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226887
2009-09-24 21:31:00
09MEXICO2778
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
09MEXICO2579
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TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 002778 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: A LOOK AT MEXICO STATE, POTEMKIN VILLAGE STYLE 
 REF: MEXICO 002579 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado. 
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Poloffs traveled to Toluca, the capital of 
Mexico State (Estado de Mexico - Edomex) and headquarters for 
popular Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) Governor 
Enrique Pena Nieto, on September 10-11 for what turned out to 
be two highly-orchestrated days of meetings with state 
officials, politicians, and a civil society representative 
hand-picked by Edomex officials to try to better understand 
the politics, economics, and leadership of the country's most 
populous state.  While the visit offered a less-than-balanced 
perspective on presidential hopeful Pena Nieto's performance, 
it clearly revealed the extent to which his current efforts 
are geared to preparing for a future presidential bid, shed 
light on his recent outreach to the United States, and 
provided some insight into his style of governing.  Pena 
Nieto's commitment to popular infrastructure projects is 
clear; his commitment to progressive reforms is not.  With 
influence over the majority of the local congress, 
municipalities, and a large representation in the federal 
Chamber of Deputies, Pena Nieto has an enormous opportunity 
to shape state and, to a lesser degree, federal politics over 
the next three years.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (C) Poloffs traveled to Mexico State on September 10-11 
for a visit that was highly managed by Edomex officials from 
the governor's Office of International Affairs.  The handlers 
accompanied Poloffs to each meeting, which included 
presentations by the Social Development, Education, 
Government Secretariats, the State Security Agency, the State 
Commission on Human Rights, the Autonomous University of 
Mexico State, a local PRI congressman, and a representative 
from a civil society organization working with indigenous 
communities in the state.  At each meeting, representatives 
reminded Poloffs of the state's unique political, economic, 
and geographic features and challenges.  Nearly engulfing 
Mexico City, the state counts the largest population in the 
country, its 15 million accounting for 13.7 percent of the 
national total in only 1.1 percent of the country's 
territory.  The population is highly transient -- which 
officials blame for security and economic challenges -- since 
Edomex serves as a transit point for migrants en route to the 
United States and also as a destination point for those 
looking for work in one of the country's economic hubs.  The 
state is responsible for a fair share of the Mexican economy, 
with its GDP representing almost 10 percent of the country's 
total last year. 
 
Party and Personal Politics 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Elected governor in 2005, Pena Nieto is at a new high 
point in his 6 year term in office.  The party and other 
political opinion makers had pitched the July 5 federal and 
local elections as a litmus test for his ability to produce 
favorable electoral results for the PRI and prove himself as 
more than just a pretty political face.  He passed the test 
in spades.  The PRI went from controlling 55 municipalities 
to 97 (of 125), from 19 to 40 local congressional slots (of 
45), and from 7 to 38 federal deputies (of 40 directly 
elected from Mexico State, plus a number of plurinominal 
seats).  Mexico State Undersecretary of Government Alejandro 
Nieto Enriquez openly admitted that Pena Nieto will have a 
much freer hand in implementing policies now that he has seen 
to the "decimation" of the National Action Party (PAN) and 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) in the corridors 
bordering Mexico City.  He reported that the governor can 
also count on support from the Green Party (PVEM), Nueva 
Alianza (PANAL), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and, to a 
certain extent, even Convergencia, in the local congress.  At 
the federal level, Pena Nieto controls the single largest 
bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, and the Undersecretary also 
said the governor personally wields significant influence in 
the Green Party (PVEM), the PRI's electoral and sometime 
congressional ally.  He said that the leader of the PVEM's 
Chamber of Deputies bloc, Juan Jose Guerra Abud, was in fact 
 
MEXICO 00002778  002 OF 005 
 
 
the governor's former boss and that the two remain close. 
Indicative of his growing influence within the party at the 
national level, 14 PRI governors (19 of Mexico,s 31 
governors are from the PRI) and over 200 federal deputies 
attended his yearly "State of the State" address in early 
September.  While it is too early to say that the PRI is 
closing ranks around candidate Pena Nieto, it is clear that a 
majority of PRI elected officials see some benefit in 
associating more closely with him. 
 
¶4. (C) A number of factors contributed to the PRI's electoral 
success in Mexico State, including the PRD's constant 
infighting and the PAN's unlucky affliction with a struggling 
economy.  Nevertheless, Pena Nieto's popularity in Edomex -- 
his approval ratings topped 70 percent in a recent, reliable 
poll -- certainly provided the party with a much needed boost 
in a state that has long had a PRI governor but has had a far 
less reliable hold of the local congress and mayorships.  The 
question, of course, is how much of the esteem for Pena Nieto 
is a result of his personal charm and careful crafting of his 
image and how much is due to serious work to improve and 
reform his state. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Mexico State's densely packed urban areas and 
impoverished districts make it fertile ground for crime of 
all sorts.  The State Security Agency (ASE) -- Edomex's 
preventative police force -- said that 261,849 crimes were 
reported in 2008, ranking it 11th nationally but still below 
Mexico City in terms of per capita crime rates.  Crime rates 
have risen about 17.5 percent since 2002, compared to a 
national average of 16.4 percent over the same period.  In 
terms of organized crime violence, Embassy statistics 
indicate that Mexico State in 2009 had seen 231 narco-related 
homicides as of September 11, 360 in 2008, 11 in 2007, and 31 
in 2006.  Edomex so far this year has the sixth highest 
number of narco-related homicides nationally. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Improvements in the state's security situation and 
reform of its justice apparatus appear high on the 
government's agenda.  ASE, which includes 14,198 operational 
police officers, reported that it is in a period of 
transition.  The agency is increasingly focused on collection 
and use of intelligence in its preventative policing role, as 
well as organizing units to focus on specific crimes, which 
officials claimed has helped to reduce in particular crime 
linked to gangs and increase the capture of criminals by some 
30 percent.  Poloffs toured the state command center, which 
acts as a centralized C-4 (communication, coordination, and 
control).  Analysts were actively exploiting databases 
containing a myriad of information, including fingerprint and 
biometric data, license plate numbers, and telephone numbers. 
 ASE officials said that SEDENA, SSP, and paramedic/fire 
teams always have representatives at the command center, 
although Poloffs only saw paramedics present during their 
tour.  While the federal Attorney General's Office (PGR) is 
not permanently represented, the command center does have a 
"red line" telephone for quick communication when necessary. 
As is generally true in the rest of Mexico, ASE indicated 
that coordination with the State Attorney General's Office is 
not always easy, but indicated that improving communication 
between the entities has been a "priority" for the governor. 
The command center also serves as an emergency call center, 
and Poloffs saw in action a new school alert program that 
sends special emergency signals when a disturbance in a 
school is detected. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The ASE is focused on building its technological 
capabilities, and indicated it receives technological 
assistance for its criminal databases from Germany and Israel 
and other aid from Colombia, Spain, Chile, and France.  ASE 
officials highlighted a new program spearheaded by Governor 
Pena Nieto to create a six-state, mid-Mexico regional 
database including vehicle and other personal information. 
Officials complained that Plataforma Mexico is often slow and 
difficult to use, so they try to first exploit state and 
regional databases before turning to the national system. 
Information fed into state-level systems, however, does 
automatically populate Plataforma Mexico, according to the 
officers. 
 
MEXICO 00002778  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) ASE also maintains internal control mechanisms to 
help prevent and excise corruption.  Officials noted that 
access to the command center's databases is highly 
restricted, and municipal-level elements can only receive 
information if they have passed through the internal control 
measures.  The state reported it is actively engaged in 
setting up the internal control centers mandated by the 
National Public Security System law passed in the federal 
congress last year, but said that only 2 percent of its 
officers have actually passed through the exam.  ASE 
officials pointed to a unit in the command center dedicated 
to monitoring employees' e-mail usage as another mechanism to 
try to control what leaves the building.  The ASE claimed 
that a citizen participatory council on public security does 
exist at the state level, but it was not clear how autonomous 
and genuinely "citizen" it is since the governor appoints 
members. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Officials from the State Attorney General's Office 
(PJE) also noted that they are in the process of transition 
which involves modernizing their operations and adapting to 
the federal-level reforms.  They are building a new biometric 
database in place of Plataforma Mexico, which they say they 
have given up on using, and most PJE officials have been 
through the internal control vetting tests, such as polygraph 
and drug use exams, at least once.  Officials complained that 
they do not have sufficient resources to deal with the new 
investigative and prosecutorial changes passed down to them 
as a result of the recently signed narcomenudeo law on 
small-time drug trafficking. 
 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) The State Commission on Human Rights is housed in a 
new, spacious facility and is clearly receiving significant 
funding from the state government.  Officials noted 
improvements in public access to the commission's services, 
such as handicapped facilities and vans that travel to 
isolated rural areas or to regions suffering from some sort 
of emergency.  Commission representatives also pointed to 
human rights ombudsmen in every municipality -- at least one 
in less populated areas to large operations in urban zones -- 
as unique amongst government human rights systems in Mexico, 
the region, and, they claimed, the world.  Officials said 
that a citizen participation council actively participates in 
human rights matters, and indeed, Poloffs saw a council 
meeting convoked to evaluate the ASE's implementation of 
vetting mechanisms.  The Commission has also developed a 
career service for employees to offer them training, 
benefits, and prospects for advancement; other state 
representatives said such a service is still lacking in much 
of the government apparatus.  The current Commissioner's term 
is coming to an end in October, and his replacement will be 
selected by the (now heavily PRI) local congress.  (Note: 
Poloffs did not speak to outside observers or civil society 
representatives on Mexico State's human rights situation. 
End note.) 
 
Economy and Development 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite swathes of rural areas, Mexico State's 
primary economic drivers are manufacturing and logistics, and 
state officials maintain that it has suffered less than 
Mexico has nationally from the global downturn.  Claiming an 
almost unbelievable 6 percent growth rate last year, 
officials said Edomex is looking to become the country's 
logistics hub.  Once completed, a new highway linking 
Michoacan (Pacific ports) to Veracruz (Gulf of Mexico ports) 
will cross the main thoroughfare leading to the United States 
in Mexico State, making it geographically strategic for 
transportation and manufacturing purposes.  The state's 
International Relations office is keen to attract 
international business and noted that the state must do 
better in correcting rule of law deficiencies to assure 
companies that their rights will be respected.  Foreign firms 
more often cite lack of confidence in legal security than 
Mexico's struggle with violence as their key concern about 
doing business in Mexico State, according to the 
International Affairs Office. 
 
MEXICO 00002778  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Edomex is highly focused on social development 
issues, and in fact Pena Nieto counts it as one of his three 
"pillars of government" (the other two being public security 
and economic security).  The Social Development Secretariat 
noted that Mexico State has two major urban areas with a 
great deal of poverty (Toluca Valley and the metropolitan 
Mexico City area), as well as poorly developed, more 
indigenous rural areas.  It classifies 1.9 million people as 
being unable to meet their nutritional requirements, 3.1 
million as unable to access adequate education services, and 
6.9 million as meeting those most basic needs, but still 
lacking in other fundamentals.  Officials from the 
Secretariat claim that its budget will not be impacted by any 
contractions in the FY10 budgeting process due to the 
downturn, but rather that its funding is isolated and 
specially allocated to ensure that, by law, the development 
budget is not lower than the year prior, regardless of the 
broader economic situation.  The emphasis in the coming year 
will be how to treat problems caused by the economic 
downturn, including a 5-6 percent rate of unemployment 
(which, like the national statistics, is probably 
underestimated).  Officials highlighted the transparency of 
their programs, reporting that they had invited a notable 
academic from Berkeley who helped to author the 
"Oportunidades" program to study Mexico State programs, 
review them, and decide which had been effective and which 
had produced only marginal results. 
 
Pena Nieto: The Same Old PRI or Making Real Changes? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶13. (C) The PRI bills Pena Nieto as representing a younger, 
fresher, and more modern party adapted to the new political 
realities of a democratic Mexico; he is often referred to as 
the "next President of Mexico."  Nevertheless, the governor 
hardly appears to be cut from a new cloth.  When pressed to 
explain Pena Nieto's popularity in the state, government 
officials most often pointed to his "Compromisos," or 
"Pledges" program. During his campaign, Pena Nieto drew up a 
list of over 600 items -- which he primarily drew from 
citizen requests and mostly include small infrastructure 
projects like paving roads in rural communities -- he 
promised to accomplish while in office.  He then signed the 
list in front of a notary.  The state government claims he 
has already completed some 400 items and is on track to 
complete the rest by the end of his term.  While indicating 
that the governor can efficiently accomplish projects -- or 
at least convince his constituents he can -- Poloffs found 
the Compromisos program to smack more of populism than of 
achieving lasting reforms in his state.  Moreover, every 
government building, as well as almost every mile of highway, 
every hospital, and every street corner, feature signs 
promoting the governor's work in "complying with the 
compromiso."  More difficult work on serious reforms has been 
slower in coming.  Mexico State lags in competitiveness, 
ranking in the 2009 "Doing Business in Mexico" survey as only 
the 28th easiest place (of Mexico,s 31 states and Mexico 
City) to conduct business.  Edomex has yet to approve 
legislation to enable the transformation of the judicial 
system -- putting Pena Nieto far behind some other PRI 
governors -- and only two percent of state security officials 
have been passed through the vetting tests.  Pena Nieto's 
commitment to popular infrastructure projects is clear; his 
commitment to progressive reforms is not. 
 
¶14. (C) The governor's hand-picked officials even have a 
difficult time explaining how he represents a more 
progressive PRI.  The International Affairs officers railed 
against entrenched unions and monopolies, but in the next 
breath suggested that this "system" of political and economic 
interests would coalesce around Pena Nieto and bring him to 
the presidency.  When asked how, then, the governor would be 
able to break the very forces that backed him, the officials 
offered vague murmurs that only from within the system can 
you change it -- the PRI created the system, and thus only 
the PRI can manage or break it.  It is widely accepted, for 
example, that television monopoly Televisa backs the governor 
and provides him with an extraordinary amount of airtime and 
other kinds of coverage.  Moreover, as the godson of 
ex-President Salinas and made from the entrenched Mexico 
State PRI political mold, Pena Nieto is not known for 
 
MEXICO 00002778  005 OF 005 
 
 
transparency when it comes to his friends and allies -- he 
helped shield former PRI Mexico State Governor Arturo Montiel 
Rojas from prosecution for corruption charges early on in his 
tenure.  The Mexico State PRI has a reputation for taking 
advantage of gaps in transparency to build campaign war 
chests, and given the amount of money flowing through the 
state and Pena Nieto's status as a presidential front-runner, 
it seems unlikely that his administration would not look to 
exploit such opportunities. 
 
¶15. (C) This is not to underestimate Pena Nieto's -- or his 
team's -- political acumen and ability to get things done in 
Mexico State.  He clearly has expert advice on image 
management and public relations -- the constant "Compromisos" 
advertisements are testament to that.  His government also 
has demonstrated itself to be responsive when it counts.  The 
governor, as well as Secretary-level officials from virtually 
every ministry, traveled during Poloffs visit to an area of 
the state afflicted by heavy flooding, demonstrating a 
responsiveness that citizens crave of their elected leaders. 
Moreover, the state has made some progress in implementing 
key security measures, such as the introduction of an 
effective and efficient C-4 system.  Ernesto Cardenas from 
the respected NGO Insyde told Poloff that the state's C-4 
system is quite well-developed, though indicated that the 
security apparatus in general lacks citizen participation. 
 
Outreach to U.S.: 2012 in Sight 
------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) The governor is clearly making policy with the 2012 
presidential election in mind, and his recent outreach to the 
United States is no exception.  It comes as little surprise 
that following his unexpectedly large success in the July 
midterm elections, a hurdle to his executive ambitions, he 
almost immediately sought increased cooperation with the USG 
on security and justice that would include exchanges of 
information, technologies, and investigative training and 
assistance (reftel).  The governor is burnishing his 
international credentials.  His International Affairs Office 
has grown from 8 to 35 individuals, who are on message and 
clearly understand what the USG likes to hear on investment, 
immigration, and security matters.  Pena Nieto's 
international affairs coordinator told Poloffs that the 
governor has said, "China and India are opportunities.  The 
United States is our reality."  The coordinator also assured 
Poloffs that Pena Nieto would look to maintain close security 
cooperation with the USG should he become president, but made 
no mention of how the governor would look to solve the 
country's budgetary problems.  State government officials 
pushed Poloffs hard for increased ties and assistance.  With 
the governor keen to demonstrate he is ready for a job, we 
can only expect Edomex to court us with increasing intensity 
over the course of the next three, pre-campaign and campaign 
years. 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
WILLIARD