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DE RUEHC #0252/01 2682045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 252025Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 6475
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG IMMEDIATE 7125
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 5538

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 100252 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DAY 3: U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: 
UPCOMING EVENTS 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
AND NEXT STEPS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AF KNNP MNUC NP PARM ENRG SF
SUBJECT: DAY 3:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: UPCOMING EVENTS, CONCLUDING REMARKS, 
AND NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A. STATE 078766 
     ¶B. STATE 082147 
     ¶C. STATE 097420 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) On Day 3 of the U.S.-South Africa Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament Dialogue, participants shared views and plans 
for upcoming international events, and discussed next steps. 
Einhorn provided an overview of the latest U.S. plans for the 
upcoming UN Security Council Summit on Disarmament and 
Nonproliferation.  He exchanged views with Minty on the IAEA 
General Conference (Minty recommended a Presidential 
Statement instead of a resolution on contentious Middle East 
issues), UNGA First Committee session (both countries need to 
help manage expectations post-Prague speech), and UNSCR 1540 
Comprehensive Review (SAG unconvinced of UNSCR 1540's 
utility, but will participate in the review).  NSC Senior 
Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction Laura Holgate 
provided information on the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit 
and Sherpa planning meeting.  South Africa will send a senior 
representative, but has not yet designated an official 
Sherpa.  Planning for the 2010 NPT Review Conference was 
discussed at length, including the need for discussions on 
abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision, improving the 
procedural setup of Treaty implementation, and coordination 
to build consensus around substantive policy agendas. 
Participants agreed to a series of next steps, to include a 
robust agenda for expanded discussion and cooperation in the 
coming months.  A second round of the Dialogue was proposed 
for November 2009 in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with 
site visits to U.S. nuclear facilities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT ON DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Special Advisor Einhorn confirmed that President 
Obama would chair a September 24 UN Security Council Summit 
on disarmament and nonproliferation (per the U.S. presidency 
of the Security Council in September 2009).  The objective of 
the summit is to have Heads of State and Government endorse a 
broad non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, affirm and 
reaffirm commitments, and establish future objectives to set 
the stage for the Nuclear Security Summit and NPT RevCon. 
Planning for the session is ongoing, and the United States is 
consulting with the Council, plus other UN members (such as 
South Africa), about meeting objectives.  Einhorn emphasized 
that the USG wants the UNSC Summit to address broad 
nonproliferation and disarmament themes that are regime-wide. 
 
 
----------------------- 
IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Einhorn reiterated outcomes that the U.S. hopes for 
at the General Conference and on its margins:  signing of the 
draft nuclear energy R&D agreement, announcement of the new 
bilateral energy dialogue, and South African participation in 
the Sherpa planning meeting for the nuclear security summit. 
Regarding the General Conference itself and the perennial 
problem of contentious Middle East issues, the United States 
hoped the Chair could gain agreement on a single, consensus 
resolution.  Minty hoped all would avoid heated debate at the 
General Conference.  Minty also expressed his personal view 
that it would be much more complicated, if not impossible, to 
get a resolution because resolutions require sponsors, and 
sponsorship issues can unleash political rivalries.  Also, 
once a resolution is adopted, that country will want another 
one next year.  He recommended a Presidential Statement, 
instead.  Both countries pledged to work constructively 
towards consensus. 
 
----------------------- 
NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 
----------------------- 
 
STATE 00100252  002 OF 005 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Following President Obama's personal invitation to 
President Zuma on the margins of the G-8 Summit, NSC Senior 
Director Holgate said that formal invitations to the Nuclear 
Security Summit would be sent soon.  The goal for the summit 
would be to build common understanding on threats, and on the 
importance of security for all nuclear materials in military 
and civilian contexts.  Our objective is for Heads of State 
and Government to identify ways in which countries could more 
fully implement their existing commitments, rather than make 
it a venue for pressuring countries to join the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, or other such efforts.  The Summit 
agenda and outcomes will be refined during a series of three 
Sherpa meetings in advance of the April Summit.  Holgate 
noted that the Summit likely would produce a document of 
commitments for action on a number of issues, from accounting 
to physical protection, nuclear forensics and enforcement, 
information and intelligence sharing, etc.  The Summit also 
can provide a forum to showcase existing efforts towards 
strengthening the global nuclear security agenda.  A special 
side conversation is being considered for nuclear industry 
leaders, since the majority of nuclear materials are under 
private control in the nuclear industry.  She solicited South 
African views on Summit planning. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Einhorn added that the United States hopes that 
Heads of State and Government attendance would motivate 
bureaucracies to consider in the coming months what more they 
could do to advance nuclear security within individual 
countries in advance of the Summit.  Minty and, separately, 
Department of Energy Acting Director General Nelisiwe 
Magubane noted that the SAG would likely not appoint a 
permanent Sherpa in time for the mid-September planning 
meeting.  The SAG would send a senior official in September, 
with a final Sherpa appointed thereafter.  (Note:  A few days 
after the Dialogue, State officials received word that the 
senior official representing South Africa at the Sherpa 
planning meeting would be Ditebogo Kgomo, not Minty as 
expected.) 
 
-------------------------- 
2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Einhorn stated that, for many years, the P-5 looked 
at the NPT RevCons as damage-limiting exercises.  The United 
States, however, is taking a very different approach this 
time.  The regime is under great stress, and more than a 
consensus final document is needed to remedy it.  The USG 
views the RevCon as an important milestone on a longer road 
(not a destination), and will actively seek to improve how 
the regime operates over the coming years.  Mabhongo said 
that South Africa had a similar approach to the RevCon, and 
shared the United States' concern about balancing the three 
pillars of the NPT appropriately. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Minty said that South Africa was very interested in 
the problems associated with abuse of the withdrawal 
provision in the Treaty (see Day 1 Septel) and wished to work 
with the United States on a way forward.  Negative security 
assurances were an important confidence-building measure for 
the NPT-defined Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in moving 
the RevCon agenda forward.  A major objective for South 
Africa in May would be a reaffirmation of the 1995 RevCon 
consensus outcome and the 2000 RevCon Final Document, 
especially the "13 practical steps" towards nuclear 
dismantlement contained therein. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Einhorn contended that circumstances have changed 
since the 2000 RevCon result and the "13 practical steps," 
and the disarmament agenda needed to be updated.  He hoped 
that delegations would not become fixated on precise 
application of the 13 steps, noting that certain parts, such 
as the one affirming the ABM Treaty (highlighted in step 7), 
have been overtaken by events.  The Parties therefore need to 
chart a course for the future with an agenda that's 
appropriate for 2010 and beyond.  Part of that will be the 
vision that President Obama outlined in his Prague speech. 
As part of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the USG is 
looking at the role of nuclear weapons in our national 
security policy.  We are also reviewing our declaratory 
policy, including previous statements on negative security 
assurances.  Einhorn said it was premature to commit to 
specifics at this time, but the USG is aware of other 
countries' interest in that issue. 
 
STATE 00100252  003 OF 005 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Minty said the NPT review process needs to be 
strengthened.  The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings 
are increasibly frequented by junior delegates with no 
mandate to negotiate for consensus and with no substantive 
grasp of the issues to debate.  Issues of methodology and 
process are just as important as substance in ensuring a 
successful RevCon.  Minty endorsed Einhorn's suggestion that 
the United States and South Africa discuss new approaches to 
strengthen the review process. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 AND THE COMPREHENSIVE 
REVIEW 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Einhorn gave the USG perspective on UNSCR 1540, 
and sought South Africa's views on the resolution, and on 
funding mechanisms for implementation.  He also informed 
Minty of a U.S.-funded and UNODA-sponsored January workshop 
on reducing biological threats in Africa.  Mabhongo replied 
that South Africa has had concerns with UNSCR 1540 from the 
beginning, particularly the way that it was passed through 
the Council.  South Africa was not as optimistic about the 
utility of UNSCR 1540.  Most of the work under the resolution 
focused on states instead of non-state actors, which the 
resolution was designed to target.  South Africa had seen 
minimal progress on implementation.  Country reports 
submitted pursuant to 1540 Committee requirements lacked 
substance.  Minty said the resolution failed to address 
illicit networks, striking against the credibility of the 
resolution.  Regarding implementation reporting, Minty had 
previously suggested that the 1540 Committee use a simple 
questionnaire that the Council could use to follow up with 
countries whose responses indicated sophisticated technology 
and capabilities.  As it is now, even the first question is 
way above the level of most countries.  Minty recommended 
that the UNSC take a country-by-country approach to see what 
each individual country needs.  Nevertheless, the SAG was 
willing to discuss the issue.   Einhorn encouraged South 
Africa to convey its concerns during the UNSCR 1540 
Comprehensive Review.  He agreed that country-specific 
assessments of national efforts, gaps, and the assistance 
needed should help implementation move forward. 
 
--------------- 
CLOSING REMARKS 
--------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Einhorn led the closing remarks.  Balancing the 
three NPT pillars was important, but so was balancing 
responsibilities for strengthening the regime.  The United 
States is prepared to do more than its fair share in pursuing 
nuclear disarmament and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy; but, in exchange, we hope that NNWS, including 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, will accept their 
responsibilities and join with us to strengthen barriers 
against further proliferation.  South Africa is a leading 
voice in the NAM and has a greater understanding of these 
issues than many of its NAM colleagues, in part because of 
its unique historical experience.  Although cognizant of the 
pressure to maintain NAM solidarity, Einhorn expressed hope 
that South Africa would use its enormous credibility and 
knowledge to lead the NAM toward pragmatic solutions to these 
problems that genuinely serve NAM interests.  In closing, 
Einhorn expressed USG satisfaction with the week's nuclear 
security discussions.  Overall, the meetings marked a good 
start toward fulfilling our Presidents' directive to create a 
bilateral dialogue on these issues.  Einhorn expressed the 
expectation that South Africa and the United States would 
maintain constant contact  through DICO and State, and that 
engagement would not be limited to episodic visits. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Minty expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to 
build a partnership with South Africa.   He looked forward to 
expanded cooperation, but cautioned that the SAG often faces 
unexpected demands on its time and attention from within the 
continent.  Meeting regional needs is a principal objective 
of South African foreign policy, and Minty said it seems to 
"never end."  South Africa also has commitments to the 
African Union and the South African Development Community 
(including its year-long Chairmanship), all of which create 
unanticipated obligations that South Africa must fulfill-a 
persistent problem.  (Note:  Minty mentioned earlier in the 
Dialogue that Russia and France had proposed similar future 
dialogues, which also would take up finite SAG resources. 
 
STATE 00100252  004 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 3:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: UPCOMING EVENTS, CONCLUDING REMARKS, 
AND NEXT STE 
Embassy Pretoria has heard rumors of a Japanese Dialogue, as 
well.)  Minty reiterated South Africa's concerns about 
"meddling with foundations" (such as the NPT, UN Security 
Council Resolutions, etc.), because it establishes precedents 
that others can meddle with as they wish.  This relates to 
South Africa's strong commitment to multilateralism: the SAG 
seeks buy-in and consensus because that ensures the 
legitimacy of decisions taken.  Regarding block positions in 
multilateral meetings, South Africa tries to work across 
groups on global concepts, and speaks its mind on issues of 
strong belief irrespective of any block position.  This, he 
said, is South Africa's commitment, and it will not change. 
For example, at the 1995 NPT RevCon, South Africa sided 
against the NAM by supporting the U.S. push for indefinite 
extension of the Treaty.  South Africa tries to generate 
constructive approaches to build bridges between the G-77 and 
the G-8.  In closing, Minty looked forward to robust, 
continuing cooperation with the United States over the coming 
months, coordinated through DICO and the State Department. 
End of Day 3 discussions. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
POINTS OF CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) For further information, please contact State POC 
(ISN/RA) Krista Fisher (202-647-6793, fisherkk@state.gov, 
NNSA POCs Heather Looney (202-586-6772, 
Heather.Looney@nnsa.doe.gov) or Andrew Bieniawski 
(202-586-0775, Andrew.Bieniawski@nnsa.doe.gov), or NRC POC 
Cindy Rosales Cooper (301-415-1168, 
Cindy.Rosales-Cooper@nrc.gov). 
 
--------------------- 
DIALOGUE PARTICIPANTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶14.  (U) United States: 
 
Robert Einhorn, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms 
Control (State) 
Laura Holgate, Senior Director, WMD Terrorism and Threat 
Reduction (NSC) 
Bruce Mallet, Deputy Executive Director for Operation (NRC) 
Ken Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DOE/NNSA) 
Andrew Bieniawski, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Global 
Threat Reduction (DOE/NNSA) 
Dave Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator for 
International Material Protection and Cooperation (DOE/NNSA) 
Jeff Eberhardt, Office Director (State) 
Al Burkart, Deputy Director (State) 
Madeline Seidenstricker, Political Counselor (State, Embassy 
Pretoria) 
Heather Looney, Special Assistant (DOE/NNSA) 
John Mentz, Foreign Affairs Officer (State) 
Cindy Rosales-Cooper, International Relations Officer (NRC) 
David Young, Energy and Minerals Officer (State, Embassy 
Pretoria) 
Amy Prible, Nuclear Policy Analyst (OSD) 
Krista Fisher, Foreign Affairs Officer (State) 
Dave Barber, Physical Protection Expert, Sandia National 
Laboratory 
Greg Herdes, Physical Protection Expert, Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory 
 
¶15.  (U) South Africa: 
 
Abdul S. Minty, Ambassador and Special Representative on 
Disarmament and NEPAD, Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation (DICO) 
Xolisa Mabhongo, Chief Director, Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation (DICO) 
Johann Kellerman, Deputy Director, Nuclear Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation (DICO) 
Michiel J. Combrink, Deputy Director, Nuclear Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation (DICO) 
Lunga Bengu, Office of the Ambassador and Special 
Representative on Disarmament and NEPAD (DICO) 
Melinda N. Williams, Deputy Director, Biological, Chemical 
and Arms Control (DICO) 
Simbongile V Mancotywa-Kumsha, Assistant Director, Nuclear 
Disarmament       and Non-Proliferation (DICO) 
Ingrid Kirsten, Assistant Director, Biological, Chemical and 
Arms Control (DICO) 
Jonathan D. Passmoor, Foreign Service Officer, Biological, 
 
STATE 00100252  005 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 3:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: UPCOMING EVENTS, CONCLUDING REMARKS, 
AND NEXT STE 
Chemical and Arms Control (DICO) 
Fadl Nacerodien, Director, US Directorate (DICO) 
Graham Anderson, Deputy Director, US Political Desk (Safety 
and Security) (DICO) 
Alu Museisi, Foreign Service Officer US Political Desk 
(Safety and Security) (DICO) 
Elsie Monale, Director: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Department 
of Energy (DOE) 
Lillian Sedumoeng, Deputy Director: Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
(DOE) 
G Clappison, Acting CEO, National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) 
J Mwase, Senior manager, Strategic and stakeholder executive 
(NNR) 
Joseph Shayi, General Manager: Risk and Infrastructure 
Management (responsible for Safeguards and Security) 
(NECSA) 
W J Theron, Emergency Planner (responsible for Emergency 
planning and response) (NECSA) 
Chantal Janneker, Senior Manager: Group Communication and 
Stakeholder Relations (NECSA) 
Lucky Molefe, Senior Manager International Trade and Customs 
Policy, South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
CLINTON