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TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 093930 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IAEA KNNP TRGY AORC PTER IR
SUBJECT: IAEA: GUIDANCE FOR USDEL TO BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
(BOG) MEETING ON IRAN 
 
¶1.      PER SEPTEL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USDEL FOR AGENDA 
ITEM 6(D) ON IRAN ARE INCLUDED IN PARAS 2-3.  DEL IS 
INSTRUCTED TO USE THE STATEMENT IN PARA 4. 
 
¶2.      U.S. POSITION PAPER 
 
BEGIN ISSUE PAPER 
 
ISSUE: 
 
THE BOARD WILL DISCUSS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL?S LATEST 
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA?S 
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN; IRAN?S COMPLIANCE WITH 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1737, 1747, 1803, AND 
1835; AND THE SECRETARIAT'S INVESTIGATION INTO IRAN?S 
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. 
 
BACKGROUND: 
 
IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL (DG) ELBARADEI'S 26TH REPORT ON 
THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA'S SAFEGUARDS 
AGREEMENT IN IRAN MAKES CLEAR THAT IRAN HAS MADE 
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN ITS ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND WITH 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ARAK REACTOR, AND THAT IRAN?S 
COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA?S INVESTIGATION REMAINS 
INSUFFICIENT.  CONSEQUENTLY, IRAN HAS, ONCE AGAIN, 
FAILED TO FULLY COMPLY WITH ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
OBLIGATIONS AND IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BOG) 
REQUIREMENTS TO SUSPEND ITS PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE 
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE IAEA. 
THIS LATEST REPORT MARKS THE ELEVENTH TIME SINCE THE 
ADOPTION OF UNSCR 1737 IN DECEMBER 2006 THAT THE IAEA 
HAS REPORTED IRAN?S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THESE 
OBLIGATIONS. 
 
NUCLEAR PROGRAM STATUS 
 
ACCORDING TO THE IAEA'S AUGUST REPORT, IRAN CONTINUES TO 
ENRICH URANIUM USING APPROXIMATELY 4,600 IR-1 
CENTRIFUGES AT ITS FUEL ENRICHMENT PLAN (FEP) AT NATANZ 
AND, MOST TROUBLING OF ALL, NOW POSSESSES 1,430 KG OF 
LOW ENRICHED URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE (LEUF6). 
CONSEQUENTLY, IRAN NOW HAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT LEUF6 TO 
PRODUCE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPON, IF FURTHER ENRICHED TO 
WEAPONS-GRADE.  THIS INCREASE IN PRODUCTION SUGGESTS 
IRAN HAS SUSTAINED GENERALLY GOOD CENTRIFUGE PERFORMANCE 
SINCE NOVEMBER 2008.  IN ADDITION, IRAN ALSO CONTINUES 
TO INSTALL AND TEST NEW CASCADES AT THE UNDERGROUND FEP 
(FOR A TOTAL OF 8,308 CENTRIFUGES INSTALLED OR 
UNDERGOING TESTING AS OF 12 AUGUST 2009), AND TO TEST 
CENTRIFUGES OF VARIOUS DESIGNS (IR1, IR2, IR2 MODIFIED, 
IR3, AND IR4), INCLUDING WITH UF6 GAS, AT THE PILOT FUEL 
ENRICHMENT PLANT AT NATANZ.  THE REPORT NOTES THAT IRAN 
HAS ACCEPTED AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS MEASURES AT NATANZ, 
BUT ONLY THOSE THAT THE IAEA REQUESTED IN ORDER TO MEET 
THE MINIMUM NECESSARY STANDARD TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE AS 
TO THE NONDIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL.  THIS 
STEP DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED 
WITH IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 
 
THE REPORT ALSO NOTES ONGOING CONSTRUCTION OF THE HEAVY 
WATER RESEARCH REACTOR AT ARAK (IR-40), A VIOLATION OF 
UNSCR 1737.  WHILE IRAN PROVIDED THE IAEA WITH ACCESS TO 
THE IR-40 ON 17 AUGUST TO CARRY OUT A DESIGN INFORMATION 
VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER 
SUCH ACCESS WAS ONE-TIME OR WILL BECOME ROUTINE.  THE 
IAEA WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THAT NO REACTOR VESSEL WAS YET 
PRESENT; HOWEVER, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL NOTED THAT IRAN 
STILL NEEDS TO PROVIDE UPDATED AND MORE DETAILED DESIGN 
INFORMATION, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE NUCLEAR FUEL 
CHARACTERISTICS, FUEL HANDLING AND TRANSFER EQUIPMENT, 
AND THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND CONTROL SYSTEM. 
FURTHER, IRAN MUST PROVIDE ROUTINE, REGULAR ACCESS TO 
THE ARAK REACTOR IN ORDER FOR SAFEGUARDS TO BE SUSTAINED 
AND EFFECTIVE.  ONE-TIME ACCESS AT IRAN?S WHIM DEFEATS 
THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDS. 
 
TO DATE, IRAN HAS NOT MADE SUCH ACCESS ROUTINE, AND IT 
CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS CONTINUING 
OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT THE MODIFIED CODE 3.1 OF THE 
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENT TO ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, AS 
NOTED BY THE IAEA DG IN THIS LATEST REPORT.  THIS 
PRESENTS THE RISK THAT IRAN COULD BUILD A NEW NUCLEAR 
FACILITY AND FAIL TO DECLARE IT UNTIL 180 DAYS PRIOR TO 
THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL INTO THE FACILITY. 
IRAN?S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THE IAEA WITH PRELIMINARY 
DESIGN INFORMATION FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IT IS 
PLANNING TO BUILD AT DARKHOVIN IS A CASE IN POINT.  THE 
IAEA (AND THE UNITED STATES) REJECTS IRAN?S UNILATERAL 
ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO IMPLEMENT 
MODIFIED CODE 3.1. 
 
THE DG FURTHER NOTED THAT, IN ORDER FOR THE AGENCY TO BE 
IN A POSITION TO PROGRESS IN ITS VERIFICATION OF THE 
ABSENCE OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND ACTIVITIES IN 
IRAN, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IRAN TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS 
TO ENABLE THE IAEA TO CLARIFY AND BRING TO A CLOSURE THE 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND IMPLEMENT ITS ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL. 
 
POSSIBLE MILITARY DIMENSIONS 
 
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL USED A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF HIS 
LATEST REPORT TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE MILITARY 
DIMENSIONS (PMD) TO IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.  HE 
EMPHASIZED THAT THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING 
ISSUES THAT GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT NEED TO 
BE CLARIFIED BY IRAN.  SPECIFICALLY, HE NOTED QUESTIONS 
RELATED TO THE ALLEGED STUDIES, THE ACQUISITION OF THE 
URANIUM METAL DOCUMENT, AND THE PROCUREMENT AND 
REASEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY- 
RELATED INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES THAT COULD BE NUCLEAR- 
RELATED, AS WELL AS THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR-RELATED 
EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING TO 
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES.  THE REPORT FURTHER HIGHLIGHTED THAT 
THE INFORMATION ON THESE OUTSTANDING ISSUES APPEARS TO 
HAVE BEEN DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES OVER DIFFERENT 
PERIODS OF TIME, AND APPEARS TO BE GENERALLY CONSISTENT. 
IT IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED THAT IT 
NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED BY IRAN WITH A VIEW TO REMOVING 
THE DOUBTS THAT NATURALLY ARISE ABOUT THE EXCLUSIVELY 
PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.  MOST 
IMPORTANTLY, THE REPORT OFFERED AN EXTENDED RENDITION OF 
THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND THE LENGTHS TO WHICH THE IAEA 
HAS GONE TO ENGAGE IRAN TO NO AVAIL. 
 
END POSTION PAPER 
 
¶3.      U.S. POSITION: 
 
THE U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD DELIVER A STRONG NATIONAL 
STATEMENT AND ALSO WORK TO ENSURE THAT NON-P5+1 MEMBER 
STATE NATIONAL STATEMENTS ARE FIRM AND DIRECT IN THEIR 
INSISTENCE THAT IRAN COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.  TO THAT END, THE 
U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD WORK TO ENSURE THAT AS MANY NON- 
P5+1 MEMBER STATES AS POSSIBLE REFLECT THE FOLLOWING 
MAIN THEMES IN THEIR NATIONAL STATEMENTS: 
 
--CALL ON IRAN TO COMPLY WITH ITS UNSC, NPT, AND IAEA 
SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS, AND ENCOURAGE IRAN TO ENGAGE THE 
P5+1 IN GOOD FAITH TO RESOLVE ALL THE OUTSTANDING 
CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 
 
--CONCERN WITH IRAN?S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE FULLY AND 
TRANSPARENTLY WITH THE IAEA'S INVESTIGATION, AS WELL AS 
IRAN?S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS UNSC OBLIGATIONS.  OF 
PARTICULAR CONCERN IS IRAN?S FAILURE TO SUSPEND ITS 
PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, ITS REFUSAL 
TO RATIFY ITS ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL, AND ITS REJECTION OF 
ITS CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE EARLY DECLARATION 
OF NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES. 
 
--AFFIRMATION THAT, WHILE IRAN MAY HAVE ALLOWED THE IAEA 
ONE-TIME ACCESS TO THE ARAK REACTOR FOR A DESIGN 
INFORMATION VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION, THIS ACCESS 
MUST BE PROVIDED ON A REGULAR AND ROUTINE BASIS IN ORDER 
TO FULFILL IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS AND ENSURE THE 
REACTOR IS NOT USED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURPOSES. 
SIMILARLY, STATEMENTS SHOULD AFFIRM THAT WHILE IRAN 
AGREED TO AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS MEASURES AT NATANZ, THESE 
MEASURES ARE THE BARE MINIMUM NECESSARY IN ORDER TO 
ENSURE THE NONDIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL. 
THESE STEPS DO NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF 
IRANIAN NONCOMPLIANCE AND NONCOOPERATION. 
 
--NEED FOR IRAN TO ADDRESS FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY ALL 
OF THE IAEA'S OUTSTANDING AND SERIOUS CONCERNS 
REGARDING:  THE EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION MADE 
AVAILABLE TO THE AGENCY ON IRANIAN WORK ON NUCLEAR 
WARHEAD DESIGN; THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACQUISITION OF 
THE URANIUM METAL DOCUMENT; PROCUREMENT AND R&D 
ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY-RELATED INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES 
THAT COULD BE NUCLEAR-RELATED; AND THE PRODUCTION OF 
NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING 
TO MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS. 
 
--NOTE THAT UNLESS IRAN COOPERATES WITH THE IAEA AND 
FULLY COMPLIES WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, THE 
BOARD CANNOT HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE IN THE EXCLUSIVELY 
PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM OR IN ANY 
ASSURANCES REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR 
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN.  THUS, IRAN WILL REMAIN OUT OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. 
 
¶4.      STATEMENT.  THE USDEL IS INSTRUCTED TO USE THIS 
STATEMENT ON IRAN. 
 
BEGIN STATEMENT. 
 
MADAME CHAIR, 
 
      THE UNITED STATES APPRECIATES THIS LATEST REPORT ON 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL OBLIGATIONS.  WE 
THANK THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AND THE SECRETARIAT FOR THEIR 
CONTINUED SERIOUS AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORTS IN CONDUCTING 
THEIR VERIFICATION MISSION IN IRAN. 
 
      THIS IS MY FIRST INTERVENTION ON THE SUBJECT OF 
IRAN AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS.  IRAN REMAINS A 
CRITICAL CHALLENGE FOR THE AGENCY AND CONTINUES TO BE A 
KEY ISSUE DEMANDING THE ATTENTION OF THIS BOARD. 
 
      UNFORTUNATELY, THE SECRETARIAT IS NOT GETTING THE 
FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION THAT IT NEEDS FROM 
IRAN TO RESOLVE THESE LONG-OUTSTANDING ISSUES.  THE 
IAEA?S INVESTIGATION IS NOW ENTERING ITS SIXTH YEAR, AND 
STILL MANY OF THE ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED AS A RESULT 
OF IRAN?S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THE INFORMATION AND ACCESS 
NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE IAEA'S SERIOUS QUESTIONS, 
PARTICULARLY REGARDING IRAN'S PAST NUCLEAR WARHEAD 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. 
 
      IN FACT, THE LATEST DIRECTOR GENERAL?S REPORT 
DESCRIBES THAT, ONCE AGAIN, IRAN HAS MISSED AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.  WE 
REGRET THAT NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE 
IAEA?S INVESTIGATION FOR OVER A YEAR, AND NO PROGRESS AT 
ALL HAS BEEN MADE WITH RESPECT TO IRAN?S FULFILLMENT OF 
ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NPT, AND IAEA OBLIGATIONS. 
 
      THIS INCLUDES IRAN?S OBLIGATION TO SUSPEND URANIUM 
ENRICHMENT AT NATANZ PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL.  THE MEDIA HAS NOTED IRAN?S ACCEPTANCE 
OF AN AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS APPROACH AT NATANZ.  HOWEVER, 
THAT ONLY RE-ESTABLISHES THE MINIMUM NECESSARY IAEA 
MONITORING AT NATANZ WITHOUT ADDRESSING IRAN?S BASIC 
OBLIGATIONS.  IN ADDITION, THE PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE 
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED AT THIS FACILITY SHOULD BE 
SUSPENDED PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL. 
 
      THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF IRAN?S PROVISION OF ACCESS 
TO ARAK.  THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT INDICATED THAT 
IRAN PERMITTED THE IAEA TO CONDUCT A DESIGN INFORMATION 
VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION AT THE ARAK REACTOR.  THIS 
DEVELOPMENT IS, OF COURSE, WELCOME.  HOWEVER, ACCESS 
GRANTED AFTER A YEAR OF DEFIANCE IS NOT SOMETHING TO BE 
CONGRATULATED.  MOREOVER, IRAN?S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO 
IMPLEMENT CODE 3.1 MODIFIED OF ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT 
TO PROVIDE EARLY NOTIFICATION OF NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
DISCONCERTINGLY SUGGESTS THAT THIS ACCESS WILL NOT BE 
ROUTINE OR REGULARIZED, AS REQUIRED BY IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS 
AGREEMENT AND SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS, BUT RATHER AD HOC 
AND LAST-MINUTE WHEN POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT.  AS THE 
DIRECTOR GENERAL NOTED IN HIS REPORT, IRAN IS THE ONLY 
STATE WITH SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES THAT HAS A 
COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN FORCE BUT IS NOT 
IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED CODE 3.1. 
SIMILARLY, OVER A YEAR AGO, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 
REQUESTED DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION INFORMATION 
FOR THE NEW POWER REACTOR IRAN PLANS TO CONSTRUCT AT 
DARKHOVIN.  AND ONCE AGAIN, IRAN HAS REFUSED TO PROVIDE 
SUCH INFORMATION TO THE IAEA.  THE FAILURE TO APPLY CODE 
3.1 MODIFIED IS A SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO THE IAEA?S 
ABILITY TO PROPERLY SAFEGUARD AND VERIFY NUCLEAR 
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. 
 
      THE LIMITS PLACED BY IRAN EVEN ON THIS ONE 
OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT SAFEGUARDS AT THE ARAK REACTOR 
REVEALED FURTHER THE LACK OF IRANIAN COOPERATION.  THE 
REPORT CLEARLY INDICATES THAT, WHILE IRAN CONTINUES TO 
MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT ARAK, IRAN HAS YET TO 
PROVIDE CRITICAL, DETAILED DESIGN INFORMATION, IN 
PARTICULAR ABOUT THE NUCLEAR FUEL CHARACTERISTICS, FUEL 
HANDLING AND TRANSFER EQUIPMENT, AND THE NUCLEAR 
MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND CONTROL SYSTEM.  THIS 
INFORMATION IS FUNDAMENTAL TO SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION 
AND SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITHOUT DELAY. 
 
      AGAINST THIS BACKDROP OF LIMITED COOPERATION, THE 
REPORT DESCRIBES BOTH TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN IRANIAN 
URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND A TOTAL STALEMATE IN ADDRESSING 
THE IAEA'S SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN?S PAST WARHEAD- 
RELATED WORK. 
 
      INDEED, THIS LATEST REPORT DESCRIBES THAT IRAN NOW 
HAS, AT A MINIMUM, 1,430 KILOGRAMS OF LOW ENRICHED 
URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE.  IRAN IS NOW EITHER VERY NEAR OR 
IN POSSESSION OF SUFFICIENT LOW ENRICHED URANIUM TO 
PRODUCE ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON, IF THE DECISION WERE MADE TO 
FURTHER ENRICH IT TO WEAPONS-GRADE.  THIS ONGOING 
ENRICHMENT ACTIVITY, PROHIBITED BY THREE CHAPTER VII UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, MOVES IRAN CLOSER TO A 
DANGEROUS AND DESTABILIZING POSSIBLE BREAKOUT CAPACITY. 
 
      TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH IRAN?S REFUSAL TO ENGAGE 
WITH THE IAEA REGARDING ITS PAST NUCLEAR WARHEAD-RELATED 
WORK, WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT IRAN IS DELIBERATELY 
ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION - AT A 
MINIMUM.  WHILE THE AGENCY CONTINUES TO REQUEST 
CLARIFICATION ON THE ALLEGED STUDIES, THE URANIUM METAL 
DOCUMENT, AND THE PROCUREMENT AND NUCLEAR-RELATED R&D 
ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES, AS WELL 
AS THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR-RELATED EQUIPMENT AND 
COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, 
IRAN CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE.  THIS IS 
REGRETTABLY UNPRODUCTIVE.  IT IS ALSO DISAPPOINTING THAT 
OVER TEN MONTHS HAVE GONE BY AND IRAN HAS FAILED TO TAKE 
WHAT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL CALLS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP 
IN ADDRESSING THESE LONG-OUTSTANDING ISSUES BY PROVIDING 
SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS TO THE IAEA?S QUESTIONS.  WHAT 
CONCLUSION SHOULD THE BOARD DRAW FROM IRAN?S REFUSAL TO 
PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS TO THE IAEA?S QUESTIONS? 
 
MADAME CHAIR, 
 
      IT HAS BEEN NEARLY SIX MONTHS SINCE THE UNITED 
STATES JOINED ITS P5+1 PARTNERS IN OFFERING TO NEGOTIATE 
WITH IRAN BASED ON MUTUAL INTERESTS AND MUTUAL RESPECT, 
WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.  THE UNITED STATES AND OUR P5+1 
PARTNERS HAVE MADE A GOOD-FAITH EFFORT TO REACH OUT TO 
IRAN AND FIND A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION TO THIS ISSUE. 
AND WHILE WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT IRAN HAS A NEW 
PROPOSAL, WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL, 
SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE FROM OUR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS. 
NONETHELESS, WE WOULD REVIEW ANY PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY IN 
THE SPIRIT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND WOULD WELCOME THE 
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE P5+1'S 
APRIL 2009 INVITATION TO MEET FACE-TO-FACE.  MOVING 
FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD 
BEGIN TO BRING IRAN INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ITS 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND CREATE CONFIDENCE IN THE 
EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 
 
      THIS IS A FRESH, NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR IRAN TO TURN 
THE PAGE, COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND PROVE 
THAT IT IS A RESPONSIBLE, TRUSTWORTHY MEMBER OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  THE PATHWAY TO A NEGOTIATED 
SOLUTION REMAINS ON THE TABLE FOR IRAN AND WE CONTINUE 
TO CALL ON IRAN'S LEADERS TO DEMONSTRATE GENUINE 
COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
TO THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. 
WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT DISPUTE IRAN?S RIGHT 
TO A CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, BUT WITH THAT RIGHT COMES 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE 
EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN'S ACTIVITIES AND 
PROGRAM.  WE WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE, HONEST ENGAGEMENT 
WITH OUR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE ONCE 
AND FOR ALL. 
 
MADAME CHAIR, 
 
      IRAN CLAIMS THAT ALL OF THE IAEA'S CONCERNS HAVE 
BEEN ADDRESSED.  UNFORTUNATELY, THIS IS FAR FROM THE 
CASE, AS THE LATEST REPORT AND ITS MANY PREDECESSORS 
DEMONSTRATE.  WE, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD, HAVE A 
RESPONSIBILITY TO DEMAND THAT THE SECRETARIAT'S 
QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED, AND TO ENSURE THAT WE CAN OBTAIN 
CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACEFUL INTENT OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM.  WHEN A STATE SUCH AS IRAN HAS VIOLATED ITS 
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR DECADES AND IS KNOWN TO HAVE 
ENGAGED IN WEAPONS-RELATED WORK, IT MAKES THIS TASK ALL 
THE MORE VITAL.  WHEN A STATE SUCH AS IRAN CONTINUES TO 
VIOLATE ITS OBLIGATIONS, WE MUST RESPOND. 
 
MADAME CHAIR, 
 
      MY GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO A DIPLOMATIC 
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM AND THE P5+1 DUAL-TRACK APPROACH.  WE CONTINUE 
TO CALL ON IRAN TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY AND TO RESPOND 
CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE P5+1 OFFER ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
MADE IN APRIL 2009.  WE ARE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT 
DIPLOMACY BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND INTERESTS AND SEEK 
A WILLING PARTNER.  HOWEVER, AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, 
WITH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES. 
 
      WE URGE IRAN TO FULFILL ITS INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR 
OBLIGATIONS AND ACCEPT THE PROMISE OF A NEGOTIATED AND 
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT THAT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL 
IRANIANS.  WE HOPE THAT IRAN WILL NOT MISS THIS 
OPPORTUNITY, AND WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO RESTORE 
INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.  WE LOOK FORWARD TO 
A TIME IN WHICH IRAN IS GREETED BY THIS BOARD AS AN IAEA 
MEMBER STATE IN GOOD STANDING AND URGE IRAN TO DO WHAT 
IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THAT A REALITY. 
 
THANK YOU, MADAME CHAIR. 
 
END STATEMENT. 
CLINTON