise, and 
materiel to Syria could lead to a reduction in Syria's 
dependence on North Korea.  Nonetheless, for the foreseeable 
future, North Korea will continue to act as a key procurement 
agent for raw materials, production equipment, and possibly 
guidance equipment, which Syria is unable to produce 
indigenously. 
 
END TEXT OF PAPER. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR 
issues for ISN/MTR.   A word version of this document will be 
posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON