VZCZCXRO6562
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHYN #1729/01 2720421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
R 290421Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2832
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0943
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0282
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0284
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0289

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 001729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP, DS/CR/OCI, NEA/ARP 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
RIYADH FOR DHS/ICE ATTACHE 
ATHENS FOR DHS/CIS OIC 
CAIRO FOR RCO CHRISTOPHER ROWAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC YM
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - SANA'A 
 
REF: A)SANAA 583 
     B)Turnbull/Hooshangi/Carothers/Sexton E-Mail 08/24/09 
 
SANAA 00001729  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶1. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle 
East, with an illiteracy rate of over 50% and unemployment rates 
over 30%.  Yemen is also home to upwards of 500,000 - 600,000 
refugees, mostly of Somali origin.  Due to lack of opportunities in 
Yemen, the impetus for and volume of fraud witnessed at post is 
high.  Unfortunately, legitimate civil documents are easily obtained 
based on falsely-provided information and therefore often must be 
discounted.  Fraud prevention efforts rely heavily on scientific 
testing, trend analysis, and vigorous investigations. 
 
¶2. NIV FRAUD: NIV fraud makes up less than 5% of Post's fraud 
efforts, as cases suspected of even minor fraud are refused under 
214(b).  During this six-month period, Post has adjudicated 2268 NIV 
cases, most of which are adjudicated by our half-time NIV officer. 
One unique aspect of NIVs in Yemen is the frequent refusal of 
applicants seeking B1/B2 visas, who are in possession of Diplomatic 
or Official Yemeni passports.  Low salaries and a history of Yemeni 
officials overstaying their visas often results in an inability to 
overcome a 214(b) inadmissibility finding.  In Yemen, issuance of 
diplomatic passports is not limited to diplomatic officials and 
their immediate families. 
 
Due to the large turnover in officers and understaffing of the FPU, 
Post did not perform a validation study during this reporting 
period.  We are now in the process of conducting validation studies 
for referrals. 
 
¶3. IV FRAUD:  Due to the pervasive fraud environment, all Immigrant 
Visa (IV) cases are considered fraudulent until proven otherwise. 
Interviews are complex, due not only to fraud, but also to the 
illiteracy and poor education of applicants.  "I don't know" and "I 
don't understand" are common responses from the beneficiary to basic 
questions about her family.  Post, therefore, allows petitioners to 
participate in interviews, as the petitioner is often the only one 
able to locate and obtain documents, complete paperwork, and provide 
information we would normally expect the beneficiary to be able to 
articulate in the interview.  This increases the difficulty of fraud 
detection, as officers are forced to rely on a series of patterns 
and interviewing experience in order to detect fraud successfully. 
 
Post estimates that 1686, or two-thirds, of the 2542 IV cases 
adjudicated during the reporting period were referred directly to 
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU).  Approximately 226 of these were 
referred for phone investigations and 1395 for DNA testing.  Some 
cases also require both DNA and a phone investigation.  Since phone 
numbers and names are provided by the petitioner and beneficiary for 
phone investigations, Post waits several months before conducting a 
phone investigation.  As a result, even those who had been coached 
on what to say often revert to the truth, having forgotten the story 
they had been coached to tell. 
 
Step-child fraud is increasing at Post (see para 3 of reftel A).  In 
this growing trend, the petitioner immigrated as unmarried when he 
was in fact married and the "step-children" are actually his 
children.  When DNA testing reveals that the children are biological 
and not step-children, the applicants must then obtain new, correct 
identification documents in order to immigrate.  It is both costly 
and timely to obtain all new civil documents, applications, 
affidavits of support, and all other documents, as all documents 
were issued based on the false name provided for the 
"step-children."  Furthermore, A/RSO-I simultaneously coordinates 
with local authorities to prosecute any applicant who returns to the 
Consular Section in possession of two sets of ROYG-issued 
identification documents in different names. 
 
Recently, however, Post has noticed a twist in step-child fraud that 
represents a new trend.  The petitioner immigrated as unmarried, and 
is now altering the date of marriage and dates of birth of the 
children, since he was married at the time of immigration. 
Falsification of the children's ages is necessary since children are 
rarely born out of wedlock in Yemen.  Post has caught on to this 
fraud by noticing a recent spike in children who look much older 
than claimed during their interviews.  Post combats this type of 
fraud through bone-age testing and again requiring the petitioner to 
acquire new, correct identification documents for his children.  In 
cases where the petitioner is a Legal Permanent Resident (LPR), 
 
SANAA 00001729  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
however, A/RSO-I is able to pursue the revocation of his status 
since his being married would have precluded him from an F-2B visa. 
During the reporting period, Post received the results for 
approximately 120 bone age tests indicating under reporting of age 
in at least 85% of the cases. 
 
In CR/IR cases at Post, it is very unusual to see an American 
petitioner who is not of Yemeni origin.  However, in these rare 
cases, the Yemeni father has often overstayed on a B1/B2 visa and 
adjusted status by marrying a non-Yemeni American.  He then 
convinces his new wife to petition for his children from a 
"previous" marriage, when in fact the first wife is still alive in 
Yemen and is still married to him.  A/RSO-I refers these cases to 
U.S.-based field agents who can pursue deportation of the Yemeni 
father, and notify American authorities of a polygamous marriage. 
 
Polygamous marriages are extremely common in Yemen (see para 3 of 
reftel A).  In cases with more than one wife listed, polygamy is 
suspected, even if the petition claims previous marriages had 
terminated in divorce or death.  Yemenis frequently try to abuse the 
divorce system to cover up polygamous marriages by claiming they 
have divorced previous spouses when they are only separated. 
Shari'a law, upon which Yemeni law is based, requires three decrees 
for a divorce to become final and legal.  Post only accepts the 
final, third decree as evidence of divorce.  FPU investigations 
routinely reveal that claimed divorces were never finalized or that 
previous spouses are not deceased. 
 
Post remains skeptical of all cases involving children over the age 
of 20 who claim to be single.  According to a recent sociological 
study, approximately 80% of Yemeni men and women marry by the age of 
20, and nearly 50% by the age of 15.  Post sees many Yemeni males in 
their late 20s and 30s who claim to be unmarried, but subsequent 
phone investigations often reveal they have wives and children.  For 
F-1s, they are simply requested to provide proof of their marriage 
and are transferred to F-3s; IR-2s are similarly transferred to 
F-1s. F-2s and those who refuse to confess have their cases sent to 
DHS with the recommendation that they be revoked. 
 
K-Visa: As per para 3 of reftel A, K-1 visas remain suspicious due 
to Yemeni cultural norms that would prevent an unmarried woman from 
traveling to meet a fianc.  Phone investigations are conducted for 
all K-1 visas, due to the suspicion that the beneficiary and 
petitioner are in fact already married and therefore ineligible for 
the K-1 visa.  In over 90% of these cases, phone investigations 
reveal that the petitioner and beneficiary are already married, 
resulting in requests for revocation.  Some phone investigations 
also result in the discovery that the beneficiary is not the only 
current wife of the petitioner. 
 
Investigation Procedures: Country security conditions still prevent 
FPU from performing field investigations.  We rely almost 
exclusively on phone investigations to combat the aforementioned 
types of fraud.  FPU has been remarkably successful in finding 
"deceased" spouses and getting full confessions from them on the 
phone.  Phone investigations have also been successful in combating 
polygamy-related fraud as the second wife will readily admit to her 
status outside the interview window. 
 
Of the 85 phone investigations performed during the reporting 
period, 64 uncovered material fraud.  In only about 10-15% of phone 
investigations were we unable to obtain information due to 
uncooperative or suspicious relatives.  Post's ARSO-I obtains 
several confessions each month from applicants and petitioners 
during DNA sampling in addition to information voluntarily provided 
by the petitioner when scheduling DNA testing. 
 
Post's FPU remains severely overburdened and understaffed.  The EFM 
Fraud Prevention Supervisor position has remained unfilled since 
January 2009, and ARSO-I has been acting as FPM in addition to his 
other duties.  Two LE Staff are responsible for all phone 
investigations and work extra hours to perform DNA sampling.  In 
addition to the aforementioned duties, FPU performs approximately 14 
document, video and picture analyses, and translations per day. 
 
¶4. DV FRAUD: DV cases continue to be extremely difficult to evaluate 
in Yemen due to the large number of Somali applicants.  Neither Post 
nor AmEmb Addis have the capacity to verify any Somali documents. 
Therefore there is no concrete way to determine the bona-fides of 
Somali DV applicants who attempt to qualify based on education. 
 
SANAA 00001729  003.3 OF 005 
 
 
Officers attempt to interview such applicants stringently, but 
ultimately the burden of proof remains on the applicants.  It is 
equally challenging to evaluate most Yemenis who attempt to qualify 
based on work experience, since documents can be easily obtained. 
Post continues to train its new officers on the use of O*Net to 
improve its interviewing capacity.  The use of LE Staff field 
expertise in medicine has also been vital to combating DV fraud, as 
Post has seen several applicants from this field. 
 
On the other hand, the bona-fides of Yemeni applicants who attempt 
to qualify based on education are easily verified via contacts in 
the ROYG Ministry of Education and at several universities.  During 
the reporting period, 7 of 30 Yemeni educational documents submitted 
in DV cases that were sent for review turned out fraudulent. 
 
Yemeni education standards are significantly lower than those of the 
United States.  50% is a passing grade for Yemeni high school 
graduates.  Post is attempting to recalibrate its standards to meet 
the FAM requirement that all DV applicants be "able to apply for 
university in the US."  Since Yemeni universities require at a 
minimum a 70% passing grade from high school, Post recently 
submitted an Advisory Opinion (ref B) requesting permission from CA 
to change its requirement from 50% to 70% to be a passing high 
school grade, in order to align with both Yemeni and U.S. university 
standards. 
 
(e) ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: In many IV cases, the petitioner may 
have sufficient physical presence in the U.S. to transmit U.S. 
citizenship to the beneficiary of the IV petition.  Of the 983 
Consular Reports of Birth Abroad (CRBA) applicants interviewed 
during the reporting period, Post estimates that 250 were referrals 
from IV.  Post has worked hard to streamline the communication 
between these two sections and now each routinely refers to the 
other's notes.  This has greatly helped our fraud prevention 
procedures as the fraud from IV carries over to ACS once the case is 
referred. 
 
The most common types of fraud in first time CRBA applications are 
relationship related.  Since many cases are refused simply for lack 
of physical presence documentation, Post rarely has cause to pursue 
document-fraud as it relates to physical presence.  However, as our 
applicant pool is uneducated and poor, they often do not possess 
convincing proof of relationships.  DNA testing was used in 
approximately 96 such cases to ensure that only the children of 
Amcits are obtaining passport benefits.  More recently, we are 
seeing falsification of dates of birth for children in order to 
ensure sufficient physical presence to transmit citizenship.  Post 
combats this fraud through bone age testing. 
 
In passport renewals, the first passport contains a photo of an 
infant that is not easily matched to the young adult in front of the 
officer.  In these cases, Post requests photos showing the applicant 
at different ages, or requests DNA testing to prove the relationship 
with the parents. 
 
¶6. ADOPTION FRAUD: Yemeni law has no provisions for legal adoption, 
yet Post continues to witness attempts to petition for "adopted" 
children in Yemen.  These cases are returned to USCIS for revocation 
since there is no petition-able relationship.  During the reporting 
period Post noted 4-5 such cases. 
 
¶7. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post utilizes a Cellmark lab in Sana'a to 
process all DNA requests.  All DNA tests conducted by Cellmark tests 
siblings and compare husband and wife.  DNA testing is an 
outstanding deterrent to fraud.  Half of Post's applicants for DNA 
testing fail to complete the required testing, preferring not to 
spend money on a test that will only confirm fraud. 
 
As mentioned above, FPU handles many Post-initiated requests for DNA 
testing.  In addition, FPU continues to receive requests from DHS 
for DNA testing prior to the forwarding of some cases to Post.  DHS 
currently requests DNA testing for only selected family members in 
each case.  Post, however, requires that all family members submit 
to DNA testing.  As a result, Post has received DNA results showing 
that "parents" are siblings, "children" are grandchildren, 
"siblings" are not related to each other, and "step-children" are 
children.  Post's more-stringent DNA testing requirement has 
revealed a much larger fraud picture. 
 
In this six-month period, the FPU conducted DNA testing on 
 
SANAA 00001729  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
approximately 1400 people and has dramatically streamlined the 
overall process. 
 
¶8. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: There are no new developments 
this reporting period. 
 
¶9. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: 
Post currently does not have any open cases related to these topics. 
 Yemen's borders and coastline are porous and poorly monitored, 
allowing regular movement from both sea and land.  Additionally, 
Yemen is coping with the continual illegal immigration of various 
nationalities from the Horn of Africa region and has, as of yet, 
been unable to stem the flow. 
 
¶10. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: An A/RSO-I has been assigned 
to the Consular Section since December 2008.  The A/RSO-I reports 
directly to the Consular Chief for all matters concerning consular 
investigations and to the RSO for all security issues.  The A/RSO-I 
is currently collocated with the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) and has 
been serving as the acting Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) since 
January 2009.  A Vice Consul will move into the FPM role on October 
¶1. 
 
The local government has shown interest in prosecuting only those 
document fraud cases which involve an imposter or someone with 
Yemeni identification documents in two different names. 
Fraudulently-obtained documents or legitimately-issued documents 
obtained with incorrect information are of no concern to the local 
authorities. 
 
The working relationship is improving between the A/RSO-I and local 
law enforcement.  Post is now able to get lead requests answered in 
a timely fashion. 
 
The A/RSO-I is the RSO and Consular Section's liaison with other law 
enforcement entities at Post and assists with various inter-agency 
investigations of mutual interest.  The ARSO-I assists in the 
entering of fraud related lookouts and watch phrases into the CCD 
and assists Consular Officers with conducting criminal records 
checks for visa and passport applicants. 
 
¶11. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
Both fraudulent and legally-issued Yemeni civil documents are easily 
attainable for a price.  The Civil Status Authority (CSA) requires 
no evidence of an event to issue civil documents, and Yemenis rarely 
document births, deaths, marriages, or divorces when they happen. 
Documents are procured only later when they are needed for a 
bureaucratic procedure.  A complete absence of record-keeping and 
rampant corruption within the CSA and court system mean that even 
legitimately-issued documents often reflect fraudulent information 
or record events that never occurred.  Given Post's serious security 
concerns and rampant relationship fraud with immigrant visas, 
Yemen's weak documentation is a significant border-security 
vulnerability. 
 
The Immigration and Passport Authority is responsible for the 
issuance of Yemeni Machine Readable Passports (MRP).  They encounter 
the same problems as the CSA regarding records management and fraud 
prevention.  Given that the breeder documents needed to obtain a 
passport are readily available for a price, Yemeni passports can 
easily be obtained with false bio-data. 
 
¶12. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:  FPU has a very 
strong working relationship with ROYG Civil Status Authority (CSA) 
officials.  The CSA continues to share information and assist in 
document validations and analysis of fraud patterns at Post.  This 
is a direct result of the continued effort on the part of the FPU 
FSNs. 
 
¶13. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: A more troubling version of IV 
step-child fraud is on the rise, raising concerns at Post about 
alien smuggling.  Post is seeing an increase in petitions for IR-2 
and F33 step-children, when in reality there is no 
step-parent/step-child relationship.  In these cases, the 
"step-father" petitions for "step-children" after the "biological 
mother" is supposedly deceased.  However, given the easily-obtained, 
legitimate civil documents which contain false information, our 
applicants can acquire "step-children" with little cost and effort, 
when in fact no such relationship exists. 
 
 
SANAA 00001729  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
Post is not certain how the petitioner is connected to these 
beneficiary "step-children," nor do we know who these children are. 
DNA results over the years confirm that Yemenis have no qualms 
petitioning for relatives such as cousins, nieces and nephews, and 
grandchildren as "children," believing that DNA will sufficiently 
confirm a familial relationship, yet not reveal the specific nature 
of the non-petitionable relationship that actually exists. 
Therefore, we are certain that there is no familial 
relationship-otherwise these beneficiaries would have been listed as 
"children" and not as "step-children." 
 
Furthermore, we seriously doubt the story of the deceased "mother" 
that the petitioner supposedly had married.  We also suspect that 
the identity of the deceased "mother" has been altered, and 
therefore phone investigations would not be effective, as we would 
clearly be given away by using the fake name of both the mother and 
the child in question. 
 
We believe these children are from the same town or village as the 
petitioner, and that the petitioner is smuggling the beneficiary 
children to the U.S.  We also suspect that the true parents are 
seeking NIVs with the intention of settling permanently in the U.S. 
with their children who were naturalized at the port of entry as 
U.S. citizens, thanks to the petitioner who smuggled them in.  We 
would have no way of associating the real parents with their now 
U.S. citizen children during NIV interviews, as the children would 
most likely have been naturalized under the same false identities 
they used while being smuggled. 
 
Since DNA testing and phone investigations are not applicable in 
these situations and document integrity is so poor, Post has no way 
of determining who these children are and no method for refusing 
these highly-suspect cases.  Post has sent an Advisory Opinion to 
the Department asking for guidance since Post currently does not 
know how legally to refuse to issue these cases. 
 
A disturbing, rising trend in ACS is criminal fraud in repatriation 
cases.  During the reporting period, every one of the 18 Amcits for 
whom Post has begun repatriation cases involved breaking a law, 
whether Yemeni or U.S., and in several cases there was a criminal 
nexus.  Even when asked directly about criminal charges, many of 
these applicants lie to the consular officers, denying that such 
charges exist.  In these six months, Post has witnessed links to 
kidnapping, terrorism, child abuse, forced marriage of a minor 
child, armed robbery, assault, and murder.  CONOFFs work closely 
with contacts in LEGATT and RSO to investigate these situations 
fully, but the exceptional difficulty they present continues to 
strain the Section. 
 
¶14. STAFFING AND TRAINING:  Currently the A/RSO-I is waiting for 
funding for an LES-I position.  This is a critical asset that is 
required since the A/RSO-I position was not initially coded for 
language and every interview requires an FPU LES to assist.  A 
language designation has since been added to the A/RSO-I position, 
but given the immense fraud portfolio and other issues that dovetail 
with the A/RSO-I portfolio, an LES-I position is greatly needed. 
Post is also trying to obtain funding for an additional Fraud 
Analyst LE Staff position to assist with the overwhelming workload. 
 
¶15. The POC for this cable is Consular Section Chief Kim Shaw, who 
can be reached at 967-1-755-2154 or at shawk@state.gov. 
 
 
SECHE