VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6945 2610244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180225Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 096945 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC IN CH
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: GUIDANCE FOR AUSTRALIA GROUP 
PLENARY - SEPTEMBER 21-25, 2009 
 
¶1.  (U) This message provides guidance for the U.S. 
delegation to the Australia Group (AG) Plenary in Paris, 
September 21-25, 2009. 
 
---------- 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The principal U.S. objectives at the AG 
plenary include: 
 
--  Maintaining the current AG position on Russian 
membership in the AG through plenary discussions and 
informal consultations with AG members; 
 
--  Attaining acceptance for USG proposals to modify the 
chemical manufacturing equipment control list; 
 
--  Ensuring the AG initiates expert-level discussions 
on the proliferation potential of micro-reactor 
technology; 
 
--  Continuing discussion of the regional security 
threat emanating from chemical and biological warfare 
programs in non-member countries and non-member 
suppliers, and agreeing on steps AG members can take to 
address these threats; 
 
--  Encouraging continuing AG engagement on the 
advancing field of synthetic biology. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) At the Synthetic Biology Technical Experts 
Meeting, the Del: 
 
--  Should deliver a presentation on the current state 
of sequence screening practices within the global gene 
synthesis industry; 
 
--  Should also provide an update on U.S. efforts to 
develop sequence screening guidance for its domestic 
gene synthesis industry; 
 
--  Encourage AG participants to task the experts group 
to determine whether it would be desirable for the AG to 
provide guidance on screening orders of commercial 
synthesis of gene-length DNA sequences. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
CONTROL LISTS AND EXPORT CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) At the Implementation Meeting, the Del: 
 
--  Should agree to support a UK proposal to include an 
explanatory note at the end of the Control List of 
Chemical Weapons Precursors that states the Chemical 
Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers on the list cannot be 
used as unique identifiers for their respective 
chemicals in all situations (AG/Sep09/CL/GB/35).  This 
note is similar to one maintained on the Wassenaar 
Arrangement?s Military List and will help address 
situations where a chemical has multiple CAS numbers 
because it comes in different forms (e.g. hydrates) or 
when a chemical?s CAS number changes; 
 
--  May not/not agree to the Dutch proposal to expand 
the control for corrosion resistant valves as it is 
written (AG/Sep09/CL/NL/3), but the Del can agree to 
support adding interior valve components, such as balls, 
discs, stems and plugs to the list of components in the 
first paragraph of the control.  The Del should make it 
clear that we cannot support the terms ?principal 
components? and ?closure elements? and the associated 
technical note because we see them as unnecessary. 
 
--  Should agree to support a UK proposal to modify the 
definition of ?software? on the Control List of Dual-Use 
Chemical Manufacturing Facilities and Equipment and 
Related Technology and Software to decontrol software 
that is either in the public domain or is generally 
available to the public through commercial retailers 
(AG/Sep09/CL/GB/36).  Since there are so few items on 
the AG?s control lists that contain software, the the 
U.S. would prefer to allow AG participants develop their 
own approaches to addressing it.  We also recognize that 
adopting such an approach will help the AG?s 
participants from the European Union in drafting their 
common export control list; 
 
--  Should agree to support Germany?s proposed best 
practices guide for implementing end-user controls 
(AG/Aug09/Pol/D/1).  The best practices should be useful 
for other AG members.  They are consistent with U.S. and 
Missile Technology Control Regime best practices for 
end-user controls. 
 
------------------------------- 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE DISCUSSION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) During the Information Exchange, the Del 
should present information on emerging trends and 
threats, including the indigenous capabilities of 
countries of proliferation concern, alternative pathways 
for chemical weapons precursor synthesis, the 
proliferation of chemical incapacitants, and the 
circumvention of export controls in major non-member 
supplier countries. 
 
------------------------------- 
ENFORCEMENT EXCHANGE DISCUSSION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During the Enforcement Experts Meeting, the 
Del should present two export control enforcement case 
studies that highlight key lessons on executing of 
undercover investigations and taking down proliferation 
networks. 
 
-------------------- 
POLICY CONSULTATIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) During opening remarks, Head of Delegation 
should: 
 
--  Thank the Australians for their continued efforts in 
support of CBW nonproliferation as chair and secretariat 
of the Australia Group; 
 
--  Welcome back Ambassador John Sullivan as the 
Australia Group?s chair; 
 
--  Convey the USG?s firm desire to continue to 
strengthen the AG to make it more effective in combating 
CBW proliferation by reaching out to key supplier 
countries outside of the group to encourage them to 
adopt both the AG?s lists and guidelines; 
 
--  Highlight the Australia Group?s importance to the 
nonproliferation standards enshrined in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1540 and other resolutions; 
 
--  Express the belief that the success of these 
nonproliferation standards has reduced CBW proliferation 
down to a handful of committed proliferators; 
 
--  Suggest that the AG should begin to examine its 
options for addressing the continuing challenge posed by 
these committed proliferators over the coming year; 
 
--  Voice continued support for the AG?s consistent and 
balanced approach to membership issues in continued 
conformity with its factors and criteria for 
consideration of membership; 
 
--  Express continued support for effective and 
universal implementation of and adherence to the CWC and 
BWC. 
 
¶8.  (U) Membership: Guidance on membership issues will 
be provided septel. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Outreach: 
 
--  The Del should seek AG participant support for an AG 
chair-led visit to India.  The Indians have made 
significant strides towards harmonization with the AG?s 
guidelines and control lists, but gaps remain.  The 
attitude in New Delhi towards the importance of 
effective, legally-based export controls has also 
impoved in recent years, so an outreach visit is likely 
to be well-received. 
 
--  The Del should also seek AG participant support for 
an AG-chair led visit to China.  The chair?s last visit 
to Beijing ended acrimoniously because he mentioned 
plans to send a representative to visit Taiwan in 
passing.  The AG chair should visit Beijing again and 
press the Chinese on closing gaps in their export 
control rules, particularly in the area of intangible 
technology transfer.  Del should ask AG participants to 
consider passing to the Chinese a sanitized version of 
the best practices guide on intangible technology 
transfer it adopted in 2008. 
 
--  The Del may support suggestions by other AG 
participants to conduct outreach visits to Israel, 
Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
 
--  The Del may support a UK proposal for the AG to 
conduct an industry outreach event.  Though the U.S. 
agrees with the view that industry outreach is the 
prerogative of AG participants, an outreach event 
coincident to a future AG plenary could help raise the 
AG?s public profile.  If prompted, the Del should 
indicate its intention to complete the questionnaire 
attached to the proposal. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Interaction with the UNSCR 1540 Committee: The 
Del should express disappointment over Russia?s decision 
to block efforts by the 1540 Committee to invite the AG 
to participate in its Comprehensive Review scheduled for 
September 30 - October 2.  Del should urge AG members 
that will participate in the Comprehensive Review to 
make positive representations on the Australia Group?s 
behalf. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Regional Nonproliferation: Guidance on 
regional nonproliferation issues will be provided 
septel. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Intangible Technology Transfer Booklet: 
 
--  The Del should volunteer to draft Chapter 3 (?AG 
Controlled Biological Agents, Including Synthetic 
Biology?) of the Intangible Technology Transfer Booklet 
funded by a voluntary contribution from South Korea, in 
addition to drafting Chapters 9 and 10, which the U.S. 
has already volunteered to draft; 
 
--  The Del should thank Germany for volunteering to 
draft three chapters of the booklet and encourage other 
AG participants to draft the remaining chapters of the 
booklet; 
 
--  The Del should approach the Austrian, Japanese and 
Turkish delegations and suggest that as current members 
of the UN Security Council, they are well-placed to 
draft Chapter 7 (?UN Sanctions and ITT?). 
 
¶12.  (U) The Del should endorse holding the next AG 
plenary meeting in June 2010, as well as intersessional 
meetings as appropriate. 
 
¶13.  (U) The Del should ensure that the press release on 
the AG meeting is consistent with U.S. policy 
considerations delineated in paragraphs 2 and 7.  In 
particular, the Del should ensure that the final press 
release references: 
 
--  The well-established global norms against chemical 
and biological weapons and CBW nonproliferation; 
 
--  The AG?s commitment to working with all interested 
parties to address the challenges posed by a small 
number of committed CBW proliferators that reject these 
global norms; 
 
--  The AG?s signficance to the work of the 1540 
Commitee; 
 
--  The commitment of AG participants to ensuring the 
1540 Comprehensive Review is successful; 
 
--  The importance of UNSCR 1874 to ensuring a Korean 
peninsula free of weapons of mass destruction; 
 
--  AG members? gratitude to Rogelio Pfirter for his 
leadership at the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons. 
CLINTON