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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 001539 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; September 25, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo, All TVs 
Leaders Pledge Closer ROK-Japan Ties; Hatoyama Says 
Tokyo has Courage to Face up to History 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
With Coffers Overflowing with Dollars, China Invested $60.9 Billion 
in First Half Alone to Secure Overseas Energy Resources 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Seoul National University Promotes Only 38 Percent of Candidates to 
Full Professor 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Hankyoreh Shinmun, Segye Ilbo, 
Seoul Shinmun 
Court: Nighttime Rally Ban Is Incompatible with Constitution 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
Chinese President Hu Jintao, during a Sept. 23 summit in New York 
with President Lee Myung-bak, said that North Korea sees bilateral 
talks with the U.S. as a requirement and multilateral talks as an 
option. (JoongAng) 
 
The leaders of the ROK, China and Japan will meet in Beijing on Oct. 
10 to discuss ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. (All) 
 
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg will visit five Asian 
countries from Sept. 25-Oct. 1, including the ROK, China and Japan. 
He will visit Seoul from Sept. 29-30, accompanied by Sung Kim, 
Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks and other White House and 
Defense Department officials. (Chosun, Hankook) 
 
According to the Korea International Trade Association, 91.8 percent 
of the U.S. stakeholders surveyed said that they support the KORUS 
FTA. (Hankook) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
The U.N. Security Council yesterday unanimously adopted "Resolution 
1887" that "empowers" nuclear technology suppliers to require the 
return of nuclear material and equipment from recipient states that 
diverted it for military purposes. The resolution makes no direct 
reference to Iran and North Korea, but targets the two countries. 
(All) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-N. Korea 
---------- 
All ROK media gave front-and inside-page play to yesterday's 
unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of "Resolution 1887" 
and noted that the resolution "empowers" nuclear technology 
suppliers to "require the return of" nuclear equipment and materials 
from recipient states that have diverted it for military purposes. 
The ROK media cited foreign media analyses that the resolution makes 
no direct reference to Iran and North Korea but targets the two 
countries. 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo quoted President Obama, who chaired 
the United Nations Security Council session, as asserting: "(The 
resolution) calls on all states to freeze any financial assets that 
are being used for proliferation.  And it calls for stronger 
safeguards to reduce the likelihood that peaceful nuclear weapons 
 
SEOUL 00001539  002 OF 004 
 
 
programs can be diverted to a weapons program."  JoongAng's 
inside-page headline read: "Obama, who Seeks World without Nuclear 
Weapons, Sends Strong Warning to N. Korea and Iran." 
 
JoongAng Ilbo also noted a Sept. 23 ROK-China summit held on the 
sidelines of the UN gatherings in New York, quoting an ROKG official 
as saying: "Chinese President Hu Jintao told ROK President Lee 
Myung-bak that North Korea sees bilateral talks with the U.S. as a 
requirement and multilateral talks as an option."   The Chinese 
leader was further quoted: "North Korea may return to the Six-Party 
Talks, but the nuance, in fact, was that it is unlikely." 
 
Controversy over President Lee's "Grand Bargain" Proposal on N. 
Korea's Nuclear Issue 
In a commentary, JoongAng Ilbo argued: "The February 13 Agreement 
failed not because it was a step-by-step approach but because it 
carelessly handled the sensitive issue of verification at a stage 
between North Korea's nuclear disablement and nuclear dismantlement. 
 If President Lee's 'grand bargain' is to mark a decisive milestone 
in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. and the ROK should 
learn a lesson from their failure in implementing the February 13 
Agreement and come up with a compromise between the U.S.'s 'package 
deal' and the ROK's 'grand bargain.'  The ROK should also make every 
effort to persuade the North (to abandon its nuclear ambitions) 
while restoring inter-Korean relations and giving the North what it 
is supposed to receive.  It is a narrow-minded, impractical 
political action for Seoul to offer (only) a series of half-baked 
proposals just in order to take the leadership in resolving the 
nuclear issue.  What matters is denuclearization, not who takes the 
leadership." 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo editorialized: "Given its pathological 
distrust and suspicion of international society, North Korea will 
not agree to dismantle its nuclear program before receiving 
comprehensive compensation.  The 'grand bargain,' which calls for 
the North's denuclearization while at the same offering 
comprehensive aid, will be more useful in bringing North Korea back 
to the negotiating table.  However, the 'grand bargain' would end up 
being merely empty rhetoric unless the Six-Party countries dispel 
mutual distrust and reconcile different interests among themselves. 
The ROKG has a long way to go to take a leading role in resolving 
the North Korean nuclear issue." 
 
-G20 Summit 
----------- 
Most media reported on today's opening of the G20 leaders' summit in 
Pittsburgh.  Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo wrote in the headline: 
"Main Agenda Item is Exit Strategy from Stimulus Measures, But G20 
Engage in War of Nerves over 'Side Menus'"   The article's sub-heads 
read:  "China  Suggests Multinational Sovereign Fund;" "Latin 
America Calls for Increase in IMF Quotas to Emerging Markets and 
Developing Countries;" and "U.S., U.K. Call to Ease Trade 
Imbalance." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
--------------------- 
 
WAYS FOR PRESIDENT LEE'S "GRAND BARGAIN" PROPOSAL TO SURVIVE 
(JoongAng Ilbo, September 25, 2009, Page 47; Excerpts) 
 
By Senior Journalist Kim Young-hie 
 
The North Korean nuclear issue is suddenly moving away from the 
phase of sanctions and confrontation to the phase of dialogue and 
negotiations.  This is the time when the ROK-U.S. cooperation should 
be watertight.  Therefore, officials of the two nations have made 
frequent visits to each other's nation.  At this critical moment, we 
believed that there was not a single problem in ROK-U.S. 
cooperation.  But what is all this about?  The USG is sneering at 
and disregarding the ambitious proposal that President Lee Myung-bak 
put forward in New York to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Unless the Obama Administration intentionally did so with hidden 
intentions, it means that the ROKG's foreign policy and security 
 
SEOUL 00001539  003 OF 004 
 
 
officials have been negligent in having prior consultations with 
Washington. 
 
President Lee's proposal marks a meaningful shift in North Korea 
policy.  His statement that North Korea's economic growth takes 
precedence over unification is the same as the basic philosophy of 
the Kim Dae-jung Administration's Sunshine Policy - that the 
establishment of peace should come before unification.   Since 
taking office, President Lee has not softened his hard-line policy 
toward the North.  His remark in New York can be said to signal that 
such a hard-line stance may be eased.  It remains to be seen how 
Pyongyang will respond to it, but Seoul's hard-line stance on the 
North seems be at a turning point.  Given this significance carried 
by President Lee's proposal, it is shocking that the Obama 
Administration is cool to it.  The statements by the State 
Department Spokesman and the Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs - "This is his policy" and "Actually, I - 
to be perfectly honest, I was not aware of that" - are what we 
expect to see between North Korea and the U.S.  The ROK Foreign 
Ministry said that it explained the "grand bargain" to the U.S. 
Embassy in Seoul, but it does not appear that (this explanation) was 
delivered to high-ranking officials in Washington.  This does not 
make sense.  U.S. Assistant Secretary Campbell noted that even in 
the ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers' meeting, which was held before 
President Lee's speech, the "grand bargain" did not come up.  The 
Foreign Ministry's explanation is all the more confusing. 
 
Due to this confusion, discussions about the validity of the "grand 
bargain" have been put on the backburner.  The proposal has one good 
point and one bad point.  The good point is that the "grand bargain" 
signifies a U-turn from Seoul's hard-line attitude toward the North. 
 Recently, two changes happened in North Korea.  The one is that the 
North began feeling the effects of the sanctions imposed by the UN 
and the U.S.  The other is that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il 
became healthy enough to be back in the saddle.  Against this 
backdrop, Kim called in former U.S. President Bill Clinton to 
Pyongyang and handed over the detained U.S. journalists to him, 
released a Hyundai Asan employee and ROK fishermen, and sent a 
special envoy to the ROK under the pretext of mourning the late 
President Kim Dae-jung.  These are Kim's conciliatory gestures. 
 
The bad point of the "grand bargain" is that considering the 
complicated nature of the denuclearization process, it is rather 
unrealistic.  Even if Six-Party countries or three parties (the ROK, 
the North, and the U.S.) or two parties (the U.S. and the North) 
successfully reach an agreement with North Korea while placing 
nuclear abandonment, a security guarantee and economic aid on the 
negotiation table at the same time, the process of implementing the 
agreement will have to go through some steps.  At every step of the 
process, Pyongyang could employ stalling tactics, renege on an 
agreement, be unduly stubborn, or ask for more, as it has done so 
far. 
 
The February 13 Agreement failed not because it was a step-by-step 
approach but because it carelessly handled the sensitive issue of 
verification at a stage between North Korea's nuclear disablement 
and nuclear dismantlement.  If President Lee's "grand bargain" is to 
mark a decisive milestone in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, 
the U.S. and the ROK should learn a lesson from their failure in 
implementing the February 13 Agreement and come up with a compromise 
between the U.S.'s 'package deal' and the ROK's 'grand bargain.' 
The ROK should also make every effort to persuade the North (to 
abandon its nuclear ambitions) while restoring inter-Korean 
relations and giving the North what it is supposed to receive.  It 
is a narrow-minded, impractical political action for Seoul to offer 
(only) a series of half-baked proposals just in order to take the 
leadership in resolving the nuclear issue.  What matters is 
denuclearization, not who takes the leadership. 
 
 
ROK, U.S. OUT OF SYNC ON N. KOREA 
(Hankook Ilbo, September 25, 2009, page 39) 
 
After President Lee Myung-bak proposed a grand bargain in a speech 
 
SEOUL 00001539  004 OF 004 
 
 
during his visit to the U.S., it appeared that the ROK and the U.S. 
were out of sync on this matter.  Now both countries are swiftly 
moving to patch up any differences.  Yesterday, they stressed in 
unison that they have no disagreements and are coordinating closely 
together.  The U.S. State Department had reacted coolly at first; 
State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly said, "This is his policy," and 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Kurt Campbell said, "Actually, I -- to be perfectly honest, I was 
not aware of that."  We believe that the ROK and the U.S. lacked 
communication or prior coordination. 
 
In fact, the grand bargain and the comprehensive package deal, on 
which the U.S has consulted with the Six-Party countries, are not 
much different.  Under the U.S.-envisioned package deal, North Korea 
will receive political and military security assurances and economic 
assistance if North Korea implements irreversible denuclearization. 
This is very similar to President Lee's grand bargain which calls 
for dismantling the core parts of North Korea's nuclear program 
while at the same time providing a security guarantee and 
international economic assistance.  The ROK and the U.S. shared the 
understanding at the June ROK-U.S. summit that North Korea's nuclear 
issue should be resolved comprehensively.  Therefore, it is natural 
for both countries to espouse similar positions. 
 
However, there are subtle differences.  The U.S. package deal 
requires Pyongyang to seek denuclearization first.  Meanwhile, 
President Lee's grand bargain calls for North Korea's 
denuclearization while at the same time offering comprehensive aid. 
This is why the Blue House officials are referring to the grand 
bargain as a "one-shot deal."  It seems that the U.S., which deeply 
distrusts the North, has a good reason to think that the ROK went 
too far.  The ROKG said that it notified the USG about the (grand 
bargain) concept through the Charge d' Affaires of the U.S. Embassy 
in Seoul, but it is doubtful whether the differences in their 
positions were also conveyed.  This is why we are concerned that the 
ROK failed to communicate with the U.S. properly. 
 
Given its pathological distrust and suspicion of international 
society, North Korea will not agree to dismantle its nuclear program 
before receiving comprehensive compensation.  The 'grand bargain,' 
(which calls for the North's denuclearization while at the same 
offering comprehensive aid,) will be more useful in bringing North 
Korea back to the negotiating table.  However, the 'grand bargain' 
would end up being merely empty rhetoric unless the Six-Party 
countries dispel mutual distrust and reconcile different interests 
among themselves.  The ROKG has a long way to go to take a leading 
role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. 
 
 
STEPHENS