VZCZCXYZ0019
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #7434 2612218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 182200Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 097434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC RS KN IR SY KZ BR CI MX
SB, AINR 
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE FOR 
AUSTRALIA GROUP PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 21-25, 2009 
 
REF: (A) 08 STATE 2956, (B)07 MOSCOW 5535 
 
Classified by: ISN TFoley. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This message provides supplmentary guidance on 
membership and regional nonproliferation issues for the 
U.S. delegation to the Australia Group plenary in Paris, 
September 21-25, 2009. 
 
---------- 
MEMBERSHIP 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Russia: 
 
--  The Del may not support Russian membership in the 
Australia Group at this time because Russia still has 
not satisfied the AG's well-established criteria for 
membership.  We continue to be concerned that Russia has 
not addressed AG concerns adequately, particularly those 
related to compliance with the CWC and BWC, a 
requirement relevant to membership. 
 
--  The Del may not support the idea of inviting Russia 
to a special AG meeting for reasons outlined in REF B; 
 
--  The Del should express continued interest in holding 
a technical-level outreach visit to Moscow during the 
intersessional period focused on eliciting information 
on how the Russian export control system works. 
 
¶3.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Kazakhstan: The Del may 
not/not support consideration of Kazakhstan for AG 
membership at this time, but may support an outreach 
visit to Astana.  The U.S. has yet to resolve 
outstanding compliance issues relating to Kazakhstan's 
initial declaration to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC).  Inquires made by the OPCW Technical Secretariat 
to clarify Kazakhstan's declaration remain unanswered 
since 2002.  The Del may note that Kazakhstan continues 
to make significant progress in improving its national 
export controls with bilateral assistance from the U.S. 
and other AG members, but we do not believe Kazakhstan's 
controls meet the standard set by the AG. 
 
¶4.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Brazil: The Del should 
welcome Brazilian interest in AG membership and inform 
AG participants that the U.S. would look favorably upon 
a formal expression of interest in membership.  The Del 
should urge AG participants to consider an outreach 
visit to Brasilia during the intersessional period to 
help entice Brazilian interest. 
 
¶5.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Serbia: The Del may not/not 
support consideration of Serbia for AG membership at 
this time, but may support an outreach visit by 
neighboring AG participants to Belgrade.  The U.S. has 
yet to resolve outstanding compliance issues related to 
Serbia's (then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's) 
initial declaration to the CWC. 
 
¶6.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Mexico: The Del may not/not 
support consideration of Mexico for AG membership at 
this time, but may support an outreach visit to Mexico 
City.  The Del may note that Mexico recently passed CWC 
implementing legislation and is now beginning to draft 
export control legislation.  If raised, the Del may 
agree to support an outreach visit to Mexico. 
 
¶7.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Chile: The Del may not/not 
support consideration of Chile for AG membership at this 
time, but may support an outreach visit to Santiago. 
The Del should note that although Chile is only in the 
initial stages of drafting export control legislation, 
an initial outreach visit may help to catalyze interest 
on the part of Chilean officials. 
 
------------------------- 
REGIONAL NONPROLIFERATION 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Opening Statement: In its 
opening plenary statement, the Del should note in 
general terms the continuing problems presented by Iran, 
Syria and North Korea and suggest that ways to address 
these continuing problems should be considered. 
 
¶9.  (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Meetings on the Margins: 
The Del may approach the British, French, German, and 
Japanese delegations and AG secretariat: 
 
--  Remind delegations of the decision the Australia 
Group took in 2005 to exercise increased scrutiny of 
export license applications and AG-controlled goods 
bound for Syria, Iran or North Korea; 
 
--  Note the numerous Information Exchange presentations 
delivered at plenary sessions since 2005 suggesting that 
Syria, Iran and North Korea have continued to acquire 
goods useful to their chemical and/or biological weapons 
programs; 
 
--  Emphasize that failure to halt the flow of AG- 
controlled goods into Syria, Iran and North Korea may on 
day call into question the AG's relevance and important 
role in nonproliferation. 
 
--  Indicate that during the intersessional period the 
United States may suggest that AG participants should 
begin a conversation about what additional steps the AG 
could take to strengthen its posture against CBW 
proliferation to Syria, Iran and North Korea, including 
possibilities such as: 
 
-  Agree to exercise, on a national basis, a 'strong 
presumption to deny' export license applications for 
some or all AG-controlled goods and technology bound for 
Syria, Iran and North Korea similar to the approach 
currently employed by the Missile Technology Control 
Regime; 
 
-  Urge China, India and other key non-member supplier 
states to adopt a similar posture to what the AG adopted 
in 2005 ('exercise a high degree of scrutiny'); 
 
-  Urge specific citation of the proliferant behavior of 
Syria, Iran and North Korea in an Australia Group press 
release. 
CLINTON