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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1501, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; September 21, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1501 2009-09-21 08:26 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO0241
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1501/01 2640826
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210826Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5697
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9176
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0306
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6662
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6733
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1284
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5056
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4016
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7230
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1532
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2845
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1923
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2531
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 SEOUL 001501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; September 21, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
University Graduates Failing to Land Regular Jobs 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
First Disclosure of College Scholastic Ability Test Scores 
from 2005 to 2009 by City and District 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Prime Minister Nominee Faces Tough Hearing; 
Nominee in Hot Seat over Relocation of Government Agencies to 
Central Region as Part of the Sejong City Project 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
Survey Shows People Almost Evenly Divided 
over Sejong City Project 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
President Lee under Criticism for Ignoring Illegal Acts Committed by 
Nominees Named to High-ranking Positions and Trying to Go Ahead with 
Nominations 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
President Barack Obama told CNN on Sept. 20 that North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-il is "pretty healthy and in control." Obama's remarks come 
at a time when the U.S. is considering resuming bilateral talks with 
North Korea. (JoongAng, Hankyoreh, Hankook, Segye, Seoul, KBS, MBC) 
 
Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, told reporters on Sept. 19 upon his return from 
Japan: "The U.S. is prepared to see whether indeed North Korea is 
prepared to come back responsibly to sit down in the Six-Party 
framework and again work toward what we are all seeking to achieve - 
a verifiable non-nuclear Korean Peninsula." This remark is in 
response to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's recent statement that 
the North is willing to resolve its nuclear issue through both 
bilateral and multilateral talks. (Chosun) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-N. Korea 
---------- 
On Saturday (Sept. 19), all media front-paged a report by China's 
Xinhua New Agency quoting North Korean leader Kim Jong-il as telling 
visiting Chinese Presidential Envoy Dai Bingguo that his country is 
willing to participate in bilateral and multilateral talks. 
 
Most media noted Seoul's cautious response to the report, quoting a 
key Blue House official as saying: "The North did not say 
specifically that it will return to the Six-Party Talks.  We will 
check on what the North really means after the Chinese delegation 
returns home." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo described this development as proof that 
the current, unprecedented cooperation between the ROK, the U.S. and 
China to pressure North Korea is working.  Right-of-center JoongAng 
Ilbo wrote the headline: "U.S Calls for N. Korea to Return to 
Six-Party Talks Have Worked... Once This 'Big Obstacle' is Removed, 
Bosworth's Visit to N. Korea Likely to Happen Sooner."  Conservative 
Dong-a Ilbo's headline read: "North Korea's Cycle of Provocations, 
Sanctions, Mediations and Dialogue in Place Again?" 
 
Today, Chosun Ilbo carried an inside-page article entitled "U.S. 
Reacts with Caution to N. Korean Overtures."  It quoted Kurt 
Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
 
SEOUL 00001501  002 OF 008 
 
 
Affairs, as saying on Saturday that the U.S. would wait to see if 
North Korea is indeed prepared to return to the Six-Party Talks. 
The article also quoted a diplomatic source in Washington as saying: 
"One important reason why the North is trying to scrap the Six-Party 
Talks is to nullify the Sept. 19, 2005 statement of principles.  The 
U.S. Administration is aware of this, so it's being very cautious 
about changing the framework of talks." 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized on Saturday: "North Korea 
declared in April that it will never rejoin the Six-Party Talks. 
While publicly proposing multilateral dialogue, the North may demand 
trilateral or four-party talks in order to drive a wedge between the 
Six-Party countries.  Judging from its past behavior, North Korea 
may also ask for a quid pro quo for resuming dialogue." 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo editorialized today: "There is nothing wrong 
with the ROKG's position that it will make a judgment after 
confirming what intentions and conditions the North has behind such 
overtures.  However, we cannot shake off the feeling that Seoul is 
too inactive or passive toward the possibility of a big change in 
addressing North Korea's nuclear issue.  ...  President Lee 
Myung-bak left for the U.S. yesterday to attend a meeting of the UN 
General Assembly and the G20 Financial Summit in Pittsburgh. 
President Lee should use this visit as an opportunity to take a 
leadership role at the same time as adopting a more active attitude 
toward this new development in the North Korean nuclear issue." 
 
-G 20 Summit in Pittsburgh 
-------------------------- 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized today: "The ROK is 
already a member of the meeting of the Group of 20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors, and will hold the presidency of the 
meeting next year.  The ROK, which is being touted as the first 
country to recover from the global financial crisis, is well 
positioned to play a constructive role as an 'honest broker' between 
the developed and developing countries.  In every respect, it is 
natural and reasonable for the ROK to host next year's G20 summit." 
 
-President Obama's Decision to Scrap Missile Defense Plans in 
Eastern Europe 
------------------------ 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun editorialized on Sept. 19: "This U.S. 
policy change, despite its denial, is aimed at improving ties with 
Russia.  Currently, the U.S. is in urgent need of Russia's help to 
resolve the issues of Iran and Afghanistan, the U.S.'s most 
important foreign policy goals at the moment.  Discussions also need 
to begin on a new agreement to take the place of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty with Russia, which is set to expire.  Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev has indicated that he views Obama's 
decision as a responsible move and intends to respond in a 
forward-thinking way.  Obama's policy shift has shown the potential 
to bring the international order into an age of cooperation rather 
than conflict." 
 
 
Opinions/Editorials 
------------------- 
 
WILL OBAMA BE FOOLED? 
(Dong-a Ilbo, September 19, 2009, page 30: Excerpts) 
 
By Editorial writer Bang Hyung-nam 
 
The Obama Administration should have learned from the past the 
lessons of failed U.S. diplomacy in regard to the North Korean 
nuclear issue.  Instead, in a shift from a hard-line position, the 
Obama Administration accepted North Korea's overtures for bilateral 
talks.  Even a list of incentives the U.S. could provide to the 
North is being floated.  China tried to persuade Pyongyang to return 
to the Six-Party Talks through its chief envoy to the Six-Party 
Talks Wu Dawei.  But after its failed attempt, China sent Chinese 
State Councilor Dai Bingguo to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il.  It is odd that the U.S. and China are being 
swayed by North Korea as if they themselves had done something 
 
SEOUL 00001501  003 OF 008 
 
 
wrong. 
 
The U.S. has already been deceived twice by North Korea over the 
nuclear issue.  Former President Bill Clinton signed the 1994 Geneva 
Agreed Framework through the U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks but 
couldn't block the North from its nuclear development.  Former 
President George W. Bush was fooled by the September 19 Joint 
Statement.  If President Obama enters into negotiations with North 
Korea, he will face North Korea's third nuclear scheme.  Will he be 
able to outmaneuver North Korea, unlike his predecessors? 
 
Recent moves by the U.S. government are stirring concerns.  The 
Obama Administration's initial position was that there is no 
alternative except the North's return to the Six-Party Talks.  Then, 
the U.S. Administration said that U.S.-North Korea talks will take 
place within the framework of the Six-Party Talks.  Now it has 
changed its position, saying that the U.S. can have bilateral 
negotiations with the North to facilitate the Six-Party Talks. 
Criticism is rife (over changes in USG positions) even in the U.S. 
 
 
President Obama chairs a nuclear summit at the UN Security Council 
on September 24.  He will also preside over the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference next May.  These 
are the steps toward realizing a nuclear-free world he espoused this 
April.  However, Obama's diplomacy will become futile if he does not 
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, which is the most pressing 
issue.  Even if U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks take place, Obama 
should uphold the principle that the U.S. will not reward North 
Korea for its erroneous behavior.  We hope that the U.S. will not be 
deceived by North Korea's third nuclear scheme. 
 
 
KIM JONG-IL'S TRUE INTENTIONS BEHIND PROPOSAL FOR MULTILATERAL 
DIALOGUE 
(JoongAng Ilbo, September 21, 2009, Page 45) 
 
By Yoon Duk-min, Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and 
National Security 
 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il recently told Chinese State 
Councilor Dai Bingguo that he "would like to resolve the 
denuclearization issue through bilateral and multilateral dialogue." 
 Some observers point out that (this means that) Pyongyang has 
finally yielded to international pressure, especially the trade 
embargo imposed by China.  Unsurprisingly, (Kim Jong-il's statement) 
fits with the tactical pattern of North Korean (foreign policy) that 
we've seen at least three times over the past two decades in which 
Pyongyang creates an external crisis in order to consolidate 
domestic control and, then, moves to address the outside situation. 
 
North Korea's behavior this year is almost similar to that during 
the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s.  The only difference is 
the involvement of China.  During a meeting with former U.S. 
President Clinton, Kim Jong-il mentioned bilateral talks but did 
talk about a return to the Six-Party Talks, an issue which the North 
left for China, the host of the Six-Party Talks, to take up.  Since 
its nuclear and missile tests, the North has completely sidelined 
China.  While Kim Jong-il met with Clinton and Hyundai Group 
Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun and even sent a special delegation to 
President Lee Myung-bak, he did not allow Chinese Six-Party Talks 
chief Wu Dawei to meet with North Korean key officials during his 
recent visit to Pyongyang.  Concerned that Beijing might lose its 
leadership over Korean Peninsula issues, President Hu Jintao sent 
Dai Bingguo as his special envoy.  Although it looks as if Kim 
Jong-il, a master of brinkmanship diplomacy, "saved the face" of 
Beijing by referring to multilateral dialogue, Kim did not 
specifically mention the Six-Party Talks.  This tactic is the same 
as the one that the North employed in 2007.  At that time, the North 
made China anxious when it said in the October 4 Joint Declaration 
that peace on the Korean Peninsula can be addressed through "three 
or four-party dialogue" but did not specify whether China would be 
included in three-party talks. 
 
 
SEOUL 00001501  004 OF 008 
 
 
Through bilateral talks with the U.S., North Korea intends to 
establish diplomatic ties with the U.S. and, at the same time, gain 
recognition as a nuclear state, as India and Pakistan did.  To this 
end, Pyongyang is trying to break up international cooperation aimed 
at preventing the North from joining the nuclear club.  North Korea 
is hinting at denuclearization to the U.S., inter-Korean summit to 
the ROK, and the Six-Party Talks to China, respectively.  Toward the 
new Japanese government, the North is probably taking a conciliatory 
approach regarding the issue of abducted Japanese (citizens). 
 
Just because the Six-Party Talks resume does not mean that the 
nuclear issue will be resolved.  While the Six-Party Talks were 
under way, the North staged two nuclear tests.  What is most 
important in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is for the 
ROK, the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia to show the North through 
action that, "unless it gives up its nuclear ambitions, it will 
suffer damage."  If even a single nation is deceived by the North 
into withdrawing from international cooperation, we will see North 
Korea conduct a third nuclear test and its nuclear possession 
accepted as a fait accompli. 
 
 
U.S. POLICY SWITCH IS A VICTORY IN RATIONALISM 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, September 19, 2009, Page 23) 
 
U.S. President Barack Obama announced plans yesterday to scrap the 
George W. Bush Administration's installation of a missile defense 
(MD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and to build a new, 
more flexible MD system instead.  This is a welcome sign that U.S. 
foreign policy has begun to assume a basis in rational 
determinations. 
 
Despite its huge price tag, the Bush administration's MD policy has 
been criticized for having limited effectiveness and for needlessly 
generating international conflicts.  More than 90 billion dollars 
have been poured into the plan since its start in 2002, yet (the 
program's missile) interception rate has lingered below 50 percent 
in its more than ten-odd trials.  Some analysts have even suggested 
that the reason the Bush Administration persisted with the  program 
despite these lackluster results was because core policy makers like 
former Vice President Dick Cheney and former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld were in league with the military-industrial 
complex. 
 
The Bush Administration did not stop at building an MD base in 
Alaska, but also urged allies like South Korea and Japan to 
participate as well.  This is why the (U.S.'s) MD policy has irked 
China and Russia.  In particular, the decision that is at issue now, 
a December 2006 decision to introduce the MD system in Poland and 
the Czech Republic, has been a decisive factor in the worsening of 
U.S.-Russia relations.  The pretext was that (setting up an MD 
system within these countries) would protect Europe from long-range 
missile attacks from Iran and North Korea, however,(Moscow) viewed 
the move as a (threat to Russia). 
 
As a result, the Obama Administration's change in policy is, despite 
the Administration's denial, aimed at improving relations with 
Russia.  Currently, Russia's help is urgently needed for a solution 
to the issues of Iran and Afghanistan, the U.S.'s most important 
foreign policy goals at the moment.  (The U.S. also needs to begin 
discussion on a new agreement to take the place of the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, which is set to expire.  Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev has indicated that he views Obama's 
decision as a responsible move and intends to respond in a 
forward-thinking way.  Obama's policy shift has shown the potential 
to bring the international order into an age of cooperation rather 
than conflict. 
 
South Korea in turn needs to mull over the meaning of the shift by 
the U.S. in MD policy.  Even within the ruling Democratic Party of 
Japan, there are growing calls to cut the MD budget.  Their 
determination is that, rather than sinking astronomical sums of 
money into building an ineffective defense network, it is more 
pragmatic to create the kind of international environment where 
 
SEOUL 00001501  005 OF 008 
 
 
missile launches can be avoided in the first place.  South Korea 
should make formulating a plan that can alleviate tensions a policy 
priority. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
WE SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY REACTIVE TO PYONGYANG'S HINT OF RETURNING TO 
MULTILATERAL TALKS 
(Dong-a Ilbo, September 19, 2009, Page 31, Excerpts) 
 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il expressed his intent yesterday (for 
North Korea) to return to dialogue aimed at resolving the North 
Korean nuclear issue.  Kim told visiting Chinese State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo that he "hopes to resolve the denuclearization issue through 
bilateral and multilateral dialogue."  This has now opened the 
possibility that dialogue may resume to resolve the North Korean 
nuclear issue.  Since the statement came as a result of China's 
efforts to persuade Pyongyang to return to dialogue by sending Dai 
Bingguo to Pyongyang as President Hu Jintao's Special Envoy, Kim's 
words are expected to be translated into action.  However, 
considering that Kim used the words "multilateral dialogue," which 
is a vague term that does not specify how many countries are 
involved in the talks, we cannot expect the Six-Party Talks to 
resume soon.  North Korea may have intentionally used the 
confusing-sounding term in order to (hint at its goal of) achieving 
direct dialogue with the U.S., which it has persistently demanded. 
 
In a situation where the North's return to the Six-Party Talks does 
not guarantee the resolution of the nuclear issue, Pyongyang simply 
mentioned its intent to hold bilateral and multilateral dialogue 
(and did not mention the resolution of the nuclear issue.)  North 
Korea's state news agency made no report about it, suggesting that 
Kim's expression of intent to rejoin dialogue does not carry much 
weight. 
 
North Korea declared in April that it will never rejoin the 
Six-Party Talks.  While publicly proposing multilateral dialogue, 
the North may demand trilateral or four-party talks in order to 
drive a wedge between the Six-Party countries.  Judging from its 
past behavior, North Korea may also ask for a quid pro quo for 
resuming dialogue.  This is why we cannot be overly reactive to 
Kim's proposal for dialogue. 
 
 
PREPARE FOR BIG CHANGE IN ADDRESSING N. KOREA'S NUCLEAR ISSUE 
(Hankook Ilbo, September 21, 2009, Page 39, Excerpts) 
 
It is encouraging that during a meeting with visiting Chinese State 
Councilor Dai Bingguo, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il expressed the 
intention (of North Korea) to join bilateral and multilateral 
dialogue aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.  (It is 
encouraging) because, by this statement, Pyongyang seems to be 
hinting at its return to the Six-Party Talks, which it has strongly 
rejected.  The North Korean nuclear issue is now taking a new turn. 
 
It is, of course, difficult to be optimistic until we determine the 
accurate meaning and intention of Kim's reported statement.  A 
clearer picture will be revealed through U.S.-North Korea bilateral 
dialogue, which is expected to occur next month, and Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang.  Judging from recent developments, 
however, it is fair to say that the North Korean nuclear issue is in 
the stage of dialogue. 
 
Amid this situation, the ROKG is taking a cautious attitude, saying, 
"We need to fully examine in what context Kim's statement was made." 
 There is nothing wrong with the ROKG's position that it will make a 
judgment after confirming what intentions and conditions the North 
has behind such overtures.  However, we cannot shake off the feeling 
that Seoul is too inactive or passive toward the possibility of a 
big change in addressing North Korea's nuclear issue.  It also looks 
timid and defensive to be on the guard against any progress on 
U.S.-North Korea relations out of concern over North Korea's 
 
SEOUL 00001501  006 OF 008 
 
 
strategy of "promoting exchange with the United States and blocking 
off South Korea." 
 
After the third North Korean nuclear crisis, relevant nations are 
now in the phase of seeking a new framework of dialogue to resolve 
the issue.  The ROKG should play a leading and proactive role in 
this process.  It should remember that, if the U.S. and China lead 
the efforts to create a framework, the ROK, although a direct party 
to Korean Peninsula issues, would have to sit on the sideline. 
President Lee Myung-bak left for the U.S. yesterday to attend a 
meeting of the UN General Assembly and the G20 Financial Summit in 
Pittsburgh.  President Lee should use this visit as an opportunity 
to take a leadership role while at the same time adopting a more 
active attitude toward this new development in the North Korean 
nuclear issue. 
 
 
DON'T FALL FOR NORTH'S TRICKS 
(JoongAng Ilbo, September 19, 2009, Page 34) 
 
The North Korean nuclear issue is facing an important turning point. 
 The United States is getting ready to offer an incentive to North 
Korea before (holding) a bilateral meeting with the communist 
country, while China has dispatched a special envoy to Pyongyang in 
an attempt to coax the country into returning to the Six-Party 
Talks.  At the same time, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, a 
senior figure in the Democratic Party, previously said that the new 
administration will take "a tough stance" with North Korea, 
emphasizing that talks with the country will come only after the 
regime launches an investigation into its abduction of Japanese 
people and freezes nuclear and missile tests.  And Yu Myung-hwan, 
South Korean foreign minister, said on Friday, "I think resolving 
the nuclear issue should be prioritized before the inter-Korean 
issue." 
 
The U.S. and China seem to be reaching out, which is a different 
approach than the one Japan and South Korea are taking.  North Korea 
is trying to turn the tables in its favor by approaching South Korea 
and the United States in a friendly manner, taking advantage of its 
position after the release of two U.S. female journalists who were 
charged with trespassing.  And the U.S. government is seemingly 
responding positively, signaling that it wants to resolve the 
nuclear issue through dialogue now that it has discovered that 
sanctions alone won't work.  That is a so-called two-track strategy, 
which basically seems appropriate.  But for the strategy to succeed, 
prudent execution is necessary.  This, after all, is North Korea, a 
country that has successfully used skillful brinkmanship to get its 
way. 
 
The first step for success is to stick to the framework of the 
Six-Party Talks.  Immediately after the announcement of UN 
sanctions, North Korea proclaimed that the Six-Party Talks had 
"ended permanently."  North Korea, according to some observers, is 
attempting to induce the U.S. to withdraw its forces from South 
Korea by developing nuclear weapons.  Resolving the nuclear issue is 
closely tied to the peace of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia 
in a broader sense. 
 
The sanctions on the North should not be lifted until there is some 
real progress to report in terms of resolving the nuclear issue.  In 
the past 20 years of negotiations with North Korea, the country has 
always demanded the lifting of sanctions as a prerequisite to 
beginning negotiations.  Experts say that North Korea aims to catch 
up with India when it comes to the nuclear development race. 
 
But North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is a scary 
proposition for the world.  It is a huge threat to this region and 
could trigger a nuclear domino effect across Northeast Asia. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
WHAT PRESIDENT LEE SHOULD DO AT G20 SUMMIT 
 
SEOUL 00001501  007 OF 008 
 
 
(JoongAng Ilbo, September 21, 2009, page 46) 
 
President Lee Myung-bak arrived in the U.S. this morning to attend 
the UN General Assembly, Climate Change Summit and G20 Summit, which 
will take place in New York and Pittsburgh.  Even though the UN 
General Assembly and Climate Change Summit are meaningful, what 
President Lee considers most important is the G20 Summit.  This is 
because, at the Summit, it will be decided where the next G20 Summit 
will be held and whether the ROK will be able to host it.  President 
Lee should make concentrated efforts to host the G20 Summit next 
year by having global leaders fully realize the necessity of the 
next Summit and the justification for the ROK's hosting.  The G20 
Summit, if held in the ROK, will provide a significant opportunity 
for the ROK to increase its status in the international community. 
 
 
The Summit for the G20 countries, which account for 85% of the 
(world's) GDP, was established when the G7 countries, the European 
Union (EU) and 12 emerging economies gathered in Washington in 
November 2008 to tackle the unprecedented global financial crisis. 
With the shared understanding that the crisis could not be overcome 
only through efforts by developed countries, the G20 Summit sought 
to involve countries with emerging economies, signaling a change in 
the structure of the world order in the wake of the financial 
crisis.  As a follow-up to the second G20 Summit in London this 
April, the third Summit will be held in Pittsburgh on September 24 
and 25. 
 
Analysts say that the world economy has surpassed its worst point 
and has entered into a recovery phase,,(making) some observers 
skeptical about the need to hold the additional G20 Summit.  Also, 
some European countries question the "representativeness" of the 
G20, arguing that the G20 should be decreased to the G13 or G14. 
These arguments, (if they are acted upon,) would be to our 
disadvantage.  Even though the world economy has shown signs of 
recovery, (the upturn) is just a result of (sudden) fiscal 
expansion, and it is too early to say that the economy is moving 
toward sustainable recovery.  The prevailing opinion is that it is 
too early to implement an exit strategy now.  Therefore, G20 
countries should continue to cooperate together. 
 
If it is decided that the ROK hosts the fourth G20 Summit, this 
signifies that the G20 Summit will serve as a new "rule maker" of 
the world economy, replacing the G7 or G8 summit.  The ROK is 
already a member of the meeting of the Group of 20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors, and will hold the presidency of the 
meeting next year.  The ROK, which is being touted as the first 
country to recover from the global financial crisis, is well 
positioned to play a constructive role as an 'honest broker' between 
the developed and developing countries.  In every respect, it is 
natural and reasonable for the ROK to host next year's G20 summit. 
This is a point President Lee should stress in Pittsburgh. 
 
However, the harsh reality is that there are some (who believe) that 
the ROK is too reliant on overseas exports and makes small 
contributions to the international community.  The ROK should make 
every effort to dispel this negative perception in order to host the 
G20 Summit and enhance its international status. 
 
 
IT IS TIME TO MAKE CONCERTED EFFORTS FOR SUCCESSFUL NUCLEAR 
NEGOTIATIONS 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, September 21, 2009, page 27) 
 
The U.S. and North Korea are swiftly moving to enter into nuclear 
negotiations.  On September 18, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il 
expressed willingness to resolve the denuclearization issue through 
bilateral or multilateral talks.  The U.S. is engaging in final 
discussions to lay out specific incentives for the North.  All 
countries concerned should make concerted efforts for successful 
negotiations. 
 
What matters most is North Korea's resolution.  Pyongyang has made 
conciliatory gestures toward the outside world without, however, 
 
SEOUL 00001501  008 OF 008 
 
 
mentioning any intention to abandon its nuclear program.  According 
to a Chinese source, Kim Jong-il told Chinese State Councilor Dai 
Bingguoon on September 18 that North Korea will seek the goal of 
denuclearization.  If this is true, Pyongyang should make its 
position clear to the world and proactively engage in related 
negotiations.  The North also should clarify whether it will 
participate in the Six-Party Talks.  There is no other framework 
that can fundamentally replace the Six-Party Talks, (which should 
continue) even if they are somewhat ineffective.  Therefore, North 
Korea's equivocal remarks on multilateral talks only invite 
suspicion from related countries. 
 
The U.S.'s active commitment is a requisite for successful 
negotiations.  The U.S. should go through full consultations to come 
up with effective incentives and ways of negotiations in order to 
get North Korea to give up its nuclear ambition at the upcoming 
U.S.-North Korea talks.  In particular, since the outcome of initial 
dialogue could become an important test to determine all future 
negotiations, the two nations should think about ways to increase 
mutual trust.  They could establish a liaison office in each other's 
countries on the condition that North Korea expresses the intention 
to abandon its nuclear programs.  It is also important that they 
should focus on the nuclear issue so that momentum of dialogue may 
not be lost. 
 
The ROKG, for its part, should abandon its passive attitude toward 
nuclear negotiations, including the U.S.-North Korea dialogue.  The 
key to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is (premised on) 
a decision by North Korea (to abandon its nuclear program), but all 
relevant nations share the responsibility to create an environment 
where Pyongyang will make a wise decision.  Nevertheless, the ROKG 
has lost its ground by making all Korean Peninsula issues 
conditional on denuclearization.  This attitude is highly likely to 
become a stumbling block to future negotiations.  Seoul should 
change its North Korea policy in a way that will allow it to take a 
leadership role in negotiations while making efforts to advance 
inter-Korean relations and resolve the nuclear issue. 
 
(We should not sway in our support for) the principle of 
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula under any circumstances. 
In order to persuade Pyongyang to give up the illusion that it can 
be recognized as a nuclear state and to abandon its nuclear 
programs, relevant nations should demonstrate their strong 
commitment toward negotiations.  Now is the time when joint efforts 
are desperately needed. 
 
 
STEPHENS