VZCZCXRO3042
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0399/01 2591206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161206Z SEP 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7233
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000399 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF SU PHUM LY QA CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN FAKI SAYS CHAD ACTING RESPONSIBLY ON JEM, 
CHAD-SUDAN, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, AND CHILD SOLDIERS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 362 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 355 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 353 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 311 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 306 
     ¶F. NDJAMENA 283 
 
NDJAMENA 00000399  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (U) ACTION MESSAGE:  This is an action message:  See para 
¶8. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Chad FORMIN Faki told Ambassador September 16 that 
he was looking forward to representing Chad as Head of 
Delegation at the UNGA and afterwards in Washington.  Faki 
said that Chad had continued to implement a coherent policy 
regarding JEM, normalization of Chad-Sudan relations, and 
reconciliation with Chad rebels, including child soldiers. 
Chad had continued to act in good faith with its friends in 
the international community as well as in Chad's own best 
interests.  The GoC had:  Continued to press JEM to reach a 
political solution in Darfur because "no military solution 
was possible;" been talking to Sudan bilaterally on 
normalizing relations, welcomed the idea of a Sudanese 
delegation to Chad and bilateral meetings at UNGA and was 
willing to go to Khartoum for the next meeting of the Dakar 
Accord Contact Group; continued to welcome defectors from 
Chad rebel groups and former opposition leaders back to Chad 
(he cited Soubiane and Goukouni); and was working 
increasingly closely with UNICEF with the goal of eliminating 
child soldiers on Chadian soil. Faki said he looked forward 
to talking to USG representatives in NY and that he would be 
happy to consider meetings in the Department after his UNGA 
duties were finished. 
 
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CHAD-JEM 
-------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Faki said the GOC had continued to tell JEM that 
there was "no possible military solution" to the Darfur 
crisis, and to press Khalil Ibrahim to negotiate seriously 
and rationally on all key issues, including sequencing 
prisoner-release until after a cease-fire and giving up its 
pretensions to be the "only actor" representing Darfur (Ref 
E).  Faki said that the GOC had "pressured" JEM to go to 
Libya and work closely with Libyan mediators, as well as with 
SE Gration's efforts. 
 
---------- 
CHAD-SUDAN 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Faki said that Chad remained open to nearly all 
efforts to normalize its relations with Sudan. Most recently 
Faki had discussed bilateral relations in Libya September 1 
with Razi Saladdin, who had protested Sudanese good faith in 
seeking rapprochement with Chad.  Faki had told Razi that 
Chad still had its doubts and that "the ball was still in 
Sudan's court" regarding concrete steps toward a 
rapprochement: Sudan to stop supporting Chad rebels, canton 
them, and permit any who wished to return to Chad to do so. 
Faki said that President Deby had agreed in Tripoli to a 
Sudanese proposal to send a Razi-led delegation to N'Djamena 
and that, despite that delegation never materializing, Faki 
himself had agreed to meet with Razi in NY during the UNGA. 
Faki said Chad welcomed the apparent decision of the Dakar 
Accord Contact Group co-chairs Congo B and Libya to re-launch 
efforts to implement the accord, and Faki was willing to 
Khartoum, where the next Contact Group meeting should be held 
(Refs D and F). 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The only things Chad would not/not do regarding 
Sudan were:  (A) Agree to a Bachir-Deby summit before/before 
Chad-Sudan relations were fully normalized and guaranteed by 
mediating powers; and (B) Renounce its position on the ICC's 
indictment of Bachir.  The former would hand Sudan a media 
and diplomatic victory with no quid-pro-quo for Chad and the 
latter would violate Chad's adherence to the ICC and its 
 
NDJAMENA 00000399  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
values.  Apart from those conditions, Chad was willing to 
discuss anything and everything regarding Chad-Sudan 
relations. 
 
----------------------- 
CHAD REBELS AND 
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Faki said that the Chad rebel situation seemed to 
be "calming down," with the defection of Ahmat Soubiane from 
rebel ranks and the return to Chad of ex-President Goukouni 
Oueddei marking significant progress (Refs B, C, and E). 
Faki said that many rebels had defected individually and in 
groups, and that Sudan had forcibly prevented the defection 
August 30-31 of a large group of Mahamat Nouri's fighters, 
and may have killed some of them.  Faki noted renewed GOC 
efforts to eliminate child soldiers on Chadian soil and 
increased cooperation with UNICEF on this issue (Ref A). 
 
---------- 
FAKI IN DC 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Faki said he looked forward to talking to USG 
representatives in NY and that he would be happy to consider 
meetings in the Department after his UNGA duties were 
finished.  In DC he said he would participate in the Congo 
Basin Forest meeting on the Hill and that he would dedicate 
the new Chadian Embassy towards the end of this month. 
 
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ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  That the Department consider meetings in DC as 
well as in NY for Faki, and that USG goals in all such 
meetings reflect the totality of our interests in Chad and 
the region. (We do not suggest that Faki ought to see the ame 
USG officials he saw in July, but that some consideration of 
other useful meetings for him would be a good idea.) 
 
¶9.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO