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RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002759 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO; DEPT FOR WHA DAS 
JACOBSON, MEX DIRECTOR LEE, D STAFF CUE, AND INR HOHMAN. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019 
TAGS: MX PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: MEXICO: NEW ATTORNEY GENERAL -- THE GOOD, THE BAD 
AND THE UGLY  
MEXICO 00002759  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado. 
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: President Calderon's decision to replace 
Mexican Attorney General Medina Mora could have far-reaching 
consequences: on prospects for judicial reform; on the GOM's 
ability to manage human rights' criticism; and on our efforts 
to move forward on an expanded Merida agenda.  Calderon's 
choice of a party loyalist, lacking political heft and/or 
legal reputation and burdened with a controversial human 
rights record, has thrust Calderon into a political battle of 
his own making, raising the price of getting his candidate 
through the Senate at a time when he is already in a serious 
battle over his budget for FY10.  That said, there is no way 
that Calderon will allow any Attorney General to back away 
from cooperating with the United States on the fight against 
narco traffickers especially when he needs our help to get 
results. 

¶2.  (C)  The fight against narco traffickers and economic 
stability are the two core objectives of Calderon's 
administration.  Without much forethought, Calderon handed 
the opposition the lever it did not have to attack him on his 
fight against drugs and to establish the rule of law. 
AG-designate Chavez is scheduled for committee hearings early 
next week.  Questions continue to circulate about whether he 
will make it out of the Senate, though the press suggests he 
essentially already has the votes he needs.  Some Senators 
say the confirmation process will be bruising but he'll get 
through.  His predecessor tells us that he helped Calderon 
cut a deal to make sure he makes it.  The reaction of the 
U.S. and Mexican human rights communities will be negative. 
End Summary 
 
-------- 
The Good 
-------- 

¶3.  (C)  A review of files from various U.S. law enforcement 
agencies reflect a generally positive impression of Chavez 
during his stint as the Attorney General of Chihuahua in the 
early 90's (1993-1996).  Back then, Chavez worked closely 
with U.S. law enforcement and was a favorite of FBI, DEA and 
others in El Paso and at EPIC.  He was considered 
pro-American and a trusted interlocutor and quickly developed 
a reputation as a low-key, steely prosecutor who had 
surprising success against the cartels in the early days of 
the fight against Mexican drug lords, when the legal and 
political terrain was extremely complicated.  Former Attorney 
General Medina Mora also went out of his way to underscore 
Chavez's bonafides to the Ambassador: "He is a lawyer, a good 
one.  I am not. I was a good public servant.  I came out of 
intelligence.  We are different people.  He will bring the 
legal capacity that I did not have." 
 
------- 
The Bad 
------- 

¶4.  (C)  There are, however, reports that Chavez could have 
played both sides in his effort to make progress against the 
cartels.  Current Chihuahua Attorney General Gonzalez, 
recently told us that Chavez' youth and inexperience -- he 
was the youngest Attorney General in Chihuahua's history -- 
led him to be easily influenced by others and to delegate 
control of sensitive investigations to local police 
commanders in the Chihuahua Attorney General's office (PGJ), 
at a time when police there were plagued by corruption. 
Chavez was also hindered by the unwillingness of 
then-Governor Francisco Barrio Chavez to provide sufficient 
financial support for the PGJ, which lacked resources to 
conduct even basic office functions, e.g., forensic expert 
investigations, case filling, etc. 
 
-------- 
The Ugly 
-------- 

¶5.  (C)  The most damaging part of his early record relates 
to his prosecutorial neglect of a series of killings of young 
women in Chihuahua that came to light when he was the local 
Attorney General.  Human rights groups both in Mexico and 
abroad have criticized him for his lackluster response to 
this criminal, and not fully resolved, femicide.  Medina Mora 
said: "Did he do enough to investigate the femicides?  In 
retrospect, no.  But from the standards of the time, he acted 
the same way everyone else did.  It was bad judgment, but you 
could make that a collective statement about Mexico."  While 
some have attributed the murders to cartel thugs trolling for 
female victims, charges of alleged police complicity and 
investigatory foot-dragging continue to linger. The difficult 
local environment he faced in the early 90s puts the charges 
in context -- a few of our reports from "non-public sources" 
at that time also relate an episode of Chavez offering a 
"helpful hand" to certain cartel figures -- but none of it 
refutes charges of serious missteps. 
 
------- 
The Why 
------- 

¶6.  (C)  State Secretary for Public Security (SSP) Garcia 
Luna told us that even though Chavez was on the original list 
of five candidates, he was seen as a long shot overshadowed 
by front-runner Blake, the Baja California Prosecutor. He 
said he did not know Chavez well but he believed he could 
work well with him if he were confirmed. (Garcia Luna's 
constant feuding with Medina Mora has complicated our joint 
law enforcement efforts in the past.) He described Chavez as 
somewhat the opposite of outgoing AG Medina Mora: stronger as 
a jurist but weaker in the political skills required for 
working things through legal and political channels. Garcia 
Luna was uncertain that Chavez would make it through the 
Senate given the PRI's suspicion of his strong PAN 
credentials; the PRI, he told us, had suggested Interior 
Minister Gomez Mont for AG.  Respected legal scholar and 
Director of the National Institute of Legal Studies (INACIPE) 
Gerardo Laveaga, described Chavez as a personal friend, who, 
he said, did not even want the job.  He described Chavez as 
"plodding", unrenowned in the legal field and not "clever" 
enough to move legal reforms forward.  Laveaga termed the 
baggage from Chihuahua as "poison" that would reinforce a 
view among many politicians that Chavez was not up to the 
judicial challenge, not the guy they would want to see 
leading critical legal efforts in the current environment. 

¶7.  (C)  Well-placed PAN sources confirmed that Calderon had 
nominated Chavez to gain favor with a faction inside of the 
PAN led by Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, PAN's candidate for 
President in 1994 who also served in the Senate from 2002-06. 
Chavez currently works in Cevallos' law firm, mostly on 
commercial and civil cases, and served as his chief of staff 
during Cevallos' time in the Senate. One PAN contact 
conjectured conspirationally that Calderon was using the 
nomination to gain favor with the Cevallos faction, but fully 
expected that the Senate would reject him; according to this 
source, Calderon would then nominate acting Attorney General 
Juan Miguel Alcantara. 

¶8.  (C)  PRI leader in the Senate, Manlio Fabio Beltrones, 
confirmed earlier reports that the opposition had turned down 
front-runner Blake. Beltrones characterized him as a 
"political hack" who ran Calderon's campaign in Baja 
California with no legal background.  "You would think the 
government would have consulted us before announcing a 
"political unknown" like Chavez," he told the Ambassador. 
Beltrones described Chavez as a "nice boy" who stuck to his 
talking points but had no real vision. On confirmation he was 
ambiguous, noting strong opposition from the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRD) and scant support in some PRI 
quarters. Beltrones positioned himself to take whatever side 
of the Chavez vote seems convenient: "This is too important a 
post to leave vacant. The PRI would be abnegating its 
responsibilities if we just abstained.  So I will try to get 
the votes, but it will be hard."  No doubt Beltranes is 
asking a price to get this through.  What that might be is 
still unclear.  And if the political cost of doing that is 
too high, then Beltrones is giving himself (and the PRI) the 
space to position himself (and the party) as human rights 
advocates. 
 
-------- 
The When 
-------- 

¶9.  (C)  Chavez is scheduled to appear before the Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs Committees on 21 September. He must 
get through both in order to come up for a vote before the 
full Senate where he'll need a simple majority of those 
Senators present.  PRD President Jesus Ortega told us that 
the PRD would vote in bloc against his confirmation. PRD 
Senator Torres Mercado noted, however, that there were limits 
to how long the AG nomination could be held up given that no 
party would want to look like they were being obstructionist 
on matters of national security.  Beltrones predicted that 
whatever happens, it will be quick.  Medina Mora predicted 
confirmation by the end of the week. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Implications for Calderon and the U.S. 
-------------------------------------- 

¶10.  (C)  For Calderon, the Chavez nomination is a 
self-inflicted political headache.  The internal vetting was 
poor, discussions on alternatives was limited to a narrow 
group, the government did not fully vet the options with the 
key power brokers, and Chavez himself was not well briefed or 
prepared to make his own case to legislators.  PRI Senator 
Beltrones is a skilled back-room negotiator and Calderon will 
have to spend significant political capital to get Chavez 
through.  Even then, the opposition will likely badger and 
bloody him through the process. Chavez is said not to have 
the legal or or political skills to make much headway on 
needed security agenda reforms. Progress on that front will 
require Calderon to engage personally or another agency, like 
the SSP, to push for the reforms as a way of enabling their 
success in the fight against organized crime. 

¶11.  (C)  Still, there is no way that any candidate in the 
Attorney general's office will walk away from cooperation 
with the United States.  Calderon knows that U.S. support in 
this area is critical to concrete progress and to certain 
degree his own political credibility.  He will not tolerate 
any obstruction to investigations that make it harder to 
seize high-value targets and disrupt the cartels.  That said, 
cooperation on day-to-day law-enforcement issues could become 
more complicated.  Medina Mora consistently placed 
operational requirements ahead of procedural fine points.  If 
another day was needed to complete a report or investigation 
before he took action on a case or investigation or appeal, 
he had no aversion to allowing the file to linger in his 
in-box.  He was pragmatic about bureaucracy and used his 
position to aid our efforts.  Our experience with his deputy, 
Alcantara, is quite the opposite. 

¶12.  (C)  Most fundamentally, Chavez' confirmation will also 
present a difficult credibility challenge for Calderon on the 
human rights front.  His Chihuahua baggage will make it 
harder for Calderon to get on the right side of this issue: 
criticism in the NGO community and skepticism about the 
government's resolve to address the problems will deepen. 
Not only will Calderon be under attack on the role of the 
military, his civil justice system will be the target of 
human rights critics as well.  Mexicans across the border are 
spilt on whether Medina Mora should have been fired -- many 
said he had become ineffectual on the "big issues" -- but on 
the handling of Chavez the views of the Mexican elite are 
unanimous: questionable judgment, bad timing, and poor 
execution. 

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
PASCUAL