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RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG PRIORITY 7100
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 5517

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 STATE 097420 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AF KNNP MNUC NP PARM ENRG SF KN IR
SUBJECT: DAY 1:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:  NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
POLICY TOPICS 
 
REF: A. STATE 078766 
     ¶B. STATE 082147 
 
------------------------- 
VISIT SUMMARY AND CONTEXT 
------------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The United States and South Africa launched a new 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Dialogue August 26 - 28 in 
Pretoria, South Africa.  State Department Special Advisor for 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert J. Einhorn and South 
African Ambassador Abdul Minty, Special Representative on 
Disarmament and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's 
Development) at the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DICO), led their respective interagency 
delegations.  The meeting followed the decision by Presidents 
Obama and Zuma at the July 8-10 G-8 summit to expand our 
bilateral dialogue.  Secretary Clinton also discussed the 
Dialogue with Foreign Minister Nkoana-Mashabane during her 
August 2009 visit to South Africa. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Dialogue's main objective was to persuade South 
Africa to work with (rather than at times against) USG 
efforts to shore up the nonproliferation regime.  In the 
past, South Africa has helped moderate problematic 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) positions on some issues, but on 
others it has supported the NAM, out of its own convictions 
or in the interest of group solidarity.   Minty over the 
years has been alternatively thorny and helpful.  In this 
Dialogue, he was cooperative, thanks largely to the promising 
start the new Obama and Zuma administrations have made in 
their bilateral relationship.  Pretoria also appreciated our 
reaching out to South Africa and treating it as a partner in 
our efforts to overcome polarization between the NPT-defined 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
(NNWS) in the NAM and G-77 contexts-polarization that  has 
helped erode  the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
The other main objective was to help South Africa improve 
security at its nuclear installations, including the 
Pelindaba facility, at which U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel 
is stored.  In November 2007, Pelindaba experienced a 
significant security breach.  The delegation made progress in 
both areas. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Discussions in the Dialogue were positive, 
constructive, and frank, even on contentious issues.  The 
participants agreed to a robust agenda for further discussion 
and cooperation and found common substantive ground on many 
issues.  The South Africans applauded our nuclear disarmament 
position and also seek to strengthen the IAEA verification 
system (including through coordinated efforts with us to 
expand adherence to the Additional Protocol (AP)).  They also 
support developing countries' pursuit of civil nuclear 
energy, and disruption of proliferation networks.  (In this 
connection, they reminded us that countries other than South 
Africa still have not prosecuted members of the A.Q. Khan 
network.)  Indeed, on some issues, such as the vision of a 
nuclear-free world and increasing the IAEA budget, we are 
closer to South Africa than we are to other P-5 members or 
close allies.  However, South Africa stuck to the NAM 
position that it was premature for the IAEA Board of 
Governors to adopt an IAEA-administered fuel bank.  South 
Africa also persisted in blocking consensus on strengthened 
Nuclear Suppliers Group controls on transfer of enrichment 
and reprocessing technology, and opposed using coercive 
measures against Iran. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On nuclear security, South Africa, like some other 
countries, is wary that securing nuclear materials and 
facilities will involve intrusive inspections.  It is 
defensive about the 2007 break-in at Pelindaba and other 
perceived security deficiencies.  But officials seemed to 
consider in a positive light some U.S. proposals on expanding 
nuclear security cooperation, including securing radiological 
sources (material that can be used in dirty bombs) in the 
run-up to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, nuclear 
security assistance provided jointly to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and the creation of a Nuclear Security 
Training Center.  South African officials expressed 
sensitivities when the U.S. officials indicated a clear 
interest in visiting the Pelindaba facility as part of a 
bilateral physical protection consultation.  To make nuclear 
security cooperation more reciprocal and palatable, the U.S. 
delegation invited South African experts to visit U.S. 
 
STATE 00097420  002 OF 009 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 1:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:  NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
POLICY TOPI 
nuclear facilities and observe U.S. security practices-an 
offer they immediately accepted.  In part to avoid intense 
interagency and political scrutiny in South Africa, 
cooperation on security upgrades for Pelindaba in the near 
term is being pursued by Sandia National Laboratories (with 
DOE/NNSA funding) and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South 
Africa (NECSA) via "lab-to-lab" cooperation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) During the Dialogue and in sidebar meetings (see Day 
2 Septel for sidebar meeting readout), Special Advisor 
Einhorn offered a new, senior-level bilateral energy dialogue 
focusing on nuclear and renewable energy.  He also asked the 
SAG to complete the necessary internal bureaucratic steps to 
sign the bilateral agreement on civil nuclear energy research 
and development, and to announce the new dialogue on the 
margins of the September IAEA General Conference.  (The 
agreement was signed; dialogue remains to be announced.) 
Additional details are provided below and in Septels for 
agencies working these issues. 
 
--------------- 
OPENING REMARKS 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Minty opened the Dialogue and was "keen 
(and) excited" to begin a bilateral series of engagements in 
this area, noting that we have "a great deal of work to do 
together."  He said the two nations had overcome difficulties 
before and could do so again, noting "we all faced a new 
danger"-- nuclear terrorism.  He noted the strong partnership 
and close cooperation between the United States and South 
Africa at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Review Conference (RevCon), and that despite NAM opposition, 
we were able to get consensus on indefinite extension of the 
Treaty.  (Note:  Minty cited the 1995 RevCon multiple times 
throughout the dialogue as a prominent example of bilateral 
cooperation towards commonly held global objectives.)  He 
said he had sensed in recent consultations that the NPT was 
in crisis.  Minty noted the recent Nuclear Threat Initiative 
challenge grant to provide a multilateral nuclear fuel bank 
and President Obama's Prague Speech as heartening 
developments and relayed hope that the United States will 
lead efforts to rebuild consensus.  He cautioned, however, 
that the Prague Speech and the prospect of U.S.-Russian arms 
reductions have created high expectations among many 
developing countries and that the United States will need to 
manage these expectations carefully to avoid disappointment. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Special Advisor Einhorn stated that he was very 
encouraged to hear Minty's statements on the NPT.  On 
disarmament, Einhorn declared that the United States and 
Russia deserve more credit for the reductions they already 
have taken, but indicated that he appreciated the 
international perspective that, even with these reductions, 
the numbers are still far too high.  He reviewed U.S. 
perspectives on strategic developments, including Russia's 
increased reliance on nuclear weapons amid the deterioration 
of its conventional capability, China's modernization effort 
and lack of transparency about its strategic plans, and the 
vigorous competition in South Asia as India and Pakistan seek 
to increase fissile material production and expand their 
delivery system capabilities.  On nonproliferation, Einhorn 
noted that the international community has thus far failed to 
curb DPRK and Iranian nuclear ambitions, noting that the 
verification system has not proven to be fully adequate.  He 
also cited the challenge of the spread of sensitive 
technology via illicit procurement networks and the expected 
nuclear energy renaissance, noting that care should be taken 
to ensure that neither increases the risk of proliferation of 
nuclear weapons or the acquisition of fissile material by 
terrorists. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Einhorn commented that these developments are 
driving the Obama administration's plans to reinvigorate the 
nonproliferation regime.  In the past, a small group of 
developed countries (NSG, G-8) dominated the discussion of 
these issues; but, today, much broader cooperation is needed. 
 He explained that a major impediment to this cooperation is 
polarization between the NWS and the NNWS, the non-aligned in 
particular, and cited the need to bridge this divide and find 
common ground.  He described the Obama administration as 
reaching out beyond our traditional U.S. allies to support 
these efforts.  Einhorn asked for SAG views on how to 
strengthen the three pillars of the NPT in a balanced manner 
and suggested that preventing nuclear terrorism should be 
considered a fourth pillar because of its growing importance. 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Minty replied that South Africa is just as concerned 
as the United States about polarization, which he said is 
 
STATE 00097420  003 OF 009 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 1:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:  NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
POLICY TOPI 
rooted in a lack of trust and confidence.  Minty emphasized 
the need to look at how to manage differences in the various 
fora as we respond to constituencies at home and abroad, 
including the P-5, Western Group for the United States, and 
others.  He expressed appreciation for Einhorn's assessment 
of Russia and China, stating that  South Africa does not 
underestimate U.S.-Russian progress on arms control, but 
repeated what he told President Obama at the G-8 Summit: "We 
welcome reductions, it is just a question of where it stands 
versus the NPT concept of disarmament, which is complete and 
total, 'zero' disarmament."  Nevertheless, he said these 
developments are welcomed and encouraged. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
FULFILLING NPT ARTICLE VI COMMITMENTS:  DISARMAMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Einhorn reviewed the Obama Administration's pledge 
to seek a world without nuclear weapons, but noted that this 
would take time and would be difficult and that the United 
States would remain committed to maintaining a safe, secure, 
and reliable nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons 
exist.  At the same time, we will take concrete steps towards 
a 'zero' vision, such as reducing our arsenal and reducing 
the role of nuclear weapons in our policies.  The 
congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) will 
guide how we move towards this, and our efforts towards 
fulfilling NPT Article VI commitments will help generate 
support for restoring the nonproliferation regime.  Jeff 
Eberhardt, Director of the Nuclear Affairs Office in the 
State Department's Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and 
Implementation, gave a brief presentation on the NPR and the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on process, 
noting that the completion of the START follow-on process 
would not be the end, but the beginning of other treaties in 
the future for further reductions.  Ken Baker, Principal 
Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation at the Department of Energy's National 
Nuclear Security Administration, noted the importance that 
both the United States and Russia place on concluding 
negotiations quickly. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Einhorn recognized that at the upcoming NPT Revcon 
in 2010, as well as in the future, the United States will not 
be "circling our wagons" with the P-5 to defend our 
positions, but rather working with South Africa and others to 
bring the P-5 along towards the ultimate goal of disarmament. 
 Einhorn noted that on many key issues, such as working 
towards a world free of nuclear weapons, the U.S. positions 
are actually closer to those of South Africa than to some of 
the P-5. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Minty said that South Africa follows these 
developments closely and encouraged more information sharing, 
suggesting that, if kept informed of latest developments, the 
SAG could help convince the NAM that NWS are working to 
fulfill their NPT disarmament obligations.  He warned not to 
be disappointed if some developing countries still complain, 
noting that President Obama's statement about working towards 
global zero will go a long way in undermining these 
criticisms.  He did expressed concern, however, about NATO 
statements that nuclear weapons preserve the peace, and 
questions regarding Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines 
and regional stability. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Einhorn provided an update on U.S. efforts towards 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  He 
noted the U.S. hope that Egypt will reverse its stated 
position that it will become party to the CTBT only once 
Israel becomes party to the NPT.  Einhorn predicted that 
India and Pakistan would be difficult cases, but said he 
believed India would join if it became the final holdout. 
Xolisa Mabhongo, Chief Director of Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation at the South African Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DICO), replied that 
U.S. efforts to ratify the CTBT will help, and that the 
United States and South Africa should consult on likely 
holdout countries. 
 
------------------------------- 
FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Einhorn declared, with respect to the Fissile 
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), that we all need to encourage 
Pakistan to play a constructive role in the process rather 
than prevent the negotiations from moving forward.  He said 
the USG has concluded that a legally binding FMCT should ban 
new production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons 
and not address existing stocks-the position long held by the 
 
STATE 00097420  004 OF 009 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 1:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:  NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
POLICY TOPI 
P-5 and India.  However, we cannot ignore existing stocks, 
especially given the threat of nuclear terrorism.  We are 
therefore considering voluntary measures that would apply to 
existing stocks (e.g., transparency and declaring more excess 
material from former weapons stocks for irreversible removal 
from weapons use).  Einhorn noted that verification of 
existing stocks would make an FMCT much more expensive.  In 
reviewing South Africa's 2002 working group paper on a 
Fissile Material Treaty, he said commonalities were evident 
between the U.S. and South African approaches.  However, one 
questionable aspect of the South African proposal is that 
countries can decide how much material (or even whether) to 
declare stocks excess.  This would make an inherently 
voluntary provision part of a supposedly binding treaty. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Johann Kellerman, Deputy Director of Nuclear 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at DICO, explained that 
when the South African working paper was introduced, they 
envisioned a continuous flow of material so that the stocks 
declared excess would grow and more materials would be 
unavailable for making weapons.  South Africa's preference, 
he said, is for a legally-binding treaty that is as 
comprehensive as possible. He said that we can work towards 
confidence-building measures, voluntary measures, etc., but 
noted that anything not legally-binding would be a tough-sell 
for the G-21 block of developing countries in the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD). 
 
¶16. (SBU) Einhorn noted that an agreement on which provisions 
should go in a legally-binding treaty and which should be 
implemented via voluntary measures would go a long way toward 
preparing for next year's January CD session. Minty cautioned 
that if there are to be legally-required commitments and 
voluntary actions, we need to make sure that more than the 
legally-required minimum is actually done.  Minty noted that 
bilateral agreements present optics challenges for developing 
countries whereas multilateral agreements do not, but this 
challenge can be managed if addressed with sensitivity to 
developing countries' concerns.  Mabhongo agreed that the 
United States and South Africa shared some of the same broad 
concepts but that we would need to work together on specifics 
of our approach. 
 
------------------------------- 
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Einhorn noted that U.S. Government and industry saw 
several opportunities for expanded cooperation on peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy with South Africa.  Einhorn offered a 
new senior-level energy dialogue to discuss nuclear and 
renewable energy options.  He suggested Deputy Secretary of 
Energy Dan Poneman would likely lead the U.S.-side in such a 
dialogue, solicited SAG views on the mechanism, and noted a 
desire to develop the idea with them jointly.  Einhorn 
conveyed U.S. interest in having the Secretaries of Energy 
sign the bilateral agreement on cooperation in research and 
development (R&D) of nuclear energy, and  announce the new 
energy dialogue on the margins of the September 14-18 IAEA 
General Conference.  (Note:  The R&D Agreement was signed 
September 14, but the energy dialogue has yet to be 
announced.) 
 
¶18. (SBU) Einhorn reiterated the Prague speech language on 
creating a new international framework for civil nuclear 
cooperation and sought South Africa's reactions, including to 
the idea of cradle-to-grave fuel services (i.e., fuel leasing 
and spent fuel take-back).  He also provided an update on the 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), noting that the 
domestic component of GNEP has been converted to long-term 
"science-based" research, but that, as the international 
component has received broad support, it would likely be 
retained.  He mentioned the October 23 GNEP Executive 
Committee meeting in Beijing and encouraged South Africa to 
attend as an observer.  Acknowledging South Africa's past 
reservations about GNEP, he highlighted that there would be 
discussion on the future direction of GNEP and SAG input 
would be useful.  (Note:  South Africa objected to the 
original GNEP Statement of Principles language about making 
proliferation resistant reactors available to developing 
countries because of concerns about developing countries' 
"rights".)  Einhorn explained that the original language 
would likely be abandoned and that new language would affirm 
rights, and encouraged Minty to take another look as GNEP 
evolved.  NSC Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat 
Reduction Laura Holgate said that the Obama administration is 
discussing the idea of a new mission statement, thus the 
Statement of Principles may be treated as a historical 
backdrop.  Minty said he was interested in the substance and 
open to discussing the evolution of GNEP, but that 
 
STATE 00097420  005 OF 009 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 1:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:  NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
POLICY TOPI 
participation in the Beijing meeting would require 
interagency review. 
 
--------------- 
FUEL ASSURANCES 
--------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Einhorn said fuel assurances are not about denying 
or restricting rights, but about expanding options; what 
countries do to meet their fuel needs should be their choice. 
 Minty informed Einhorn that G-77 and NAM representatives 
considered it premature to make any decisions on fuel 
assurance measures, such as on the proposals for an 
IAEA-administered fuel bank.  Regarding India's actions at 
the last Board of Governors meeting, he said that many other 
countries agreed with India but, out of respect for the 
Chair, did not walk out.  (Note:  India made multiple 
interventions and later walked out in protest of the Chair's 
support for moving forward on fuel bank consultations.) 
 
¶20. (SBU) Minty said there has been very little dialogue on 
these issues and many countries had not yet solidified their 
views.  Some concerned countries perceive Western countries 
as "holding developing countries to the gun" and pressuring 
them to reach a decision soon.  Minty thought some countries 
seemed more invested in the Russian fuel reserve proposal, 
suggesting that they may have done better "diplomatic 
homework."  He explained that because none of the proposals 
is from recipient countries, but only from suppliers, this 
gives more fodder for concern that fuel assurance efforts are 
designed to deny developing countries access to technology. 
He said the fact that the United States had not already heard 
these concerns directly from the countries themselves is a 
reflection of deep-seated mistrust.  Minty suggested that the 
IAEA Secretariat collect ideas. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Minty suggested part of the reason recipient 
countries may not be putting forward proposals, and may be 
skeptical of those already put forward, could be due to fear 
that commercial suppliers may be directed by countries to 
break fuel delivery contracts.  Several countries have asked 
if any country is considering such a possible interruption, 
but no country provided an answer.  Minty also pointed out 
that if some countries interrupted fuel supply and the 
affected recipients took the issue to the IAEA, it was not 
clear whether the Director General could decide the case 
without the Board of Governors.  Minty recommended more 
discussion on the circumstances under which fuel supply would 
be interrupted and how those cases would be administered by 
the IAEA. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Einhorn pointed out that fuel assurances would only 
back up the commercial market.  He expected that fuel supply 
would be interrupted only in rare cases, possibly involving 
misbehavior regarding nonproliferation obligations.  Einhorn 
noted that the NAM/G-77 position seemed to be linked to its 
overall skepticism and lack of trust and encouraged South 
Africa to discuss these issues with other developing 
countries as it could alleviate this suspicion better than 
the United States.  Holgate suggested that South Africa and 
the United States seek input from developing countries about 
a decision-making process that would alleviate their 
concerns, commenting that countries most skeptical about fuel 
banks have not participated in the many IAEA-hosted meetings 
to discuss this issue.  Minty said that fuel assurances are 
unpalatable for many countries and that they feel tied to the 
positions they have crafted with other countries.  Minty 
suggested using the Future of the Agency forum for discussion 
of this issue and, if that proved successful we could 
identify specific concerns and propose discussion in early 
2010, along with consultations for holdout countries. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP AND EFFORTS TO RESTRICT 
TRANSFERS OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶23. (SBU) On efforts within the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) 
to restrict transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing 
equipment and technology (ENR), Minty deferred largely to 
Mabhongo, who stated that South Africa is very sensitive to 
the fact that it is the only African country, and one of the 
few developing countries, in the NSG.  He said it is 
politically difficult for South Africa to associate with a 
"club" viewed by outsiders as a body that would deny 
developing countries rights under the NPT.  Both the 
preservation of rights and decision making via inclusive 
multilateral bodies are key principles in South Africa's 
foreign policy.  (Note: These values came up on several 
issues during the discussions.)  When Einhorn later asked 
 
STATE 00097420  006 OF 009 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 1:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:  NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
POLICY TOPI 
whether South Africa's concern with the proposed ENR criteria 
was based on South Africa's own enrichment options, or on 
these broader matters of "rights" and other principles, Minty 
averred that South Africa was "in the middle." 
 
¶24. (SBU) Minty subsequently asserted that the existing NSG 
guideline (calling for restraint in enrichment and 
reprocessing transfers) are sufficient and questioned the 
current "criteria-based' effort to strengthen it further. 
With respect to both ENR and the AP as a condition of ENR 
supply, Mabhongo reiterated that South Africa was trying to 
be constructive and help bridge gaps, but that it had to bear 
in mind the political implications.  South Africa is fine 
with the principle of the AP as a condition of supply, but 
asked how the NSG could push an AP condition when not all NSG 
partners have concluded APs themselves.  Minty later 
suggested that it is a double standard to impose conditions 
of supply from which certain NSG Members would be exempt, 
implicitly referring to Argentina and Brazil.  He said South 
Africa will not accept this condition until NSG countries 
adhere to the AP, and only then would they "consider" it. 
Einhorn noted later that there did not appear to be specific, 
practical problems with the proposed criteria-based approach 
for restricting ENR transfers and said he hoped that by 
November there could be agreement on a way ahead.  Minty 
responded that the South African position was approved by 
government and that they will continue to consider the issue, 
but he did not want to give the USG "false hope." 
 
-------------------------- 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ISSUES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) More broadly on the AP, Minty commented that many 
countries are concluding APs just to get more aid.  He said 
we need to focus AP adherence efforts on newly 
industrializing countries that actually have structures and 
capacity for working with nuclear materials.  He reiterated 
the need for Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) 
outreach, because many countries did not even have this 
baseline, much less an AP.  Einhorn agreed that countries 
with advanced infrastructure should conclude APs, but said it 
is especially important for countries pursuing sensitive fuel 
cycle technologies to do so.  Minty suggested, and Einhorn 
agreed, that South Africa and the United States coordinate on 
outreach to approach high priority countries, but without 
making those countries feel like targets.  Minty also 
suggested that we undertake such outreach before the May 2010 
NPT RevCon and that we seek foreign minister statements on 
this issue to spur more solid commitments regarding the AP. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
STRENGTHENING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) Einhorn observed that our objective is not just to 
yield positive results at the 2010 NPT RevCon, but to take 
steps over the next four years to strengthen the regime 
beyond the RevCon.  He noted that all countries, both those 
with and without nuclear weapons, have the responsibility to 
help shore up the regime.  This includes a number of efforts 
to prevent and control proliferation, such as:  strengthening 
safeguards, enforcing compliance, discouraging abuse of the 
withdrawal provision in the Treaty, Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zones (NWFZ), counterproliferation, and building capacity in 
other countries to prevent and control proliferation. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶27. (SBU) Einhorn stated that the USG had reached out in 
public, privately, and via the P5 1 to engage Iran.  He said 
that if Iran's response continues to be unsatisfactory, there 
will be growing sentiment for action on sanctions in and 
outside the UN Security Council, but even then, the door will 
still be open for talks.  He said it would be helpful for 
Iran's friends to relay these messages to Tehran, so that we 
can work to resolve common concerns.  Minty said that South 
Africa has always told Iran that it needs to resolve IAEA 
concerns, regardless of what happens at the UN Security 
Council.  They have also told Iran that progress in resolving 
this issue at the IAEA could help build momentum in other 
fora.  South Africa does not want to see a nuclearized Iran 
and also does not want to see a war that would have 
"disastrous effects on the region."  He said Iran views 
anything that comes out of the P5 1 as being against it 
automatically, so offers from this group start out with no 
chance of consideration. 
 
 
STATE 00097420  007 OF 009 
 
¶28. (SBU) Einhorn said the United States expects an Iranian 
proposal soon, but Iran has a track record of doing the 
minimum necessary to defuse pressure.  He said it needs to be 
made clear to Iran that this will not work and that the 
international community will demand more.  Minty said South 
Africa has told Iran that it has to comply with the UN 
Security Council Resolutions and suggested the United States 
and South Africa keep in touch and consult on this issue. 
 
---- 
DPRK 
---- 
 
¶29. (SBU) Einhorn highlighted some recent positive gestures 
by the DPRK (release of the journalists, invitation for 
Ambassador Bosworth to visit Pyongyang, North-South dialogue, 
etc.).  He said the DPRK wants a bilateral dialogue with the 
United States in part to legitimize its nuclear weapons 
status, but Einhorn noted that the USG is not prepared to 
engage on that basis.  He said that DPRK needs to go back to 
the 2005 Joint Statement and that the United States would 
have a bilateral dialogue with the DPRK only as part of the 
Six-Party process.  Einhorn cited recent provocative actions 
as reflections of succession politics in the DPRK, with Kim 
Jong Il seeking military support for his third son to take 
over.  He commented that the DPRK military is also trying to 
verify its nuclear and missile capabilities through testing 
and demonstrate them to the world in an effort to strengthen 
its deterrent. 
 
--------------------------------- 
IAEA BUDGET ISSUES, VERIFICATION, 
COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶30. (SBU) Einhorn said that in his view, the IAEA needs more 
authorities and more resources and asked how this situation 
could be improved.  On the IAEA budget, he said the United 
States and South Africa have very close positions.  Minty 
agreed with the U.S. position on increasing the budget, 
stating that South Africa fully supports the IAEA's role in 
helping developed countries reap the benefits of civil 
nuclear technology and in safeguarding and verifying that the 
spread of that technology is used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes.  He said members should support providing the IAEA 
with the necessary resources to fulfill its mandate. 
 
¶31. (SBU) Minty said that we need to look more 
comprehensively at the IAEA's verification reports.  He said 
these reports should focus on what has been achieved, what is 
still in progress, what actions are needed and, if 
appropriate, whether the reported issue can be resolved. 
Minty said that reports of this nature would convey to the 
world that the IAEA has the capacity to verify, and reports 
could be linked to a timeline of action. 
 
¶32. (SBU) On compliance issues, in response to Einhorn's 
point about the different approaches taken on the Romanian, 
South Korean, and Egyptian cases, Minty said he did not 
believe there were concerns that the Board of Governors(BOG) 
addressed compliance cases unevenly, and there had been no 
discussion standardizing these responses.  He said these 
cases were not considered serious or in any way reflected 
intent to "cheat" on obligations.  If countries raise an 
issue with the IAEA, the IAEA should do reports and let the 
BOG decide the case instead of going to the UN Security 
Council frequently. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
ABUSE OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION IN THE NPT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) Einhorn presented the U.S. position on abuse of the 
withdrawal provision in the NPT.  Minty cautioned about the 
potential to violate international law when discussing 
changes to the withdrawal provision, but noted that abuse of 
the withdrawal provision was definitely a problem.  He asked 
which forum was best to discuss this issue and what measures 
should be taken.  Einhorn replied that he was not by any 
means suggesting a renegotiation of the withdrawal provision, 
on which the United States was a main player when the Treaty 
was drafted.  Einhorn suggested that abuse of the provision 
be considered at the upcoming NPT RevCon.  Minty 
wholeheartedly agreed with that approach, as it involved NPT 
Members discussing the issue within the NPT structure-- a 
solid multilateral channel.  He suggested considering a 
subsidiary body at the RevCon (as there was at the 2009 
PrepCom) to discuss these issues and their implications, 
noting that the Parties might decide to create a new NPT 
mechanism to deal with questions of withdrawal.  (Note:  This 
 
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subsidiary body is not included in the current draft for 
discussion on subsidiary bodies, which only includes groups 
on Negative Security Assurances and the 1995 Middle East 
Resolution.) 
 
-------------------------- 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶34. (SBU) Minty noted South Africa's longstanding interest in 
a Middle East NWFZ.  Einhorn offered congratulations on the 
recent entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty for an 
African NWFZ, and inquired about its call for the creation of 
an African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE).  Minty said 
that South Africa would spend the next 18 months consulting 
within Africa (first within the African Union, then elsewhere 
as needed) and seeking ideas on next steps for AFCONE.  He 
relayed that the headquarters of the organization will be in 
South Africa, but no administrative measures had yet been 
taken to that end.  Einhorn said that in the context of 
broader policy reviews, the United States is looking at NWFZs 
on a case-by-case basis, including taking another look at 
U.S. ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty's relevant 
protocols.  He mentioned that AFCONE provided a unique 
structure to regulate civil nuclear energy usage and enhance 
physical protection in Africa and that, if appropriate, the 
United States would be interested in the possibility of 
playing a positive role, depending on what came out of the 
consultations.  Minty said South Africa was interested in any 
U.S. ideas on AFCONE. 
 
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ILLICIT NETWORKS AND TRAFFICKING 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶35. (SBU) Einhorn noted that closer cooperation is needed to 
prevent illicit transfers, and stressed the importance of 
addressing the role of financial institutions in 
proliferation networks, adding that the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) recommendations should be implemented.  He 
mentioned the UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK and 
Iran and said that DPRK will be further cut off from global 
financial markets if they do not change their behavior. 
 
¶36. (SBU) On the topic of illicit networks, Minty immediately 
turned to discussion of prosecution.  He said that lack of 
prosecution means that the machinery of illicit networks 
stays intact, whether it is still in active operation or not. 
 In South Africa, for example, there was a 10-15 year penalty 
for trafficking in WMD, whereas trafficking in other areas 
carries at most a five-year penalty.  In other countries 
there is no penalty at all.  Minty said that the most 
important effort countries can make is not in proliferation 
finance, but information sharing.  He acknowledged that the 
legal structures are not in place to share information across 
countries that may need simultaneously to try criminals 
involved with networks operating in multiple countries.  He 
suggested that the IAEA might be able to create a mechanism 
to facilitate such information sharing. 
 
¶37. (SBU) On the financial aspects of proliferation, Minty 
said that South Africa is uncomfortable with the FATF 
provisions' reinterpretation of UNSCRs in ways not intended 
when the resolutions were passed.  In the South African 
constitution, there is a commitment to implement UNSCRs, so 
FATF "reinterpretation' of UNSCRs is problematic.  Minty said 
FATF guidance papers are written by "financial types" that 
seem disconnected from policy communities within their 
governments.  Mabhongo also expressed concern about FATF 
efforts to create a list of proliferators, saying that South 
Africa could not implement such a list because it is 
inconsistent with its national approach. Minty also voiced 
concerns about a recent proposal to look at all "unsecured" 
transactions as a risk, noting that South Africa has ongoing 
trade agreements in the South African Development Community 
(SADC) with countries that lack capacity to stay current with 
all the various conventions required for transactions to be 
deemed secure.  He said these concerns had been voiced 
before, but with no response.  Minty suggested more 
discussion of these topics.  Einhorn agreed that an experts 
exchange would be useful. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
POINTS OF CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶38. (SBU) For further information, please contact State POC 
(ISN/RA) Krista Fisher (202-647-6793, fisherkk@state.gov, 
NNSA POCs Heather Looney (202-586-6772, 
Heather.Looney@nnsa.doe.gov) or Andrew Bieniawski 
 
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POLICY TOPI 
(202-586-0775, Andrew.Bieniawski@nnsa.doe.gov), or NRC POC 
Cindy Rosales-Cooper (301-415-1168, 
Cindy.Rosales-Cooper@nrc.gov). 
CLINTON