VZCZCXRO4831
OO RUEHJO
DE RUEHC #0237/01 2682030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 252009Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 6471
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG IMMEDIATE 7121
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 5534

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 100237 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AF KNNP MNUC NP PARM ENRG SF
SUBJECT: DAY 2:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: NUCLEAR SECURITY AND SIDEBAR 
MEETINGS WITH SA DOE, NECSA 
 
REF: A. STATE 078766 
     ¶B. STATE 082147 
     ¶C. STATE 097420 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Day 2 discussions of the U.S.-South African 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Dialogue focused on 
technical level nuclear security issues.  DOE/NNSA, NRC, and 
State gave a series of presentations on areas of cooperation. 
 The United States invited the SAG to visit U.S. nuclear 
facilities later in the year to share best practices on 
safety, security, and safeguards.  The South Africans agreed 
to consider a U.S. requested physical protection consultation 
(including a site visit) for the Pelindaba site, which stores 
U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel.  This would help fulfill 
commitments, per USG interpretation, in the bilateral 
Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy ("123 Agreement"). 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The SAG appeared ready to move forward soon with 
specific cooperative security activities, including South 
African Department of Energy and the Nuclear Energy 
Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) supply of LEU-based 
Molybdenum-99 to the United States.  Progress was also made 
on the removal of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel and the 
Megaports Initiative (for which the South African Cabinet is 
considering approval of an implementing agreement).  The USG 
proposed additional and extended cooperation, including on 
regional nuclear and radiological security activities, 
"lab-to-lab" security assistance for Pelindaba, and 
consideration of possible bilateral nuclear safeguards 
cooperation.  The United States will provide additional 
details for further consideration.  Special Advisor Einhorn 
told representative from NECSA of U.S. interest in creating a 
new energy dialogue, to include discussion of nuclear and 
renewable energy.  He also asked the SAG to complete the 
necessary steps to sign the draft bilateral agreement on 
civil nuclear energy research and development.  The U.S. said 
it would welcome a public event to sign the agreement and 
announce the new Dialogue on the margins of the upcoming IAEA 
General Conference (Note:  The agreement was signed, but the 
dialogue remains to be announced.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
DISCUSSION OF DOMESTIC U.S. NUCLEAR SECURITY EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Dr. Bruce Mallet, Deputy Director of Operations at 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), explained 
changes and upgrades in physical security requirements for 
U.S. civilian nuclear sites since 9/11.  Mallett discussed 
the importance of safety and security interface, as well as 
the importance of balancing between the two.  He also 
discussed lessons learned from the U.S. implementation of 
additional safety/security requirements and provided an 
overview of the NRC,s "force-on-force" inspection program. 
Mallett acknowledged the cooperative relationship between the 
NRC and its South African counterpart, the National Nuclear 
Regulatory (NNR), and noted both agencies, intentions to 
continue cooperation in the area of physical security.  Since 
the NNR does not have responsibility for materials security, 
the U.S. NRC would be willing to work with the South African 
DOE, which does. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The DOE/NNSA Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI) presented on its domestic efforts, lessons learned, 
and voluntary security upgrades at U.S. civilian (medical, 
educational, etc.) sites storing nuclear and radiological 
materials.  DOE/NSA described the scope of U.S. domestic 
nuclear security efforts, including typical enhancements; 
lessons learned regarding security culture; infrastructure; 
alarm response; and sustainability, as well as secondary 
benefits of reactor conversions and the need for additional 
human resources beyond those planned.  On radiological 
security, the GTRI outlined efforts, including recovering 
disused and/or orphan radioactive sources, and technical 
experts from Sandia National Lab and Pacific Northwest 
National Lab provided technical perspectives and lessons 
learned.  GTRI also presented on the program,s international 
nuclear and radiological security efforts, including those 
worldwide to convert HEU-fueled research reactors to the use 
 
STATE 00100237  002 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 2:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: NUCLEAR SECURITY AND SIDEBAR 
MEETINGS WITH SA DOE, NEC 
of less-proliferation sensitive LEU fuel, and to repatriate 
HEU fuels. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMENTS ON THE STATUS OF SECURITY AT PELINDABA 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Minty and other South African officials briefed on 
SAG efforts to increase nuclear security at nuclear 
facilities since 9/11, and the November 2007 break-in at the 
Pelindaba facility.  These facilities now had a clean bill of 
health on security.  The SAG addressed its work with the IAEA 
in assessing and enhancing security at Pelindaba.  The 
nuclear regulatory agency had performed a post break-in 
security assessment and "most" of the recommended actions had 
already been completed. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During informal conversations, NECSA officials 
acknowledged that they need and are interested in assistance 
to improve nuclear security at Pelindaba.  Joseph Shayi, 
NECSA General Manager for Risk and Infrastructure Management, 
specifically mentioned the need for: 
 
--Additional volumetric sensors and cameras for his perimeter; 
--Additional fence line for the perimeter; 
--Response force training for his guard personnel; 
--Emergency response training exercise that would include the 
police back-up forces; and 
--Basic physical protection training for the guard force 
personnel, physical protection staff and some site managers. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Shayi referenced the personnel dismissals and 
continued emphasis on employee accountability at Pelindaba. 
Shayi assumed his current position because his predecessor 
was terminated after the November 2007 break-in.  Any future 
security incident would similarly result in his termination. 
The requested assistance could be provided with GTRI funding 
via a "lab-to-lab" effort between Sandia National 
Laboratories (SNL) and NECSA.  As a next step, SNL would 
provide NECSA with a detailed proposal regarding areas for 
cooperation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
U.S. REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION CONSULTATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) U.S. officials outlined U.S. nuclear security 
physical protection bilateral consultations with the 46 
countries that possess U.S. origin nuclear materials.  DOS 
officials stressed the broad scope of such consultations, as 
required under U.S. domestic law for countries with 
U.S.-origin nuclear materials, and as provided under the 
consultation provisions of  the "123" Agreement for Peaceful 
Nuclear Cooperation with South Africa.  U.S.-origin HEU spent 
fuel is still held at Pelindaba; South Africa last agreed to 
such a consultation in 1998.  (Note: In 1998, the U.S. 
interagency delegation did not find Pelindaba,s security to 
be consistent with the IAEA INFCIRC/225 recommendations and 
suggested several remedial actions.  The USG does not have 
independent confirmation that South Africa made these or 
other security enhancements.)  South African officials stated 
they would consider the United States proposal to conduct a 
follow-up physical protection visit.  In response, Baker 
mentioned the offer to visit U.S. nuclear facilities, which 
was well-received.  On the margins, Johann Kellerman, Deputy 
Director, Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, DICO, 
told a member of the U.S. delegation that such a visit was 
"contractual obligation" under the 123 Agreement and should 
not be a problem. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
SOUTH AFRICAN INSIGHTS ON NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE, STATUS AT 
PELINDABA 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Joseph Shayi (NECSA) confirmed that the U.S.-origin 
and the South African-origin spent nuclear fuel assemblies 
are co-located in pipe storage.  DOE/NNSA (via the GTRI 
program) and the SAG are planning to return approximately 50 
U.S.-origin spent HEU fuel assemblies from the SAFARI-1 
reactor at Pelindaba to the United States in early 2011.  As 
requested by South Africa as part of the agreement to return 
this spent fuel, GTRI committed to help train South African 
personnel in all aspects of nuclear materials handling and 
transport, as well as in overall project management.  Both 
sides agreed to keep working on the contract for the removal 
of HEU fuel, with the goal of beginning implementation as 
soon as possible.  As for the South African origin fuel, SAG 
officials intended to retain it in pipe storage and did not 
indicate any specific plans to recycle the fuel.  They 
 
STATE 00100237  003 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: DAY 2:  U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: NUCLEAR SECURITY AND SIDEBAR 
MEETINGS WITH SA DOE, NEC 
provided no information on the storage of its relatively 
large domestically produced inventory of HEU recovered from 
its weapons program. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
AREAS FOR EXPANDED BILATERAL, REGIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 
COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) DOE/NNSA,s GTRI program offered to assist South 
Africa with the security of radiological sources in South 
Africa and elsewhere in Africa, especially in the lead up to 
the South Africa-hosted June 2010 World Cup.  The U.S. also 
proposed establishment of a National Nuclear Training Center 
to support South Africa,s nuclear skills development and 
capacity-building needs.   The U.S. also encouraged South 
African assistance to the Democratic Republic of Congo to 
remove U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel and in other areas. 
The U.S. also raised the idea of possible cooperation to 
assist other African countries with radioactive source 
recoveries by deploying NECSA-developed Spent High Activity 
Recovery Sources mobile technology. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The U.S. also presented briefings on Megaports 
Initiative efforts to install radiation detection equipment 
at the Ports of Durban and Cape Town, and to provide training 
on operation and maintenance of the equipment.  South African 
officials appeared very receptive to such cooperation.  They 
confirmed that the necessary implementing Memorandum of 
Understanding agreement was before the South African Cabinet, 
with approval expected in the near future. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Other areas of expanded cooperation discussed 
included Commodity Identification Training and export control 
collaboration, bilateral nuclear safeguards, and nuclear 
nonproliferation forensics cooperation. The U.S. thanked the 
SAG for arranging the May 2009 consultative visit on 
Commodity Identification Training and said it looked forward 
to the next collaboration in November. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In the DOE/NNSA presentation on the International 
Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program, U.S. officials 
emphasized that such cooperation would not jeopardize a 
country,s work with the IAEA.  In fact, such cooperation 
allows both sides to better implement their IAEA nuclear 
safeguards obligations (via cooperation on safeguards 
technology and approaches in areas of mutual interest). 
Minty welcomed the clarification, requested a full annotated 
copy of the presentation, and would consider these issues. 
(Note:  South African officials have not been receptive to 
establishing a formal, or even informal, dialogue on 
safeguards R&D cooperation.  Minty has made clear the SAG 
preference that such cooperation be done through direct SAG 
cooperation with the IAEA.) 
 
------------------------ 
MO-99 ISOTOPE PRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Both sides discussed the global shortage of the 
Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) medical isotope, required for medical 
diagnostic procedures.  After the shutdown of Canadian 
reactors, South Africa became the top global Mo-99 producer 
(utilizing HEU targets) and has increased its production by 
between 20-30 percent.   South African officials outlined 
their plans to convert their production process from HEU to 
less proliferation-sensitive LEU, and declared it would be 
technically feasible to do so in less than two years. 
DOE/NNSA officials agreed to develop a joint paper on options 
for expediting this conversion process with the required U.S. 
FDA approval and possible GTRI financial assistance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
U.S. INVITE FOR SAG DELEGATION VISIT TO U.S. NUCLEAR 
FACILITIES 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) In closing, Baker reiterated the invitation for 
SAG officials to visit U.S. nuclear facilities to observe 
U.S. nuclear security and safeguards practices.  The USDEL 
suggested a November 2009 visit, as part of the next round of 
the Dialogue.  Baker encouraged the SAG to provide input on 
an agenda, including potential dates, to help us develop a 
comprehensive and compelling tour.  End of Day 2 discussions. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
SIDEBAR MEETING WITH SA DOE ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL NELISIWE 
MAGUBANE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
STATE 00100237  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) South African Department of Energy Acting Director 
General Nelisiwe Magubane and Director for Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Elise Monale met with members of the U.S. 
delegation.  Minty also attended, although he was not 
invited.  Einhorn gave a brief overview of the proposed 
senior-level energy dialogue on nuclear and renewable energy 
issues.  He outlined USG preferred outcomes to be achieved on 
the margins of the upcoming IAEA General Conference:  signing 
the draft nuclear energy R&D agreement, announcing the new 
energy dialogue, and participation in the Sherpa planning 
meeting.  Minty assured that South Africa would try its best. 
 Magubane said that there is a high level of interest in 
renewable energy issues in the SAG, as well as in nuclear 
energy issues.  The SAG recently started cooperation with the 
Clinton Climate Change Commission on solar power and has a 
standing invitation to visit a U.S. solar plant.  SAG is 
considering its options to build bigger plants and replace 
its reliance on coal. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Al Burkart, Deputy Director of the Office of 
Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security Affairs (State), gave an 
overview of U.S. efforts within the IAEA milestone project. 
He presented the USG offer to team up with South Africa and 
the IAEA to co-host a workshop or a series of workshops at 
both higher political and technical levels for African 
countries considering civil nuclear energy infrastructure 
development.  Magubane welcomed the suggestion and separately 
asked how customs officials could be trained to identify 
fissile material and stop illicit trafficking.  Andrew 
Bieniawski, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Global Threat 
Reduction (DOE/NNSA) gave a brief overview of the State 
Department Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI). 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Einhorn gave a brief overview of the changing 
nature of GNEP and encouraged South Africa to consider 
attending the October GNEP meeting as an observer.  Magubane 
would consult with the Minister about the meeting, noting 
that it "doesn,t hurt to learn." Baker provided a brief 
overview of the Day 2 nuclear security talks and Holgate 
offered an overview of the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SIDEBAR MEETING WITH NECSA CEO ROB ADAMS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) U.S. officials met with NECSA CEO Rob Adams to 
discuss nuclear security cooperation.  Regarding Molly 99 
production, Adams explained that NECSA has already increased 
its supply to the United States, and would be willing to 
discuss additional opportunities in the U.S. market.  The 
parties agreed to meet on the margins of the IAEA General 
Conference to develop an action plan to address U.S. needs. 
(Note: The meeting was held.)  Adams welcomed the invitation 
to visit U.S. nuclear facilities where HEU and plutonium are 
stored to see U.S. nuclear security procedures, as well as a 
separate U.S. offer to provide nuclear security-related 
training to NECSA; Adams commented that adding a nuclear 
security component would improve NECSA,s existing nuclear 
skills development center.  He also informed the group that 
NECSA is on contract with the IAEA to collect sources in 
Africa (SHARS project).  DOE/NNSA offered a nonpaper on 
expanded cooperation to secure sources in Africa.  Finally, 
agreement was reached to develop a plan for "lab-to-lab" (via 
U.S. Sandia National Labs) cooperation at Pelindaba, to 
include security upgrades and training.  Holgate gave a brief 
overview of plans for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit, 
noting that industry involvement is being considered to 
address the issue holistically.  End of Day 2 sidebar 
meetings. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
POINTS OF CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU) For further information, please contact State POC 
(ISN/RA) Krista Fisher (202-647-6793, fisherkk@state.gov, 
NNSA POCs Heather Looney (202-586-6772, 
Heather.Looney@nnsa.doe.gov) or Andrew Bieniawski 
(202-586-0775, Andrew.Bieniawski@nnsa.doe.gov), or NRC POC 
Cindy Rosales-Cooper (301-415-1168, 
Cindy.Rosales-Cooper@nrc.gov). 
CLINTON