VZCZCXRO4606
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1463/01 2570700
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140700Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5634
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9144
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0280
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6627
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6700
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1259
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5025
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3984
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7200
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1508
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2822
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1900
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2508

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 001463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; September 14, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
A Year after "Lehman's Collapse," ROK's Semiconductor, 
LCD and Automobile Industries Have Grown Stronger, but Steelmakers 
and Shipbuilders Have Been Outpaced 
by Chinese Rivals 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
U.S. Ready for Talks with N. Korea 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Death Toll from New Flu Reaches Seven over Weekend 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
September, October Critical Moment for N. Korea Issues 
U.S. to Decide How and Where to Hold Talks with N. Korea within 
Couple of Weeks; China's Premier Wen Jiabao May 
Visit N. Korea Next Month to Meet Kim Jong-il 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
From Confrontation to Dialogue: U.S., N. Korea 
to Hold Talks Soon 
 
Segye Ilbo 
U.S. Seeks Meeting between Bosworth and N. Korea's First 
Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
ROK's Economy Grows 2.6 Percent in Second Quarter of This Year, 
Highest among OECD Nations 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip J. Crowley, 
in a Sept. 11 regular briefing, said that the U.S. is prepared to 
enter into a bilateral discussion with North Korea. He added: "It's 
designed to convince North Korea to come back to the Six-Party 
process and to take affirmative steps toward denuclearization." 
(All) 
 
In a related development, a key (ROK) Blue House official was quoted 
as welcoming the U.S. move, saying: "There is no reason to oppose 
bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang if the talks are 
aimed at denuclearizing North Korea." (Dong-a, Hankook) 
 
According to Japan's Mainichi Shimbun, China's Premier Wen Jiabao is 
planning to visit North Korea early next month to attend the closing 
ceremony of the China-North Korea Friendship Year, which marks the 
60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries. 
(All) 
 
According to AP and Fox TV citing Open Radio for North Korea, a 
Seoul-based rights group, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has warned 
of a third nuclear test if the U.S. and the international community 
intensify sanctions against North Korea. (Chosun) 
 
According to a report by Chinese authorities, China in 2003 
retrieved the corpses of 56 North Koreans floating in a border river 
after they were apparently shot dead by North Korean soldiers while 
trying to defect. (All) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-North Korea 
------------ 
All ROK media today front-paged Sept. 11 press remarks by Assistant 
 
SEOUL 00001463  002 OF 007 
 
 
Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip J. Crowley, in which he 
said that the U.S. is prepared to enter into a bilateral discussion 
with North Korea.  He was further quoted: "It's designed to convince 
North Korea to come back to the Six-Party process and to take 
affirmative steps toward denuclearization.  When it'll happen, where 
it'll happen, we'll have to wait and see.  We'll be taking some 
decisions in the next couple of weeks in light of our recent 
consultation." 
 
In a related development, conservative Dong-a Ilbo and moderate 
Hankook Ilbo quoted a key Blue House official as welcoming the U.S. 
move, saying: "There is no reason to oppose bilateral talks between 
Washington and Pyongyang if the talks are aimed at denuclearizing 
North Korea."  Dong-a Ilbo also noted that there is concern among 
Seoul officials that the U.S.-North Korea talks may send a wrong 
message to Pyongyang that it can achieve what it wants through such 
talks while keeping its nuclear ambitions, and that the ROK may 
become alienated in the bilateral process between the U.S. and North 
Korea. 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo, meanwhile, quoted an ROKG official as 
saying: "The envisioned U.S.-North Korea talks will be different 
from those in the past.  In the past, the start of (U.S.-North 
Korea) dialogue meant the end of sanctions (against North Korea,) 
but the U.S. is making it clear that it will continue sanctions 
(against North Korea) unless a meaningful denuclearization (of the 
North) is guaranteed." 
 
Newspapers carried the following front-and inside-page headlines: "A 
Shift in U.S. Strategy on N. Korea: 'We Are Willing (To Have) 
Dialogue to Facilitate Six-Party Talks'" (conservative Chosun Ilbo); 
"Bosworth Highly Likely to Visit N. Korea Next Month... U.S. Media 
Call Washington's Move a Major Policy Shift" (right-of-center 
JoongAng Ilbo); "Is Obama Getting Impatient with Lack of Foreign 
Policy Achievements, Faced with Declining Approval Ratings?" 
(conservative Dong-a ilbo); and "From Confrontation to Dialogue: 
U.S., N. Korea to Hold Talks Soon" (left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun) 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "It is believed that 
U.S.-North Korea dialogue is inevitable in order to resolve the 
North Korean nuclear standoff.  The issue is the format and timing 
of the dialogue.  ...  Above all, we hope that the Obama 
Administration will not follow in the footsteps of the previous Bush 
Administration, which took an inconsistent approach toward North 
Korea by adopting an ultra hard-line stance in its early days and 
turning excessively conciliatory in its final days." 
 
An editorial in conservative Dong-a Ilbo argued: "Washington should 
exercise caution to ensure that the U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks 
don't replace the Six-Party Talks or that the U.S. will not be used 
by North Korea to exclude the ROK from discussion of issues 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula.  Furthermore, the bilateral talks 
should not result in derailing the Six-Party Framework." 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo editorialized: "What matters is that 
U.S.-North Korea talks should provide momentum for North Korea to 
return to the Six-Party Talks and engage in denuclearization 
negotiations. ...  However, the prospect of holding the Six Party 
talks seems uncertain because North Korea is highly likely to insist 
on being recognized as a nuclear state." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo carried Sept. 12 AP and Fox TV reports 
citing "Open Radio for North Korea," a Seoul-based rights group, as 
claiming that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has warned of a fresh 
nuclear test if the U.S. and the international community intensify 
sanctions, by saying (to his party and military leaders): ""You 
should be ready to conduct a third and more powerful nuclear test if 
the U.S. intensifies sanctions without dialogue with the North." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
-------------------- 
 
OBAMA'S "SAVING KIM JONG-IL" 
 
SEOUL 00001463  003 OF 007 
 
 
(Chosun Ilbo, September 14, 2009, Page 34) 
 
By Senior Editorial Writer Kim Dae-joong 
 
The United States seems to have agreed to hold the bilateral 
dialogue that North Korea wanted so badly.  The visit by former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang in early August may have been a 
turning point which contributed to (the possibility of dialogue.) 
Voice of America on Saturday said that Clinton proposed to Kim 
Jong-il that U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen 
Bosworth should visit North Korea.  The report suggests that Clinton 
did not go empty-handed when he sought the freedom of the two U.S. 
journalists detained in the North.  The U.S. position was that the 
journalists' release was entirely separate from any direct 
Washington-Pyongyang contact and that President Barack Obama's North 
Korea policy was unchanged. 
 
Seeing no change in the U.S. insistence on maintaining the framework 
of the Six-Party nuclear talks since the inauguration of the Obama 
Administration, the North's no. 2 man, Kim Yong-nam, on July 15 said 
that the North will not return to the Six-Party Talks, which are 
"over for good."  China dispatched its Vice Foreign Minister and 
Chief Nuclear Negotiator Wu Dawei to Pyongyang on Aug. 17-21, for 
the purpose of attempting to persuade the North Korean leadership to 
hold bilateral talks within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. 
That only made the North insist more strongly on having bilateral 
Washington-Pyongyang talks.  China probably knew this in advance. 
Now the U.S. State Department says that consensus has been formed 
within the (other Six Party Talks) countries that direct 
Washington-Pyongyang talks can take place after all. 
 
So North Korea appears to have prevailed.  The North Korean 
delegation to the funeral of former President Kim Dae-jung, led by 
two senior officials, conveyed their leader Kim Jong-il's message to 
President Lee Myung-bak on Aug. 23.  Upon leaving, the delegation 
made remarks suggesting they were satisfied with the results of the 
meeting.  They must have told the South to agree to bilateral talks 
between the North and the U.S. in return for another inter-Korean 
summit.  On Sept. 1, a North Korean delegation, headed by Vice 
Foreign Minister Kim Yong-il, visited Beijing.  Earlier, Pyongyang 
took a series of conciliatory steps like the release of a South 
Korean worker detained in the border city of Kaesong and the release 
of the crew of the fishing boat 800 Yeonan which had been abducted 
to the North, and the resumption of family reunions and package 
tours to the Mt. Kumgang resort. 
 
Yet, on Sept. 3, when Bosworth left for a tour of South Korea, China 
and Japan to sound out their views on the Six-Party Talks, North 
Korea, in a letter to the UN Security Council chairman, announced 
that its experimental uranium enrichment entered the "final stage," 
that the reprocessing of spent fuel rods is being completed, and 
that already extracted plutonium is being turned into weapons.  This 
sounds like saber-rattling incompatible with the North's attempts to 
approach America, but in fact is a kind of a stimulant to 
Washington-Pyongyang dialogue, suggesting that it is urgent for the 
U.S. to stop the developments and that the North has no alternative 
but to take that route if the U.S. procrastinates, according to Joel 
Wit, a former U.S. State Department official who was a consultant to 
Obama. 
 
Obama seems to have been pressured by the criticism in the country 
that there is no progress in his campaign pledge to talk to 
America's enemies, and North Korea's uranium claim almost gives the 
impression that it was pre-arranged so Obama could revive his pledge 
and talk (with North Korea.)  Bosworth's remarks on completing his 
three-country tour -- that nothing has changed in North Korea's 
attitude and that there will be no bilateral talk outside the 
framework of the Six-Party Talks -- may have been a smoke screen. 
 
Why does North Korea so desperately want to talk to the U.S.?  Many 
experts believe that the North faces a crisis.  Damage from cold 
weather, heavy rains and blight has hurt the harvest to the point 
where another famine looms.  At this point, South Korea has 
suspended aid until the North denuclearizes, American aid has 
 
SEOUL 00001463  004 OF 007 
 
 
already been suspended, and even China is not as forthcoming as it 
used to be.  Coupled with rumors of Kim Jong-il's ill health and 
problems involving the succession, the North is seeking an exit 
strategy, and is looking to the U.S. 
 
Is our government's attitude as stable and trustworthy as President 
Lee's confidence suggests?  In a meeting with security advisers on 
Friday, Lee spoke of a "turning point" in the North Korean nuclear 
issue and stressed the need to maintain leadership in the atmosphere 
of inter-Korean dialogue.  But it seems that the North does not 
think of Korea as an equal partner in discussing issues related to 
the Korean Peninsula, and the recent unannounced opening of the 
floodgates of the Hwang River Dam is clear evidence of what it 
really thinks. 
 
There is no guarantee that the U.S. will not recognize the North as 
a nuclear state, under cover of letting it use nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, and that the South will not be dragged around in 
a replay of the past pattern where Seoul provided all the money and 
technology for the construction of light-water reactors in the 
North.  If Obama's pragmatism kicks in, and Lee's pragmatism compels 
him to follow, Kim Jong-il will utter cries of delight once again. 
South Korea and the U.S. are in danger of missing, as they did in 
1998, the best opportunity to get the North to abandon its nuclear 
programs and opt for reform and opening. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
U.S.-N. KOREA DIALOGUE SHOULD LEAD TO DENUCLEARIZATION NEGOTIATIONS 
 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, September 14, 2009, Page 31) 
 
Changes are proceeding apace in the political situation surrounding 
the Korean Peninsula.  After numerous multi-layered conciliatory 
measures from North Korea, following a visit by former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton, the U.S. and North Korea have finally 
declared plans to engage in bilateral dialogue.  Philip J. Crowley, 
Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Public 
Affairs, made it clear in a regular briefing last weekend that both 
countries have consented to talks and that a decision on a time and 
place will be determined within the next two weeks. 
 
Although the U.S. is limiting the character of these talks to an 
attempt to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks, the 
significance of these talks should not be taken lightly in that they 
will represent the first real dialogue between the two countries 
during U.S. President Barack Obama's administration.  Hopes had been 
high for rapid advancements in North Korea-U.S. relations with the 
arrival of this administration, which has been advocating dialogue 
as a way to resolve international conflict, but it has taken nine 
months to get the two countries to this point following North 
Korea's policy of hard-line confrontation such as its rocket launch 
in April.  It is a shame that so much time and energy has been lost 
in finding out each other's true intentions but, on the positive 
side, there is a greater understanding of the need for a solution. 
 
Peace on the Korean Peninsula, the only region in the world still 
caught up in a 20th century-style Cold War, is impossible without a 
simultaneous resolution regarding North Korea's nuclear program and 
its concerns about the stability of its system.  In that sense, both 
North Korea and the U.S. need to approach these talks as an 
opportunity to lay the groundwork for peace on the peninsula and to 
bring back the Six-Party Talks, which made considerable headway 
towards resolving these issues.  The issue of North Korea's nuclear 
program has been under discussion for the past 20 years.  The 
parties involved cannot keep spinning their wheels. 
 
For bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S. to produce any 
results, the governments of interested nations, in particular those 
of Japan and South Korea, urgently need to adopt a future-oriented 
approach.  Their hard-line positions on North Korea have thus far 
been an obstacle to solving the North Korean nuclear issue.  Some 
 
SEOUL 00001463  005 OF 007 
 
 
signs of change are in the air, however.  For example, the 
Democratic Party of Japan that will be taking over the government on 
Wednesday has opened up the possibility for dialogue with North 
Korea.  In contrast, President Lee Myung-bak insists on adhering to 
his present policy tone even while acknowledging that the current 
changes represent "both a momentous turning point and a period of 
upheaval for inter-Korean relations."  This cannot be seen as 
anything but a shame.  The Korean Peninsula is entering a period of 
upheaval in which the peace process that began after the 2000 
inter-Korean summit, but was halted when the George W. Bush 
Administration took office in the U.S., is once again gaining steam. 
South Korea's government should be playing the role of a core 
participant at this time, but if the Lee Administration gets trapped 
in outdated ways of thinking and is unable to keep up with the 
changes, it will foolishly make us bystanders of our own issues. 
The government's North Korea policy should be reexamined at once. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
N.K.-U.S. BILATERAL TALKS 
(Dong-a Ilbo, September 14, 2009, Page 35) 
 
Amid continued international sanctions on North Korea after its May 
2 nuclear test, the possibility of bilateral talks between Pyongyang 
and Washington is increasing.  P.J. Crowley, Spokesman of the U.S. 
State Department, said Friday that the U.S. is ready for dialogue 
with North Korea, adding that Washington will decide on the time and 
venue for the talks within two weeks.  The U.S. made it clear, 
however, that the talks are intended to get North Korea to return to 
the Six-Party Talks.  Yet Washington should exercise caution to 
ensure that the U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks don't replace the 
Six-Party Talks or that the U.S. will not be used by North Korea to 
exclude the ROK from discussion of issues surrounding the Korean 
Peninsula.  Furthermore, the bilateral talks should not result in 
derailing the Six-Party Framework. 
 
Washington may have found it difficult to keep demanding that 
Pyongyang return to the Six-Party Talks as a precondition for 
bilateral talks amid the North's latest peace offensive.  Through 
the visits by U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy 
Stephen Bosworth to South Korea, China and Japan, the U.S. has 
coordinated with the other parties to the Six-Party Talks regarding 
(the possible) bilateral dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. 
As South Korea has expressed support for the bilateral dialogue as 
long as it helps resolve North Korea's nuclear program, there is no 
need to view the Washington-Pyongyang talks from a negative 
perspective. 
 
Yet the purpose of the talks should not just be to get North Korea 
to return to the Six-Party dialogue.  The international community 
knows that the North can walk away from the negotiating table at any 
time.  Therefore, full-fledged bilateral talks should ensure that 
the Six-Party framework is maintained and its results (implemented.) 
 No more time should be wasted because of Pyongyang's delay tactics. 
 
 
Caution is also needed to temper optimism that the North's return to 
the negotiating table will end its nuclear threat.  Seoul should 
also be fully prepared to counter any argument that easing or 
lifting sanctions on Pyongyang should be done to reactivate the 
Six-Party Talks. 
 
The international community should remember that mere dialogue 
without sanctions for North Korea's behavior is not enough to get 
the communist state moving.  Sanctions must remain until it has been 
confirmed that the communist state has abandoned its nuclear 
program. 
 
The dominant view is that Pyongyang is in a desperate situation and 
needs to buy time to avoid international sanctions and to solidify 
its power succession process.  Thorough international coordination 
is essential to prevent the North from taking advantage of its 
 
SEOUL 00001463  006 OF 007 
 
 
bilateral dialogue with the U.S. to get out of its dire 
predicament. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
U.S-NORTH KOREA DIALOGUE SHOULD LEAD TO DENUCLEARIZATION 
NEGOTIATIONS 
(Hankook Ilbo, September 14, 2009, page 39) 
 
The U.S. is moving to hold bilateral talks with North Korea.  The 
U.S. State Department said on Friday that the U.S. is prepared to 
enter into a bilateral discussion with North Korea, adding that 
Washington will decide on the time and venue for the talks within 
the next two weeks.  Considering current circumstances, U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth is expected 
to visit Pyongyang late this month or early next month.  It may be 
too early to jump to this conclusion given complicated relations 
between the U.S. and North Korea.   However, it is clear that the 
long-stalled discussion over the North Korean nuclear issue has 
entered a new phase. 
 
The U.S. has put pressure on North Korea through UN sanctions while 
demanding as the precondition for bilateral talks that Pyongyang 
return to the Six-Party Talks or at least express its intention to 
do so.  This U.S. shift to a "dialogue-first" approach marks a 
significant change.  It seems that the U.S. has realized the need to 
react flexibly to the North Korean position that if the U.S. puts 
sanctions first, it will respond by bolstering its nuclear 
deterrence such as weaponizing its already-extracted plutonium and 
enriching uranium.  It appears that the U.S. also judged that it 
should not repeat the same mistake of encouraging North Korea to 
boost its nuclear capability by sticking to pressure and sanctions 
as the past Bush Administration did. 
 
What matters is that the U.S.-North Korea talks should provide 
momentum for North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks and engage 
in denuclearization negotiations.  The U.S. also made it clear that 
bilateral talks with North Korea will be held for this purpose. 
Ambassador Bosworth revealed this position during his recent visits 
to the ROK, China and Japan to win consent from those countries (to 
the bilateral U.S. - North Korea dialogue.)  However, the prospect 
of holding the Six Party Talks seems uncertain because North Korea 
is highly likely to insist on being recognized as a nuclear state. 
This is why (the other Six Party) countries should continue to 
cooperate closely. 
 
Later this month and early next month, other diplomatic events, such 
as the UN General Assembly, the G20 financial summit in Pittsburgh 
and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to North Korea, are scheduled 
to take place in addition to U.S.-North Korea talks.  These events 
are expected to have a considerable impact on the Korean Peninsula. 
The ROKG should be prepared to proactively respond to the changing 
situation (in dealing with North Korea.)  Some people have expressed 
concern that if the ROKG does not accept the fact that the U.S. and 
North Korea are moving towards having a dialogue, the ROKG will be 
sidelined.  The ROKG should take a flexible but bold approach to 
inter-Korean relations which have recently shown noticeable signs of 
change. 
 
 
RESUMPTION OF U.S.-NORTH KOREA DIALOGUE 
(JoongAng Ilbo, September 14, 2009, Page 46) 
 
The U.S. has decided to resume dialogue with North Korea soon. 
There is reportedly a high possibility that U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth may visit 
Pyongyang in early October.  In response to the declaration by North 
Korea that "the Six-Party Talks are completely over," the U.S. 
applied pressure, saying, "There will not be dialogue unless the 
North returns to the Six-Party Talks;" but the U.S. has now changed 
its stance.  High-level contact between the U.S. and North Korea may 
be held during the UN General Assembly meeting late this month or 
 
SEOUL 00001463  007 OF 007 
 
 
during the October 1 celebration of the 60th anniversary of the 
foundation of China.   The situation on the Korean Peninsula and 
Northeast Asia is entering a new phase. 
 
The USG explains that any dialogue will be aimed at bringing North 
Korea back to the negotiating table.  It is believed that U.S.-North 
Korea dialogue is inevitable in order to resolve the North Korean 
nuclear standoff.  The issue is the format and pace of the dialogue. 
 In short, the U.S.'s 20-year-old process of failed nuclear 
negotiations should not be repeated this time again.  Above all, we 
hope that the Obama Administration will not follow in the footsteps 
of the previous Bush Administration, which took an inconsistent 
approach toward North Korea by adopting an ultra hard-line stance in 
its early days and turning excessively conciliatory in its final 
days.  Early in his presidency, former President Bush labeled the 
North as part of the "axis of evil" and rejected any dialogue with 
it.  But when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 
October, 2007, a year before Bush's presidency expired, Washington 
lifted its financial restrictions against the North and came forward 
for talks with the communist state.  As a result, the Six-Party 
Talks proceeded for some time but, faced with criticism by some U.S. 
lawmakers of the Administration's "too soft" stance on Pyongyang, 
the Bush Administration again insisted on setting out a procedure 
for verifying nuclear dismantlement in the North and did not produce 
any results until its term ended. 
 
There may be several reasons why the Obama Administration decided to 
restart dialogue with the North.  First of all, the administration 
may have taken into consideration the pessimistic view that 
sanctions are not sufficient to make North Korea give up its nuclear 
ambitions in the short term.  In addition, mindful of his declining 
job approval ratings over domestic issues, such as health insurance 
reforms, President Obama may have needed to find a "new 
breakthrough" in U.S. foreign relations.  However, there is an 
(important) point that the USG should not forget under any 
circumstance: it is the principle that North Korea must get rid of 
its nuclear weapons.  The U.S. should not forget this point even for 
a moment. 
 
As the North is strongly committed to possessing nuclear materials, 
it will be difficult to proceed with the North Korean nuclear talks. 
 Therefore, the negotiations will inevitably be prolonged.  In order 
to achieve the goal of nuclear dismantlement in North Korea through 
a difficult and long process, it is essential to have a strong 
determination not to undermine the principle.  In this sense, the 
USG is right to stick to the Six-Party framework.  In particular, 
sanctions imposed on North Korea - a nation which broke all 
agreements and has made progress on nuclear development - should 
also be maintained at least until the North demonstrates its 
commitment toward nuclear abandonment through action. 
 
So far, the strategy of using both "carrots and sticks" in 
negotiations with North Korea has not worked properly.  North Korea 
has just used "weak sticks and excessive carrots" to its advantage. 
However, the U.S. should bear in mind that even weak stick measures, 
if maintained for a long time, will produce a strong effect on the 
North and the U.S. should take a consistent approach toward the 
North. 
 
 
TOKOLA