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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2413, CULTURE" IS NO EXCUSE FOR ABUSES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2413 2009-09-21 12:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO0437
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2413/01 2641239
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211239Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4871
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002413 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM RS
SUBJECT: "CULTURE" IS NO EXCUSE FOR ABUSES 
 
REF: MOSCOW 2338 
 
1. (SBU) Meeting with us to discuss a GOR attempt to water 
down UN Human Rights Council work by introducing a resolution 
on "respect for traditional values" (reftel), a member of the 
MFA's Department of Human Rights and Humanitarian Cooperation 
acknowledged deep flaws in Russia's protection of rights and 
democratic freedoms.He also recognized the limits of the 
"cultural relativism" argument used by some to denigrate the 
primacy of human rights protection.  He asked for patience as 
Russia attempts to reform, and predicted a more fair society 
for his children.  Our human rights contacts also pinned 
their hopes on the younger generation, while asking us to 
keep up the pressure on the GOR to deliver on its rhetorical 
promises.  End Summary. 
 
Playing the "cultural relativism" card 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On September 11, we met with Andrey Lanchikov of the 
MFA's Department of Human Rights and Humanitarian Cooperation 
to discuss a GOR attempt to introduce a resolution on 
"respect for traditional values" into the work of the UN 
Human Rights Council (reftel).  By promoting this initiative, 
the GOR seeks to put forth the idea that human rights, rather 
than being universal, are contingent on a nation's culture. 
 
3. (SBU) The "cultural relativism" argument is not a new one. 
 The UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects 
fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to life 
and freedom of expression, but it also protects individual 
cultures.  Under the cultural relativism argument, a member 
of a culture whose practices violate human rights may argue 
that anyone attempting to prevent him from carrying out these 
practices is violating his cultural rights. 
 
A choice between human rights and Russian culture? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4. (SBU) In Russia, cultural relativism provides opponents of 
meaningful human rights and civil society promotion with a 
convenient excuse for inaction or obstructionism.  They 
portray the idea of universal human rights as Western, and 
incongruous with Russian culture.  During the course of its 
existence for over a millennium, the Russian nation has had 
little or no experience with civic freedoms.  The post-Soviet 
euphoria was short-lived, and the past eight years have seen 
a slide back to what some consider Russia's "natural state," 
in which the majority of people support a strong, autocratic 
hand steering the ship of state (the Russian word for "to 
govern," "rukovodit'," literally means to steer something 
with one's hand). 
 
5. (SBU) The economic reality of the past two decades has led 
many Russians to associate the poverty and chaos of the 1990s 
with civic freedoms, and the wealth of the Putin years with 
his moves to curtail those freedoms.  According to the 
popular nationalist narrative, eagerly fed by GOR statements, 
U.S. support for reforms in the 1990s was part of a plan to 
keep Russia down, which failed when oil wealth -- and Putin's 
wise policies -- brought Russia "back from its knees." 
Working in this environment to promote human rights puts the 
U.S. in a delicate position; those who oppose expanding civil 
society use any linkage with Western countries to promote 
their narrative that the U.S. is working to destabilize 
Russia via a "color revolution."  We frequently must maintain 
a balancing act, striving to help those who work to hold 
their government accountable, without making them appear to 
be puppets in our employ. 
 
Don't believe it 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU)  The view that Russians do not want more freedom is 
superficial, and under closer examination is not borne out. 
Andrey Rikhter told us September 9 that anyone who argues 
that Russian culture is not conducive to human rights and 
individual freedoms has "not been paying close attention to 
this country," and may even have a patronizing or 
condescending view of the Russian people.  According to 
Rikhter, the "people power" visible in the streets of Moscow 
and St. Petersburg in 1991 was not an anomaly.  Even now, in 
polls Russians consistently support principles such as a free 
press and a multiparty system.  A June Levada poll indicated 
that 57 percent of Russians would prefer to see the return of 
direct gubernatorial elections.  More directly, a July Levada 
poll showed 57 percent of Russians answering "yes" to the 
question, "Does Russia need democratic freedoms?", with 67 
percent of Russians aged 25-40 agreeing. 
 
Lanchikov: Problems are "no secret," but be patient 
 
MOSCOW 00002413  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7. (SBU) Even members of the GOR have acknowledged to us the 
limits of the "cultural relativism" argument as an obstacle 
to promotion of human rights.  Lanchikov noted that the 
concept of "Russian culture" is complicated, as Russia 
consists of a number of different cultures, not only among 
its myriad of ethnic groups (at the "rossiskiy" level), but 
also within traditional Russian Orthodox groups (at the 
"russkiy" level).  He alluded to the American joke that if 
there are two lawyers in a room, that means there are three 
opinions, and he applied this idea to Russians as well. 
Boris Bogdanov noted that culture need not be thought of as a 
"bounded entity," fixed and unchanging; on the contrary, its 
borders are "porous and fluid," and it naturally changes over 
time and receives outside influences.  Lanchikov admitted 
that different civilizations, no matter how diverse in the 
trajectory of their development, have always included respect 
for human rights in some form; human rights "are not 
something alien" in any culture. 
 
8. (SBU) Lanchikov showed surprising candor in his assessment 
of the current state of human rights in Russia.  He said that 
Russia's problems stem not from its laws, but from their de 
facto enforcement, the flaws of which he called "no secret." 
He said that the GOR "needs to work on this better," and he 
intimated that, as a private citizen, he himself finds it 
frustrating living in a society without an established rule 
of law applied fairly to everybody.  At the same time, he 
counseled patience, saying that the GOR is working on 
creating new practices and standards, as well as attempting 
to stamp out corruption, but that "we can't expect it all to 
change in one hour."  He added that the GOR is aware of its 
international obligations in this area, and noted that 
average citizens also have an obligation to educate 
themselves better about their rights. 
 
Our contacts agree 
------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Perhaps ironically, Lanchikov's call for patience is 
echoed among our human rights contacts.  Exhorting us "not to 
give up," and not to abandon rights defenders who "need your 
support now more than ever," Moscow Helsinki Group's Lyudmila 
Alekseyeva nonetheless told us, "Don't get discouraged when 
we don't meet our shared goals overnight."  Grigoriy Shvedov 
agreed, advising us to develop a long-term strategy that will 
gradually raise consciousness and change social norms.  As 
Shvedov noted, for truly meaningful systemic changes to take 
place, people will need to overcome their own passivity; help 
from the outside is valuable, but only up to a point. 
 
10. (SBU) Both Lanchikov and our human rights activists 
therefore prefer to take the long view.  Lanchikov, while 
offering his veiled complaint about living under the current 
system, said, "I think my children will have a better life 
than I do."  We have heard this statement almost verbatim on 
numerous occasions from our contacts, many of whom are 
getting old and thus pinning their hopes on the younger 
generation.  That the July Levada poll in favor of increased 
freedoms (para 7) showed a notable upward bump when applied 
to younger people appears to bolster this belief. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) We should reject simplistic statements such as 
"Russia's culture does not allow for individual rights."  At 
the same time, it would be equally simplistic to view the 
Russian populace as teeming with eagerness to topple the 
status quo.  The weakness of Russia's legal institutions and 
the lack of a viable watchdog on government activity are 
symptomatic of an absence of fair, equal rules applicable to 
everyone.  For this reason, Shvedov is correct when he 
suggests that a change in social norms will be an integral 
part of any meaningful reform.  Some liberals cling to the 
hope that recent GOR statements decrying the ossified and 
corrupt system of oligarchs, clans, and abuses of personal 
freedoms indicate a sincere desire to implement meaningful 
change.  However, in the long run the "porousness and 
fluidity" of Russian culture may prove a more effective 
vehicle for real change, at both the top and bottom levels of 
society. 
Beyrle