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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 096892 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED 
MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION (PART TWO OF TWO PARTS) 
 
¶1. (U) This is an ACTION REQUEST.  Please see paragraph 
¶3. 
 
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The White House announced a 
Presidential decision on September 17 regarding a U.S. 
European-based BMD adaptive regional architecture, which 
is significantly different from the Bush Administration's 
plan to deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and 
a BMD tracking radar in the Czech Republic. 
END BACKGROUND. 
 
¶3. (U) ACTION REQUEST: All Posts, as they determine 
appropriate, may draw upon he Questions and Answers in 
paragraph 4 for public affairs/diplomacy purposes.  The 
Questions and Answers should not/not be handed over to the 
press.  Part One of this Public Affairs Guidance contains, 
septel, a White House Fact Sheet and President Obama's 
statement of September 17, 2009. END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
¶4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: 
 
¶1.      What is this new "phased" approach?  Details? 
 
- We will pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach to missile 
defense in Europe, which will improve the collective 
defense of the United States and Europe.  The first 
elements of this approach will be available to defend 
portions of Europe six or seven years earlier than would 
have occurred under the previous plan. 
 
- Our proven regional missile defense capabilities, 
including the Aegis Weapon System and the Standard Missile 
3 (SM-3) interceptor, and Army-Navy TPY-2 forward-based 
radar can be deployed initially, to address the current 
Iranian short- and medium- range ballistic missile threat. 
 
- As our missile defense technology improves and is 
tested, the architecture also will evolve and become more 
capable. 
 
- For example, we also can leverage our advanced regional 
missile defense development programs such as the 
land-based SM-3s with advanced SM-3 interceptor capability 
and advanced sensors in subsequent phases. 
 
- This approach provides many opportunities for allied 
participation, and we have begun engaging our NATO Allies 
to discuss these. 
 
- The phased approach will enable us to provide protection 
to U.S. deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their 
accompanying families, and NATO Allies at risk to current 
and emerging Iranian missile threats. 
 
- We anticipate that this plan can augment missile defense 
of the United States against a potential future Iranian 
ICBM.  In the meantime, we will invest in the continued 
improvement of Ground Based Interceptors now based in the 
United States. 
 
¶2.      What are you doing about the program of record? 
 
- Based on our updated understanding of the threat and our 
more advanced capabilities and technologies, we believe 
the best course of action no longer involves the single 
GBI field in Poland or the single large, fixed European 
radar originally planned to be located in the Czech 
Republic. 
 
- The Czech Republic and Poland are steadfast Allies of 
the United States, and we appreciate their willingness to 
take a leadership role in NATO on missile defense.  We 
discussed this announcement with them earlier today and 
communicated our gratitude. 
 
- The United States remains committed to the security of 
its NATO Allies, including Poland and the Czech Republic. 
The indivisibility of Allied security and Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty are cornerstones of that commitment. 
 
¶3.      What nations will host this architecture? 
 
- Some of the assets will be sea-based, which allows them 
 
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to be moved quickly to meet new or unexpected threats. 
Other parts of the defensive architecture - sensors and 
interceptors - could also be land-based and potentially be 
deployed in northern or southern Europe to provide 
coverage of Allied territory and populations. 
 
- One benefit of the phased approach is that there is a 
high degree of geographic flexibility; for example, there 
are many potential locations for any land-based 
interceptor sites.  Moreover, some of the land-based 
elements will be relocatable, so we can adjust as 
appropriate if circumstances change. 
 
- I would prefer not to get into specific issues related 
to hosting this equipment at this time.  We are engaging 
at NATO with Allies on those questions. 
 
¶4.      What has changed since Secretary Gates made the 
Program of Record decision? 
 
- Both our assessment of the Iranian missile threat and 
the technical capabilities of U.S. missile defense have 
evolved. 
 
- The growing numbers of Iranian short- and medium-range 
missiles pose an increasingly important near-term 
challenge to U.S. forces, allies, and friends in multiple 
regions. 
 
- The threat from Iranian short- and medium-range missiles 
has developed more rapidly than anticipated. 
-- Iran already has fielded hundreds of ballistic missiles 
that can threaten neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey, 
and the Caucasus. 
-- Iran is actively developing ballistic missiles that can 
reach beyond its neighbors and deeper into Europe. 
 
- Iran's successful space launch (the Safir) in February 
2009 demonstrated progress in longer-range ballistic 
missile technologies. 
 
- In addition, new options for missile defense 
capabilities now exist in our missile defense development 
program that were not previously available. 
--Improved interceptor capabilities, including new 
versions of the SM-3, offer a more flexible and capable 
architecture for the defense of Europe, and indeed of 
other regions. 
--We also have made progress with sensor technologies that 
offer an increasing variety of options to detect and track 
enemy ballistic missiles and provide that data to an 
interceptor. 
 
¶5.      Does this weaken our protection of the homeland 
against missile attacks? 
 
- To the contrary: The phased approach develops the 
capability to augment our current protection of the U.S. 
homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats. 
-- In the later phases, a new variant of the SM-3 
interceptor in development could eventually provide a 
capability against Iranian ICBM threat to the United 
States.  Because it uses a different approach and 
different technology than the GBIs deployed in the United 
States, it offers the opportunity for layered defense of 
the United States. 
-- In all phases, the GBIs deployed at Fort Greely, 
Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, are 
available to protect the United States from an incoming 
ICBM. 
 
- As we move forward, we will be better positioned to 
accelerate development and deployment of system elements 
if needed - this flexibility is a key benefit of this 
approach compared to the previous program. 
 
- We are committed to missile defense for the U.S. 
homeland.  By the end of 2010, the U.S. will have 30 
ground-based interceptors (GBIs) deployed in Ft. Greely, 
Alaska, and Vandenberg AFB in California. 
-- This is more than enough to defend against an ICBM 
attack from Iran or North Korea that we may face in the 
foreseeable future. 
-- We will continue to maintain and improve our GBI 
capabilities to ensure they are available when needed and 
could combat an evolving threat. 
 
¶6.      If our current missile defense capabilities 
 
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(GBIs) for defending the homeland are more than 
sufficient, why do we need the European architecture for 
homeland defense? 
 
- The current force of 30 GBIs is sufficient to meet the 
long-range threat we face today from rogue countries.  If 
the threat grows in number or complexity, or if the threat 
originates from another region, we will review our missile 
defense posture, and augment it as needed. 
 
- A benefit of the European architecture as outlined in 
our new phased approach is its ability to adapt as the 
Iranian ballistic missile threat evolves.  In the near 
term, we will be able to counter the expected short- and 
medium-range threat to our deployed forces, friends and 
allies in the region. 
 
- We are monitoring the Iranian threat closely and will be 
prepared to adjust our missile defense capabilities and 
posture in a timely manner.  The phased approach ensures 
that we are best able to defend against all ranges of 
Iranian ballistic missiles both today and in the future. 
 
¶7.      Is the new approach cost-effective? 
 
- Yes.  This approach begins with proven capabilities, 
like the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, with SM-3 
interceptors, and relocatable radars that are being 
deployed and in use today. 
 
- As newer, more capable versions of these systems become 
available, we will deploy them to defend against evolving 
threats. 
 
- This approach employs missile defense capabilities that 
are flexible and scaleable; that is, they are mobile or 
relocatable and can be surged in times of crisis.  This is 
a cost-effective way to leverage our BMD investments. 
 
- We estimate that the overall, long-term cost of the 
Phased Adaptive Approach will be roughly the same as the 
previous program.  In addition, we expect the 
per-interceptor costs for SM-3 to be significantly less 
than for a GBI. 
 
¶8.      Who pays?  Potential cost to Allies? 
 
- We will work closely with NATO Allies to examine broader 
resourcing requirements and determine the most efficient 
and appropriate way to finance the integration of the 
Phased Adaptive Approach with NATO. 
 
¶9.      What about NATO missile defense efforts? 
 
- NATO missile defense efforts in recent years have 
focused on missile defense systems to protect deployed 
forces from shorter-range ballistic missile threats. 
Several NATO countries already possess or are acquiring 
missile defense systems. 
 
- U.S. missile defense efforts will, of course, be 
complementary to those of NATO, and we will ensure our 
systems are interoperable.  We expect that the current 
NATO systems will be able to "plug-and-play" with the 
overall phased approach. 
 
- NATO is already developing a command and control 
architecture designed to link missile defense systems for 
defense of NATO forces in the field, known as the Active 
Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Program 
(ALTBMD). 
 
- Thus, Allied contributions will have the possibility of 
being linked together to ensure they form a cost-effective 
and comprehensive architecture. 
 
- Use of ALTBMD as a shared command and control backbone 
will enable a more cost-effective missile defense 
architecture. 
 
¶10.  Did you consult as you'd promised with allies? 
 
- Consultations with allies and friends on the BMD Review 
began early in May, in bilateral and multilateral settings 
with allies and partners around the world. 
 
- Over the past several months, we have had multiple 
senior-level discussions with NATO, as well as with many 
 
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individual countries including the Czech Republic and 
Poland. 
 
- During these consultations, we listened.  And we assured 
our partners that our decisions would be informed by our 
assessments of the nature of the threat from Iran, by the 
costs and effectiveness of various missile defense 
capabilities - and by these discussions with our allies. 
 
- As soon as the decisions on missile defense in Europe 
were made, we informed our allies first and foremost. 
 
¶11.  If a primary purpose of this is to defend Allies, why 
aren't they paying for it?  Do NATO members 
even want this?  What's the purpose of the NATO MD? 
 
- The ballistic missile threat concerns not just the U.S. 
but our Allies, as well.  In fact, NATO has been working 
on missile defense for the past few years, agreeing to 
develop a system called Active Layered Theatre Ballistic 
Missile Defense (ALTBMD) to protect deployed forces.  At 
the NATO Summit in April, 2009, Allies agreed to examine 
whether the Alliance should expand its ALTBMD program to 
cover Alliance territory and populations as well. 
 
-Prior to that, at the Summit in Bucharest last year, 
Allies provided strong support for the U.S. missile 
defense program and tasked the Alliance to look at how 
those two programs could work together. 
 
- To implement Alliance missile defense, Allies are 
purchasing national systems such as Patriot, Aegis or 
Patriot-like systems, and the NATO Alliance itself will 
finance the C2 backbone for ALTBMD into which Allied 
national systems can be integrated. 
 
- We will work closely with NATO Allies to examine broader 
resourcing requirements and determine the most efficient 
and appropriate way to finance the integration of our 
Phased Adaptive Approach with the NATO program. 
 
¶12. Are we giving Poland or the Czech Republic something 
instead - are we "pulling the rug out from under 
them"? 
 
- The threat has evolved and technology has changed; the 
Czechs and Poles appreciate this fact and the need to 
change our approach to the missile defense threat to 
enhance protection for all of our European Allies. 
 
- Under the phased adaptive approach, there are greater 
opportunities for our Allies and friends to participate. 
One of the characteristics of our new architecture is its 
flexibility.  There are many options for working with 
Allies on the way-ahead and we intend to engage soon at 
NATO and with Allies on how they might be involved.  We 
look forward to working with Poland/Czech Republic and all 
of our NATO Allies on moving the Phased Adaptive Approach 
forward together. 
 
¶13. How does this affect U.S. missile defense cooperation 
with Allies in East Asia?  How about our 
friends in the Middle East? 
 
- The broad outline of this Phased Adaptive Approach for 
Europe is consistent with our current missile defense 
efforts throughout the world. We will continue to work 
with our friends and allies in other regions to field our 
most capable, mobile, interoperable systems to protect 
deployed U.S. forces, civilian personnel, and their 
families, as well as allied forces, populations, and 
territories. 
 
¶14. Was your announcement rushed to be able to tell 
President Medvedev the results next week? 
 
- No.  We made the announcement when we did in order to 
discuss these developments with our allies and friends as 
soon as possible.  We did not want to delay the process 
for improving defenses for ourselves and our allies, many 
of whom face an increasing threat of missile attack over 
the next several years.  This has been a topic of great 
interest among our international partners - not only in 
Europe, but across the globe. 
 
- We consulted with our allies first and foremost. 
Subsequent talks with Russia are designed to provide them 
with transparency into our decisions and to discuss 
 
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possible areas for cooperation. 
 
¶15. Did you consult with the Russians prior to the public 
announcement? 
 
- The Russian Ambassador in Washington was informed of the 
President's decision before the public 
announcement, but after key Allies. 
 
¶16. How about cooperating with Russia on missile defense? 
What about using the Qabala and/or Armavir 
radars? 
 
- The United States will continue to explore the potential 
for cooperating with Russia on missile defenses that 
enhance the security of both countries and that of our 
Allies and partners. 
 
- In this regard, the U.S. and Russia agreed at the July 6 
summit to continue the dialogue on missile defense issues, 
including identifying areas for cooperation. 
 
- These efforts could include data sharing, such as from 
the Qabala or Armavir radars, which could offer a way for 
Russia to make a meaningful contribution in a joint 
architecture. 
 
¶17. Did you cave in to Russian demands just to get a START 
Treaty or Russian cooperation on other issues? 
 
- We are moving to a Phased Adaptive Approach because it 
will be more effective against current and emerging 
missile threats to Europe and the United States, including 
large missile raid sizes from Iran. 
 
- In their joint statement in London on April 1, 
Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed that the subject of 
the START follow-on treaty would be the reduction and 
limitation of strategic offensive arms.  From the 
beginning of the START follow-on negotiations, we have 
made it clear to the Russians that the treaty should not 
include any limitations on missile defenses and that 
discussions on missile defense should be conducted through 
other bilateral contacts. 
 
- The previous missile defense architecture did not pose 
any threat to Russia, and we have repeatedly emphasized to 
Russia that our missile defenses are not directed at 
them.  The new phased approach poses no threat to them 
either. 
-- On the contrary, we believed before, and we still 
believe, that the Russians would benefit from cooperating 
with the United States and NATO on missile defenses. 
 
- President Obama and President Medvedev agreed to pursue 
missile defense cooperation when they met in Moscow in 
July 2009 and we look forward to this dialogue. 
 
¶18.  On potential linkage between offensive and defensive 
weapons in START follow-on: 
 
- The United States will not negotiate limitations on 
missile defense capabilities in the START follow-on treaty 
with Russia, and we have made that clear to the Russians. 
 
- Our missile defenses are deployed to counter the threats 
from Iran and North Korea, not Russia.  It will be 
important for Russia to help to constrain both of these 
growing threats. 
 
- Both the United States and Russia have an interest in 
maintaining a stable deterrence relationship, so it makes 
perfect sense for us to discuss the relationship between 
offensive and defensive weapons. 
-- The fact that there is a relationship between offensive 
and defensive forces has long been recognized by the 
United States and Russia. 
-- President Obama and President Medvedev agreed to have 
such discussions in their April 1, 2009, Joint Statement. 
-- While we welcome these discussions, we do not believe 
that either the previous architecture or the new 
architecture for missile defense in Europe poses any 
threat to Russia. 
-- The previous architecture was not open for negotiation, 
and neither is the new one. 
 
¶19.  Isn't Iran more likely to use means other than 
missiles for coercing or attacking the United States and 
 
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its allies? 
 
- Iran is putting a lot of resources into its missile 
programs, and is increasing its arsenal in terms of both 
range and numbers.  Ballistic missiles are attractive to 
rogue states as tools of coercion and power projection 
because they are capable of potentially delivering WMD 
payloads over great distances in short periods of time. 
 
- Although perhaps one should not take everything that 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad says at face value, it is 
worth noting that following an Iranian missile test on 
April 20 of this year, he gave a speech saying "Today Iran 
has the power to turn any base that fires a bullet at Iran 
into hell." 
 
¶20.  Does this reflect the Administration's acceptance of 
a nuclear Iran - that we're just going to 
defend against their nuclear missiles rather than try to 
stop them from becoming a nuclear power? 
 
- The Administration's policy on Iran has not changed: a 
nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. 
-- We are continuing to work with our international 
partners to prevent Iran from developing technologies 
capable of deploying nuclear weapons. 
-- We also remain open to direct discussions with Iran on 
this and other issues. 
 
- Countering ballistic missiles is just one part of our 
overall response to the threat posed by Iran, and the new 
phased approach is designed to be tailored depending on 
how the Iranian missile threat evolves. 
 
END TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. 
CLINTON